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ABSTRACT
Thi,s work treats of both the general law and the 
customary law of succession in southern Nigeria, with 
special reference to the newly established Mid-Western 
Region*
The rules of the various systems of the customary 
law of succession of the peoples inhabiting our area of 
special reference - the Mid-Western Region - have been 
examined in defined patterns; although the opportunity 
has also been taken to point out instances of local 
variations occurring within the patterns, as well as those 
of similarities existing between systems dealt with in 
different patterns•
The work is in five parts • Part One gives an out­
line of the legal system of the Mid-Western Region, in­
cluding a brief sketch of certain topics - the creation 
of the Region, its position, extent and peoples - serving, 
as it were, as a background for an intelligent understanding 
of the legal system.
Part Two deals with the general law. Chanter Two 
contains a brief account of the law relating to the ad­
ministration of estates; while Chapters Three and Pour
*  ....... ~TTT~rt-rmrtirnn.il • i ~~on~iir n»iaii.iM w w ii^Tim iiiiiiJ.iiw ii !■■■ inw ii^ M w m n
examine the effect of a Christian or monogamous marriage 
on intestate succession.
Part Three is concerned with the process of the 
administration of estates under customary law in southern 
Nigeria generally. Chapter Five gives an account of the 
performance of the burial and funeral ceremony of the 
deceased, and the connexion between the performance of 
this ceremony and the succession to his estate. Chapter 
6ix deals with the customary administrator, including his 
appointment, rights, duties, powers and liabilities*
Part Pour is devoted almost exclusively to an 
examination of the various customary law rules of distri­
bution observed by the different ethnic groups occupying 
the Mid-Western Region* In this part also, the rights 
and duties of the heix* as well as those of a guardian are 
considered.
Part Five covers testate succession. Chapter Thirteen 
deals with wills, gifts inter vivos and donationes mortis 
causa governed by the customary law. Chapter Foux»teen 
discusses the general law of wills, i.e. wills in English 
form; and examines the purposes for which the machinery 
offered by the English Wills Acts has been employed by 
the Nigerian testator. The chapter concludes with sugges­
tions regarding the enactment of legislation to deal with 
two aspects of the law of wills. One recommends that
an attempt should he made to effect either complete in­
tegration or harmonisation of certain requirements of the 
general law and the customary law relating to wills. The 
other calls for the placing of some restrictions on the 
testamentary powers of the deceased, or more precisely, 
family provision.
A word must he said concerning the method used in 
collecting some of the materials presented in this work*
7
Apart from several hitherto untouched publications, 
bearing on the Mid-Western Region, which have been presented 
here, there has been oral information collected on the 
spot from chiefs and other persons versed in the customary 
law in the Region* Their help in this connexion has 
been duly acknowledged at the appropriate pages of this 
thesis•
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PART ONE
INTRODUCTION 
CHAPTER ONE
THE LEGAL SYSTEM OR THE MID-WESTERN REQION 
Background
A full appreciation of the reasons for the type 
of legal system, together with the type of organisation 
reflected by the judicial system, now existing in the 
Mid-Western Region; indeed, an overall picture of the 
subject of this thesis can only be gained by a brief 
explanation, given at the outset, of certain topics 
forming, as it were, the background on which they are 
based. These background topics include; the creation 
of our area of special reference as one of the autonomous 
Regions comprising the Federation of Nigeria; the posi­
tion and size of this new creation; and the peoples 
inhabiting the new Region, to whose law of succession 
special reference will be made in this thesis.
The creation of the Mid-Western Region
"The British created Nigeria; Nigerians created
2.
the Mid-West"** . Up till the 8th August, 1963, the area,
now known as the Mid-Western Region of Nigeria, formed an
integral part of a much larger territory - the old Western
Region of Nigeria. Following the due observance of the
procedures laid down by the Nigerian Constitution with res-
2pect to the creation of a new Region , including the holding
of a referendum which resulted in overwhelming support for 
■3
its creation , Mid-Western Nigeria was established on the 9th 
August, 1963, as an autonomous Region within the Federation 
of Nigeria^*.
Within three days of its creation, the administra­
tive machinery of the Region was set up: an Administrator
and a team of Commissioners, knowntcollectively as the 
Administrative Council, were appointed to administer the 
Region for an interim period of six months in accordance 
with the provisions of a special Act of the Federal Parlia­
ment designated as the Mid-Western Region (Transitional 
Provisions) Act^.
1 This was the popular cry at Warri in the Mid-Western Region 
as from the 14 th July, 1963* after the results of the 
referendum held on the previous day with respect to the 
creation of the Region had conclusively shown that the 
requisite pex*centage of affirmative votes (at least 60% of 
those entitled to vote) had been secured. The writer
was at Warri both during the referendum and the creation 
of the Region.
2 See now the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 
s.M3) .
3 89.07% of the voters voted in favour* See: Federal Govern­
ment Notice No .1811 of 1963; published in the Federal Of­
ficial Gazette, No.73, vol.50 of 19th September, 1 9 6 3.
4 The Mid-Western Region Act, 1962 (No.6 of 1 9 6 2) Appointed 
Day Order, 1 9 6 3, L.N. 96 of 1 9 6 3.
5 (1963) No. 19 of 1 9 6 3.
3.
During the life of the interim administration, steps 
were taken with regard to the eventual setting-up of a 
normal government and to the provision of a written consti­
tution for the Region^. Arrangements were also made in 
connection with the establishment and composition of the 
Regional House of Assembly, drawing up of electoral consti-
7
tuencies and the holding of elections to the House of Assembly; 
Elections were held to the newly constituted RegionalO
House of Assembly on the 3**d February, 1964 . The present
government took office four days later, when the provisions
of the Constitution of Mid-Western Nigeria also came into 
9foree"^.
Position and size of the Mid-Western Region
The Mid-Western Region actually occupies the middle 
part of South-western Nigeria, and is situated right on the 
western portion of the delta formed by the country’s 
historic and largest river, the Niger. On the north, it 
has administrative boundaries with both the Northern and 
Western Regions, taking the position from east to west.
The administrative boundary with the Northern Region 
follows closely latitude 7° 30 N; while in the case ..of 
the Western Region, the boundary stops roughly at latitude 
7° N. To the south is the Atlantic
6 See: L.N. 9 of 1964 slightly amending W.R.L.N. 227
of i960 (Parliamentary Electoral Regulations) for the 
purpose of application in the new Region; No.3 of 1964* 
the Constitution of Mid-Western Nigeria Act, enacted 
by the Federal Parliament*
7 See: L.N. 9 of 1 9 6 4*
8 Federal Government Notice No .57 of 10th January, 196!!-#
9 M.N.N. Nos. 1-21+ of 13th February, 1964; L.N.7 of 1964,
the Constitution of Mid-Western Nigeria Act (Commencement) 
Order, 1964* s.l.
4 .
Ocean, curving into the Bight of Benin. Eastward, the lower 
reaches of the river Niger constitute the natural boundary 
between it and the Northern Region, on the one hand, and the 
Eastern Region on the other. The western boundary is partly 
an administrative one, running near longitude 5°E, which it 
again has with the Western Region, and partly that offered by 
the Atlantic Ocean or, more precisely, the Bight of Benin*
The area so defined covers some 14,923 square miles 
10of territory , and has a population of 2,535*839 according
to the figures obtained from the last country-wide Population
11Census taken in November, 1963 * Barring the Federal Ter-
12ritory of Lagos , our Region of special reference is easily
the smallest autonomous unit, both in area and population,
13in the Federation of Nigeria * It consists only of two 
provinces: the Benin and the Delta provinces, split up into
10 The Nigeria handbook. 11th edn* (1936)» PP * 27-8.
11 feee: the Nigerian Sunday Times of 30th August, 1964. Up 
till the time of writing, the final figures of the last 
Population Census (1 9 6 3} have not been published in any 
official gazette. This may have been due to their rejection 
by the Government of the Eastern Region, and the subsequent 
dispute which arose in connection with their acceptance by 
all the other Governments of the Federation. See: suits 
nos.231 and 232/1964: The Attorney-General of Eastern Nigeria 
v. The Attorney-General of the Federation of Nigeria* (un^ 
reported) in which the Eastern Regional Government unsuccess- 
fully challenged the validity of the census figures. The 
Supreme Court of Nigeria held that no legal right of the 
Regional Government had been infringed by the Federal Govern­
ment’s acceptance of the figures.
12 The area of the Federal Territory of Lagos is 27 sq. miles; 
the population, according to the 1963 Population Census, is 
665,246. See: Burns, A.C. History of Nigeria, 6th edn.
(1 9 6:3), p.17; The Federation of Nigeria (1953). prepared 
by the Commonwealth Institute, p.19; Davies, H.O. Nigeria: 
the prospects for democracy(l96lJ.p.13:The Nigerian Sunday
Times of 30th August. 1964: The Nigeria Year Book (19o4).p *11*
13 The total area and population of the Federation of Nigeria
5.
ten administrative divisions . The Regional capital is at 
Benin, an ancient and well-known city.
Peonies
Inhabiting this comparatively small area of territory 
are what may be described as a wealth of peoples of various 
languages, dialects and ethnic affiliations. The geographi­
cal positions of the main ethnic groups inhabiting the Region 
and their dispersion’into administrative divisions are as 
shown on the map attached to this work, and referred to as 
appendix I* For ease of reference, however, the ten main 
indigenous groups are stated here in alphabetical order as 
follows: the Akoko-Edo, Bini, Etsako, Ibo, Ijaw, Ishan, Isoko,
Itsekirl, Ivbiosakon and the Urhobo. In the heart of the
area occupied by the Ibo of the Asaba administrative division,
1*5there occur three communities of Yoruba origin , who settled
"i £1
there some seven centuries ago. They still speak a dialect
13 ..are 356,669 sq. miles and 55,620,268 people respectively, 
made up as follows: Northern Region - 281,782 sq. miles, 
pop. 29*758,875; Western Region - 30,1+53 sq. .miles, pop.
10,265,81+6; Eastern Region - 29,1+81+ sq. miles, pop.
12,391+, 1+82; Mid-Western Region - ll+,923 sq. miles, pop. 
2,535,839; Federal Territory of Lagos - 27 sq. miles, 
pop. 665,21+6. See the authorities cited in footnote 12 
overleaf, and the following: The Nigeria Year Book (196!+), 
pp. 213,233 and 21+7; Perkins, W.A., and Stembridge, J.H. 
Nigeria: a descriptive geography (1 9 6 2), pp.1,83,102 and 117. 
11+.These are: Aboh, Afenmai, Akoko-Edo, Asaba, Benin, Ishan,
Isoko, Urhobo, Warri (itseldri) and Western I jaw. See:
Federal Government Notice No. 156 of 23rd January, 1961+; 
the Constitution of Mid-Western Nigeria Act, No.3 of 1961+, 
first schedule; the Akoko-Edo Division (Establishment)
Order, M.N.L.N. 70 of l6th July, 1961+; Mid-Western Nigeria 
Notice No.338 of 12th September, 1961+.
15 Thomas, N.W., Anthropological report on Ibo-sneaking peoples 
(1911+), pt.IY, p.2; Beier, H.U., Yoruba enelave!,( 1958) 58 
Nigeria, p.238.
16 Thomas, loc.cit.
of* the Yoruba language as well as Ibo, which they use as a
second language; they have adopted Ibo culture and customs
17in almost all other respects. 1 It will have been observed 
that the establishment of the ten administrative divisions 
has, to a considerable extent, followed the ethnic distribu­
tion occurring in the Region.
Too much, however, must not be made of the multipli­
city of the ethnic groups inhabiting the Region. For, despite 
the semblance of what may appear to the foreigners eye as 
the bewildering number of ethnic variations exhibited by the 
peoples, one significant and, it is generally believed,
uniting characteristic is shared by almost all the groups,
18namely their common Benin origin . Thus, the present premier
17 Thomas, loc.cit.; Beier, op.clt. , pp.238, 247 and 251.
18 The volume of literature on this is staggering* The 
following may be referred to: Moloney, A.,"Notes on Yoruba 
and the Colony and Protectorate of Lagos..."(1890) 12 Proc. 
of Royal Geog. Soc. (series 2), 596 at p.606; Cardi, C.N.
"A short description of the natives of the Niger Coast 
Protectorate..." in West African Studies (1899)ed# Kings­
ley, M.H., pp. I4J4.9—14.5 7 ; Roth, H.L.. Great Benin (1903).
PP • 7* 99-100, and the authorities quoted therein; Thomas, 
op. cit.. pp.2-8; Talbot, P.A., Thepeoples of southern 
Nigeria (1926). vol.l, pp.317-325*332-5; vol.Ill,pp .589-592 
Ward Price, H.L., Land tenure in the Yoruba Provinces(1933) 
para. 345; Moore, W.A.. History of Itsekiri(1930)*p p .25-6; 
Omoneukam*in, C.O., Itsekiri law and custom (1942) ,pp .13-18 
Bowen, R.L., "The Olu of Itsekiris,r( 1944) 22 Nigeria,p .62, 
Bowen, ” Obi Oputa of Aboh", ibid , p. 64; Allen, H.A.,
"The Jekris" (1949) 20 West African Rev., p.757; Lloyd,P.C 
"Tribalism in Warri" (1956) Proc. Annual Confr. W.A.I.S.S.R 
March 1956, 99 at p.101; Lloyd, "The Itsekiri" in The 
Benin kingdom (1957)* ed*. . Bradbury, R.E., pp .178-9; 
Hubbard, J.W., "The Isoko country"(1931) 77 Geog.J., 110 
at 115* Welch, J.W. "An African tribe in transition"(1931) 
20 Inter. Rev. of Missions, 556 at pp .557-8; Hubbard,
The Sobo of the Niger Delta (1948), pp .5-6,72-3* and chaps. 
6-12; Salubi, T.E*A., HThe establishment of British admini 
stration in the Urhobo country" (1958)1 Journal of the
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of the Region, Chief Osadebay, has justified the choice of
Benin as the regional capital on the grounds that this city
is "the ancestral and cultural home of almost all of us in
the Mid-West"^* In addition and, no doubt, because of
this common Benin (Edo) origin, seven of the ten major ethnic
groups (Akoko-Edo, Bini, Etsako, Ishan, Isoko, Ivbiosakon
and Urhobo) have linguistic affinities and other common
cultural features; they are collectively known as the Edo-
20speaking peoples 
THE LEGAL SYSTEM
The legal system of the Mid-Western Region, including 
the judicial system and the types of law administered by 
the Regional courts, offers no material difference from the 
systems in other jurisdictions within the Federation of 
Nigeria; the Federal Territory of Lagos, having no customary 
or native courts, being excepted with respect to the judicial
18.*..Hist. Soc. of Nigeria, 18U at pp. 197-8; Butcher,H.L.M.
"Some aspects of the otu system of the Isa sub-tribes of 
the Edo people"" (1935) 8 Afr. p.lij-9; Bradbury, The Benin 
kingdom, pp. 13,19,22,63,85,101,112 and 130-1: Egharevba, 
J.U., A short history of Benin. 3rd edn.(1960;, pp .5,22-3,
27,30,35,52-3,85-8 ; Oko j ie, C .G-., Ishan native laws and 
customs (I960), pp. 23,30,66 and 2 k £ "Bike♦ K.O.. Trade 
and politics in the Niger Delta (1956), pp.21-26; Beier,H.U. 
'"The dancers of Agbor,f( 1959) 7 Odu, p.Ul; Crowder, M., The 
story of Nigeria (1 9 6 2), pp*55,68 and 7k*
19 See the Nigerian Sunday Times of 8th August, 1 9 6 3*
20 See: Thomas, Anthropological report on the Edo-sneaking 
peoples (1910), pt 1, pp .5 and oU ?ff.; Thomas, "Marriage 
and legal customs of the Edo-speaking peoples" (1910),
11 J. Comp* Leg. (.N.S.), 9k at 9^-5; Thomas, "The Edo- 
speaking peoples" (19IO) 10 J.A.S. p.l* Bradbury, The 
Benin kingdom, p p .  13-17,61,81,8U,100,110,123 and 127*
The term Edo people, however, refers exclusively to the 
Bini, who call themselves and their city (Benin) Edo.
8 .
21system * The common patterns of these Nigerian systems -
duality of courts (English and customary or native courts,
except in the ease of Lagos) and of law (English or general
law and customary law or native law and custom) - as well as
other aspects of the systems have been fully covered by
22the standard works now available *
In one respect, however, the legal system of the 
Mid-Western Region, with regard to the general law now in 
force therein, is in marked contrast with the position ob­
taining in any of the other jurisdictions in the country*
This is because, as will appear shortly, Mid-Western Nigeria 
is at present the lone jurisdiction applying practically the 
whole body of the general law of another Region* It is 
this rather interesting aspect of the legal system of the 
new Region, together with one or two related topics, that 
will occupy our attention in the remaining part of this 
chapter* The related topics are: a brief indication of the 
two types of law governing succession in the Region; and mention 
of the appropriate courts in which disputes and claims, 
arising out of succession, are determined*
The general law in force in the Region
The bulk of the general law at present in force in 
the Mid-Western Region is the corpus of the Laws of the
21 Allott, A*N*, Judicial and legal systems in Africa (1962), 
p.47; Nwabueze, B*0., The machinery of justice in Nigeria 
(1963), p.32; Park, A*E*W*, The sources of Nigerian Law 
(1963)* pp.68 and 118*
22 See: Allott, op*cit ** pp • l4-h-75; Nwabuese, op*cit*: chaps. 
1-12; Park, op*cit** Chap. 1; Elias, T*0*, Groundwork of 
Nigerian lav; (1953) * chaps. 1-11; Elias, The Nigerian 
legal system (1 9 6 2), chaps.1-11.
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Western Region of Nigeria2** as it stood on the 9th August,
19639 when the new Region was established.
The provisions, by virtue of which this general law
continues to be in force in the Mid-Western Region, are now
contained in paragraph 6 of the second schedule to the Con-
2k
stitution of the new Region . This paragraph substantially 
embodies the earlier relevant provisions of sections 2, 3, 
and k of the Mid-Western (Transitional Provisions) Act2^, 
which regulated the position during the period of the interim 
administration of the Region.
The paragraph provides;-
(1) Any law, which, immediately before the appointed day 
£i.e. the 9th August 1963* when the Mid-Yv'estern 
Region was created]), is in force in any part of the 
Region by virtue of section two, three or four of the 
Transitional Provisions Act, shall until it is 
changed by an authority having power to do so and 
subject to paragraph 5 of this Schedule £i.e. the para- 
graph; deal ingOv&fch; the assets, liabilities and the 
Consolidated Revenue Fund of the Region}, continue
in force in the Region or part with such modifications 
(whether by way of addition, alteration or omission) 
as may be necessary to bring it into conformity with 
this Constitution.
(2) Without prejudice to the provisions of the foregoing 
sub-paragraph, where any matter;-
(a) fails to be prescribed under this Constitution 
by the Legislature of the Region or any other 
authority; and
(b) is prescribed by any law having effect by 
virtue of that sub-paragraph or paragraph 5 of 
this Schedule,
that law shall, as respects that matter, be deemed 
to have been made by the Legislature or other authority
23 Published in 1959* these Laws run into seven volumes.
2k The Constitution of Mid-Western Nigeria Act, No.3 of 196k. 
25 (1963)* No. 19 of 1963.
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In question*
(3) For the avoidance of doubt, it is hereby declared
that the provisions repealed by section 13 1^- of the-' 
Constitution of the Federation [i*e * the Act the 
British Parliament entitled the Nigeria Independence 
Act^6 an(f[ ^he Nigeria (Constitution) Order in Council 
(other than the third, fourth and fifth schedules^ 
to that Order^ ceased to have effect as respects the 
Region on the coming into force of this Constitution, 
and accordingly nothing in sub-paragraph (l) of 
this paragraph shall be construed as continuing those 
provisions in force as respects the Region.
(I4.) For purposes of subsection (l) of section three of
the Constitution of Mid-Western Nigeria Act, 196k 
(i.e. as regards the provisions relating to the 
establishment and composition of the Mid-Western 
House of Assembly, electoral constituencies, etc., 
which were deemed to have come into force on the 1st 
November, 19&33 * n°t ^or ani7 other purposes, 
the reference in this paragraph to the appointed day 
shall be construed as a reference to the relevant 
date mentioned in that subsection £i*e. 9th August,
1963].
26 (i9 6 0) 8 and 9 Eliz* 2, c*55*
27 (I9 6 0), S.I, No*1 6 5 2.
28 These schedules contain the Constitutions of the 
Northern, Western and Eastern Regions respectively.
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Jurisdiction of the High Court of the Mid—Western Region - 
up till the 11th February, 196U ____ _ ____________
Another interesting aspect of the judicial system 
of the Mid-Western Region was that the jurisdiction of its 
High Court was different from that of the High Court of 
the Western Region, whose general law (as it stood on the 
9th August 19^3) is in force in the new Region; and was 
that of the High Court of Lagos*
The jurisdiction of the High Court of Lagos was 
extended to the Mid-Western Region by section 6 of the Mid- 
¥/estern Region (Transitional Provisions) Act ; and was con­
tinued by paragraph 3 of the second schedule to the Consti-
2tution of Mid-Western Nigeria Act , when the former Act was 
repealed*
Paragraph 3 of the schedule provided that:
(l) The High Court of Lagos shall, to the exclusion of
the High Court of the Region, exercise the juris­
diction conferred by this Constitution on the last- 
mentioned court -
(a) subject to the following provisions of this sub- 
paragraph, until such day as the Governor may
by order appoint or the expiration of the year
nineteen hundred and sixty-four, whichever
first occurs; and
(b) as respects any proceedings which, by virtue 
of the foregoing provisions of this sub-para­
graph, are pending in the High Court of Lagos 
immediately before the day or the expiration 
of the period aforesaid, and references in 
this Constitution to the High Court of the 
Region shall be construed accordingly.
1 (1 9 6 3), No.19 of 1963
2 (196I+), No.3 of 196U.
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(2) The High Court of Lagos shall, as respects proceedings
pending in that court immediately before the appointed 
day, continue to exercise to the exclusion of any 
other court the jurisdiction conferred on it by section 
6 of the Transitional Provisions Act^ .
gome Comments on the special provisions applying the general 
law of the old Western Region to the Mid-Western Region
The position under which the general law of the old 
Western Region was specifically made to be applicable in the 
Mid-Western Region may be interesting, but by no means 
startling. Firstly, it may be recalled that the Region was
part and parcel of the old Western Region; and as such has 
a legitimate claim to the general law of the old Region, now 
split into two. Before the split the whole area enjoyed 
the same legal and judicial systems. Secondly, the special 
provisions applying this general law to the new Region con­
tain adequate safeguards in respect of the Region’s applica­
tion of such general law. The general law is that as it 
stood on the 9th August, 196.3; so that any subsequent 
alteration by the competent authority of the present Western 
Region does not affect the position in the Mid-Western Region. 
The more important safeguard, however, is the power given 
to the Mid-Western Regional competent authority to alter or 
repeal the general law specially made applicable in the 
Region, as may be necessary to bring it into conformity 
with the Constitution of the Region. Let us examine the
1 (1963), No.19 of 1963.
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Instances, both, diming the period of interim administration 
and since the formation of a normal government, where such 
alteration or repeal of the general law applicable in the 
Region has been effected by the Regional competent authority*
Alteration of the applicable general law during period of 
interim administration
During this period the competent authority having 
power to effect alteration or repeal of the applicable 
general law was the Administrative Council (the Administrator 
and his Commissioners), together with the Prime Minister of 
the Federation, whose approval was required before any 
alteration or repeal came into force'1'.
The competent Regional authority did not exercise 
its powers in this regard to any appreciable extent during 
the period of the interim administration. This period was 
one, during which that authority concerned itself almost 
exclusively with the maintenance of law, order and good govern­
ment in the Region; and with arrangements relating to the 
establishment and composition of the Regional House of 
Assembly, the fixing of parliamentary constituencies and 
the holding of elections to the Regional House of Assembly. 
Accordingly, the only slight alteration made in respect of
1 The Mid-Western Region(Transitional Provisions) Act, 
1963 (Wo.19 of 1963), s.3.
14.
the applicable general law was the amendment of the Electoral
2Regulations of the old Western Region , so as to re-organise
3
the parliamentary constituencies in the new Regior .
Modifications of the applicable general law since the forma­
tion of a normal government
Establishment of a Regional High Court
The High Court of the Mid-Western Region was esta­
blished under section 48 of the Constitution of Mid-Western 
Nigeria Act, with effect from the 7th February 1964* when 
the Regional .Constitution came into force^, and when the 
present government also took office .
Five days later, the Governor of the Region made 
an order abolishing the jurisdiction of the High Court of 
Lagos over the Mid-Western Region^, by virtue of the powers 
conferred on him by paragraph 3 of the second schedule to 
the Regional Constitution*
Creation of new Judicial Divisions and magisterial districts
The former two Judicial Divisions comprised in the
7
area, now Imown as the Mid-Western Region*, were re-organised
8 9into six Judicial Divisions • Similarly, the former three^
2 ♦ W.R.L.N. 227 of I960.
3 See: L.N.9 of 1964*
k L.N.7 of 1964; the Constitution of Mid-Western Nigeria
(Commencement) Order, s .1.
5 M.W.N. Nos. .1-21+ of 13th February, 1 9 6 4.
6 M.N.L.N* 1 of 196U| High Court of Mid-Western Nigeria
(Appointed Day) Order.
7 W.R.L.N. 2 of 1959; and W.N.L .N.l of 1962.
8 M.N.L.N. 88 of 1964? dated 18th September, 1961+, but with 
retrospective effect from 12th February, 1964* Three 
earlier legal notices (M.N.L.N.24 of 19§4* M.W.L.N.48 of 
1964 and M.N .L.N .66 of 1964) contained only five Judicial 
Divisions•
9 W.R.L.N.139 of 1959.
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magisterial districts were split into twelve separate
10magisterial districts • .
Amendment of the Customary Courts Rules
The rules regulating the practice and procedure of 
the customary courts with respect to the granting of bail 
for accused persons have been amended and slightly relaxed.
In particular, a customary court of appeal is nov/ empowered 
to admit an accused person to bail, notwithstanding that the
A
court below has refused to grant him bail • Under the old 
rules, the power to grant bail in such circumstances was 
restricted to the High Court or the magistrate’s court .
A new provision has been added to the rules of the
customary courts which now requires a court, in which a
person has been convicted, to inform him of his right of
-2
appeal from such conviction .
Also amended are the provisions of the Customary 
Court Members (Conditions of Service) Regulations^* relating 
to the appointment and remuneration of legally qualified 
sole presidents of grade A customary courts employed on 
part-time basis* Hitherto, such persons earned a salary of 
£1 ,3 8 0 per annum, if they had been legally qualified for 
more than ten years prior to the date of appointment"^. Under
10 M.N.L.N. 23 of 1964*
1 M.N.L.N, 89 of 1964* the Customary Courts (Amendment) Rules, 
1964; Order VI, Rule 1(3).
2 W.R.L.N. 260 of 1959 > incorrectly referred to in M.N.L.N*
89 of 1964* o p . c i t as W.R.L.N. 258 of 1958, which had been 
superseded by W.R.L.N.260 of 1959, with effect from 1st 
August, 1959.
3 M.N.L.N. 89 of 1964* ibid. Order XVIII, Rule 1(3).
4 W.R.L.N. 239 of I960,
5 Ibid. first schedule•
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the new dispensation, however, they get up to £1 ,U22 per
annum if they have just more than six years’ experience
after having been called to the Bar .
Finally, the Customary Courts (Amendment) Rules,
made in 1962 during the period of emergency that occurred
2in the old Western Region, have now been revoked .
Proposed changes in the existing general law
It is proposed to make amendments, alterations and 
changes in respect of the following:-
(a) the Communal Land Rights (Vesting in Trustees) Law;^
(b) the Sheriffs and Civil Process Ordinance;^
(c) the High Court haw;^
(d) the Road Traffic Law;^ and
(e) the Local Government Law*
(a) The Communal Land Rights (Vesting: in Trustees) 
(Amendment) Bill
Under the provisions of this Bill, it is proposed 
to amend the definition of "traditional authority" in whom 
the communal rights may be vested as trustees for the com-
1 M.N.L.N* 92 of 19&4-, the Customary Court Members (Condi­
tions of Service)(Amendment) Regulations, 1962+.
2 These rules were contained in W.N.L.N. 317 of 1962; see 
M.N.L.N. 89 of 196U, o p .cit.. which revoked them.
3 Laws of the Western Region of Nigeria, 1959* cap. 22+.
2+ It is not at all clear what piece of legislation the
amending authority has in mind, since there were no 
Ordinances in force in Western Nigeria when the Mid-Western 
Region was established. Besides, the Designation of 
Ordinances Act, No.57 of 1 9 6 1, makes it clear that all 
Federal statutes, formerly designated as Ordinances,etc., 
are now to be called Acts.
5 Laws of the Western Region of Nigeria, 1959» cap.i+U.
6 Ibid. cap.113*
7 Ibid, cap.68*
8 (196k), published in the Supplement to the Mid-Western 
Nigerian Gazette, No.22*vol.1 of 21st May, 196h*
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munity. Section 2 of the Communal Land Rights (VestingA
in Trustees) Law limits the definition of "the traditional 
authority" to chiefs so declared hy the Governor in Council# 
The proposed amendment seeks to broaden the definition to 
include a local government council or any person or body of 
persons having the experience of, or having shown capacity
T . * !*
in, matters relating to communal rights**"
p
(b) The Sheriffs and Civil Process Bill
It is difficult to ascertain the piece of legisla­
tion which this Bill seeks to amend. Section 4 of the 
Bill speaks of a proposed amendment of section 12 of the 
Sheriffs and Civil Process Ordinance. Now, Federal lav/s 
have, since 1st October I960, ceased to be known as Ordinances 
by virtue of the Designation of Ordinances Act , which has 
designated them as Acts. Nor was there any Federal law 
relating to civil process in force in the Mid-Western Region 
at the date of its creation. It is submitted^with respect * 
that what the Bill could, properly seek to amend are the 
provisions of the Sheriffs and Civil Process Law which 
continue to be in force in the Mid-Western Region by virtue, 
first, of the Mid-Western Region (Transitional Provisions)
Act; and, now, by paragraph 6 of the second schedule to the 
Constitution of Mid-Western Nigeria.
In addition, the Bill, with respect, quite inelegantly 
proposes to provide for the criminal execution of the sentence 
of capital murder. Section k of the Bill which contains
1 Laws of the Western Region of Nigeria, 1959? cap.2Ji.
2 (19 6 4) published in the Supplement to the Mid-Western 
Nigeria Gazette, No.30, vol. 1, of 18th dune, 196I4..
3 No .57 °f 1961#
<pke sill became law late last year. See: The Communal 
Land Rights (Vesting in Trustees)(Amendment) Law, M.N.L.N. 
3 of 196J+.
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the provisions reads:-
"Where sentence of death has been pronounced upon a 
person, the Sheriff shall as ordered, and unless 
the sentence is commuted or a respite is granted, 
cause the sentence t> be carried into execution * 
by some person appointed in writing by the Sheriff "
(c) The High Court haw
The provisions of this Bill are based substantially 
on those of the High Gourt Law of the Western Region, which
-z
are at present in force in the Mid-Western Region . There 
are also three provisions governing the right of appeal to 
the Supreme Court of Nigeria, which are a reproduction of 
the Rules of this Superior Court, with respect to appeals 
going to it from the High Courts of the various jurisdictions 
in the country.
There is, however, one original provision in the 
Bill, This deals with the retiring age of the Judges of 
the High Court, which has been fixed at sixty-two years*"**.
(d) The Road Traffic(Amendment) Bill^
Under this Bill, it is proposed to amend section 25
6of the Road Traffic Law by inserting a new section immediately 
after the existing section, to be referred to as section 
25A.
The object of the proposed amendment is to give powers 
to police officers to enable them to retain the driving 
licences of traffic offenders pending the serving of summonses 
on such offenders. The framers of the Bill have in mind
T  S.h of the Sheriffs and Civil Process"bTTiT Tbid.
2 (l96h), published in the Supplement to the Mid-Western 
Nigeria Gazette, No.^2, vol.l, of 7th August 196A; as Mid- 
Western Nigeria Notice No.275*
3 Laws of the Western Region of Nigeria, 1959* cap.Uh. 
k The High Court Bill, op.cit.. s.7.
5 Mid-Western Nigeria Notice, No.275, o p .cit.
6 Laws of the Western Region of Nigeria (1559), cap.113.
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the practice of some traffic offenders who give false or
i
misleading addresses to the police.
p
(e) The Local Government (Amendment) Bill
This Bill seehs to add the words fTor fails1' to the
word "refuses11 occurring in the second line of the provisions
of section 255 of the Local Government Law; thereby creating
a new penalty for failure to pay rates* The purpose of the
proposed amendment is stated in the Bill as follows: "As the
Lav/ stands now, 1 refusal1 to pay rates must he proved to 
constitute an offence* Experience has shown that it is not 
always easy to prove the fact of refusal, and the taslc of 
enforcing payment of rates is for that reason made very 
difficult". (3)
BRIEF INDICATION OF THE TWO TYPES OF LAW GOVERNING SUCCESSION 
IN THE MID-WESTERN REGION
The two types of law governing succession in the 
Region are the general or English law, and the customary 
lav/. Both types of lav/ will he fully dealt with in the 
subsequent chapters. For the present, it is not intended 
to do more than indicate the various statutes embodying 
the general lav/ as well as the indigenous bodies of law 
(customary law) of , the various ethnic groups inhabiting the 
Region.
The general law of succession (including the admini­
stration of estates) in the Region is contained in local
1 The Bill is now law. See; The Road Traffic (Amendment) 
M.3T.L.N.8- of 196k.
2 Mid-Western Nigeria Notice, No.275» ot> .cit.
3 The Bill became law late last year. See; The Local Govern­
ment (Amendment) Law, M.ff.L.N.6 of 1964*
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statues-which include:
 a
(i) the Administration of Estates Law;
2
(ii) the Administrator-General*s Law;
(iii) the Legitimacy Law;^ and
(iv) the Wills Law^.
When the general law of succession applies
As will he fully shown in later chapters* the general 
law relating to intestate succession applies where a person, 
married under a monogamous or Christian system of marriage, 
dies intestate while domiciled in the Region; or where 
such a person (whether or not he was also domiciled in the 
Region) dies intestate, leaving real property situated in the 
Region*
As regards testate succession, the general law
governs the position where a testator makes a will in English
or the general law form, irrespective of the system under 
which a marriage is contracted* The law of wills is treated 
fully in latef:chapters.
Customary lav/
In respect of the Western Region, it is possible to 
speak of a broad uniform system of customary law of succes­
sion - Yoruba customary law. As regards the Mid-Western 
Region, however, this is dangerous; and one must refer 
specifically to the society one has in mind, since the various 
ethnic grotips already enumerated have their own systems, 
with local variations sometimes occurring within one and the 
same system. We are, therefore, concerned with at least ten
1 Laws of the Western Region of Nigeria, 1959* cap*l.
2 Ibid* cap.2 .
3 Laws of the Western Region of Nigeria, 1959* cap.62* 
A Ibid, cap.133*
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main systems (corresponding with the number of the main 
ethnic groups), together with any local variations which 
may exist under one or more of the ten main systems of the 
customary law.
Despite this multiplicity of systems, however, it 
is possible, as will be shown later, to classify the various 
bodies of indigenous law governing succession into three 
main patterns in the essentially patrilineal societies; 
with a fourth pattern for the groups in which both the patri­
lineal and matrilineal principles exist side by side. The 
basis of this classification, which will be discussed later, 
is whether only eldest sons, or all sons, or all children 
are entitled to inherit from one or both of their parents.
The forum or the appropriate court in which proceedings 
relating to succession are brought
Where succession is governed by the general law
Where the succession is governed by the general law, 
the appropriate court in which proceedings may be instituted
A
is the High Court of Justice . Neither the magistrates1
2 3courts nor the customary courts have jurisdiction in causes
and matters relating to succession governed by the.general law.
Where succession is governed by customary law
Where customary law applies to the succession,
1 The High Court Law (Western Region), ibid.. cap .l+U, s.9; 
the Administration of Estates Law (Western Region), ibid. 
cap.l, s.2 (1); the Administrator-General1s Law (Western 
Region), ibid. cap.2, s.2.
2 See the authorities cited in footnote 3 (p.20); also the 
Magistrates * Courts Law (Western Region), ibid. cap .7^ -,s .20(b)
3 W.R. No* 3*4- of 1959* the Customary Courts (Amendment) Law 
1959t second schedule; amending the second schedule to the 
Customary Courts Law, 1957, cap .31, op.cit.
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*1customary courts have exclusive original jurisdiction .
2Appeals from these courts go to the magistrate^’ courts 
and the High Court ; the last court also exercising appel-
s 3
late jurisdiction over magistrate^ courts * In appropriate 
cases, an appeal lies from the High Court to the Supreme 
Court of Nigeria^.
In addition to the channels of appeal from the 
customary courts to the non-customary, or English courts, 
there is the avenue of review by means of which chief magis­
trates, acting as supervising authorities, exercise powers 
of review in respect of all cases tried by the customary
5
courts^.
jurisdiction of the High Court and of the magistrate^*:
courts where succession is governed by customary law 
The High Court
It has always been assumed that the High Court is 
precluded from exercising original jurisdiction where the 
cause or matter Is governed by customary law. This seems 
to be the interpretation put on the provisions of the High 
Court Lav*r, which exclude:, the original jurisdiction of that 
Court in any matter “which is subject to the jurisdiction of 
a customary court relating to .... inheritance or dispoai- 
tion of property on death” .
1 W.B. Ho‘.'3U of 1959* the Customary Courts (Amendment) Law, 
1959* second schedule; amending the second schedule to 
the Customary Courts Law, 1957* cap. 3 1, op.cit.
2 Cap*31, s.47*
3 Ibid. s.1+8.
I* That is, where the amount in dispute is £50 or more,cap.31*
5 Cap.31* ss. I+I4A-I+I4E • (s.1+9 *
6 Cap.l+ij.* op .cit. .s *9*
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It has, hoy/ever, never been argued that where such 
a cause or matter involves an amount in excess of the juris­
diction of the appropriate customary court or courts, or 
where, in fact, no customary court exists in the area con­
cerned (for example, where the establishing warrant is 
temporarily withdrawn as happened to the majority of courts 
in the Delta Province in 1963)* it would amount to misuse 
of language to insist that such a cause or matter is "subject 
to the jurisdiction of a customary court ”. This is because 
in one ease, the customary court would be incompetent to 
exercise jurisdiction; in the other, there simply would be 
no such court to whose jurisdiction the cause or matter would 
be subject. It is submitted that in the eases instanced, 
it would be open to the High Court to assume original 
jurisdiction.
It is a matter for regret that no thought has been
given to a clearer wording of the excluding provisions con-
4
tained in the proposed High Court Bill , which has instead
copied the relevant provisions of the existing High Court
Law. Had some consideration been given to the matter,
model provisions Y/ould have been found in the Magistrates’.
2Courts Law , which v/ill be discussed in the next paragraph.
Magistrates’ courts
In contrast to those contained in the High Court
1 Op .cit.. s.10.
2 Cap.7U> Laws of the Western Region of Nigeria, 1959*
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Law, dust discussed, the relevant provisions of the Magis-
# 2
tratejg Courts Law are distinguished by their clarity, 
These latter provisions exclude the original jurisdiction 
of magistrates* courts in causes or matters "relating to 
inheritance upon intestacy under customary law and the
*
administration of intestate estates under customary law "*
2 Gap* 7k9 Laws of the Western Region of Nigeria, 1959*
3 Ibid, s.20 (d) ,
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PART TWO
THE GENERAL LAW RELATING TO ADMINISTRATION Off ESTATES AND
AND INTESTATE SUCCESSION
CHAPTER TWO 
ADMINISTRATION OP ESTATES 
1* Courts exercising .jurisdiction in administration suits
We have already seen that jurisdiction in causes and 
matters pertaining to the administration of estates under 
the general law in force in the Western and the Mid-Western 
Regions is vested in the High Courts, with the Supreme 
Court of Nigeria acting as the Court of Appeal; and that 
the magistrates* courts exercise no jurisdiction whatsoever
in these causes and matters. This is also the position
1 2 m  the Federal Territory of Dagos and the Eastern Region .
2. Law relating to administration
The general law at present in force in southern
1 The High Court of Lagos Act, cap.80, s.11. Laws of the 
Federation of Nigeria and Lagos, 1958; the Magistrates* 
Court (Lagos) Act, cap.113* s.ID, ihid. On right of 
appeal to the Supreme Court, see: cap *80, s.50, ihid; the 
Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria,”T953*s .117.
2 The High Court Law, Eastern Region, No.27 of 1955* s.10; 
the Magistrates* Courts Lav/, Eastern Region, No.10 of 1955* 
s.17* On right of appeal to the Supreme Court, see: The 
High Court Law, ibid. s.37; the Constitution of the 
Federal Republic of Nigeria, loc.cit.
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Nigeria with respect to the administration of estates is, 
subject to the provisions of any locally enacted statutes 
to the contrary, partly the current English law on the 
subject; and partly local enactments based substantially 
on English law*
(a) Lagos and the Eastern Region - Current English law
In both the Federal Territory of Lagos and the 
Eastern Region, the current English law is made applicable
by virtue of special provisions contained in the High Court
1 2 Act and the High Court Law , respectively, which incorporate
that law (current English law) by reference. Thus, section
16 of the High Gourt of Lagos Act provides
"The jurisdiction of the High Court an probate^. divorce
and matrimonial causes and proceedings may..........be
exercised by the court in conformity with the law and 
practice for the time being in force in England ".
1 Cap•80, ibid•
2 No.27 of 1955, s.1 6 .
3 Underlined for emphasis. Does probate include the
grant of Administration? The answer, obviously,is "yes". 
See, for instance, section 20 of the Supreme Court of 
Judicature (Consolidation) Act (1925) (15 & 16 Geo.5? 
c,U9) which has defined tlae probate jurisdiction of the 
English High Court to include the granting or revoking 
of administration. See also the Zambian (Northern 
Rhodesian) case of In the matter of the Estate of Ntonga. 
decided by the High Court of Zambia, where Conroy, C.J. 
followed the English statutory definition; and held
that the probate jurisdiction of the High Court of Zambia 
includes the authority to grant letters of administration. 
For a note on this case, see jl96f|) J.A.L.ii-1.
U The High Court Law, Western Region, limits this to
matters of procedure and pi*actice only: cap ss .9 • 11*
Laws of the Western Region, 1959*
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This means, of course, that the relevant provisions
A
of the English Administration of Estates Act and the prin­
ciples laid down in the English decisions bearing on the 
matter apply to Lagos and the Eastern Region.
(b) Western and Mid-Western Regions - Local statute 
based on English law
The applicable law governing the administration of
estates under the general law in force in iotli Regions
2is the Administration of Estates Law • But, as has been 
stated, this Law is substantially as much English as the 
Administration of Estates Act itself* It (the Law) con­
tains copious marginal notes indicating its source, and, 
therefore, leaves no room for doubt as to which of both 
statutes is based on the provisions of the other.
(c) Other local statutes
There are also a number of other Acts and Laws dealing 
with the subject of the administration of estates under the 
general law. They include:
(i) the Administration (Foreign Employment) Act^;
(ii) the Administration (Real Estate) Act^j
(iii) the Administration of Estates by Consular Officers
R
Act : c
(iv) the Administrator-Oeneral,s Act ;
1 (1925) lgpQecu5, c.23.
2* Op »cit. 'Its provisions came into force on 23rd April, 1959* 
3 Cap.l, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria and Lagos, 1958. 
l|. Cap. 2, ibid.
5 Cap.3, ibid.
6 Cap.l+, ibid.
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A
(v) the Administrator-General's Law ; and
(vi) the Administrator-General Law •
TREATMENT OF THE SUBJECT
It is not intended in this chapter or, indeed, in
this thesis to deal at any length with the ’'received” or
"copied” English law relating to the administration of
estates. This means that, except for the purposes of
comparison or amplification, the Administration of Estates
Act, the English decisions on the matter and the Administration
of Estates Law of the Western Region will not be accorded any
detailed treatment. The reader is referred to the standard
■5
works on the subject .
This method of treatment leaves us with only the 
discussion of the local Acts and Laws governing the admini­
stration of estates under the general law*
3# Areas where the local Acts and Laws apply
Prom the point of view of the area of application, 
the local Acts and Laws dealing with the topic of administra­
tion governed by the general law may be grouped into three 
headings as those applying:-
(a) throughout southern Nigeria;
(b) only in the Federal Territory of Lagos; and
(c) only in the Western, the Mid-Western and the Eastern
Regions.
1 Cap.2, Laws of the Western Region, 1959#
2. No.17 of 1961, Eastern Region. Its provisions came into 
force on 1st August 1962: see E.N.L.N. No.60. of 1962.
3 See: Parry, The lavvT of succession. Uth edn. 1961, chaps.
10-15; generally, Williams, 
llf-th edn. I960, vol.l.
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(a) Acts applying throughout southern Nigeria
Both the Administration (Foreign Employment) Act
and the Administration of Estates by Consular Officers 
2Act apply throughout southern Nigeria and, indeed, through­
out the Federation of Nigeria. The provisions of both 
Acts are designed to deal with the administration of estates 
in which a foreign element is involved or is likely to be 
involved. We shall consider these Acts separately^
A
The Administration (Foreign Employment) Act
This Act, as its title implies, provides for the 
administration of the estate of a native^ employed under a
1 Cap. 1, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria and Lagos, 1956.
2. Cap . 3, Ibid.
3 "Native^is defined in the repealed section of the Inter­
pretation Act* "It includes a native of Nigeria and a 
native foreigner". "Native of Nigeria" means any person, 
whose parents were members of a tribe or tribes indigenous 
to Nigeria and the descendants of such persons; and in­
cludes any person one of whose parents was a member of 
such a tribe. "Native foreigner" means any person (not 
being a native of Nigeria) whose parents were members of 
a tribe or tribes indigenous to some part of Africa and the 
descendants of such persons, and shall include any person 
one of whose parents was a member of such tribe. See 
Section 3 of the Interpretation Act, cap. 899 ibid. See 
also an identical provision contained in the Interpretation 
Law, Western Region, cap.51* s.3; Laws of the Western 
Region, 1959* The Interpretation Act seems to apply to 
the Eastern Region: see the Interpretation Act (Amendment)
Law, Eastern Region, No.11 of I960, which by amending 
the Interpretation Act implied that the Act was in force 
in that Region, This definition of "native" is broad 
enough to cover American negroes and West Indians of 
negro stock, but not Europeans or Asians. Note, however, 
that this section of the Interpreation Act has been 
repealed by the new Interprelation Act, No.l of 1961}., 
designating the unrepealed part of the old Interpretation 
Act as the Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act.
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*1
foreign contract of service, who dies intestate , leaving
unpaid wages and emoluments, which have been defined as
2"estate11 in section 2 of the Act •
On the death intestate of such a native , his
estate vests automatically in the Official Administrator^,
the Government official charged with the duties of ad-
5ministration under the provisions of the Act * Where 
the estate is situated outside Nigeria, the Official
Administrator is under a duty to cause it to be brought
6 7into the country. All assets are paid into the Treasury'.
It is also part of his duties to publish in the . 
Official Gazette, to be posted in some public place at 
the deceased’s native town or village or last known place 
of the deceased’s abode; stating the fact of the death, 
the particulars of the estate and inviting claimants to 
the estate to submit their applications within a speci­
fied time^.
Any claims, put forward are examined and adjudicated 
upon by the Official Administrator, who may direct his 
Deputy to take evidence in respect of any claim^. The 
Official Administrator certifies his decision, which he 
forwards to the Accountant-General, directing the latter
1 Cap. 1, s*3, ibid.
2 Gap.l, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria and Lagos,1958.
3 See: footnote No.3 on page 29.
Ibid. s .6.
5 Ibid. s.l+.
6 Ibid. s.7.
7 Ibid, s .8.
8 Loc.cit.
9 Ibid, s .9.
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1to satisfy the successful' claim . Any claimant ag­
grieved by the decision of the Official Administrator
may, within one month of the decision, appeal to the ap-
2propriate High Court. •
A successful claimant is, however, responsible 
for the payment of the debts due from the deceased and
any e:xpenses incurred by the Official Administrator in
3Arealising the estate . In addition, a sum of five 
pounds per cent is deducted by the Accountant-General 
to defray the costs of administration^.
The Official Administrator incurs no liability 
in respect of.any decision or adjudication given or made 
by him in good faith; nor in respect of anything done 
or omitted to be done by him in good faith, in the exe-
p;
cution or supposed execution of his powers under the Act *
The Administration of Estates by Consular Officers Act
The Administration of Estates by Consular Officers 
Act governs the administration of the estates of nationals
7
of foreign States with which the Federation of Nigeria 
has treaty obligations. It applies where such foreign 
nationals die intestate, leaving property in Nigeria; and 
there are no persons present In Nigeria, at the time of 
death, who are entitled to administer such foreigno
nationals’ estates • The provisions of the Act enable
1 JQilSju s.ll* 6 Cap.3* Laws of the Federation
^ s. 10* of Nigeria and Lagos, 1958.
3 Ibi.d, s.13* 7 For a list , of the treaties (of
3A rbjdy s.15* commerce and navigation), see
k Ibid, s.lb* the schedule to the Act*
5 Ibid, s . U m  8 Ibid. s.2.
32.
the consular officers of such foreign States to take pos­
session and have custody of the property of such deceased
A
persons • The consular officers may apply the property
in payment of the debts due from such deceased persons
and in defraying the funeral expenses; retaining any
balance for the benefit of those entitled * They must,
however, immediately apply to the appropriate High Court
•1
for the granting of the letters of administration .
(b) Acts applying onl.v to the Federal Territory of 
Lagos
o
(i) The Administration (Heal Estate) Act
Under the Administration (Heal Estate) Act^, the 
real property of an intestate is treated as personal 
property for the purposes of administration . But the 
real property, in inspect of which the intestate has no 
powers of testamentary disposition under customary law, 
is expressly excluded from the provisions of the Aet^*. 
Thus, section 2 of the Act^ provid.es:-
tfWhen any person shall die intestate... .leaving 
real property of whatsoever natuxe of which the 
intestate might have disposed by will, such 
real property shall for the purposes of admini­
stration be deemed to be part of the personal 
estate of the said intestate and shall be ad­
ministered accordingly: provided always that
the real property, the succession to which cannot 
by native law and custom be affected by testa­
mentary disposition, shall descend in accordance
1 Ibid, s .2 (b).
2 Cap. 2, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria and Lagos, 1956.
3 Ibld»s.2,
h Cap.2, ibid.
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with the provisions of such native lav/ or custom 
anything herein contained to the contrary not­
withstanding. . .!f
One result of placing the intestatefs real estate 
in the same position as his personal estate for the pur­
poses of administration is that anyone intermeddling 
with the estate, whether real or personal, without having 
obtained the grant of administration thereby constitutes 
himself an executor de son tort. Thus, in Jones v 
Martins, the defendant, the sister of the intestate, had 
collected rents on the house left by her deceased brother. 
The plaintiff, A medical px^actitioner, sued her as an 
executor de son tort in respect of professional services 
rendered to the deceased during his lifetime* The West 
African Court of Appeal held that the effect of section 2 
of the Administration (Real Estate) Act was to put the 
intestate1s real and personal estate on an equal footing, 
for the purposes of administration, and that the inter­
meddling by the defendant in the real estate constituted
her an executor de son tort, and made her liable to the 
2plaintiff •
The real estate of the intestate shall not,however,
1 (1943) 9 W.A.C.A.100.
2 At pp. 101 and 103. But for the provisions Qf the Act, 
the defendant would not have been liable as executor 
de son tort because the real estate of the deceased 
intestate would have passed d-irect to his heir-at-law. 
There would then have been no administrator whose 
functions the defendant had usurped. See: Jones v
Martins ♦ op .cit.. at pp. 100 and 103; and. dicta in the 
English cases of John v Johnfl898l 2 Ch. 573 at p.576;
In b. Prvse CL904I P.301 at p.305> and. Re Griggs
[191*0 2 Ch.5*1-7 at p.552.
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be administered unless it is proved that the personal 
estate is insufficient to pay the intestate’s debts, the
•t
expenses of his funeral and the costs of administration • 
If these facts cannot be established, the Court will re­
fuse an application for the grant of administration re­
lating to the real estate a? its sale. Thus, in Bamg-
2boye v Administrator-General , the West African Court of 
Appeal set aside the order made by the trial Judge, em­
powering the sale of the real estate of an intestate, 
when there was no evidence that his personal estate was 
insufficient to meet his debts, the expenses of his fune­
ral and the costs of administration.
In granting letters of administration in respect 
of the real estate of the deceased intestate, the Court 
is to have regard to the rights and interests of the bene 
ficiaries; and the heir-at-law, if not one of the next- 
of-kin, is to be equally entitled to the grant of admini-
■ *3
stration with the next-of-kin .
(ii) The Administrator-General*s Act^
The Administrator-General*s Act^" is designed to 
apply to the administration of all estates defined as 
’’unrepresented" within the meaning of section 2 of the 
Act; whether the rights of the beneficiaries thereof
5are determined under the general law or customary law . 
The following estates are regarded as unrepresented, and
1 Ibid, s .3*
2 T195U) lb W.A.C.A. 616.
3 Ibid. s.3.
4 Cap .h» Laws of the federation of Nigeria and Lagos, 1958*
5 On.cit.ss.2 and 31(2).
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are administered under the provisions of the Administra­
tor-General 1 s Act:-
(a) the estate of any person who shall die intestate
and whose next-of-kin (or where such next-of-kin 
is a minor, his guardian) shall he unknown or 
shall he absent from Nigeria without an attorney 
therein or if in Nigeria and known, shall have 
refused or neglected for a period of one month 
after the death of the deceased to apply to the 
court for letters of administration;
(h) the estate of a deceased who shall die having
made a will, when owing to any cause it shall he 
necessary to appoint an administrator cum testa- 
mento annexo or de honis non of such an estate 
and the person entitled to such letters of ad­
ministration shall he unknown or shall if in 
Nigeria and known, refuse or neglect for one 
month after the death of the testator to apply 
to the court for such letters or shall he absent 
from Nigeria without having an attorney therein;
(e) every estate whereof the executor or administra­
tor shall he absent from Nigeria; and
(d) every estate where the deceased has named the
Administrator-General as the sole executor of 
his will*
Certain estates which would qualify as unrepresen­
ted within the meaning of the Act are, nevertheless, ex­
cluded from administration under the provisions of the 
Act* These otherwise unrepresented estates include those 
belonging to persons subject to British Military Law ; 
those whose administration is governed by any other Act
1 Op *cit * * part viii, ss*56-61*
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or Law ; and those of deceased European officers in res­
pect of which the High Court exercises discretion as 
to whether they should he administered under the Act or 
not *
The provisions of the Act will now he examined 
in some detail.
The Administrator-General
The Administrator-General is the Government of­
ficial appointed to act as the administrator of estates
•3
to which the provisions of the Act apply . He is assisted
by other officials known as Assistant Administrators - 
■3
General . The office of Administrator-General is a cor­
poration sole^. He may he appointed the sole executor 
W any testator^.
Grant and revocation of probate or administration
The Administrator-General may, on becoming aware 
of any estate he considers unrepresented, apply to the
High Court for the granting of probate or letters of ad-/?
ministration in respect of such estate • He may, however, 
for the purposes of preserving such estate, take posses­
sion of the property comprised in the estate before ob~
1 Qp .cit.. ss.13 and 70*
2 Op .-cit , part VII, ss 50-55? especially s .55 (l)*
3 STTXT).
1(S.3(3). 
5 8.9*
6 S.13*
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taining the grant of probate or administration relating 
*1
to the estate , And where there is uncertainty as 
regards the succession to the estate,he may, of his own ac­
cord or on the application of any person interested in 
the estate, obtain an order of the Gourt to administer it; 
and will take possession of any property comprised there­
in and conduct the administration under the orders of the
Gourt, or in default of any directions by the Gourt, in
2accordance with the provisions of the Act . He is, not, 
like a private administrator, required to enter into an 
administration bond or furnish security before obtaining 
the grant of probate or administration * The grant of 
probate or administration to him is conclusive evidence 
as to his representative title against all debtors of 
the deceased, and all persons holding the deceased’s pro­
perty; and affords full indemnity to all debtors paying 
their debts and all persons delivering up the deceased’s 
property to the Administrator-General^. Neither the 
Administrator-General noi* his agent is liable for any act 
done by him bona fide in the execution of his duties
unless such act was done not only illegally but also wil-
5fully or with gross negligence .
Any other person who appears in the course of 
the proceedings connected with the grant of probate or
1 S.lh.
2 S.16.
3 S.8 (2). 
k S.lit
5 s mk *
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administration to the Administrator-General and estab­
lishes his claim to the estate may he granted the probate
or administration thereof, in preference to the Admini-
a
strator-General . Such ..a, claimant must, however, give
such security as may be required of him by law . A
private executor or administrator may, by Instruction;
in writing, notified in the Gazette, transfer all the
assets comprised in the estate of which he is an executor
2or administrator to the Administrator-General • There­
upon the transferor will, as from the date of such trans­
fer, be exempt from all liability as such executor or
3administrator .
A grant of probate or letters of administration 
already made to the Administrator-General may be revoked 
in favour of an executor or next-of-kin of the deceased 
who, within six months of such grant, establishes a claim 
in preference to that of the Administrator-General^".
But any costs already incurred in respect of administration 
by the Administrator-General may be ordered to be paid 
out of the estate-^. It is also provided that any acts 
done by the Administrator-General or his agents in re­
lation to the estate shall be deemed valid notwithstanding 
the revocation of-his grant of probate or administration .
1 S.17*
2 S.19 (1)»
3 S.19 (2).
4 S.20.
5 S.21»
6 S.22»
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Powers of the Administrator-General
One of the first duties of the Administrator- 
General is to take possession of, and preserve the assets
i
comprised in the estate . He must prepare an mven-
2tory of all the assets and file it in the Court • He 
must also cause a notice to be published in the Gazette, 
calling upon all persons interested in the estate to 
submit and prove their claims thereto before him within 
a specified period . Such publication is deemed to be 
notice to debtors of the deceased, namely those owing him 
wages or salary, to pay up^‘.
He is required to keep accounts of all receipts, 
payments and dealings connected with the estate^. Any 
creditor ov beneficiary of the estate is entitled, on pay­
ment of a prescribed fee, to inspect such accounts and to
r
obtain copies therefrom at all reasonable times .
He is empowered to deposit any moneys received
by him from any estate in a Government savings bank, or
to invest it in any funds or securities in which trustees
7are authoi^ised to invest by current English law *
At the expiration of the time set for the sub­
mission of the claims by interested persons, he examines
1 Ss• lU and 16#
2 S.13 *
3 'S .25(1)* 
h S.25(3)*
5 S .32 *
6 S *33*
7 S.3 4(1)*
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the claims, and may require any claimant to establish
his claim on oath . Any person whose claim has been
rejected or disallowed in part must commence proceedings
to enforce such a claim within two months after notice
of rejection or disallowance of such claim has been given,
and must prosecute the proceedings without unreasonable 
2
delay *
After his determination of all claims of which he
has notice, the Administrator-General is empowered to
distribute the estate among the successful claimants*"';
and he is not liable for the assets so distributed if
any other person comes forward with a claim of which he
(the Administrator-General) had no notice at the time of
such distribution^*. But such immunity from liability
does not prejudice the right of any creditor or other
claimant to follow the assets in the hands of the persons,
*5who may have received thenr . Where the assets are 
insufficient to meet the claims of creditors of the es­
tate, payment will be made equally and ratbably among
p; a
creditors, but secured creditors will be preferred .
Section 39 lays down the order of distribution as
follows
(i) costs and expenses incurred in the course of 
admini s tration;
(ii) estate duty as may be prescribed by the Treasury;
1 s #25(1)*
2 S.27(3).
3 S.27(1).
4 S.27(2).
5 S .27(4} *
5A S.28(2)*
r
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(lii) creditors of the estate in the order and 
manner prescribed by law; and
(iv) beneficiaries legally entitled to the estate.
Where beneficiaries are unknown
If the beneficiaries of the estate are unknown, 
the Administrator-General is to deposit the proceeds 
of such an estate in the Treasury pending their being 
ascertained; but he shall forthwith publish all rele­
vant information relating to the estate in the Gazette, 
requesting all persons claiming on legal, equitable or
moral grounds to present their applications to the 
*1
Court . As a rule, such applications must be made with­
in two years of the publication in the Gazette, unless
2the Court fixes a shorter period . Claims based on 
equitable or moral grounds include those arising from 
the illegitimacy of the deceased or of his children and 
grandchildren^.
After hearing the claims, the Court may direct 
the Administrator-General to pay to a successful claimant 
the sum awarded, tohim^. Where, however, the Admini­
strator-General has already paid the assets into Court 
following the laying of rival claims , no such direction 
will be given.
1 S.42(l}»
2 S.42(2)*
3 S .42(7;*
4 S.43(2).
5 S .44*
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Assets of estate of negligible value
If the assets of an estate are so small in 
value as to he practically indivisible among the bene- 
ficiaries or creditors entitled thereto, such assets 
are paid into the Treasury, i.e. to the account of
A
the Government .
Disposal of real property
tti—|- —h i  inrtr m ~ rm in ii.iiiw  i a n  n  i n n i n i r t i w M H i ——>rrTrrr~-| iwittiTTlrTTTnri¥rn~iffiiMM
If, after winding up an estate any real pro­
perty remains undisposed of, the Administrator-General 
may apply to the Court for directions as to Its disposal
and the Court may order its sale, or may appoint a
2receiver or malce any other order it deems just .
Bona vacantia
All assets paid by the Administrator-General 
into the Court or deposited in the Treasury, which have 
hot been claimed through the Court and have been in 
the Court or Treasury for upwards of five years, belong 
to the Government as bona vacantia. But the Govern­
ment may,nevertheless, waive its right and distribute 
such assets among the next-of-hin of the deceased, or
any other such persons claiming on equitable or moral 
BAgrounds *
1 S.3U(3).
2 S.UO.
3 S.U5* 
3A S *
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Estates administered in accordance with special 
provisions of the Act
The Act contains special provisions for the 
administration of five different categories of estates. 
These estates are:-
(i) estates devolving according to customary law ;
o
(ii) * estates of persons not domiciled in Nigeria ;
(iii) estates of deceased European officers^;
(iv) estates of military persons;^ and
R
(v) small estates .
(i) Estates devolving according to customary law
If an estate, ox1 part of it, devolves in accor­
dance with the provisions of customary law, the Ad­
ministrator-General may apply to a customary court ad­
ministering such customary law for information as to 
the distribution. Distribution in accordance with 
the information so obtained is deemed to be proper ad­
ministration of the estate; and shall afford the Admini­
strator-General full immunity from liability relating 
to the administration of such an estate .
As there are no customary courts in the Federal
R A
Territory^ , the Administrator-General will always ap­
ply to the courts in the Regions, when acting under his
1 S.31(2)*
2 S.4l(l)*
3 Dart VII, ss .50-55.
4 Part VIII, ss.56-58.
5 Part IX, ss.59-61,
5A Park, A.E.W., The sources of Nigerian law, 1 9 6 3,
pp .68 and 118 ; Allott, Judical and legal "systems in 
Africa (1962) p .471 Nwabueze, The machinery of justice 
in Nigeria (1 9 6 3) p.32.
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powers under this provision of* the Act.
(ii) Estates of* persons not domiciled in any part of 
Nigeria
It will have "been observed that the phrase "not 
domiciled in Nigeria" has been deliberately expanded by 
the writer to "not domiciled in any part of Nigeria".
This has been done in order to cater for the emerging con­
cept of regional domicile as opposed to one Nigerian domi-
1 2cile* There are decisions both for and against a sepa­
rate domicile in each of the component units of the Federa­
tion of Nigeria in respect of jurisdiction in divorce 
matters. In view, ‘however, of the separate legal system 
established in each component unit, the cases in support of a
1 Okonkwo v. Eze \ i960] N ,K.L .R.8Q : Machi v. Machi [15)60] 
L.L.R.103; Adeoye v. Adeoye fl96l| All N.L.R.792; Q.9 6 2] 
N.R.N.L.R.63;, Adeyemi v ♦ Adeyemi 11962] L.h.R.70:
Uchendu v . Uchendu 119&21L.h.R.101. Of. the Legitimacy 
Law of the Western Region, cap.6 2, s.3(l) which provides 
"... where the parents of an illegitimate person marry 
or have married one another .... the marriage shall, if 
the father of the illegitimate person was or is at the 
date of marriage domiciled in the Region, render that 
person, if living, legitimate.....
2 Nwokedi v . Nowkedi [1958] L .L .R.9U; which, however, must 
be of doubtful authority in view of the fact.that the
*Judge who decided it now supports the concept of a regional 
domicile, which he expressed in Adeyemi v . Adeyemi and 
Uchendu v. Uchendu both of which were decided by him in
T962".™Also Udom v. Udom 119621 L.L.R.112: and two cases 
decided by the High Court* of Lagos in 1962 (unreported) 
to wit: Ettarh v. Ettarh and Qdunio v. 0dun,1o. For 
a discussion of these cases, see: Atilade, P.A. "Is
there one Nigerian domicile or different regional domiciles 
in regard to Divorce cases?" Vol.V, (1 9 6 4) The Nigerian
— * —  jr ■inimm 1.11 1 « i 1 M im. i ni ■ iHfim * .nil 111
Bar Journal, pp .56-66 *
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regional domicile seem to be more logical and sensible* 
Accordingly, we shall refer to a Lagos domicile rather 
than a Nigerian one in this work*.
The proceeds of the estate of a deceased person, 
who was not domiciled in Lagos at the time of his death, 
may not be distributed, but paid to the foreign executor 
or administrator of such a deceased person . Where, 
however, the beneficiary of the estate resides in a 
British possession, the Administrator-General may pay 
the proceeds to the Chief Secretary of such British pos-
-i
session . In the case of a beneficiary residing in a 
foreign State, payment will be made to the consular of-
A
ficer of such a State •
(iii) Estates of deceased European officers
The administration of the estates of deceased 
European officers is limited, to the collection and 
realisation of the assets of such deceased officers as 
are situated in Nigeria; the payment of the funeral 
and testamentary expenses and debts within Nigeria; and 
the payment of the residue into the Treasury to the
credit of the personal representatives of the deceased
2
officers .
Certain articles (watches, jewelry, letters,e t c ) 
belonging to solvent deceased officers may not be sold, 
but sent to the Crown Agents in London for delivery to
1 S.41(1)*
2 8.5l(l) and (3)
i+6•
•i
the deceased officers1 personal representatives .
As regards the debts owed by the deceased of­
ficers, the Administrator-General may order a stricter
method of proof and require creditors to support their
. 2claims by affidavit .
It is also the duty of the Administrator-General
to pay the net balance of the estate to the Crown
Agents on behalf of the legal representatives of the
■5
deceased officer.
It is important to observe that the Administrator 
General may be precluded from administering the estate 
of a deceased European officer. This happens when 
an application is made to the Court for that purpose, 
or where the Court, of its own motion, so orders^.
When this happens, some other person may be appointed 
by the Court to act as administrator^.
(iv) Estates of military persons
The personal estates of deceased military persons 
or persons subject to British military law, are admini­
stered under the British Regimental Debts Act^. This 
is specially provided for in section 56* of the Admini-
1 S.53*
2 S.5l(U)*
3 S.5U(l). 
k S.55U)*
5 S.55(2)*
6 (1893) 56 Vict*,e.5*
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strator-Genei’al*s Act, which reads:-
’’Nothing in this Act shall he deemed to affect 
the provisions of the Regimental Debts Act,1893"*
Under the provisions of the Administrator- 
General’ s Act, the Administrator-General is empowered 
to apply to the Court for the grant of administration, 
limited for the purpose of dealing with the estate in 
accordance with the provisions of the Regimental Debts
-j
Act . If, however, the value of the estate does not
exceed one hundred pounds, it will not be necessary for
him to apply to the Court for the grant of administration
2before administering such estate ; but he is, neverthe­
less, bound to carry out his administration in accordance
"]
with the provisions of the Regimental Debts Act *
It should be observed that the Regimental Debts 
Act has extra-territorial application, that is to say, 
it applies to all persons subject to British military
■z
law, wherever they die . The estates of such deceased 
persons are usually administered by the appropriate com­
mittee of adjustment prescribed by the British Sovereign^0
Section 2 of the Regimental Debts Act gives the 
order of the preferential charges on the estate of a
1 The Administrator-General’s Act, cap .I*., s.58, ibid*
2 Op .cit, s .57*
3 (18937, 56 Viet., c.5, s.30(l).
U Op.cit •, s . 1.
ij.8.
1deceased military person as follows;
(1) Expenses of last illness and funeral;
(2) Military debts, namely, sums due in respect
of, or of any advance in respect of
(a) Quarters;
d>) Mess, band, and other regimental accounts;
(c) Military clothing, appointments and equip­
ments not exceeding a sum equal to six 
months1 pay of the deceased, and having 
become due within eighteen months before 
his death;
to which shall be added, where the death occurs 
out of the United Kingdom
(3) Servants1 wages, not exceeding two months’
wages to each servant; and
(4) Household e^enses incurred within a month before
the death, or after the last issue of pay to
the deceased, whichever is the shorter period.
It is provided in the Act that the decision
of the Secretary of State shall be final and binding
in case of doubt or difference relating to any pre-
2ferential charge or the payment thereof .
The net personal estate of a deceased military 
person which the beneficiaries share is, therefore, the 
balance after the deduction of the preferential charges
1 For the full provisions of the Act. see; The law 
Reports, Statutes, vol.XXX (1893-4),oap.5* pp.8-17.
2 The Regimental Debts Act, s.4*
h 9 *
indicated .
(v) Small estates
A small estate is one whose assets do not exceed
2the sum of fifty pounds • In respect of such estate, 
the Administrator-General is relieved of the dutj^  to 
file accounts in the Court unless required to do so by 
a beneficiary or creditor * If the value of the es­
tate does not exceed ten pounds, the Administrator-
General need not give notice in the Gazette of his inten-
2tion to administer the estate ,
He has full powers to determine finally all dis­
putes and questions relating to the administration of 
small estates, though he has a discretion whether to al­
io?/ any appeals and applications^', He is not strictly 
bound to receive legal evidence in his determination of 
claims; but may, in the interests of justice or with a 
view to saving e:xpense, act on information which appears
to him to be credible, though such information is legally 
5inadmissible »
(c) Laws applying only in the Western, Mid-Western and 
Eastern Regions
In each of the Regions, there is a local statute
1 Ibid., s.3#
2 The Administrator-General’s Act, cap.4, s «60(l),ibid*
3 Op.cit., s.60(3)«
h sjSSTs)*
5 S.6o(6)*
50.
which applies to the administration of estates, defined 
(in precisely the same manner as it has heen defined
*1
in the Administrator-General1 s Act) as !funrepresented,f
In the Western and Mid-Western Regions, this local en-
actment is the Administrator-General’s Law ; while in
the Eastern Region, it is the Administrator-General"2
(i.e. without an apostrophe and ’s’) Law . It will 
he recalled that the Administration of Estates Law of 
the Western Region also applies to estates governed by 
the general law in both the Western and the Mid-Western 
Regions; but that we have excluded it from our discus­
sion on the ground that it is based substantially on 
the English Administration of Estates Act.
Both regional Laws, not only contain identical 
provisions, but are almost entirely based upon the 
provisions of the Administrator-General'sAct• This is 
not surprising: the Act applied to all the Regions up
to 1st October I960, when the Western Regional Law 
came into force in that Region^ and thereafter, it 
applied to the Eastern Region up to 1st August 1962, 
when the Law of that Region commenced to apply therein^
1 Cap.2, s.2, Laws of the Western Region of Nigeria, 
1959; Eastern Nigeria Law, No.17 of 1961, s.2;
Laws of Eastern Nigeria, 1961, vol.l, Alll at p.A113.
2 Cap.2, ibid,
3 Eastern Nigeria Law, No.17 of 1961, ibid»
k W.R.L.N. 317 of i960 of 18th September i9 6 0; Legis­
lation of the Western Region of Nigeria, I960, part B 
p *U73.
5 E.N.L.N. 60 of 1962 of 27th September, 1962; Laws 
of Eastern Nigeria, 1962, part B, p.118*
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TREATMENT OF THE REGIONAL LAWS
No formal attempt is made here to deal with 
the Regional Laws, It has already been stated that 
these laws have almost entirely been based on the 
provisions of the Administrator-General*s Act, which has 
been considered# Reference, therefore, should be made 
to our discussion of the provisions of this Act#
52.
CHAPTER THREE 
THE EFFECT OP A CHRISTIAN OR MONOGAMOUS MARRIAGE OH
INTESTATE SUCCESSION 
SUCCESSION GOVERNED BY THE PROVISIONS OP THE MARRIAGE
ACT1
Christian or monogamous marriage - Definition
The definition of a Christian or monogamous marriage
is contained in at least half a dozen Nigerian statutes,
2 3namely: the Criminal Code , the Interpretation Act^ and
the Legitimacy Act^ in force mainly in the Federal Terri­
tory of Lagos; and the Western Regional Enactments en-
titled the Criminal Code^, the Interpretation Law and the
7Legitimacy Law . In these local statutes, a Christian 
or monogamous marriage is defined as:
Ha marriage which is recognised by the law of the place 
where it is contracted as the voluntary union for life 
of one man and one woman to the exclusion of all others 
during the continuance of the marriage1' •
1 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria and Lagos (1958), 
cap .115 •
2 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria and Lagos (1958), 
cap .I4.2, s .1.(l).
3 No.l of 196U, s.18(1). This Act repealed much of the 
provisions of the former Interpretation Act, cap.89, 
op .cit. The unrepealed part of the earlier enactment
is now designated as the Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) 
Act. See: s.28 of No.l of 1964* 
ij. Cap.103* s.2, op .cit.
5 Laws of the Western Region of Nigeria (1959)? cap.28.s.1.
6 Laws' of the Western Region of Nigeria (1959;? cap.51,s.3 .
7 Cap.62, ibid..s.2.
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This definition is the well-known one given by 
Lord Penzance in the ease of Hyde v. H.vde and Woodmansee .
It follows that a Christian marriage is not necessarily 
confined to one celebrated in accordance with the rites of 
the Christian Church; hut extends to any system of marriage 
that enjoins monogamy* Thus, while two Moslems contracting 
a marriage under a system that knows of one man and one 
wife only, would qualify under the definition of a Christian 
marriage; two Christians, however ardent their belief in 
the faith may be, marrying under a system permitting of a 
plurality of wives or husbands would fall outside the pale 
of this definition.
Christian or monogamous marriage celebrated in accordance
2with the provisions of the Marriage Act compared with that 
not so celebi^ate&s different rules relating to intestate 
succession
Any Christian or monogamous marriage contracted in 
Nigeria must be celebrated in accordance with the provisions 
of the Marriage Act , which is^lex loci celebrationis *
1 (1866) L.R.I P. & D.130 at p. 133*
2 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria and Lagos (1958). cap.115
3 On this, see: Dicey, A.V., Conflict of laws (1958)
7th edn., chap.11, esp. pp.231-7; Cheshire, G.C. Private 
international law (1961), 6th edn*, chap. XI, esp .pp. 330- 
49; Graveson, K.H., Conflict of laws (i960), 4th edn., 
chap. 6, esp.pp.151-4; also Coker, Family property
(1958), pp.253 tf.
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A marriage contracted outside Nigeria, which satisfies 
the definition given above, is regarded as a Christian
A
or monogamous marriage • One result of this distinction
is, as will be shown more fully later, that in the case
2of the marriage contracted under the Marriage Act ,
section 36 of that Act governs the intestate succession
of the spouses and issue of sucli marriage; while in the
case of a Christian or monogamous marriage not celebrated
2
under the provisions of the Marriage Act , some other 
general law governs the intestate succession; with the 
further result that the rights of the intestate's children 
to his real property may not be equal, and those of the 
Crown or State may remain unaffected in the event of there 
being no heir 01* next of kin to take.
In this regard, the position in Ghana should be 
noted. There,the provisions of the Marriage Ordinance 
relating to intestate succession under the general law
M ia * —i i m a a f  — Mu !■ 11 ■ 1 ' t w i   mu wwn — m i m — i m i  inn ■ i i w w w h i— i— hi^  w * i n h it i>  i i  w i m  m w  111 i ■ — . .
1 On this, see: Dicey, A*V., Conflict of laws (1958),
7th edn., chap.11, esp. pp.231-71 Cheshire, G.C. Private 
international law (1 9 6 1), 6th edn., chap XI, esp. pp.330- 
W ;  Graveson, hTh. Conflict of laws (i9 6 0), Uth edn., 
chap.6 , esp. pp. 151-S: "also" Coker. Family -pronert.v 
among the Yorubas (1 9 5 8), pp . 253 ff•
2 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria and Lagos (1958), cap.115*
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apply irrespective of the country in which the intestate’s
i
marriage had been contracted.
2The provisions of section 56 of the Marriage Act
 ^ 2 
Section 36 of the Marriage Act provides as follows:
(l) ’’Where any person who is subject to native lav/ or
ciistom contracts a marriage in accordance with the 
provisions of this Act, and such person dies in­
testate, subsequently to the commencement of this 
Act, leaving a widow or husband, or any issue of 
such marriage; and also where any person who is 
the issue of any such marriage as aforesaid dies 
intestate subsequently to the commencement of this 
Act -
The personal property of such intestate and also 
any real property of which the said intestate might 
have disposed by will, shall be distributed in ac­
cordance with the provisions of the law of England 
relating to the distribution of the personal estates...*, 
any native law or custom to the contrary notwith­
standing: provided that -
(a) where by the law of England any portion of the 
estate of such intestate would become a portion 
of the casual hereditary revenues of the Crown, 
such portion shall be distributed in accordance 
with the provisions of native law and custom, and 
shall, not become a portion of the said casual here­
ditary revenues; and
(b) real property, the succession to which cannot by 
native law or custom be affected by testamentary 
disposition, shall descend in accordance with the 
provisions of such native law or custom, anything 
herein to the contrary notwithstanding.
1 The Marriage (Ghana) Ordinance, cap.127, s.US(l); 
also, Ollennu, N.A., The law of succession in Ghana 
(i960), pt.X, pp.42-5'2.
2 Laws of the Federation of Nigei*ia and Lagos (1956), 
cap.115 *
56.
(2) Before the registrar of marriages issues his
certificate in the case of an intended marriage, 
either party to which is a person subject to 
native law or custom, he shall explain to both 
parties the effect of these provisions as to the 
succession to property as affected by marriage.
(3) This section applies to the Colony only.11 
Some comments on this section of the Act 
"Native law-and custom” or"native law or custom11
There seems to be some error in the use of the 
term by which customary law is referred to in the section. 
Apart from paragraph (a) of subsection (l), v/here the 
alternative aiid correct term native law and custom is 
employed, the section attempts to separate law from custom 
by the use of the term native law or custom. It is sub­
mitted that the correct term is either customary law or 
native law and custom. It has been aptly said that
11 ’native law and custom1 is .... a single inseparable 
phrase, and it is incorrect to attempt to give separate 
meanings to ’lavf1 and ’custom’ here" 1*
The courts will, no doubt, construe the conjunction "or"
between law and custom as meaning "and", since it is a
rule of construction that "in order to carry out the
1 Allott, A.N., Essays in African law (i960), pp .165-6,
cf. Coker, G.B.A., Family property among the Yorubas 
(1958), pp.6-7.
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intention of the legislature, it is occasionally found 
necessary to read the conjunctions ’or* and ’and* one for 
the other’1 (l)
This means that the legislature must he taken to have 
intended that the correct term should he native law and 
custom, and not native law or custom.
Subsection (3) of the section itself limits its
2application to the Colony of Nigeria , of which the
present Federal Territory of Lagos was an important part"*.
iTie constitutional changes which took place in 1954^*
however, resulted in the transfer to the Western Region
of a considerable portion of the territory formerly corn­
'sprised m  the Colony of Nigeria . The question which
1 Maxwell, Interpretation of statutes (1962), 11th edn., 
pp.229-31; Odgers, C .E.,~ The construction of deeds and 
statutes (1952), 3rd edn., pp. 275-6; aTio" R". Y'.‘ Eze"Tl95C0 
19 N.L.R.11Q; Adelabu and anor. v. Inspector-General of 
Police [1955-61 W.N.L.R.7 at p .10, and the authorities” 
considered therein,
2 For the extent of the former Colony, see: The Colony of 
Nigeria Boundaries Order in Council (1913)t Rev.XVI, 
p*885> S.R. & 0. (l913)» P *2393; also Laws of the Western 
Region of Nigeria (1959;9 vol.VII, pt.v, pp .385-8; Laws 
of the Federation of Nigeria and Lagos (1958), vol.XI,
pp.218-221; The Nigeria handbook (1936). 11th edn., p.28.
3 The total area of the Federal Territory of Lagos is only 
27 square miles. See: Davies, H.O., Nigeria: the pros­
pects for democracy (1 9 6 1) p.13; The Federation of Nigeria 
(1 9 6 3) p . 19,~ublished by the Commonwealth Institute;
Burns, A.C., History of Nigeria (19&3)* 6th edn., p.17#
The Nigeria Y^ar Book (196'lj.V p~.il.
4 See: Ni ge r i a (Cons titution) Order in Council, 195U*S.I.No 
11U6.
5 The areas so transferred include Epe, Badagry and Ikeja.
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immediately arises is whether the provisions of section 
36 of the Marriage Act continue to apply in those parts 
of the former Colony now included in the Western Region; 
or whether their operation is limited to that area of the 
old Colony no?/ constituting the Federal Territory of 
Lagos.
Two learned authors have recently expressed the 
view that the section applies only in the Federal Terri-
A
tory of Lagos . The present writer shares this view; 
and, as the authors have not indicated the ground on 
which their eminently sensible view has been based, he 
proposes to advance reasons to justify the view e:xpressed.
It should be pointed out that the answer to this 
question, which is a constitutional issue, must depend 
upon the legislative competence of the Federal Parliament
U . * . • The constitutional arrangements involved the old 
Colony of Nigeria in the loss of 1,35U square miles of 
its former territory, having an area of 1,381 square 
miles. But the old municipality of Lagos, having an 
area of 2b square miles, gained in the process - 3 
square miles! See notes 2 and 3 on p • 57.
1 Obi, The Ibo law of property (1963)* pp.211,213 and 
219-20; Park, The sources of Nigerian law (1 9 6 3)* • 
p.133 n.
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and that of the Western Regional legislature with respect, 
to the topic of intestate succession under the general law. 
It is, of course, true that the subject of Christian or 
monogamous marriage, including the related topics of 
annulment, dissolution and matrimonial causes under the 
general law, is one of the matters over which the Federal 
Parliament has exclusive legislative powers .. But succes­
sion is not one of the matters so4exclusively assigned to
the Federal Parliament# In point of fact, it is not even
2a topic appearing on the Concurrent Legislative List ; 
nor is it one of those items not included in the Legis­
lative Lists, hut in respect of which an Act of Federal 
Parliament nevertheless has the effect of nullifying a 
Regional La?/ to the extent of any inconsistency contained 
in the latter enactment • It follows, therefore, that 
succession is one of the matters in regard to which the
Regions are competent to legislate# That this is the
true position and that section of 36 of the Marriage Act 
dealing with intestate succession does not apply in the
1 Item 23 of part I of the schedule to the Constitution 
of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, No#20 of 1963 (the 
Exclusive Legislative List)*
2 Part II of the schedule, ibid#
3 S . 69 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of
Nigeria#
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Western Region may be seen from the enactment in the 
Region of legislation providing for intestate succession
A
under the general law •
Basis of the application of section 56 in the Federal 
Territory of Lagos: Place of marriage, domicile or
situation of •property?
The topic now canvassed is this: granting that the
deceased intestate (a person subject to customary law) 
married under the Marriage Act and dies, leaving a widow 
or husband or issue of the marriage; or he is himself an 
issue of such marriage; what connection must he and/or 
his property have with the Federal Territory of Lagos 
in order to attract the operation of the provisions of 
section 36 of the Marriage Act? In other words, is it 
the fact of the celebration of his marriage in Lagos, 
or his Lagos domicile, or his having left property situated 
therein that brings into operation the provisions of the 
section? We shall take the different parts of the question 
one by one. As a general point, however, it may be ob­
served that, apart from providing that it "applies to the
1 The Administration of Estates Law, cap.l, Laws of the 
Western Region (1959)9 with effect from 23rd April,
1959♦ '
6 1 .
Colony only” , the section does not offei'1 any help with 
respect to the solution of the problem posed.
(a) Celebration of marriage in Lagos
The mere fact that the deceased intestate contracted a 
marriage under the Marriage Act in Lagos is of itself in­
sufficient to bring his succession within the provisions 
of section 36 of the Act. This is so because,under the 
rules of private international law, the lex loci celebra­
tionis has nothing to do with the intestate succession of 
a married deceased person; but is concerned with whether
or not the formalities of the marriage have been complied 
2
with .
(b) Lagos domicile of the deceased intestate
Up till the time of the constitutional arrangments 
referred to above, it was perfectly safe to speak of one 
common Nigerian domicile, since the Colony and Protectorate 
of Nigeria enjoyed a common legal system. Since then, 
however, the concept of a separate domicile - at least in 
divorce matters - in each of the constituent parts of the
1 Subsection (3) of the section.
2 Cheshire, G.C., Private international law (1 9 61),
6th edn., chap. XI, esp. pp.330-49; Graveson, R.H., 
Conflict of laws (i960), 4th edn, chap. 6, esp. pp.151- 
4; Dicey, A.Y., Conflict of laws (1958), 7th edn, 
chap.11, esp. pp.231-7.
6 2
1
country has emerged ; though decisiors to the contrary are 
2not lacking . Having regard to the existence of a separate 
legal system in each of the Regions and the Federal Terri­
tory comprising the Federation of Nigeria, and the fact 
that domicile is geared to a territory over which a single 
legal system operates, the decisions in favour of a
regional - as opposed to one Nigerian - domicile appear
%
to be more logical .
If the deceased intestate was domiciled in the Federal 
Territory of Lagos at the date of his death, the succession 
to his movable property is governed by the provisions of 
the section. This is in accordance with the principles
1 Okonkwo v. Eze [l96q] N.R.N.L.R.80; Maehi v. Machi 11966) 
LVL.R.103; >deoy? v f Adeoye [196$ All N.L.H. 792;. [1962]
N .R .N .L .R • 63; Adeyemi v . Adeyemi [1962] L.l .R ,70;
Uchendu v ♦ Uchendu|196'2T L1.L *R >101 ♦ Of. the Legitmacy 
Law of the Western Region -which contains a provision 
referring to Western Region domicile: Laws of the Western
Region of Nigeria (1959). cap.62, s.3(l).
.2 Nwokedi v. Nwokedi [1958] L^L .R.9U; which, however* must 
now be regarded as rather doubtful authority having regard 
to the fact that the judge who decided it also decided 
the later cases of Adeyemi v. Adeyemi and Uchendu v 
Uchendu cited in footnote 1 above* Also Udom v. Udom 
Il962jL*L .R .112; including two unreported cases decided 
by the High Court of Lagos: Ettarh v. Ettarh, suit HD/23/
63; Odunjo v. Oclunjo. suit wBT^STSST^To™a discussion 
of these cases, see: Atilade, P.A./'Is there one Nigerian
domicile or different regional domiciles in regard to 
Divorce cases?% (l96ij.), vol.V, The Nigerian Bar Journal
pp.55-66*
3 See: Cheshire, G . C ., Private International law (1961),
6th edn., chap .VII; Graveson, R.H., The conflict of lav/s 
(i9 6 0), 2+th edn., chap Dicey, A.V., Conflict of laws. 
0-958), 7th edn., chap .6.
of private international law . On the same principles, 
the succession to his movable property will fall outside 
the ambit of the section, if he died intestate domiciled 
elsewhere, say, in one of the Regions.
(. c) Situation of property in Lagos
(i) Movable •property
On the principles of conflict of laws already 
referred to above, the situation of the movable 
property of the deceased intestate within the 
Federal Territory of Lagos is not enough to bring 
the succession to such property within the provisions 
of the section! unless he was also domiciled there­
in at the time of his death.
(ii) Immovable property
Where the property of the deceased intestate is 
immovable and is situated within the Federal Terri­
tory of Lagos, the provisions of the Act will govern 
the devolution. This is because under the principles of
private international law, succession to immovables is
2determined by the lex situs .
1 Cheshire, op .cit., p p *559 ff; Graveson, op .cit.«
p p •419-20! Dicey, op *cit.» pp.598-600! and the cases cited 
therein by the authorities.
2 See: Cheshire, op .cit., pp .603 ff; Graveson, op .cit.,
pp*422-3; Dicey, op.cit♦ % pp.496-8, and 518! also Goker, 
Family property among the Yorubas (1958), pp.250-1.
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Personal •property and real property
The exact terms employed in the section are personal 
property and real property, and not the private 'international law 
terms of movables and immovables • Nevertheless, this 
makes no difference, since it is specifically provided in 
the section that
11 the personal property ..... and also any real property... 
shall be distributed in accordance with the provisions of 
the law of England relating to the distribution of the 
personal estates " 2.
Date for the application of the relevant English law
Subsection (l) of section 36 of the Marriage Act 
provides that the distribution of the intestate’s property
1
is to be nin accordance with the provisions of thetlaw of 
England relating to the distribution of the 
personal estates of intestates’*;
but does not specify the date with respect to the appli­
cable English law. The omission of the date for the ap­
plication of the relevant English law occurring in the 
Nigerian Marriage Act may be contrasted with- the position 
in Ghana, where the date 19th November, 188I4, has been ex- 
pressly mentioned in the Ghana Marriage Ordinance itself .
1 See; Cheshire, on .cit.-, PP»603 £**♦; Graveson, op .cit., 
pp .1422-31 Dicey, op .cit.» PP.I496 -8 and 518; also Coker, 
Family property among: the Yorubas (1958), pp.250-1.
2 Subsect ion (1) ofsec ■tiSiT^S^of "the Marriage Act.
3 The Marriage (Ghana) Ordinance, cap.127, s.U8(l).
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The question which now falls for consideration is 
the date for the application of the relevant English law 
incorporated by reference in section 36 of the Marriage
■i
Act. Two learned authors have suggested the year 1881+ ;
and one has sought to justify this date on the ground that
2the first Marriage Ordinance was passed in that year .
With respect, the date suggested by both learned authors is 
not the correct one. For, while it is undoubtedly true 
that the Ordinance was passed in 1881+-^ , its provisions did 
not come into force until 31st December, 1885^. As regards 
the ground on which one of the learned authors has relied 
for ascertainment of this wrong date [[i.e. that the first 
Marriage Ordinance in Nigeria was enacted in 1881+j , it 
is respectfully submitted that this View is clearly untenable * 
This is because the Ordinance of 1881+ was, in point of fact, 
the third piece of legislation to deal with Christian or 
monogamous marriage in the countryj and it repealed two 
earlier enactments on the subject. These earlier local 
statutes were the Ordinance u to provide for the granting
1 Coker, Family property among the Yorubas (1958) p.250; 
Ollennu, The law of succession in Ghana (i960) p. 1+3.
2 Coker, loc .cit.
3 No.11+ of 1881+. See: haws of the Colony of Lagos in force 
1893> PP*l+M+-59; Laws of the Colony of Lagos (1901), 
vol.l, p p .1+55-69.
1+ By Government Notice No.53 of 1885, published in the 
Gazette (Gold Coast.) See Laws of the Colony of Lagos 
in force 1 8 9 3* p.l+6 9 .
6 6  *
of Licences for Marriages in the Settlement of Lagos, and 
its Dependencies (l)tf
and the Registration Ordinance relating to the
"Registration or Solemnisation of Marriages within the 
said Settlement (2)".
Perhaps the learned author meant to say that the Ordinance 
of 1884 was the first Marriage Ordinance to contain pro- 
visions relating to intestate succession . But this is 
quite a different thing from saying that the first Marriage 
Ordinance in Nigeria was passed in 1884*
Furthermore, the date suggested by both learned 
authors fails to take into account two important conside­
rations. One is that the Ordinance of 1884 was itself
repealed in 1914^4 when the provisions of the present Mar-
6 6 riage Act^ came into force • The other is the effect of
1 No.10 of 1863* See the Laws cited in footnote 3 on p.65*
2 No.21 of 1863, ibid.
3 These provisions were then embodied in S.41 of the Ordi­
nance which, however, did not limit them to the Colony
of Lagos. See also, Fowler v. Martins (1924) 5 N.L.R.45* 
esp. at p.47.
4 By the Marriage Ordinance, No.18 of 1914* s.56* See; 
Ordinances, Orders and Regulations of Nigeria, 1914*
5 The provisions of the Marriage Ordinance (1914) have, 
with minor amendments, which are not relevant to our dis­
cussion, since appeared in successive editions of the
Laws of Nigeria. For example, they were embodied in cap *68 
of the 1923 edition of the Laws; in cap.128 of the 1948 
edition; and in cap .115 of the current edition.
6 The provisions of the Marriage Ordinance (1914) have been 
in force since the 31st December, 1914* See: Ordinances, 
Orders and Regulations of Nigeria, 1914*
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the judicial authorities on the point, which have esta­
blished that the material date is to be ascertained with 
reference to the English law in force at the date of the 
commencement of the particular Marriage Ordinance in ac­
cordance with which the intestatefs marriage had been con­
tracted . Before proceeding to the examination of the 
judicial authorities on the point, however, it may be ob­
served that another learned author has, somewhat independently,
■i
arrived at the conclusion to be drawn from the decided cases *
2In Johnson v. The United Africa Company Ltd, ,
Butler Lloyd, J. was of the opinion that the English law
referred to in section 36 of the Marriage Act was the law
in force in 1914* when the existing enactment came into
force. With respect, this decision is suspect, since
there was no shred of evidence indicating the date when the
deceased intestate contracted his marriage under the general
law^ *, However, it has been held by the West African Gourt of
(Appeal
1 Obi, The Ibo law of property (1963) p*221, where he 
states that the English law to be applied is "the law 
in force in England in 1914 when the Marriage Ordinance 
was enacted". But this statement is correct only in so 
far as it relates to persons married under the Marriage 
Ordinance of 19l4j and not in respect of those married
in accordance with the provisions of the earlier Ordi­
nance of 1884*
2 (1936) 13 N.L.R.13*
3 Ibid. at p.14*
4 The first page of the report - (1936) N.L.R.13 - contains 
only the following relevant facts: "A.8. Johnson and ..
6 8
-i ,
He Somefun, where there was abundant evidence to the
effect that the marriage -concerned was celebrated under
the Marriage Ordinance of 1914> that the English law to
be applied by virtue of section 36 is "the law of England 
(at the time of the Ordinance) relating to the distribution 
of the personal estate of intestates **..( 2)ff •
The case did not make it clear what meaning must be attached 
to the phrase at the time of the Ordinance♦ Did this mean 
at the commencement or during the continuance of the en­
actment? This question Was expressly answered in Re
3Adadevoh and ors, by the same Court which, as will be shown 
more fully later, overruled on other grounds, its earlier
A
decision in Ra Somefun . In the later case, the Court
ordered that the estate of the deceased intestate who had
married under the Ordinance of 1914 should be distributed
"in the manner and to the extent prescribed by the Statute 
of Distributions in force in England at the date of the 
commencement of the Ordinance.* *..(4)u
The clearest statement in this regard - that the
4 Dorcas Johnson were married In accordance
with the Marriage Ordinance, He died intestate in ,1926 
leaving her and four children surviving",
1 (1941) 7 W.A.C.A.156.
2 Ibid, at p ,157 *
3 TT951) 13 W.A.C.A. 30U.
4 Ibid, at p ,310•
applicable law is the English law in force at the date of 
commencement of the marriage enactment under which the 
particular marriage was contracted - was made in the 
celebrated decision of the Privy Council in Bamgbose v ♦
A
Daniel and ors» , where even the West African Court of 
Appeal erred in the fixing of the relevant date - 1914
p
instead of 1884 . The Board endorsed the agreement 
reached between the parties that it was the Ordinance of 
1884 that fell to be considered, since "the marriage of 
the deceased1s parents was contracted under that Ordinance 
As regards the content of the relevant English law appli­
cable, Lord Keith of Avonholm, who delivered the judgement 
of the Board, observed:
"The relevant law of England in 1884 is to be found in 7 
the Statute of Distribution, 1670 (22 & 23 Car,11 e.20)-5 
and the Act of l685> 1 Jae.II c.l7tf(4)
An interesting point emerging from the decisions
briefly examined is the hypothetical question of the
English law that would apply in eases of the intestate
1 (1954) 14 W.A.C.A.1 1 6; tL954l 3 All E.R.2 6 3; fi.955]
A.C.107.
2 Ibid. at p. 118; p.265; and p.114 respectively.
3 This is, of course, c.10, since cap.20 is entitled an
Act "for the relief and release of poor distressed 
prisoners for debt.” See: Statutes at large, vol.8, 12 
Cha.II to I James II, p.3 6 8.
4 Ibid. at p.119; p*266; and p.115 respectively.
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succession of persons marrying since 1956, if in that 
year £i.e. when the current edition of the Laws of the 
Federation of Nigeria and Lagos was compiled! the existing 
Marriage Act - the Ordinance of 191k - had been rejj laced 
by new legislation embodying the provisions relating to 
intestate succession now contained in section 36 of the 
present Marriage Act. There is no doubt that the pro­
visions of the Administration of Estates Act and the 
Intestates1 Estates Act would have applied in respect of 
the intestate succession of persons marrying under the 
Marriage Act of 1958* since both Acts would be the English 
law in force at the date of the commencement of the Act 
under which such persons had married.
General statutory provisions relating to the reception and
A word must be said about the effect of the general 
statutory provisions relating to the reception and applica­
tion of English law which had been in existence with res-
A
pect to Lagos since 1863 . The current provisions specify 
the 1st January, 1900, as the relevant date for the applica­
tion of English law; and also state that the application of
1 Ordinance No.3 of 1863* s.l. See: Ordinances of the 
Settlement of Lagos, 1862-70, pp.10-11.
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that law Is subject to the existence of other provisions 
contained in any Federal law* and is conditional on local 
circumstances permitting.
Thus, subsections (l) and (2) of section 45 of
A
the Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act read as follows:
tf(l) Subject to the provisions of this section, and
except in so far as other provision is made by any 
Federal law, the common law of England and the 
doctrines of equity, together with the statutes 
of general application that were in force in England 
on the 1st day of January, 1900, shall be in force 
in Lagos'.......
(2) Such Imperial laws shall be in force so far only
as ..... local circumstances shall permit and sub­
ject to any Federal law."
It seems rather remarkable that the statutory 
provisions reproduced above were not consid.ered in any 
of the cases dealing with the relevant date for the appli­
cation of the English law referred to in section 36 of - 
the Marriage Act. It is, however, submitted that the 
date 1900 mentioned in the general statutory provisions 
as regards the reception and application of English law 
would not have made any difference, especially in res­
pect of the cases in which the date has been put at the year 
1914: the relevant English law,as it stood at both dates,
1 This is the title by which the unrepealed part of the 
former Interpretation Act - cap. 89, Laws of the Fede­
ration of Nigeria and Lagos 1958 - is now referred to. 
See: The Interpretation Act, fio.l of 1964, s.28.
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was the same; and was to he found in the Statutes of
Distribution, 1670^ and 1685^; the Statute of Frauds*^,
and the Intestates!Estates Act^.
Furthermore, it is difficult to see how the general
provisions dealing with the reception date and application
of English lav/ could have affected the decisions based
on the interpretation of the special provisions embodied
in section 36 of the Marriage Act, having regard to the
rule of construction stressed, in the maxim generalia
5specialibus non derogant^ .
6The provisions of the High Court of Lagos Act empowering 
the Court to exercise its jurisdiction in probate, divorce 
and matrimonial causes and proceedings in conformity with 
current English law and practice
One other aspect of the reference date with res­
pect to the application of English law under section 36
1 22 & 23 Gar.2, c.10.
2 1 Jae.2, c.17*
3 (1677), 29 Car.2, c.3.
4 (1890), 53 & 54 Viet., c .29•
5 On this, see: Maxwell, op .cit ♦ » pp .168-77; 0dgei»s,
op .cit., pp.220 and 264*
6 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria and Lagos (1958),
cap .80.
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of the Marriage Act remains to he considered. This is
in connection with the provisions of the High Court of 
•1
Lagos Act by virtue of ,which the Court may exercise
its Jurisdiction in probate causes and proceedings, among
others, nin conformity with the law and practice for the
2"time being in force in England. . . These provisions by
which English law as it changes from time to time has
been incorporated by reference in the High Court of Lagos 
a
Act , and which empower the Court to apply current English 
law in probate causes and proceedings raise the all-impor­
tant topic of the meaning to be attached to the expression 
probate causes and proceedings. In other words, do such 
causes and proceedings include the distribution of estates 
or are they limited to the proof of wills and granting of 
letters of administration? The ansy/er to the question 
depends on the meaning assigned to that egression in the High 
Court Act itself; or anywhere else, in the event of there 
being no definition or clear definition of that expression 
in the Act. But, first it will be necessary to repro­
duce the section of the Act embodying the provisions by
1 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria and Lagos(193B),cap .80.
2 Ibid, s.16.
7*1..
virtue of* which the High Court may exercise its juris­
diction in probate causes and proceedings in conformity 
with current English lav/ and practice.
-j
Section 16 of the High Court of Lagos Act provides;
"The jurisdiction of the High Court in probate, divorce
and matrimonial causes and proceedings may, subject to 
the provisions of this Act and in particular to section 
27 [i.e. section dealing with the observance and
enforcement of any applicable rules of the customary law] 
and subject to rules of court, be exercised by the court 
in conformity with the law and practice for the time being 
in force in England.1'
It is significant that the definition of the
expression probate causes and proceedings is not contained,
2in the High Court Act or in the Rules Qf Court ; nor, 
indeed, as we shall see, in the relevant English legis­
lation. However, the similar, provisions contained in 
the forerunner of the present High Court of Lagos Act - 
the Supreme Court Ordinance^ - throw some light on the 
question. Like the High Court of Lagos. Act and the Rules 
of Court, the Supreme Court Ordinance is silent on the 
definition of the expression probate
1 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria and Lagos(l95&)? cap.80.
2 The Rules of Court at present in use are the old Supreme 
Gourt Rules - The Supreme (Civil Procedure) Rules - 
which are contained in vol.10, cap.211, Lav/s of Nigeria
(19*1-8); and which have been expressly retained by virtue 
of s.89(3) of the High Court of Lagos Act, cap .80.op .cit.
3 See; La¥/s of Nigeria (19*1-8), cap.211. The relevant 
provisions are contained in section 22 of the Ordinance.
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Nevertheless, It (the Supreme High Court Ordinance )
affords some help with respect to the solution of the
problem by referring us to section 20 of English Supreme
2Court of Judicature (Consolidation) Act , to which we
must now turn for guidance*
We may repeat that the Supreme Court of Judicature
2(Consolidation) Act has not attempted any formal defi­
nition of the expression under consideration* However, 
the scope of the topics dealt with in part VII (sections
150-175) “■ headed probate causes and matters - of the
2English legislation leaves no doubt as to the import 
of the expression: probate causes and matters are con­
cerned with proof of wills and the grant of letters of 
administration; but do not extend to the distribution
of estates *
Before concluding this discussion, however, one or
two comments may be made on the very recent decision of .
the High Court of Eambia ('Northern Rhodesia) in the case
■3
of In the Estate cf Ntonga » which involved the interpreta-
1 Cap.211, s*22, Laws of Nigeria (1948).
2 (1925) 15 & 16 Qeo*5, c.1+9.
3 The ease is noted in \l96l[J J .A.L .Ul-6.
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tion to be put on the expression probate causes and matters 
contained in the High Court Ordinance of Zambia by vir­
tue of which the Court is to exercise its probate juris-
4
diction in conformity with current English law and practice . 
The facts of that case were briefly as follows; the 
deceased died intestate leaving no issue. He was, however, 
survived by his parents, one of whom - the father - applied 
for the grant of letters of administration in respect of 
the deceased*s estate. The applicant stated in the ad­
ministrator’s oath he filed that he was the lawful father
o
of the deceased, and "one of the persons entitled to share" 
in the estate.. As will be shown more fully later, the 
applicant’s statement was correct, if the current English 
law of intestacy applied, while it was not correct if 
the pre-1925 English rules of intestate succession gover­
ned the distribution. The relevance of the pre-1925 
English rules of intestate succession will be understood 
when it is realised that Zambia has general statutory 
provisions by virtue of which English law, as it stood 
\
1 The High Court [Zambia]- Ordinance, cap.3»s.ll.
2 [1961+) J.A.L.W at p.U2.
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i
on the 17th August, 1911? applies in the territory .
The decision turned on the interpretation of the phrase 
probate causes and matters in the relevant section of 
the High Court Ordinance of Zambia enjoining the Court 
to exercise its probate Jurisdiction in conformity with 
the law and practice for the time being in force in 
England•
Conroy, C.J., while specifically refraining from
’’deciding .... that the egression ’probate causes and 
matters’ does not include the distribution of the estates 
of deceased" (2)
nevertheless applied the current English law under which 
the estate was to be held in trust for both of the de­
ceased’s parents in equal shares. In other words, he held 
that the oath of administration filed by the deceased’s 
father, to the effect that he was one of the beneficiaries, 
was in proper form.
With the greatest respect, the decision appears to 
be inconsistent with the e:xpressed determination of the 
learned Chief Justice not to decide the vital point of 
whether the phrase probate causes and matters is limited
1 This is now contained in the English Law (Extent of 
Application) Ordinance, 1963* Sees Laws of Zambia 
[Northern Rhodesia) , ±S6k edn, cap.11, s.2.
2 D.96JLQ J .A.L • hi at p.i+6.
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to proof of wills and the grant of administration; or is 
broad enough to cover the distribution of estates. For, 
by deciding, as he did, he had indirectly held that that 
phrase must be tahen to include the distribution of estates, 
which, as has been pointed out, is not the case. The 
effect of the decision was, however, short-lived. The 
legislature amended the relevant section of the High Court 
Ordinance shortly after the case was decided; and the 
English law to be applied in these causes and matters is 
that in force on the general reference date - 17th August
19111.
But the decision had two redeeming features. Firstly, 
the amendment of the law by the legislature,referred to 
above, was the result of the appeal made by the learned 
Chief Justice during the course of his judgement. He 
said:
!!If the true position is the absurd one that two entirely 
different systems of law apply, according to whether the 
High Court of Northern Hhodesia is trying a Probate matter 
or a Chancery matter, then the sooner the legislature 
enacts legislation to clarify the issue the better"#(2)
As has been indicated, legislative action in this regard
followed speedily* Secondly, by applying the current
1 Ibid, at p.2-1-3•
2 “[19SiQ J.A.L. 41 at p .46 *
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English law, the learned Chief' Justice made it possible 
for the deceased's mother to benefit from ,the estate
I >
which, as we shall see, would have descended to the
applicant (the father) exclusively*
The final point in connection with the application
of the current English law in probate causes and matters
in Nigeria is the existence of the Rules of Court referred
to in section 16^ of the High Court of Lagos Act; and
which exclude or, at all events, limit the application
of the law for the time being in force in England* Like
the provisions of part VII (sections 150-175) of the
English Supreme Court of Judicature (Consolidation) Act,2
the relevant Order"* of the Rules of Court is headed
probate causes and matters; and deals wholly with topics
relating to proof of wills and the grant of administration*
For example, Rule 1 of the Order^ speaks of petitions
^for the granting of any probate of the will, or for 
letters of administration of the estate of the deceased 
person11;
the next three Rules are concerned with the interim
1 That is the section containing provisions receiving 
the current English law and practice in probate causes 
and proceedings*
2 (1925) 15 & 16 Geo.5, c.49.
3 Order XLVIII of the Supreme Court (Civil Procedure) 
Rules, vol*10, cap.211, Laws of Nigeria, 1948#
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preservation of the property comprised in the estate, 
and the production of the testamentary documents of the 
deceased, if any; while Rules 20 to 33 deal with the 
actual process of administration.
We may now proceed to summarise what has been dis­
cuss ad with regard to the date for the application of 
the relevant English law referred to in section 36 of 
the Marriage Act. The applicable English law is the 
law in force in England at the date of the commencement 
of the particular Marriage Ordinance under which the 
deceased intestate had contracted his marriage. It is 
neither the English law in force on the 1st January,
1900 - the general reference date contained in the pro­
visions of section 45 of the Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) 
Act - nor the current English law referred to in section 
16 of the High Court of Lagos Act, which deals with the 
jurisdiction of the Court in probate, divorce and matri­
monial causes and proceedings.
PERSONS SUBJECT TO CUEQDMARY LAW
The section applies only to the intestate succes­
sion of a person who is subject to customary law and who
married under the Marriage Act; or who, as will be fully
■1
examined later, is an issue of such a marriage . Now,
1 Subsection (l) of the section
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the only persons who are subject to customary law are 
natives, defined by a repealed section of the former
A
Interpretation Act to include a native of Nigeria and
2
a native foreigner. The section reads:
" ’native* includes a native of Nigeria and a native 
foreigner; ’native of Nigeria* means any person whose 
parents were members of any tribe or tribes indigenous 
to Nigeria and descendants of such persons; and includes 
any person one of whose parents was a member of such a 
tribe; ’native foreigner* means any person (not being a 
native of Nigeria) whose parents were members of a tribe 
or tribes indigenous to some part of Africa and the des­
cendants of such persons, and shall include any person one 
of whose parents was a member of such tribe"*
Although the definition of the term "native" has
disappeared with that part of the former Interpretation
1 3Act , which has been repealed , the term is still retained
in both the High Court of Lagos Act^ and the Magistrates* 
(Lagos) Court Act*\ It is submitted that the courts, 
in, interpreting the term under the Acts establishing them, 
are entitled to refer to the definition contained in the
1 Cap.89* Laws of the Federation of Nigeria and Lagos 
(1958).
2 Ibid, s.3.
3 The repealing enactment is entitled the Interpretation 
Act, No.l of 19&U This Act leaves unrepealed part
of the former Act, which is now designated as the Law 
(Miscellaneous Provisions) Act: s*28 of the Interpretation 
Act, No.l of 196U.
4 Cap.80, s.27* ibid.
5 Cap.113* s.22, ibid.
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repealed provisions of the former Interpretation Act.
It is also submitted that the definition of 11 native" is 
broad enough to cover both West Indians of African origin 
and American Negroes, since they are descendants of 
persons who were members of tribes indigenous to Africa.
It would, however, not cover Europeans or Asians who 
are naturalised citizens of Nigeria or who are domiciled 
in Lagos. Accordingly, the intestate succession of 
such Europeans and Asians marrying under the Marriage Act 
falls outside the ambit of the provisions of section 3 6 .
The rules governing the distribution in such cases will 
be dealt with in the next chapter.
The absurdity of the effect of the -provisions of the 
section: Succession to the spouses qualified^ that in
respect of issue of the marriage absolute.
In the case of a deceased intestate married under 
the Marriage Act, the provisions of section 36 apply 
only if he or she (being, of course, subject to customary 
law) leaves a widow or husband or issue of the marriage 
surviving. As regards the succession to the issue of 
the marriage, however, there is only one condition pre­
cedent to the application of the provisions of the section,
83*
namely, the issue dying intestate; and it matters not 
whether he or she is survived by a widow or husband 
or issue; or whether, indeed, he or she was married 
under the Marriage Act or entered into a customary union. 
If one takes the contractual view of the method 
by which the change in succession is brought about, the 
manifest absurdity revealed by the provisions of section 
36 would require no further demonstration* For, while 
the succession to an actual party to the contract of 
marriage is qualified; that to an issue of the marriage, 
who ex hypo the si could not be a party to the contract 
of marriage, is absolute* The position becomes all the 
more intolerable when one consideres that there exists no 
impediment to the issue’s contracting a marriage under 
customary law"* *
Widow or husband or issue under section 36
The section qualifies the words widow or husband 
or issue as being those of a marriage contracted in ac­
cordance with the provisions of the Marriage Act*
Despite the doubt expressed by a learned author as to
1 Sees Bamgbose v« Daniel and ors. (1954) 14 W*A*C.A. ... 
116 at p.120 11954) 3. All E.B. 263 at p.267} 0-955 
A.G. 107 at p.117. " '
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whether these words, as used in the section, refer to a 
widow or husband or issue of a marriage under the Marriage 
Act , it is submitted that the qualifying; words ,fsuch 
marriage” have the effect of restricting widow* husband 
and issue to those of a marriage contracted under the Act* 
Therefore, if X marries Y in accordance with the pro­
visions of the Marriage Act; and, on the determination 
of this marriage, enters into a customary union with Zf 
Z will not qualify as a widow under the section in the 
event of X's intestacy; unless, as we shall see, X is 
also survived by an issue of his first marriage*
CHILDREN
Once the provisions of the section apply, the 
courts, after sons reluctance, have, by the process of 
judicial manipulation, interpreted.the English Statutes 
of Distribution in a manner, whereby the intestate’s 
legitimate and legitimated children under the customary 
law have been allowed to share in the estate along with 
the issue of a marriage under the Marriage Act*
The case of Re Somefun represented an earlier
1 Coker, Family property among the Yorubas (1958) p.281*
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era when judicial opinion on the question of legitimacy 
was rather rigid. In that case, the deceased intestate 
was an issue of a marriage contracted under the Marriage 
Act. He was survived by a woman he married under 
customary law, a child born to him by this woman, and a 
brother who was also an issue of the marriage under the 
Act* Despite the brilliant argument of the Administrator- 
General to the effect that the words wife and children 
in the Statute of Distribution included the deceased’s 
widow and child, the West African Court of Appeal held 
that only the surviving brother was entitled to inherit 
the estate left by the deceased.
But this rather unsatisfactory decision was not
4
to stand. For, in the case of Re Adadevoh and ors* ,
decided ten years later by the West African Court of
2Appeal, Re Somefun was expressly overruled. In the later
A
case , the deceased, who was himself an issue of a 
marriage under the Marriage Act, contracted a marriage 
in accordance with the provisions of the Marriage Act.
His marriage terminated by the death of his wife. But, 
both beKsre te marriage and after its determination, he 
entered into a number of customary unions, as a result
1 (1951) 13W.A.C.A. 30h*
2 (1941) 7 W.A.C.A.156.
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of which the respondents were born. On his death 
intestate, they claimed a share of the estate. The 
Court below, apparently considering them to be illegiti­
mate under English law, held that they were not entitled 
to succeed unless it could be shown that, in the absence 
of next-of-kin, the estate would escheat to the Crown.
The West African Court of Appeal, allowing the appeal, 
remitted the case back to the Court below, with directions 
to ascertain the customary law relating to the legitimacy 
of the appellants with respect to their rights of suc­
cession on the intestacy of their father, the deceased. 
Verity, C.J., as he then was, delivering the judgement 
of the Court, said:
”If, as it was assumed throughout the proceedings, the 
deceased was a person subject to native law and custom..., 
then the law to be applied in ascertaining the legitimacy 
of the children is the native law and custom applicable 
to him, subject, of course, to such modification and 
qualifications as may be imposed by statute? (l)
2In Bamgbose v. Daniel , the question of the legiti­
macy of the children of customary marriages under the 
Statute of Distribution once again came before the West
1 (1951) 13 W.A.C.A. at p.309.
2 (1954) 14 W.A.C.A. 111.
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•i
African Court of Appeal , and ultimately went to the
p
Privy Council . There, the deceased, the issue of a 
marriage under the Marriage Act, had entered into nine 
customary unions. The respondents (other than the Ad­
ministrator-General) were the children of these customary 
unions, and they claimed as the legitimate children of 
the deceased under Nigerian law. The appellant was 
the only son of the deceased’s brother, and was legiti­
mated under the Legitimacy Act^ by the marriage of his 
parents under the 1884 Marriage Ordinance. He claimed 
to be solely entitled, and to exclude the respondents 
on the ground that they were illegitimate under the 
English Statute of Distribution. It was held that the 
respondents were entitled to inherit the deceased’s 
estate under the Statute of Distribution in preference 
to the appellant. The case is authority for the pro­
position that, while English rules governing distribution 
determine the order in which persons take (for example, 
children before brothers and sisters, etc.), the meaning 
to be attached to the word ”children” in the Statute of 
Distribution must be ascertained in accordance with
1 (1954-) 14 W.A.C.A.lll. „ ^ n
2 (1954) 14 W.A.C.A.116; ll954| 3 All E.R.263; &955| 
A.C.107.
3 Cap .103, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria and Lagos,1958.
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Nigerian law, which includes customary law; and that 
any person legitimate by that law is entitled to inherit
■i
under the English rules relating to distribition *
The word "children” in the Statute of Distribution
has also been interpreted to include acknowledged children -
children born out of wedlock, but whose paternity has,
nevertheless, been acknowledged by their natural father -
provided that such acknowledgement of paternity does not
offend the repugnancy principle, and is not contrary to
public policy* This, in effect, means that in determining
the status of the acknowledged child under customary law,
the marriage (customary) of his parents is not a relevant
subject for investigation* *In Alake and ors* v* Pratt 
2and ors , the deceased had married under the Marriage Act, 
and had two groups of children; the respondents who 
were the issue of the marriage under the Act and the appel­
lants, who were born out of wedlock, but whose paternity 
he had nevertheless acknowledged. The court of first 
instance held that the appellants were not entitled to
1 (1954) 14 W.A.C.A. at p.121; [19541 3 All E.R. at
p.267; [1955] A.C. at p.119.
2 (1955) 15 W.A.C.A.20.
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a share of the estate on the ground that it was contrary 
to public policy to place children born out of wedlock 
on the same footing as the children born in wedlock*
This decision was reversed by the West African Court of 
Appeal* It held that the status of legitimacy was to 
be determined by the law of Nigeria which includes 
customary law (the law of the domicile of the appellants); 
and, since the effect of the deceased’s acknowledgement 
of the appellants’ paternity was to make them legitimate 
under customary law (Yoruba customary law), they were 
entitled to succeed to his estate, along with his other
i
legitimate children .
The report of the case (Alake’s) does not make it 
clear whether the children, whose paternity was acknow­
ledged, were born during the subsistence of their father's 
marriage under the Marriage Act, or whether they were 
born before such marriage or after it had been determined. 
For some time after Alake’s decision, there existed no 
authority on the status of an acknowledged child born to
1 The principle established or, better still, recognised 
in this ease has since, of course, been followed by 
the High Courts. See: Jirigho v. Anamali CL958J 
W.N.L.R. 195 (High Court of the old Western Region); 
Taylor and ors *v» Taylor [l96<3 L.L.R.286 (High Court of 
Lagos)*
2 (1955) 15 W.A.C.A.20.
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a man, during the continuance of his marriage under the 
Marriage Act, toy a woman other than his wife. In i960, 
the Supreme Court had the opportunity to pronounce 
authoritatively on the matter. In Cole v. Akinyele and
A
ors* , the deceased had married under the Marriage Act, 
the first respondent toeing a child of this marriage.
After the death of his wife, he married the second res­
pondent, also under the Marriage Act* He also had two 
sons toorn to him as a result of an irregular association 
with another woman. These two children were the appellants. 
The first appellant was toorn out of wedlock during the sub­
sistence of the deceased’s first marriage; while the 
second appellant, although conceived out of wedlock 
during the subsistence of the first marriage, was toorn 
some six weeks after the death of the deceased’s first 
wife, tout toefore his second marriage. The deceased 
acknowledged the paternity of tooth appellants during his 
lifetime. They claimed that they were entitled to share 
in their father’s estate since he had acknowledged their 
paternity, an act which under Yorutoa customary law made 
them legitimate. They gave no evidence of the Yorutoa
1 (I960) V F.S.C*8li..
1
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customary law of acknowledgement of paternity, but
•4
instead relied on Alake’s ease and section 1U(2) of
2
the Evidence Act* The trial Judge dismissed their
* "1 claim, distinguishing Alake’s case on the ground that,
in that ease, the deceased’s wife had died at the time 
of birth of the acknowledged children; while in the 
instant case, the first appellant was born when a valid 
legal marriage subsisted, and the second appellant was 
conceived during the subsistence of the deceased marriage, 
and so was ’’already in being” during the period of the 
subsistence of the marriage*
On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the decision 
of the lower Court given with respect to the first appel­
lant’s claim. The Court held that the first appellant 
was born out of wedlock during the continuance of a 
marriage under the Marriage Act, and was, therefore, 
illegitimate, notwithstanding his natural father’s acknow­
ledgement of paternity* The Court was of the view 
that to apply the rule of Yoruba customary law relating 
to acknowledgement of paternity would be contrary to 
public policy; and that the first appellant could only
1 (1955) 15 W.A.C.A. 20.
2- Cap.62, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria and Lagos. 
1958.
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be legitimated, if at all, under the general law, that 
is, the Legitimacy Act . Brett, F.J., who delivered the 
judgement of the Court, said:
"I am not prepared to treat Alake v. Pratt as authority 
for the proposition that while a man is married under the 
Marriage Ordinance he can make a child born to him during 
the continuance of that marriage by a woman other than his 
wife, legitimate by the mere acknowledgement of paternity 
and I should regard such a rule as contrary to public 
policy”(2)
As regards the claim of the second appellant, how­
ever, the Court held that the appeal must succeed on the 
ground that he was legitimate, being born at a time when 
the father’s marriage under the Marriage Act had been 
determined as a result of the death of the wife. At that 
time the deceased was free to marry according to customary 
law, and the general law relating to marriage was no 
longer applicable to him. And since under the relevant 
provisions of the general law, the time for determining 
legitimacy is the time of the child's birth, and not the 
time of its conception, public policy was not contravened 
by recognising the Yoruba customary law rule of acknow­
ledgement of paternity. The Court further held that
1 Cap.103, s.3(1), Ibid.
2 (i960) V F.S.C. at p.87. The public policy which was 
being protected seemed to be the policy against promis­
cuity and extra-marital relations.
93.
there was nothing in Alains case to warrant the observa­
tion made by the trial Judge to the effect that the 
acknowledged children in that case were born after the 
death of the wife married by their father under the Marriage 
Act.
In 1961, the Supreme Court laid down the categories 
of legitimate children in Nigeria* This was in the case
1 A
of Lawal and ors.: Ekun and ors* v * Younan and ors. , an
2
action brought under the English Fatal Accidents Acts on 
behalf of the customary widows and children of two deceased 
persons, who were married in accordance with the provisions 
of customary law. Referring to the concept of legitimacy 
in Nigeria and comparing it with that under English law, 
Ademola, C*5VF.» observed:
"Unlike in England, legitimate children in Nigeria are 
not confined to children born in wedlock or children 
legitimated by subsequent marriage of the parents. In 
Nigeria, a child is legitimate if born in wedlock accor­
ding to the Marriage Ordinance. There are also legitimate 
children born in marriage under Native haw and Custom. 
Children not born in wedlock (Marriage Ordinance) or who 
are not the issues of a marriage under Native Law and 
Custom, but are issues born without marriage can also be
1 [1961! All N.L.R. 2k5; [196^ W.N.L.R. 197.
2 (181+6) 9 & 10 Viet., e.93; and (1862+) 27 & 28 Viet., c.95.
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*1
regarded as legitimate for certain purposes , if paternity 
has been acknowledged by the putative father - see 
Bamgbose v. Daniel Ik W.A.C.A. 111 and 115 and Alake v. 
Pratt 15 W.A.C.A. 20. On the face of this, it is clear 
that legitimacy in England is a different concept to 
legitimacy in Nigeria”. (2)
Widow
It will become apparent in later chapters dealing 
with the customary scheme of distribution that a surviving 
wife is not entitled to inherit any property from her 
deceased husband under customary law. The position is, 
however, different when section 36 of the Marriage Act 
applies; for example, when a man married under the 
Marriage Act is survived by the issue of such marriage, 
and a wife he had married under customary lav/ after the 
determination of his marriage under the Marriage Act.
The point here considered may be stated thus: suppose 
X marries Y in accordance with the provisions of the Mar- 
riage Act, and there is an issue of such .marriage; and
1 The "certain purposes” are not specified. There is no 
doubt that succession would be one of these purposes. 
See: Coker, Family property among the Yoruba. p.266.
The author is, however, of the view that the legal 
effect of acknowledgement of paternity is not to make 
the acknowledged child legitimate, but merely to entitle 
him to inherit his father’s property. It is submitted 
that this view makes a distinction without a difference; 
and that the better view is that the acknowledged child 
becomes legitimate (or, at least, legitimated). See 
Lawal*s case Tl959l W-.N«L.R. 155 atp.163 (High Court of 
Western Region); and the authorities already examined 
in this section.
2 11961} All N.L.R. at p.250; 1961 W.N.L.R. at p.202.
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on determination of such marriage, he marries Z under 
customary lav/* What is Z fs legal position with respect 
to the succession to X ’s estate, if X dies intestate, 
leaving Z and the issue of the marriage under the Act 
surviving him? It will be recalled that, in these cir­
cumstances, the provisions of section 36 of the Marriage 
Act and, with them, those of the English Statute of 
Distribution govern X ’s succession, since there is an
issue of the marriage under the Marriage Act surviving
a
him. It will also be recalled that in He Somefun ,
where the customary widow was the wife of an issue of
a marriage under the Marriage Act, the West African Court
of Appeal rejected the Administrator-Geheral’s argument
that the word "wife" under the Statute of Distribution
should include the widow under customary law,
2
In He Adadevoh and ors., however, the West African
A
Court of Appeal overruled its own decision in He Some fun
and, even though no claim was made by the widow or widows
of the customary marriages, the Court indicated that the
"widow" or "widows" could succeed if they claimed and
3established proof of marriage * It will be remembered'
1 (1941) 7 W,A*C,A* 136.
2 (1951) 13 W.A.C.A. 301+.
3 Ibid, at p.311.
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that the deceased in Be Adadevoh and ors. was an issue
of a marriage under the Marriage Act, and had himself
contracted a marriage under that Act* This marriage 
was determined by the death of the wife, and there were 
no issue of the marriage* Both before this marriage 
and after it had been determined, the deceased had entered 
into several customary marriages, the wives of which the 
Court was prepared to accord the status of widows" under 
the Statute of Distribution.
2The Ghana case of Coleman v. Shang has fully 
recognised the claim of a "widow" under customary law 
under the provisions of the Statute of Distribution.
In that case, the deceased first married under customary
law* There were three children of this marriage. After
the death of his cutomary wife, he contracted a marriage 
under the Ghana Marriage Ordinance, the appellant being
s
the only surviving issue of the marriage. When the 
second (Ordinance) wife died, he married the respondent 
under customary law. He died intestate leaving an issue
1 (1951) 13 W.A.C.A.30h*
2 [1959] G.L.R.390 (Ghana Court of Appeal); [196| 2
All E.B* h06; tl96l| A.C. h81 - Privy Council. 
Discussed in [i960] J.A.L.160.
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of the Ordinance marriage, children of a customary 
marriage and a widow of the customary union» Section 
bQ of the Ghana Marriage Ordinance (similar to section 
36 of the Nigerian Marriage Act except that it applies 
to two-thirds of the estate), therefore, applied by 
virtue of which two-thirds of the estate fell to be 
distributed in accordance with the provisions of the 
Statute of Distribution. The Privy Council, affirming 
the decision of the Ghana Court of Appeal, held that the 
widow under customary law toolc under the Statute of Dis­
tribution. . The ground for the decision was that the 
status of a wife or widow was to be determined by the 
law of Ghana (the law of the domicile) which ascribed 
that status to all persons regarded as lawful wives or 
widows whether they be married under the Marriage Ordi­
nance or in accordance with customary law* Lord Tucker, 
adverting to the difficulties that might arise in the 
case of a man survived by more than one customary widow, 
said:
"Difficulties may, no doubt, arise in the application 
of this decision in cases where there are more than 
one widow both in dealing with applications for the 
grant of letters of administration and in the distribution 
of the estate, but they can be dealt with as. and when 
they arise." (l)
1 [l96l{ 2'All E.E. at p.412; [1961] A.C. at p.495.
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It is doubtful whether it was ever the intention 
of the legislature to benefit the widow of a customary 
marriage in this way. It cannot, however, be doubted 
that this decision constitutes one of the valiant attempts 
at judicial manipulation. It is to be hoped that a 
surviving husband in similar circumstances v/ould be treated 
in the same way, since what is sauce for the goose is 
sauce for the gander.
Property to which the section applies
Paragraph (b) of subsection (l) mentions, and 
excludes from the operation of the provisions of section 
36,"real property the succession to which cannot by 
native law and custom be affected by testamentary disposition". 
The most obvious example of such property is unpartitioned 
land, belonging to the family, which devolves according 
to customary law. Thus, in Caulcrick v. Harding and
i
and anor.. real property was left by a man to his three 
daughters, one of whom was married to the plaintiff in 
accordance with the provisions of the Marriage Act. This 
daughter so married to the plaintiff, died intestate sur­
vived by him. He claimed one-third share of the property
l (1926)7 n.l.r.48.
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in virtue of* his deceased’s wife’s right* Tew* <!•* held 
that the plaintiff was not entitled to such a share of 
the property since it was family property* and under 
customary law no one of those entitled had any right 
or interest of which she could dispose without the consent 
of the others • The three daughters were not tenants in 
common as under English law.
1
In Sogunro Davies v* Sogunro Davies and ors. , 
the plaintiff was the illegitimate son of one Alfred 
Sogunro Davies. The latter had died.entitled to a share
of his deceased father's estate of which there had
been no partition up to the date of his death (Alfred 
Sogunro Davies'). Alfred Sogunro Davies had married 
under the Marriage Act. The plaintiff claimed an 
account and payment to him of the share of his grandfather1 
estate to which he was entitled under customary law.
The defendants, the receivers of the grandfather's estate* 
pleaded that by virtue of section 36(a) of the Marriage 
Act all the property of Alfred Sogunro Davies (including 
the share of the grandfather's property) must on his 
death intestate be distributed according to English law#
i (1936)13 N.L.R.15.
1 0 0 .
Graham Paul, J., held that Alfred Sogunro Davies, at the 
date of his death, had no right to dispose by will of 
his share in his father's (the plaintiff's grandfather’s) 
estate, since customary law, not English law, governed 
the plaintiff's right to share in the property of his 
late grandfather*
It should be observed that the provisions of the 
section apply to all personal property left by the deceased 
intestate. It was not perhaps brought to the notice 
of the legislators that personal property (movables) 
might also become family property of which the holder 
for the time being could not dispose outright, whether 
by will, gift or otherwise* Examples of such personal 
property, which might be collectively owned by the members 
of the family, include articles of furniture or personal 
adornment possessing special or unique value, such as 
a specially wrought head-gear or beads. It is submitted 
that family personal property of this type falls outside 
the ambit of the provisions of the section. This is 
because the criterion for the exclusion of real property 
belonging to the family is the disability imposed by 
customary law on the testamentary powers of the intestate -
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a disability which clearly exists in respect of personal 
or movable property jointly owned by the members of the 
deceased intestate’s family*
Scheme of distribution under the rules of English law 
relating to the devolution of personal estates on
•i
intestacy as they stood on the 1st day of January* 1900
o
(a) The Statutes of Distribution - The personal estate
of a man
\
If a man died intestate before the 1st September, 
1 8 9 0, leaving a widow and issue surviving him, the widow 
was entitled to one-third of the estate; and the 
remaining two-thirds of the estate was distributed equally 
among the issue and such persons as legally represented 
any issue in any case where the.issue died before the 
intestate - that is to say, there was the principle of 
representation*^• The descendants of an issue who pre-
1 For a fuller account of these rules see: Halsbury*a 
haws of England. 1st edn.,(l910), vol.11/’pp .16-3 1 : 
Parry, D.H., The law of succession, i+th edn. (1961), 
pp.145-8; 22 E.K. (Ch.). cap. XXXIX. pp.367-382.
2. U670), 22 & 23 Car.2, c.10; and (1685), 1 Jac.2,e.l7.
3 Statute of Distribution (1670) (22 & 23 Car.2, c.10)
s.3.
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deceased the Intestate took per stirpes the share Which
he or she would have taken had he or she survived the
intestate* If he left a widow but no issue, the widow
was entitled to one moiety of the estate^.
If there were no issue or their representatives
(descendants), then subject to the rights of the widow,
2if any, the father took the whole of the estate ; and 
if the father also predeceased the intestate, then, subject
to the rights of the widow, if any, the mother, brothers
and sisters shared equally, the children (not grandchildren) 
of a deceased brother or sister taking their parents* 
share .
If he left neither descendants nor parents but 
only grandparents, brothers and sisters, the grandparents 
were postponed to the brothers and sisters of the intestate**.
In default of descendants, a father, brothers or 
sisters or children (not grandchildren) of brothers or 
sisters, a surviving mother of the intestate took subject
to the rights of the widow, if any, as explained above^.
1 Statute of Distribution (l670) (22 &23 Gar.2, c.10)
s.3.
2 Blackborough v. Davis (1701)- 1 P. Wms *hl at p.U8 .
3 Statute of Distribution (1685) (l Jac*2, c.17), s.7.
k Stephen^ Commentaries on the laws of England. 17th edn. 
(1 9 2 2), vol.il, p.6057~and ^ the authorities cited therein.
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If there were no parents but the next-of-kin 
(other than the widow) were brothers or sisters of the 
intestate and children of deceased brothers or
A
sisters, they shared per stirpes . But this mode of 
distribution was limited to cases where there was at 
least one brother or sister surviving; if all the next- 
of-kin were children of deceased brothers or sisters of 
the intestate, the distribution among them was per capita* 
since they took not by way of representation but as next- 
of-kin.2
In all other cases, and, subject to the claims 
of the widow, if any, the estate went to the intestate’s 
kindred in the nearest degree (next-of-kin) in equal 
shares. The next-of-kin were ascertained in accordance 
with the civil law rule, quot personae tot gradus. that 
is, by computing up from the Intestate to the common
■Z
ancestor and then down again to the claimant.
If there were no next-of-kin but there was an 
executor in existence, the latter took, subject to the 
rights of the widow, if any, unless he was by implication 
excluded by an express gift to him in the will.^*
1 Statute of Distribution (1670) (22 & 23 Car.2 
c.10) ss.6 and 7*
2 Lloyd v. Tench. 2 Ves.Sen.212*
3 Halsbury’s Laws of England. 3rd edn* (1936), vol.16
p .419.
k He Bacon’s Will (1886) 31 Ch.D.U60.
1 0 k .
If there were no next-of-kin or executor, then subject 
to the widow’s rights, if any, the Crown took the estate 
as bona vacantia"*•
(b) Statute of Frauds - Woman’s personal estate
A widower was entitled to all the personal estate 
(including leaseholds) of his deceased wife, in so far as 
it had not been disposed of by her will * If, however, 
she had been judicially separated from him before her 
death, all property acquired by her subsequent to the 
date of the decree of judicial separation devolved at 
her death, in the same way as it would have devolved if 
her husband had been dead*^
The personal estate of an unmarried woman was dis­
tributed in accordance with the rules already stated 
with respect to the estate of a man, save that there was, 
of course, no question as to the rights of a widow or 
husband.
1 He Barnett’s Trusts fl902*j 1 Ch.8U7*
2 U&77) 29 Car.2, c .3.
3 Ibid. s*2k*
k Matrimonial Causes Act (1857) (20 and 21 Viet., c.85), 
s.25; see now Matrimonial Causes Act (1950) (li Geo.6, 
c.25), s *21.
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(c) Intestates Estates Act - Real and personal estate
The Intestates Estates Act governed the distri­
bution of both real and personal estates in cases of 
total intestacies occurring after the 1st September,
1890* The Act was a modification of the Statutes of 
Distribution with respect to the claims of the widow of 
a man dying totally intestate* It provided that where 
a man died totally intestate after the 1st day of 
September 1890, leaving a widow but no issue, the whole 
of his estate, if not exceeding £500 in net value, belonged
p
to his widow absolutely . If, however, such estate 
exceeded £500 in net value, the widow had a claim to 
the first £500, payable rateably out of the real and 
personal estate according to their respective values; 
without prejudice to her other claims in respect of the 
residue of her husband,1 s estate*
1 (1890) 53 & 54 Viet. c.29.
2 Ibid, s.l.
3 Ibid. ss.2 and 4*
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THE EFFECT OP A CHRISTIAN OR MONOGAMOUS MARRIAGES OH
INTESTATE SUCCESSION (CONTINUED)
SUCCESSION NOT GOVERNED BY THE PROVISIONS OP THE 
MARRIAGE ACT________________________________ ___
In respect of the situations listed below, the
provisions of section 36 of the Marriage Act are inap-
licable to the succession of the intestate notwithstanding
his Christian or monogamous marriage; and the fact that
he has left a widow or issue of such marriage surviving
him*
These situations include:
(a) where an intestate,who is subject to customary law,
contracts a marriage under the Marriage Act, but 
leaves immovable property situated outside Lagos;
(b) where an intestate, subject to customary law,
marries under the Marriage Act, leaves movable 
property in Lagos, but dies domiciled elsewhere, 
say, in one of the Regions;
(c) where an intestate, subject to customary law,
enters into a Christian or monogamous marriage 
not in accordance with the provisions of the 
Marriage Act; and
107.
(d) where a person, who is not subject to customary 
law - an Englishman, for instance -contracts a 
Christian or monogamous marriage, whether under 
the provisions of the Marriage Act or some other 
law.
(a) Where the immovable property is situated outside Lagos: 
and
(b) where the movable property of the intestate is situated 
in Lagos, but he died domiciled elsewhere.
Both situations have already been discussed in the 
preeeeding chapter, where it was stated that, under the 
rules of private international law, the provisions of the 
section were clearly inapplicable. In these situations, 
the applicable law is the law of the Region in which the 
immovable property is situated - lex situs - or of the 
Region in which the intestate was domiciled at the time 
of his death - lex domicilii. As will appear shortly, 
the applicable law differs according to the area concerned, 
whether it is the Eastern Region, on the one hand, or the 
Western and the Mid-Western Regions on the other. The 
position in the Eastern Region will be considered first.
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THE EASTERN REGION
(i) Real (immovable?) property
As will have been noticed, a question mark has been 
inserted immediately after the word immovable appearing 
in brackets. This is designed to indicate that the old 
English rules of descent which, as will be seen later, are 
still applicable in the Eastern Region dealt with the 
devolution of only the real or freehold estate of the 
deceased intestate; and that that part of his immovable 
property consisting of leasehold estate was distributed 
in accordance with the provisions of the Statutes of Dis­
tribution discussed in the preceeding chapter. In
the discussion which follows, only the former rules 
(those governing the descent of real estate) are treated; 
those relating to the distribution of personal estates 
being postponed to a later section of this chapter.
Basis of application of English lav/
The statutory provisions by which English law has 
been introduced into the Eastern Region are contained in
<1
both the High Court Law and the Magistrates’ Courts 
2
Law of the Region. These provisions, which are sub-
1 No.27 of 19559 s. 14.
2 No.10 of 1955# s.40.
stantially similar to those embodied in the Law (Miscel- 
laneous Provisions) Act already quoted in chapter 
three, fix the date for the application of English law, 
in respect of any matter within the legislative competence 
of the Region, at the 1st day of January, 1900*
It must be observed that these statutory provisions 
state that the English law applicable should be the com­
mon law of England, the doctrines of equity, together with 
the statutes of general application* The last source 
of the applicable English law is difficult to define, 
and it has been said that "each case has to be decided on 
the merits of the particular statute sought to be enforced. 
Nevertheless, both on the basis of the "rough but not 
infallible test" - geographical generality throughout
England, and generality of application to all classes of
2 3the community - and on actual judicial authority , it
1 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria and Lagos, cap.89* 
8.145.
2 Att* - Gen* v* John Holt and Co .Ltd* (1910)2 N*L,R.l 
at p.21, per Osborne, C.J. Also, the recent case of 
Lawal and ors* v* Younan.and ors* 1961 All N.L.R.245 
at p.256; Cl9'SiT"W*N*L*R. 197 at pp. 20I4.-5 ; where 
Brett, F.J., delivering one of the judgements of the 
Supreme Court of Nigeria, approved of Osborne, C.J.’s 
view*
3 Cole v. Cole (1898) I.N.L.R.15 at p.23.'iff'vrirrrn—i rriitiiirii i*infc •*- - T t i r i . n l — n ^  ***
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may "be stated that the applicable English law relating
to descent of* real estate is to he found in the rules of
*1 2the common law; the Inheritance Act ; the Dower Act ;
■z
and Lord St Leonard’s Act .
The old English Rules of Inheritance or Canons of Descent 
Where the provisions of section 36 of the Marriage 
Act apply, the intestate’s real property is treated as 
personal property for the purposes of distribution^.
Where the old English rules of inheritance apply, however, 
the real property descends in accordance with the canons 
of descent; with the result that, as will be apparent 
later, the eldest son takes all the real estate by the 
rule of primogeniture. There are a number of other dif­
ferences between inheritance under the old English rules 
and succession under the provisions of section 36 of the 
Marriage Act. These will be seen when we discuss the 
scheme of inheritance with respect to the rights of the 
following: (a) spouses;
(b) children;
(e) other heirs; and
(d) the Crown.
1 (1833) 3 & k W i l l C.106.
2 (1833) 3 & k Will.U, c.105.
3 (1859) 22 & 23 Yict.,c.35*
U The Marriage Act, cap .115# s.36(1)9 Laws of the Federation 
of Nigeria and Lagos.
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The statement of the rules is in the past tense*
(a) Spouses 
Husband
A husband enjoyed a life interest in respect of 
the freehold estate in his wife*s possession at her death,
•i
provided that a child of the marriage had been born alive , 
This right of the husband was known as curtesy*
Wife
At common law, she was entitled to a life interest
in one-third of all freehold land acquired by purchase
(not by descent, partition, etc*) by her husband during
coverture, provided that such land was not disposed of
2by her husband, either inter vivos or by his will * In 
addition, she was entitled under the provisions of the 
Dower Act to a life interest in equitable interests to
2
which her husband was beneficially entitled at his death .
(b) Children
The eldest male child took all the deceased father’s
*2
real property by the rule of primogeniture . In default 
of male children, female children inherited together in
1 See; Halsbury’s Daws of England* 3rd edn., vol*32,
pp*299-302; Parry, The law of succession* 4th edn*
p.l44i also the authorities cited therein.
2 See: Halsbury's Laws of England* 3rd edn., vol.32,
pp.302-5; Parry, loc.cit; and the authorities cited 
by the authors.
3 Halsbury’s Laws of Eng;land. 3rd edn., vol.l6, p.425; 
Parry. op * c i t ". * p *l42* *
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A
equal shares or as coparceners . There was the prin­
ciple of representation of lineal descendants (children, 
grandchildren, etc.) in infinitum; so that if A died 
having an eldest son, B, who predeceased him (A), but 
having a son, D, and a younger son, C, who survived him (A)} 
A fs grandson inherited all his freehold lands to the ex-
A
elusion of C and all others •
(c) Rights of other heirs
On failure of lineal descendants or issue of the
2
intestate, the nearest lineal ancestor inherited . Thus 
a father was heir to his intestate son in preference to 
the brother of the intestate . The father also inherited 
before the mother of the intestate. As a rule, the 
scheme of inheritance was such that the paternal ancestor; 
was preferred to the maternal one. Accordingly no male 
maternal ancestor.nor any of his descendants inherited 
until all the paternal ancestors and their descendants had 
failed; nor any female paternal ancestor and her descendants 
until all the male paternal ancestors and their descendants 
had failed; nor any female maternal ancestor nor any of 
her descendants, until all the male maternal ancestors
1 Halsbury's haws of England. 3rd edn., vol.l6, p.l|.25;
Parry, on .cit .p .114.2.
2 The Inheritance Act (1833) (3 & 4 Will.,c.106), s.6*
3 Ibid.. ss.7 and 8.
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*1
and their descendants had failed •
Failing ancestors, collaterals (brothers, sisters,
p
uncles, nephews, etc*) of the full blood inherited •
In default of collaterals of the full blood, those of the
2
half-blood inherited * The significance about the inheri­
tance rights of collaterals was that female collaterals 
of the full blood were preferred to those of the half- 
blood* Thus, a sister of the whole blood inherited before 
a brother of the half-blood. But the mode of inheritance 
was different according as the collaterals were males or 
females. For,while only the eldest male inherited 
where there were two or more males in equal degree, females 
in equal degree all inherited together as coparceners.
(d) The rights of the Crown
On the death intestate of a tenant in fee simple
and without heirs, the Grown was entitled by escheat to
any freehold land vested in him for an estate in fee simple^. 
This right of the Grown existed under the common law.
The Inheritance Act was concerned with the tracing 
of descent and inheritance from the purchas e r, who was 
defined as the person "who last acquired the freehold land
1 Ibid., ss*7 and 8#
2 Ibid** s.9.
3 Parry, op *cit ,* pp*lUU--5. In Eastern Nigeria, this will 
now go to the State of Nigeria.
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otherwise than by descent” • But descent over the
ages was often difficult to trace, and a freehold estate
might escheat to the Crown through failure on the part
of a claimant to establish that the propositus acquired
the land by purchase and not by descent* The hardship
following from such aj ease was minimised by Lord St .Leonard* s 
2Act , by virtue of which descent was to be traced from
p
the person last entitled, as if he had been the purchaser .
(ii) Movable(personal?) property
In keeping with our desire to stress the difference 
between the rules of conflict of laws, where the division 
of property is into movables and immovables, and those of 
the domestic law in the Eastern Region, where the dis­
tinction is between realty and personalty, we have this 
time put a question mark immediately after the word 
personal* We should add that where the deceased intestate*s 
leasehold property is situated in the Region, succession 
to it will be determined in accordance with the rules 
relating to the distribution of personal estates to be 
examined in this section. Where, however, such leasehold
1 The Inheritance Act, op*cit*. s.2*
2 (1859) (22 & 23 Viet.,c.35), s.19.
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property Is situated outside the Region, the applicable 
law will be the lex situs as has been pointed out in the 
proceeding chapter.
The intestate succession to the movable property 
of a person subject to customary law who marries under 
the Marriage Act, but dies domiciled in the Eastern Region, 
is governed by the law of the Region on the ground, as has 
been stated, that such law is the lex domicilii. On the 
basis of the Regional statutory provisions relating to 
the application of English law therein , the Regional law 
of succession is to be found in four English enactments -
the Statutes of Distribution, 1670^ and 1685“*; the
U 5Statute of Frauds^*; and the Intestates Estates Act . It
will be recalled that these English Acts have already been
dealt with in chapter three, where it has been observed
that the Acts still apply in the Federal Territory of
Lagos by virtue of the provisions of section 36 of the
1 S.14 of the High Court Law, No.27 of 1955; s .40 of the
Magistrates1 Courts Law, No.10 of 1955; also, Re Emodie: 
Administrator-General v. Egbuna and ors. (1945)""18 
N.L.R.1, at pp.2 - 3.
2 22 & 23 Car.2,e.10
3 1 Jac.2,c.l7.
4
5
29 Car.2,c.3«
, 53 & 54 Viet.,c.29.
116.
Marriage Act. It now remains to consider some local 
decisions on any of these Acts.
Rights of the Grown (State) to bona vacantia
The most significant difference existing between 
succession to personal property where section 36 of the 
Marriage Act applies and that where the relevant English 
rules govern the distribution by virtue of the Eastern 
Regional statutory provisions introducing English law into 
the Region is in respect of the rights of the Crown to 
bona vacantia. For, whereas under the provisions of 
section 36 any property that would go to the Crown as bona 
vacantia is saved and distributed according to the rules
■i
of the customary law ; under the received English law,
the Crown may still take as bona vacantia. This was
the main point decided in the rather unsatisfactory case
2of Re Emodie: Administrator-General v. Egbuna and ors .
In Re Emodie% Administrator-General v. Eabuna and
2ors* , the deceased, an Ibo, contracted a marriage at 
Port Harcourt in the Eastern Region in accordance with 
the provisions of the Marriage Act. He died intestate
1 S.36(l)(a) of the Marriage Act, cap.115* op.eit.
2 (1945) 18 N.L.R.l. In view of the Republican status of
Nigeria, rights of bona vacantia now belong to the 
State of Nigeria,
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leaving personal property (not specified in the report) 
situated at Port Harcourt; and survived by the widow of 
the marriage. There were no children of the marriage.
Also surviving the deceased intestate were his brother and 
sister, and illegitimate daughter, all three of whom were 
respondents in the suit* The Administrator-General 
applied to the then Supreme Court of Lagos for directions 
as to how the residue of the estate should be distributed.
It was abundantly clear from the facts that the provisions 
of section 36 of the Marriage Act were inapplicable *
The point for determination was whether English law (with­
out the saving clause in the event of the estate belonging 
to the Crown as bona vacantia) applied; or whether the 
distribution was to be governed by the rules of the ap­
plicable customary law, in this case Ibo customary law.
Ames, J., held that the succession to the intestate’s 
personal estate was governed by English law, not the cus­
tomary law; and that the rights of the Crown to any por­
tion of the estate remained unaffected. He observed,
inter alia: ,f The fact that section 36 of the Marriage
Ordinance applies only to Lagos appears 
to me to have the following consequence * It provides 
that any part which under English law would go to the 
Crown shall not do so but shall be distributed in accor­
dance with the native law and custom. There is no such
118
provision applying to the Protectorate* It is not for 
me to make one. Consequently the rights of the Crown to 
any portion of this estate remain unaffected and are 
those which it has by the law of England” . (l)
Before examining the grounds upon which this un­
satisfactory decision has been based, it may be observed 
that even in those days when Nigeria had a unitary con­
stitution (albeit a colonial one) and enjoyed a single 
legal system, the learned Judge took the view that there 
was a ’’Protectorate” domicile and, by inference, a ’’Colony"
domicile. For, he said: "The deceased was ... domiciled
2in the Protectorate.” It is submitted, with res­
pect, that this view of the learned Judge is untenable, 
having regard to the existence of one legal system operating 
throughout the country at the time* As has been observed, 
the concept of domicile is geared to a territory enjoying 
one legal system.
As regards the ground on which the learned Judge 
based his, decision, we shall first take the well-known case 
Cole v. Cole^, which he followed. As will be fully 
seen later,, the principle enunciated in that, case is
that "a Christian marriage clothes the parties to
such marriage and their offspring with a status
unknown to native law.” (4)
T ^ Tbid. at n * 3 IT~ — — —  —  — —  —
2 At p .2.
3 (1898) 1 N.L.R.15.
4 Ibid, at p.22; per Brandford Griffith, J. Cf. Coker
and ors. v. Coker and anor. (1943) 17 N.L.R.55, at 
p.57 where Brooke J., followed Cole v. Cole, op. cit.
— * r  infitrrw uifrM* r . w h i rpi'i^iii ihi.tip»i * irnWn inn ^  i m  ■ i.n n
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Hence English law, not customary law, must govern the 
succession to intestates married in accordance with
-t
Christian rites. But the case of Smith v. Smith stood
A
in his way. In Smith v. Smith . Van Der Meulen, J., 
observed that the mere fact that a person had contracted 
a Christian marriage was not conclusive evidence that 
English law, not customary law, should govern his succes­
sion; and that the intestate’s way of life - including 
his education and general position in life - must be taken 
into account in the choice of law determining his succes- 
sion. Ames, J., however, distinguished Smith’s case on 
three grounds, none of which, it is respectfully submitted, 
is tenable: that the facts of the case were exceptional;
that it dealt with real property, while he was concerned 
v/ith personal property in Emodie’s case ; and that counsel 
for the next-of-kin had relied on section 36 of the Marriage 
Act and on section 20 of the Supreme Court Ordinance , 
instead of basing their case on the circumstances of the 
deceased’s life.
The answer to the first ground for the untenable 
distinction is that every case is decided on its own facts, 
whether these are described as exceptional or not. As
1 (1924) 5 N.L.R. 105. ~ ~
2 (1945) 18 N.L.R. 1.
3 See now the High Court of Lagos Act, cap.80, s.27; The 
High Court Law, Western Region, cap *44* s*12; The High 
Court Law, Eastern Region, No.27 of 1955* s.22.
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regards the second ground, there is nothing in the report
■1
of Smith1s case to warrant the view that the decision
would have been different had the property in dispute been
personalty rather than realty. The third ground seemed
to suggest that the Court might have decided differently
had counsel for the next-of-kin adopted the line of argument
suggested by the Judge, But the short answer is that
the Supreme Court, being a Court of Justice, ought to have,
of its own motion, taken the point and decided in favour
of the next-of-kin. The decision is, to say the least,
and with due respect, most unsatisfactory. It has the
effect of applying a more rigorous general law of succession
to the Provinces, where the customary law is more potent,
than is the case of Lagos where foreign influences have
2
tempered and are tempering the force of customary law . 
Furthermore, it did not occur to the learned Judge that 
while persons marrying under the Marriage Act in Lagos are 
warned of the effect of the section on their succession, 
the deceased in Emodie's case was not so warned^.
1 (1924) 5 N.L.R.105.
2 See Osborne^ f C.J.fs remarks in Lewis v. Bankole (1908)
1 N.L.B* 81 at p*101, to the effect that customary law 
outside Lagos was less affected by English influence,
3 8,36(2) of the Marriage Act.
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That the decision in Emodie’s case is a doubtful
authority may be seen in the recent case of Onwudinioh v,
2Onwudin.joh , where Ainley, C.J., as he then was, refused 
to follow Cole v, Cole^ on which Ames, <T*, had based his
A
decision in Emodie’s case • The facts in Onwudin.ioh y.
2
Qnwudinloh are briefly as follows: the deceased had
contracted a marriage under the Marriage Act in 1926 at 
Makurdi in the Northern Region* During the subsistence 
of the marriage, however, he purported to have contracted 
a customary union with another woman. He died in 1 946 
leaving the widow and six children of the marriage (the 
eldest among whom was the plaintiff); the other woman, 
he purported to have married under customary law, and four 
children born to him by this woman, the four defendants 
in this action. Shortly after the deceased’s death, a 
document alleged to be his will was discovered, which left 
the bulk of his property to the defendants. The plaintiff 
sued seeking a declaration that the will was invalid, 
and that he was entitled to the father’s estate on the 
resulting intestacy.
It was held (a) that the will was invalid on the
1 (1945) 18 N.L.R.l.
2 Ci957) II E.N.L.R.l.
3 (1898) 1 N.L.R.15.
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ground.that it did not comply with the provisions of the 
Wills Act relating to attestation; (b) that the defendants, 
being the offspring of an illicit union, had no interests 
whatever in their deceased father's intestate estate; and
(c) that the proper persons entitled to apply for a grant 
of the letters of administration were the plaintiff and 
the deceased's widow of the marriage under the Marriage Act.
A
As regards the principle in Cole v* Cole to the effect 
that a Christian marriage "clothes the parties ... and 
their offspring with a status unknown to native law", 
the learned Chief Justice said:
"That resume of the decision errs on the side of simplicity 
... and I would hesitate for very long before accepting all 
the conclusions which could logically be drawn from the 
case of Cole v. Cole. I do not decide this case upon the 
principles laid down in that case, for I think that that 
case itself and the whole line of cases decided by reference 
to it may one day be called in question by the Federal 
Supreme Court...."(2)
THE WESTERN AND MID-WESTERN REGIONS
In both the Western and Mid-Western Regions of
1 #(1898) i N.L.R.15.
2 ( 1 9 5 XI E.N.L.R. at pp.4 and 5. For other cases in 
which the decision in Cole v. Cole has been doubted, see: 
Smith v. Smith (1924) 5 N.L.R.105* and Bamgbose v.
Daniel (195*4.) Ik W.A.C.A.116: 0-95UJ 3 All E.R.263; [1955J 
A.C.107* The decision has not yet, however, been 
expressedly (or impliedly )overruled.
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Nigeria* the law governing the distribution of intestate
estates of persons contracting Christian marriage is
•1
the Administration of Estates Law • The Law is, in sub­
stance, a reproduction of two English statutes - the Admini-
o
stration of Estates Act and the Intestates’ Estates 
Act^.
The provisions of the Law are wider than those of 
section 36 of the Marriage Act: the Law governs the suc­
cession whether the Christian marriage is under the Marriage
I j _
Act or not ; while section 36 is limited to succession 
where the Christian marriage is in accordance with the 
provisions of the Marriage Act. Under the provisions 
of the Law, however, there is a difference between the 
succession to the estate of an intestate (who is also 
subject to customary law) married under the Marriage Act 
and that of one contracting a Christian marriage not under 
the Marriage Act. In the latter case, the rights of the 
Crown (now State) to take as bona vacantia remain unaf­
fected; in the former, the Crown (state) is expressly
1 Cap.l* vol.l, Laws of the Western Region, 1959*
2 (1 9 2 5) 15 G-eo.5»c.23.
3 (1952) 15 & 16 Geo.6 & 1 Eliz.2, c.64*
k The Administration of Estates Law, op.cit.. s.49(1) and
(5)* Section 1(3) expressly excludes succession 
governed by customary law.
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precluded from talcing, and any rights that would have gone
to it are distributed in accordance with the customary law
1
to which the intestate was subject*
The relevant provisions of the Law relating to 
the intestate succession of persons, who are subject to 
customary law, but who marry under the Marriage Act are 
similar to those contained in section 36 of the Marriage 
Act. They (the relevant provisions of the Law) read as 
follows:
"Where any person who is subject to customary law contracts 
a marriage in accordance with the provisions of the Marriage 
Ordinance and such person dies intestate after the commence­
ment of this Law 23rd April, 19593 leaving a widow
or husband or any Issue of such marriage, any property of 
which the said intestate might have disposed by will shall 
be distributed in accordance with the provisions of this 
Law, any customary law to the contrary notwithstanding:
Provided that -
(a) where by virtue of paragraph (vi) of sub-section (l) 
of this section the residuary estate would belong to the 
Crown as bona vacantia such residuary estate shall be dis­
tributed in accordance with customary law and shall not 
belong to the Crown.
(b) any real property the succession to which cannot by 
customary law be affected by testamentary disposition shall 
descend in accordance with customary law anything herein
to the contrary notwithstanding." (2)
1 I'bid, s.U9 (5)(a).
2 Ibid. s.k9 (5)#
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Rules of distribution under the Administration of Estates
Law. No distinction between realty and personalty*
On the death intestate of a person married under 
a monogamous or Christian system of marriage, his realty 
and personalty are subjected to the same rules of distri­
bution under the Administration of Estates Law. The posi­
tion is similar to that under the English Administration of 
Estates Act ; and the intestacy creates “statutory trusts*1
for the benefit of the surviving spouse, the children and
2relatives of the intestate *
Rights of the intestate1s beneficiaries
The inheritance rights of the intestate’s bene­
ficiaries may be divided into four groups, namely:
(i) rights of the surviving spouse;
(ii) rights of the children;
(iii) rights of relatives, and
(iv) rights of the Crown (State), if any.
(i) Rights of the surviving spouse
If the intestate leaves a surviving spouse and 
Issue, the surviving spouse takes the personal
1 Op .crt., s. 1^ 7*
2 The Administration of Estates Law, op.cit..s.2.
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■1
chattels absolutely, together with a sum equal to one-
third of the residuary estate free of costs, charged on
the residuary estate with interest at per cent per
annum from the date of death until the date of payment.
In addition, the surviving spouse takes a life interest
2in one-third of the residuary estate .
If the intestate leaves no issue but surviving 
spouse, a parent, a brother or sister of the whole blood 
or issue of a brother or sister of the whole blood, the 
surviving spouse takes on the lines indicated above, save 
that he or she is in this case entitled to a sum equal 
to two-thirds of the residuary estate; and, in addition, 
ore^half of the residuary estate is held in trust for him 
or her ,
Where,however, the intestate leaves a surviving
1 Loc.cit« The definition of personal chattels contained 
in s.2 of the Law comprises a long list of things, 
instruments and apparatuses. Briefly, however, it 
includes indoor and outdoor furniture and effects, also 
motor cars, jewelry, plate, books and consumable stores, 
but does not include chattels used for business pur­
poses or money or securities for money. See Parry,
The law of succession, iyth edn. (1961), p.151*
2 The Administration of Estates Law. op.cit.. s.h9(l)
(i)(2) •
3 Ibid. s.U9(l)(i)(3).
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spouse and there are no issue, no parent or brother or
sister of the whole blood or issue of such brother or
sister, the residuary estate is held in trust for the sur-
- 1viving spouse absolutely *
(ii) The Rights of the children
If the deceased leaves a surviving spouse and 
children, then subject to the rights of the surviving spouse 
already stated, two-thirds of the residuary estate is 
held on the statutory trusts for the children who also take 
the reversion on the other one-third share of the residuary
estate, which is held on the statutory trust for the sur-
2viving spouse • If there Is no surviving spouse, the whole 
of the residuary estate, including the personal chattels, 
is held on the statutory trusts for the children. Dis­
tribution as between the issue is on the basis of equality^".
5There is the principle of representation.
(iii) Rights of relatives
If the intestate leaves no issue, then subject
to the rights of a surviving spouse, if any, the residuary
estate goes to a surviving parent absolutely or to both
6
parents equally as the case may be #
1 Ibid, s.U9(I)(i)(l)•
2 The Administration of Estates Law, op.cit. .s .h9(l)(i)(2).
3 Ibid* s.49(l)(il).
Ibid, s.50(l)(i). By virtue of this section, beneficiaries 
inequal degree of relationship to the intestate take 
equally.
5 Loc.cit.
6 Tbid.'sVU9(l)(i)(5)(b)(i) ♦
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Failing issue and parents, brothers and sisters of 
the full blood take, subject, of course, to the rights of
i
the surviving spouse, if any*
In default of issue, husband or wife and parents,
the order of preference is as follows:
(a) brothers and sisters of the whole blood ;
(b) brothers and sisters of the half-blood^;
/ > 2(c) grandparents ;
(d) uncles and aunts (being brothers and sisters of the 
whole blood of a parent of the intestate) ; and
(e) uncles and aunts (being brothers and sisters of the
half-blood of a parent of the intestate)^.
(iv) Rights of the Crown (now State)
If the intestate dies without leaving a spouse,issue, 
parents, brothers or sisters, grandparents, uncles and 
aunts, who survive him, the residuary estate belongs to 
the Crown (State) as bona vacantia^; providing that, if 
he was subject to customary law and married under the 
Marriage Act, it would not belong to the Crown (state), 
but would devolve in accordance with customary law^1.
1 Ibid. s.U9(l)(i)(3)(b)(ii).
2 Ibid, s.l+9(l)(v).
3 Ibid. s .49(1K v i ) . 
k Ibid. s .14.9 (5 )\a) .
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(c) Where a person subject to customary law contracts 
a Christian marriage not in accordance with the 
•provisions of the Marriage Act*
A person subject to customary lav/ who contracts a 
Christian marriage outside Nigeria celebrates the marriage 
in accordance with the provisions of the law of the place
•i
where such a marriage takes place. This means that the 
succession to his intestate estate falls outside the 
provisions of the Marriage Act. But the law governing 
his intestate succession in Nigeria - if he dies intestate 
domiciled in any part of Nigeria, or dies intestate 
leaving immovable property situated therein - varies ac­
cording as the area concerned is either the Federal Terri­
tory of Lagos and the Eastern Region or the Western and Mid- 
Western Regions* The most obvious example is the Nigerian 
student, who contracts a Christian marriage in this country, 
and who returns to one of the component units of Nigeria, 
where he dies (intestate) domiciled or where he leaves 
immovable property.
The -Western and Mid-Western Regions
It will be recalled that the law governing the 
intestate succession of persons married in accordance
1 Berthiaume v. Dastous fl93ol A.C.79.
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with Christian rites Is. the Administration of Estates Law, 
which, as we have seen, makes no distinction between the 
real and personal estate of the intestate. The only 
distinction it makes is between the succession of an in­
testate married under Christian marriage not in accordance 
with the Marriage Act, where the rights of the Crown(State) 
to bona vacantia remain unaffected; and that of an intestate 
married under the Marriage Act, where the rights of bona 
vacantia are ousted in favour of customary beneficiaries•
The Federal Territory of Lagos and the Eastern Region 
The general rule is that English law as it stood 
on the 1st January, 1900, governs the succession of a 
person subject to customary law, who contracts a Christian 
marriage not under the Marriage Act, and who dies intestate, 
domiciled in the Federal Territory of Lagos or the Eastern 
Region; or who dies intestate - whether or not such a 
person is also domiciled in Lagos or Eastern Nigeria - 
leaving immovable property in these places. The English 
law at the material date has already been considered in 
an earlier part of this chapter. In some of the cases, 
however, the Courts have refused to apply the relevant 
rules of English law, and have, instead, applied the rules
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of the applicable customary law* We shall now examine 
the attitude of the Courts to both the rules of the English 
law and those of the customary law.
Judicial application of the English rules of inheritance 
and those of customary law 
English rules of inheritance
The locus classicus of the cases is *the decision in
-i
Cole v. Cole . There, the deceased, John William Cole 
(a native of Lagos) married the defendant, Mary Cole, in 
Sierra Leone in 186U in accordance with the Christian rites. 
He returned to Lagos where he died intestate in 1897 
domiciled in Nigeria. He was survived by a widow (the 
defendant), a brother and a lunatic son. The brother 
claimed in the lower court that he was the customary heir 
of the deceased and, as such, should succeed to the property 
as trustee for the lunatic son of the deceased. The 
widow, however, claimed that, since the deceased had con­
tracted a Christian marriage, English law, not customary 
law, should govern the succession; and, therefore,the 
lunatic son was the lawful heir to the real estate left 
by the deceased. The Divisional Court (lower court) 
gave judgement for the brother. On appeal, the Pull Court
1 (1898) 1 N.L.R.15*
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reversed the judgement of the Divisional Court, holding
that it would he contrary to the principles of justice,
equity and good consience to allow customary law to govern
the succession on the ground that the intestate’s Christian
marriage clearly showed that there was an intention to
regulate his succession by English law. The Full Court
based its decision on the wording of section 14 of the
then Supreme Court Ordinance which provided that native
law and custom should apply to natives especially in
causes and matters relating to marriage, inheritance and
land tenure, but which also further provided that
"no party shall be entitled to claim the benefit of any 
local law or custom, if it shall appear either from 
express contract or from the nature of the transactions 
out of which any suit or question may have arisen, that 
such party agreed that his obligations in connection with 
such transactions should be regulated by English law, (l),f
During the course of his judgement in the Full Court, 
Brandford Griffith, J., examined the differing incidents 
of Christian and customary marriages. He instanced the 
case of a doctor or barrister who married an educated
, 1 Bee now: the High Court of Lagos Act, Laws of the
Federation of Nigeria and Lagos, cap.80,s.27; the 
High Court Law, Western Nigeria, cap.12; the High 
Court Law, Eastern Nigeria, No.27 of 1955 > s.22.
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lady according to Christian rites, and argued against 
the "monstrous" result if customary law were applied to 
such a marriage and the wife required to marry the deceased 
doctor’s or lawyer’s brother. Explaining the position 
of a spouse of a Christian marriage and the offspring of 
such marriage, he said:
"Christian marriage imposes on the husband duties and 
obligations not recognised by native lav/....In fact, a 
Christian marriage clothes the parties to such marriage and 
their offspring with a status unknown to native law", (l)
It is submitted that, the view that the nature of a 
Christian marriage implies an agreement to subject one’s 
whole life to English law is untenable. What, for 
instance, is the sort of agreement that binds a person who 
first contracts a Christian marriage, and later, on the 
death of the other spouse, enters into a customary union?
Is the intestate succession in such a case governed by 
both English law and customary law, at the same time?
It is significant that, despite Brandford Griffith, J.’s, 
illustration regarding the mode of life of the doctor, 
barrister and the educated lady, the Court made no 
reference at all to the intentions, manner of life, or 
the education of John William Cole or his widow. The 
Court was solejy concerned with the fact that the Coles
1 (1898) 1 N.L.R. at p.22* Cf. Coker v. Coker (1943)
17 N.L.R.55 at p.57.
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had contracted a Christian marriage* But the decision 
is supportable on quite another ground, for even customary 
law, on which the plaintiff (John William Cole’s brother) 
based his claim, gave him, as we shall see, no legal 
right to succeed to the estate of his deceased brother so 
long as the letter’s son was alive; the fact that such 
a son was a lunatic could only make the claimant a guardian, 
not a legal owner of the property.
In Adegbola v. Folaranmi & ors» * the principle
o
enunciated in Cole v. Cole was not only followed, but 
inelegantly extended. In that case, the deceased, 
a native of Oyo in Yorubaland, had been married to the 
plaintiff’s mother, under customary law. Subsequently, 
the deceased was captured as a sl&ve, and taken to the 
West Indies, where during his stay of some forty years, he 
became a Christian and married another woman according 
to Christian rites. He returned to Nigeria and, in 1876, 
bought a piece of land, built a house and took up residence 
therein in Lagos. He died intestate in 1900, his wife 
by the Christian marriage continuing to live in the house 
and property. In 1918, this wife died leaving a will 
by which she devised the house and property to her
1 (1921) 3 N.L.R.89.
2 (1898) 1 N.L.R.15*
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executor, the defendant in the suit. The plaintiff - 
the only issue of the customary marriage - claimed to 
succeed under customary law to her father’s property.
The defendant, however, contended that English law applied 
by virtue of the deceased’s Christian marriage, and, 
therefore, the plaintiff was not entitled;, as she claimed, 
since she was not an issue of the Christian marriage.
Combe, C.J., held that English law applied and, most 
surprisingly, that the plaintiff was not entitled to succeed 
on the ground that she was not the issue of the Christian 
marriage. It should be observed that, although Combe,
C.J., claimed to have followed Cole v. Cole**. Adegbola’s
-I
case went further than the decision in Cole v. Cole, for 
not only did it decide that English law should govern the 
order of succession to the deceased’s estate, but also that 
it should govern the status of persons entitled to come 
within that order. The result of the mechanical applica­
tion of English law by the Court was that the legitimate 
child of a valid customary marriage (i.e. the plaintiff) 
was bastardised for the purposes of inheritance with 
respect to her deceased5father’s estate* It will, however, 
have been observed that this unreasoning application of
1 (1898) 1 N.L.R.l 5.
136.
•1
English law has been put right in He Adadevoh and ors. «
2 3 it.Bambose v. Daniel , Alake v* Pratt^ and Cole v. Akinyele *
which have held that, subject to the repugnancy principle
and public policy, the status of legitimacy - and, hence
the right to inherit from a deceased parent - is to be
determined by the law of the claimant’s domicile .
6In 1942, in the case of Gooding v* Martins , the
West African Court of Appeal, purporting to follow the
principle laid down in Cole v, Cole^* extended the grounds
7upon which the decision m  Cole v, Cole* was based. The 
deceased had first contracted a Christian marriage, during 
the subsistence of which the plaintiff was born. After 
the death of his first wife, he married again but under 
customary law, the defendants being the children of this 
marriage* On these facts, the Court held, in an extremely 
terse judgement, that only the plaintiff, the child of 
the Christian marriage, was entitled to inherit the deceased’s
1 (1951) 13 W.A.C.A.304.  ^ _
2 (1954) 14 W.A*C*A.ll6; KL95W 3 All E.R.263; tl953 A.C.107.
3 (1955) 15 W.A.C.A.20. '
4 (i960) Y.E.S.C.84.
5 See chapter 3; also Lawal and ors: Ekun and ors. v*
Younan and ors* D-96l{ All N*L.H*245; l!96lj W.N.L.H.197, 
where the concept of legitimacy in England was compared 
and' contrasted with the position in Nigeria.
6 (1942) 8 W.A.C.A.108; cf. HeSomefun (1941) 7 W.A*C*A*156.
7 (1898) i N.L.H.15.
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estate. The defendants were excluded from inheriting 
their deceased father’s estate on the ground that they 
were not, in effect, legitimate children for the purposes 
of succession. Happily enough, this decision, like that
Customary rules of inheritance
In some cases, the Courts have rejected the mechanical
application of English law with respect to the intestate
succession of persons contracting Christian marriage;
and have applied the rules of customary lav/ instead.
They have done this by having due regard to the mode of
life, the education and the circumstances of the intestate;
ov to the conduct of the parties claiming under English law.
The first of these cases was that of Asiata v.
2
Goncallo , decided just two years after the decision in
*
Cole v. Cole ♦ There, the deceased, a Yoruba Moslem, had 
been sold into slavery and taken to Brazil, where he married 
a woman first according to Islamic rites, and then ac­
cording to Christian rites. The second celebration was 
made in the belief that it alone would give State recognition 
to their first marriage which they regarded, for all other 
purposes, as the only genuine one. There were two
no longer represents the law
2 (1900) 1 N.L.R.41
3 (1898) 1 N.L.R.15
1 (1921} 3 N.L.R.89
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daughters of this t!Christian*Moslem” marriage. When the
deceased returned to Nigeria, he married a second woman
under Moslem lav/, the plaintiff being the only child of
this marriage* Upon the death intestate of the deceased,
it was held that all the children of the deceased we,re
entitled to share in his estate according to the provisions
of Moslem law. ' The Court refused to follow the decision
iin Cole v. Cole on the ground that that ease concerned 
intestacy, while in the instant case the question to be 
determined was the validity of the second (customary) 
marriage. Such a distinction, it is submitted, cannot 
be supported, since the question of whether English law 
or Moslem law should be applied to the succession to the 
deceased’s estate depended entirely upon the validity, 
or otherwise, of the second marriage. The Court was, 
hov/ever, on firmer grounds when it based its decision 
on the circumstances of the deceased as a devout Moslem, 
and applied Islamic law, notwithstanding his Christian 
marriage. As Griffith, J., said:
TfIt is clear from the evidence that Alii [i.e. the de­
ceased) was a bona fide follower of the prophet, and as 
such was legally entitled to marry many wives ..... But 
it may be fairly argued that assuming this marriage [i*e. 
the Christian marriage] to be legal, still it would be 
contrary to justice that Selia the wife of the
1 (1898) 1 N.L.R.15*
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Christian marriage] having impliedly contracted hy her 
Christian marriage for monogamy, her offspring should 
suffer hy the breach of that contract by their father.
But the contract which a Christian marriage would ordinarily 
imply was clearly not implied in the present case as Selia 
not only went through the Mohammedan ceremony of marriage 
first but she does not appear to have raised the slightest 
objection to her husband's subsequent marriages and wives...nl
Speed, Ag.C.J., was, however, of the view that the deceased
had not contracted a valid Christian marriage* He said:
,fI do not admit that the parties in this case contracted a 
Christian marriage at all* They were Mohammedans and 
they merely for local reasons went through the marriage 
ceremony in Christian form. Before and aftev the ceremony 
they lived and they died Mohammedans 2
In Smith v. Smith it was held that the position in
life occupied by the parties and their conduct with 
reference to the property in dispute may lead the Court to
aPply the rules of customary law, rather than those of
English law, to the succession of an intestate married in 
accordance with Christian rites* In that case, the 
deceased contracted a Christian marriage in Sierra Leone in 
1876, before returning to Lagos where he died intestate, 
leaving a house. After his death intestate, all his 
children lived in the house as a sort of family property.
The defendant - the deceased's eldest son - attempted, 
for the second time to raise money by the mortgage of the
1 (1900) 1 N.L.R. at p.43.
2 Ibid. at p,44«
3 TT9 2 4) 5 N.L.R.105.
I k o .
property, but was refused all co-operation by the plaintiffs, 
the other children of the deceased* He then claimed, 
for the first time, that he was absolutely entitled as heir 
at law in accordance with the rules of English law* The 
plaintiffs, basing their claim upon customary law, sued 
for the partition or sale of the property. It was held 
that, having regard to the circumstances of the deceased 
and the parties and their conduct with reference to the 
property, customary law applied; and the plaintiffs'
i
claim must succeed. The decision m  Cole v» Cole* on
which the defence had based its case, was distinguished
on the ground that the circumstances of the instant case
were entirely different. Van Der Meulen, J., observed:
ftThe fact that a man has contracted a marriage in accordance 
with the rites of the Ghristian Church may be very strong 
evidence of his desire and intention to have his life 
generally regulated by English laws and customs, but it is 
by no means conclusive evidence .... the question as to 
what law it is equitable to apply in any given case can 
only be decided after an examination of all the circumstances 
of the case.*.." 2
In the instant case, the fact that the parties con­
tinued to treat the property in dispute as common property 
(family property) after the death of the deceased tipped 
the scales in favour of the plaintiffs' claim.
1 (1896) 1 N.L.E.15.
2 (192k) 5 N.L.H. at p.107.
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A
The case of A,ia.vi v. White in which customary law 
applied to the succession of an intestate contracting a 
marriage under the Marriage Act seems to have been wrongly
decided in. so far as it was based on the decisions in
2 . ^Asiata v. Goncallo and Smith v. Smith^: that is, the
decisions based on the parties’ general position in life*
A
In A.iavi v* White , the deceased, who had married under 
the provisions of the Marriage Act, died intestate, sur­
vived by several children. Her eldest son was the defendant 
in this suit, while the plaintiffs were her grandchildren 
and offspring of.customary unions contracted by her children 
who had since died. After her death intestate, the 
parties treated her property in Lagos as family property 
from which they all received rents. The plaintiffs, 
basing their claim upon customary law and relying upon 
Smith v. Smith . brought an action for partition of their 
grandmother’s estate. The defendant resisted the claim, 
contending that he was absolutely entitled in accordance 
with the English rules of inheritance. The Court rejected 
the defendant’s contention, and ordered the property to 
be sold. It held that the facts of the case - the parties’
1 (1946) 18 N.L.R.41.
2 (1900) 1 N.L.R.41.
3 (1924) 5 N.L.R.105.
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common enjoyment of the property and the Intestate’s 
lack of education - made it unjust to apply English law 
to her succession, and that customary law applied instead. 
Baker, Ag.C.J., said:
’’Whilst not unmindful that the fact that a woman has con­
tracted a marriage in accordance with Christian rites is 
strong evidence that she desires that the succession to her 
property should he regulated by English law, in my opinion, 
however, it is not conclusive and is a presumption that de­
pends on the circumstances in each arflevery case. This I 
am of the opinion is the meaning of section 17 of the
Supreme Court Ordinance    The original owner was no
doubt the wife of an educated man but it is very doubtful 
whether she was literate or knew anything about the English 
lav/ of succession; if she had done so, it is more than 
probable she would have made a will”• 1
With the greatest respect, the reasons given for the 
decision are irrelevant. Here was a clear case of a 
person subject to customary law who had married under the 
Marriage Act, and had died intestate leaving,an issue of 
such marriage and property situated in Lagos; and to 
whose succession section 36 of the Marriage Act automati­
cally applied. The decision may, however, be justified 
on quite anothei* ground: the parties’ common enjoyment of
the property as family property after the deceased’s death 
made it inequitable for the defendant to rely on a statute 
(the English Inheritance Act) to defeat the plaintiffs’ 
claim, since equity will not permit a statute to be used
1 (1946) 18 H.L.R. at p.44
1U3.
as an instrument of fraud .
The mere fact that a person, after going through a 
marriage by Christian rites, reverts to a pagan way of 
life, for example, by marrying a host of wives under cus­
tomary law, is not sufficient evidence that he intends that 
customary law, not English law, should govern the succession 
to his estate on his intestacy# There must be some ad­
ditional evidence of his intention to be gathered from the
facts and circumstances of his case. Thus, in Haastrup v #
2Coker , the deceased, while he was not yet Oba of Ilesha 
in Yorubaland, married according to Christian rites* He 
later became Oba, and, apparently to emphasize and enhance 
his new status, took some fifty wives under customary law*
He died intestate, leaving two children of the Christian 
marriage and nine children of the customary unions sur­
viving him. He left some landed property, which was 
conveyed to the defendant by one of the two children of 
the Christian marriage, who had taken out letters of ad­
ministration relating to it. One of the nine children
1 For some of the cases decided on this equitable rule, 
see: Crook V. Brooking (1688) 2 Vern.50; Pring v.
Pring ( 6 9 }  2"Vern.69; Rochefoucauld v. Boustead 118971 
1 Ch. 196, and Bannister v . Bannister 119U~8T2 All "e *R.155
2 (1927) 8 N.L.R7587 “
li+lj.
of the customary marriages sued to have the conveyance
set aside, and for a declaration that the land was the
property of all the eleven children* He based, his claim
on the ground that their father was a pagan living a
customary way of life and that, according to the pri nciple
*1
laid down in Asia.ta v. Goncallo , customary law should
govern the distribution of their deceased father’s estate.
The Court rejected the plaintiff’s argument and, following
2the principle laid down in Cole v. Cole, held that English 
law applied. As regards the plaintiff’s specific argu­
ment that his father was not a Christian but that Cole was, 
the Court’s answer was that:
p
’’the decision of ColejL.v. Pple was based not on the fact that tie 
parties were Christian n a t i v e s but on the fact that they 
had gone through a marriage by Christian rites”. 3
The Court also considered whether there was evidence of
the kind of the manner of life of the deceased sufficient
to take the case out of the principle enunciated in Cole v 
2Cole , but held there was none. In the words of Petrides,J.j
” ... the law will presume that the parties, by going 
through a marriage according to Christian rites, intended 
to be bound by its consequences unless there was evidence 
to the contrary, of which there was none in this case.”U '
1 (1900) 1 H.L.R.ij.1.
2 (1898) 1 N.L.R.15.
3 (1927) 8 N.L.R. at p.70.
(1927) 8 N.L.R* at p.71, emphasis supplied by underlining.
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(a) Where a person not subject to customary law contracts
a Christian marriage whether or not under the provisions 
of the Marriage Act 
The situation considered here is that of the succession 
to the estate of a person not subject to customary law 
who either marries under the provisions of the Marriage Act 
in Nigeria, or contracts a Christian marriage outside Nigeria* 
We may take, for example, an Englishman* If such a person 
dies intestate domiciled in any of the component units of 
Nigeria; or dies intestate, whether or not he is also 
domiciled in any part of Nigeria, leaving immovable property 
in Nigeria, (including the Federal Territory of Lagos), 
the distribution of his property will not be governed by 
the provisions of section 36 of the Marriage Act. This is 
because, even if he married under the Marriage Act, he was 
not a person subject to customary law* But there is no 
uniform law applying to the intestate succession of such 
a person, and the position differs according as the area 
concerned is either the Federal Territory of Lagos and 
the Eastern Region or the Western gjtd Mid-Western Regions.
The Federal Territory of Lagos and the Eastern Region
The applicable law with respect to the succession of 
the type of intestate now under consideration, if he dies
• \
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intestate domiciled in Lagos or the Eastern Region, will
*1
be the Statutes of Distribution , as modified by the
g )
Intestates Estates Act , and the Statute of Frauds . These 
statutes, which will govern his personal estate, apply in 
these parts of Nigeria as statutes of general application*
The rules of distribution, as contained in these English 
statutes, have been discussed at length in an earlier 
chapter - chapter three.
As regards any immovable property left by such an
intestate, the canons of descent contained in the Inheritance
U BAct , the provisions of the Dower Act , of Lord St. Leonard’s
6 7Act , and the common law: rules of descent* will govern the
inheritance. Again, these rules have already been treated
in an earlier section of this chapter*
The Western and Mid-Western Regions
The position in these two Regions is that both the 
realty and the personalty of such intestate are subject 
to the same rules of distribution by virtue of the provisions
o
of the Administration of Estates Law. It must, however,
1 (1670} 22 &23 Oar.2, e.10; and (1685), 1 Jae.2,e.l7.
2 (1890), 53 & 54 Viet.,c.29.
3 (1677), 29 Car.2,c.3.
4 (1833), 3 & 4 Will.4,e.106.
5 (1833), 3 & 4 Will.4,c.105.
6 (1859), 22 & 23 Viet.,c.35.
7 The rights of the Crown to escheat, for instance.
8 Cap.l, vol.l, Laws of the Western Region of Nigeria,
, 1959.
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be emphasized that, since such intestate is not subject 
to customary law, the rights of the Crown (State) to take 
the residuary estate as bona vacantia remain unaffected.
The provisions of the Administration of Estates Law have 
been fully set out earlier.
PARTIAL INTESTACY
The discussion so far has been concerned with the 
general law relating to total intestacy; that is, where 
the deceased makes no effective testamentary disposition 
of any of the property of which he is competent to dispose 
of by his will. But intestacy may be partial; that is 
to say, the deceased may leave a will, which is ineffectual 
as to part only of his property. In this latter case, 
there is partial intestacy as to such property as he does 
not effectively dispose of by his will. The rules governing 
partial intestacy are, broadly speaking, similar to those 
already discussed in respect of total intestacy. But there 
are certain modifications where the intestacy is partial. 
These modifications vary according as the area concerned 
is the Federal Territory of Lagos and the Eastern Region, 
on the one hand, or the Western and the Mid-Western Regions 
on the other.
1 Gap.l, vol., Laws of the Western Region of Nigeria,
1959.
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Result of -partial intestacy
(a) The Federal Territory of Lagos and the Eastern Region
Under the old English law of succession, which is 
still in force in hoth the Federal Territory of Lagos and 
the Eastern Region, the rules governing descent to real 
property are different from those relating to the distribution 
of personal property. The result is that, if the partial 
intestacy is in respect of the real estate, it passes ex­
clusively to the heir (the eldest son, for example); while, 
if it is in respect of the personal estate, the distribution 
is among the children and widow of the intestate, as has 
already been seen.
4
Rights of widow under the Intestates Estates Act
It will be recalled that the rights of the surviving
widow (additional to her rights under the Statutes of
2 3\Distribution and the Dower Act^) under the Intestates Estates
4
Act exist only in cases of total intestacy. Consequently, 
she is not entitled to a share in the property in respect 
of which her husband has died partially intestate^".
(b) The Western and the Mid-Western Regions
Under the provisions of the Administration of Estates
1 (1890) 53 & 5k Viet.,c.29.
2 (l6?0) (22 & 23 Car,2,c.10),s.3 and (l6S5)(l Jac ,2,e.l7),
s.7.
3 (1833) (3 & 4 Will.4,c*105),s.2.
k In the Estate of Twigg ; Twigg v. Black |[l892j 1 Ch.579.
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*1
Law , any beneficial interests acquired by the issue of
2the deceased under his will , and any beneficial interests 
acquired by the surviving spouse under the will of the 
deceased (other than personal chattels specifically be­
queathed^ ), but not those acquired by anyone else^, must be 
brought into account.
This means that in the case of the issue of the
2deceased, the rule as to hotch-pot applies ; and in the 
case of a surviving spouse, his or her one^hMJ* or two- 
thirds share in the estate (for life) with interest, will 
be diminished by the value of the beneficial interests 
received by him or her under the deceased’s will*^.
1 Laws of the Western Region of Nigeria, 1959 > cap.1,s.53
2 Ibid.. s.53(b)*
3 Ibid.,s.53(a).
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FART THREE 
ADMINISTRATION OF ESTATES UNDER 
CUSTOMARY LAW
CHAPTER FIVE 
ADMINISTRATION OP ESTATES
Burial
When a man dies the most urgent task is his 
burial which, for obvious reasons, takes place as soon 
as possible, generally within a day or two after the 
death. The burial of a deceased chief or other impor­
tant person or someone dying after attaining venerable 
old age is usually delayed for about a week or two, the 
body being specially preserved in the meantime. Thus,
A
among the Bini , the body of a deceased Oba or other
prominent chief is not usually interred until about two
2 3weeks from the date of death; and Urhobo and Isoko 
deceased ivie ("kings") and edion (clan headmen) are
generally preserved for about a week before being buried. 
The Ivbiosakon do not normally bury their deceased chief 
until about the ninth day following his death.^
Funeral or "second burial"
The actual burial of the deceased must be dis­
tinguished from the funex»al or "second burial" which,
1 Bradbury,R.E., The Benin kingdom (l957),p.50.
2 Bradbury, op.cit.,p.158. ^
3 Welch, J.W.,lcThe Isoko tribe (193^) 7 Afr.l6o at p.172, 
Bradbury, op.cit.. p. 156*
k Talbot, P.A., The peoples of southern Nigeria (1926), 
vol.Ill, p.i+86; Bradbury, op .cit ..p .98.
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as a rule, is performed after the burial. Perhaps, the 
term "second burial" needs some explanation. It may 
happen that a man dies at a time when those responsible 
for the performances of his burial and funeral rites can 
ill afford, for financial or religious reasons, to accord 
him a fitting funeral. Rather than put on a poor or 
inauspicious one, they may decide to be content with 
carrying out the interment, leaving the performance of 
the funeral till suitable or better times. When the 
final mortuary rites are eventually undertaken, the de­
ceased’s body already interred is represented, as among
A
the Isoko , by an object, such as a plantain trunk; this
object is then buried. It is this ceremony that has been
termed "second burial".
A "second burial" does not take place where the
funeral has been performed at the time of death or shortly
afterwards, but only if the latter ceremony cannot be
undertaken as indicated; or where it is dispensed with
on religious grounds, for example, where a diviner holds
2
that it be not performed . This distinction has been 
clearly made by Talbot who says:
" ..in the case of a chief whose body is preserved... 
while his family are making preparations to give him 
fitting obsequies, these latter cannot be called ‘second
1 Welch, ibid.
2 Bradbury, op .cit. .p.159.
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burial1 since the corpse has not yet been buried; 
in the case of an ordinary man whose body is buried at 
once, the latter ceremonies are sometimes named fikwa 
ozu’ , ‘mourn for the dead* , and not finu ozu! , *bury the 
dead1 li 1
The interval between death and the performance of
the funeral or "second burial" depends very largely on
how soon a sufficient amount of money can be found to pay
for the expenses involved; while a rich family will carry
out the rites almost immediately after the death and
burial; a poor one will almost certainly postpone them 
2
indefinitely • Thus, among the Bini, some funerals are
known to have been postponed for as much as twenty years
3 3after interment . It is the custom among the Bini ,
Urhobo^ and Isoko^ to postpone the performance of the
funeral rites if those responsible for carrying them out
are either too young or cannot afford the expense at
the time of the death.
Burial and funeral expenses
Throughout southern Nigeria, funerals and "second
2
burials" are expensive affairs . Their chief features
1 Talbot, op .cit..p .496. Cf. Basden G-.T. Among the Ibos 
(1921), p.122; Basden Niger Ibos (1938),p.292.
2 Thcmas,N.W., Anthropological report on the Edo-speaking 
peoples (19IO) pt.l, -.1+1. Talbot. op.cit..pp.469 
and 1+74? Omoneukanrin,C.O. Itsekiri law and custom
(1942),p*69; Qkoiie.C.G. Ishan native laws and customs
(i9 6 0),p p . 69 and 124.
3 Thomas, ibid•, Bradbury, op.cit.,p.50# Cf • Meek,C.K. 
haw and authority in a Nigerian tribe, p.314*
4 Bradbury, op .cit ..p .159.
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are feasting, dancing and singing; and lax^ge sums of 
money are spent on these* Besides, those celebrating 
these rites make generous gifts - in cash or kind - to
A
all those invited or present ; and these are in addition 
to the dues which they pay to all sorts of societies,
2
usually secret ones, of which the deceased was a -member . 
No matter how heavy the costs associated with the carrying- 
out of the rites may be, those responsible regard it as 
a solemn duty to be performed without counting the cost*
To them it is a matter of no great mo m- ent if they 
thereby impoverish themselves for years or even run into 
huge debts •
Reasons underlying the performance of the burial and 
funeral rites
The heavy burden connected with the performance of 
the deceased1® burial and funeral rites is usually un­
hesitatingly accepted on religious and social grounds.
It is generally believed that a funeral or "second burial"
1 Welch, loc.cit; Bradbury, op .cit *p *159. Omoneukarin, 
op.cit.Tp«68.~~
2 Egharevba.J*U*, Benin law and custom (19U9) >P .72;
Dennett,R.E•, NTa^rrarT^tudi’es T'l 910). p.31-32; Arjisafe, 
A.K., Laws and customs of the Yoruba people (192I4J,p*79; 
TalbotTop* cit *. pp .U76-8Q and k93; Lucas, J *0*, The 
religion of the Yorubas (19U8) *2 3 0•
3 Leonard, A.G*• Tribes of the Lower Niger (1906),p*156; 
Basden, (1921J.op *cit*. p *121; Basden,(1938)»op *cit * 
p.291; Talbot, op*cit..p*U69*
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facilitates the entry into the spirit-world of the deceased 
who has now joined the ancestors whose blessings must 
be secured for the living relatives; it also prevents 
him from pursuing and molesting the living relatives, and
A
enhances his prestige in the ghost world. The social
position of the deceased1s family is also involved in the
performance of these rites; and the more lavish and
elaborate they are performed, the higher the family status
2
rises in the social scale . This accounts for the fact 
that the funeral ceremony accorded to a deceased man is 
generally higher than his station in life really demands • 
Among the Ibo, "no more abusive remark can be made to 
a man than ’you never even killed a rat for your father’s 
funeral’ And among the Ishan, unless a man has
performed his deceased father’s funeral ceremony, he cannot 
aspire to promotion to the highest grade of elders (e ^ o n )
1 Egharevba, op .cit, p.73; Basden, (1921), op .cit • ,p.121; 
Basden (1958).opTcit. pp.201,269 and 280; Meek.loc.cit.; 
Lucas, op .cit. .pp.23U-5. Okojie, op.cit..p .6U.
2 Welch, loc .cit.; Egharevba, op .cit..p.75: Omoneukanrin, 
op .cit ♦ ; Okojie, op .cit. .p .12iu
3 Ward, E., The Yoruba husband-wife code (1938) ,p • lli+ * 
k Meek, op .cit. .p .521.
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in the age grade system: no father and son can he odion
(elder) together; and until the former’s funeral is
■i
celebrated, he is regarded as still ritually alive .
To the Western mind, the preceding paragraph may 
have contained much that should be dismissed as being 
completely irrelevant to a thesis which claims to treat o£ 
the law of succession. It is, of course, readily admitted 
that some socio-religious considerations have entered this 
work in the paragraph concerned. It should, however, be 
borne in mind that we are dealing with the customary law 
of the African, to whom his reputation, his religion and 
his law are too intertwined to be separated. Moreover, 
the customary law of succession has much to do with religion, 
since its whole basis rests on the devolution and enjoyment 
of the property left by a deceased person around whom 
ancester-worship centres. It has been said that "native 
law... is inextricably bound up with life and death" and 
ancestor-worship "enters every phase of life, decides the 
form of government, imposes morality and secures obedience
1 Butcher,H.L.M., "Some aspects of the otu system of the 
Isa sub-tribe of the Edo people of southern Nigeria"
(1935) 8 Afr.lii-8 at 159.
2 Basden, Niger Ibos (1938), p.xiii.
3 Welch, op .cit .. p .73* Cf. Adam, L •, Inheritance in 
primitive cultures (193U-5) X IOWA L .R. p.7&2, where he 
says: ''primitive inheritance lav/ grew up from an intimate
contact with primitive religion, in particular, with
the. belief in the everlasting presence and influence 
of the deceased’s soul or spirit among the tribe".
1 5 6
It will be seen, when we deal with the duties of the 
administrator, that the fear of incurring the displeasure 
of the ancestors constitutes, perhaps, the most effective 
sanction which ensures that the property comprised in 
the estate is not fraudulently squandered or misap­
propriated.
Responsibility for the payment of the burial and funeral 
expenses
The responsibility for the burial and funeral 
of the deceased falls mainly on his eldest son, though 
all the children and relatives of the deceased also take 
part and join in the contributions towards the expenses
A
involved . If the eldest son is still young or there 
is no surviving son, the nearest adult male relative - a 
brother, an uncle or a nephew - plays the leading role. 
Daughters, on marriage, go to live with their husbands, 
and do not normally take full part in their family affairs. 
In any case, the information is that, apart from paying 
their funeral contributions and preparing and/or serving 
food and drinks to the mourners and sympathisers, they
1 Thomas (1910). pt.1. op.cit.» pp.^0-3; Thomas,N.W., 
"Notes onTldo burial customs" (1920) 50 J.R.A.I. 377 
at pp.38U ff; Thomas N.W., "Some Ibo burial customs" 
(1917) kl d.R.A.I. 163 at pp.186-8; Welch, op.cit. 
pp .172-3; Omoneukanrin.op.cit..p.68: Esenwa,R.E. 
"Marriage customs in Asaba Division", (19U8) XIII 
Nigerian Field, 71 at p. 80; Egharevba, op .cit. ,p.39 ; 
Bradbury, op .cit., pp .50,80,98,108,121}. and 159. Okojie, 
op .cit. pp *6 9,90-1• *
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usually do not figure prominently in these matters, which
A
are highly charged with sacrifices and ancestor-worship .
Similarly, among the Ishan, the eldest daughter of the
2
deceased,except where she is an arebhoa , is only allowed 
to carry out her deceased father’s mortuary rites on the 
strict understanding that she does so on behalf of her 
young brother and eldest son of the deceased, who is unable 
to perform the rites himself by reason of his tender age * 
This rule is said to have been designed to preclude an 
eldest daughter of the deceased from taking the dead manfs 
property, which she may carry away from the family to 
her husband^.
1 Ovie of Ughelli and Chief J.A. Akiri.
2 An arebhoa (arhewa) is a man* s eldest daughter who
is not given in marriage but is permitted to have suitors 
at her father’s house. She is regarded as a son and 
any children she has belong to her father. The custom 
is based on the fear of the extinction of the family of 
a man having only daughters and no sons. See: Thomas, 
(JL910) pt.l. p.79; Thomas, U.W. /'Marriage and legal 
customs of the Edo-speaking peoples" (1910) 11 J. Comp. 
Leg* (N.S.), 9k at p.99; Thomas, N.W.?f,The Edo-speaking 
peoples", (1910) 10 J.A.S.,1 at pp.7-8; Howling, C*W. 
Land tenure in Benin province (1946), para.65; Okojie, 
op.cit.» PP*88, 93 and 118. The Mid-Western Ibo 
equivalent is the idegbe (idebwe) and is said to have 
spread there from the Ishan area. Seer Thomas, 
pt IV, op .cit .,p.5• Eor a short description of this 
custom ( idegbe) see: Thomas, ibid, pp.60 ff; Rowling,
op.cit.» para*99*
3 Okojie, op.cit. * p*93*
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The duties of the deceased^ sons-in-law in connection
with the burial and funeral
An intei'-esting aspect of* the liability to contribute
towards the burial and funeral expenses of the deceased
is that relating to the part played by sons-in-law at
the burials and funerals of their deceased parents-in-law
or near relatives of their wives* Throughout southern
Nigeria, persons marrying from the family of the deceased
are obliged by custom to assist at the burials and funerals
of their deceased parents-in-law and close relatives of
their wives, by digging the graves and helping to defray
ithe mortuary expenses incurred .
The liability so to assist may be regarded as 
being founded upon the prior contract of marriage, an 
essential term of which is the obligation on the part of 
the son-in-law to render labour and other forms of services
1 Thomas, Anthropological report on the Edo-speaking
peoples Cl910) p t .1, pp .41-2; Thomas, ifSome Iboburial 
customs” (1917) 47 J.R.A.I* 163 at p.188; Thomas,
"Notes on Edo burial customs”, (1920) 50 J.R.A.I. 377 
at pp*38l ff*; Talbot , vol*III, op *cit *, pp.482, 684-5; 
Welch, op .cit •, pp.*172-3; Qmoneukanrin, Itsekiri law 
and custom* p*68; Egharevba, Benin law and custom, 
pp*19 and 22; Bradbury, The Benin kingdom* 457, PP *50, 
80, 121 and 159; Okogie, Ishan native laws and customs 
p.126; Adisafe, op.cit., Dennett, op.cit. ,P .30;
Eastern Nigeria Government/, 1Report of the Committee on 
bride price (1955), P&ras. '193,197,2l€7%-3 and 277.
159.
to the parents and other members of his wife’s family .
As the Keport of the Committee on bride price (Eastern 
Nigeria) puts it:
’’The labour services and the periodical gifts by the 
husband to his wife’s parents continued after marriage (2). 
more importance is attached to the help given by a husband 
to his wife’s family than to the actual dowry....” 3
A son-in-law usually assumes his obligations to as 
sist at the burial and funeral of his deceased parent-in-law 
without reluctance. His participation in these rites is 
regarded as strong evidence of his marriage with the de­
ceased’s daughter; and it may enable the children of this 
marriage to enjoy rights in their mother’s family.
Son-in-law’s assistance at the burial and funeral as 
evidence of marriage
U 5Among the Binr and Ishan , assistance rendered
1 Temietan, S.O., ’’Marriage among the Jekri ...” (193$)
13 Nigeria 75 at p.76. Esenwa, op .cit.. pp.72-3; 
Bradbury, op .cit.. pp .1+8, 157 and 159; Okojie, op .cit.. 
p.91; Talbot, op .cit.. p.M+2; Eastern Nigeria Govern­
ment, loc.cit.; Arilspo, 0., ’’The future of bride price” 
(1955) No.2108 West Africa, issue of October 29th,1955» 
p.1017. Printer,
2 Eastern Nigeria Government!fop.cit.» para.23.
3 Eastern Nigeria GovernmentJAop.cit♦. para.39; see also 
para.277.
U Thomas. (1910) pt.l* loc.cit.
5 Ohojie, op.cit.. p.126.
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by a- son-in-law at the burial and funeral of his deceased 
parent-in-law furnishes the clearest evidence of his 
having been recognised as the legal husband of the deceased’s 
daughter; and it at once differentiates him from a man 
establishing a mere passing liaison with the daughter of 
the deceased. In point of fact, it is the custom not 
to allow a mere lover of the daughter of the deceased to 
have anything to do with the burial and funeral. Among 
the Urhobo and Isoko, this obligation on the part of the 
son-in-law arises immediately the consent of the parents 
of the girl is given in respect of the marriage between
•i
their daughter and the suitor •
Rights en.ioved by the children of the marriage by virtue 
of their father’s participation in the burial and funeral 
of their deceased maternal grandparent.
Participation by the son-in-law in his deceased 
parent-in-law’s burial and funeral has its compensating 
side. Such assistance smooths the way for his children 
when they are compelled to turn to their mothers’ families 
for lielp which cannot be got from him or his family. 
Furthermore, and this is more important, no member of 
the children’s maternal families is likely to raise any
1 Bradbury, op.cit.. p. 157.
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serious objections should, they (the children) some day 
stand to inherit property or titles from these maternal 
families. Thus, among the Urhobo, sons obtain land for 
cultivation from their mothers1 families, where that owned
A
by their fathers* families is insufficient ; and among
the Bini, it sometimes happens, as Bradbury points out,
that a titled man having only daughters may pass his title
2to a son of his eldest daughter •
It is common among some sections of the Yoruba for
men to obtain or even inherit land from their mothers*
families ; and for the male descendants of a female member
of the family to take as wife the widow of his mother*s
deceased relative^. Similarly, a male descendant of a
female member of the family has the right to contest for
5
a title vested in his mother’s family, though it is stated
6that his chances of being selected are rather remote"•
1 Thomas, Anthropological report on the Edo-speaking 
peoples ,"TT910) pt.I.p.93. "
2 Bradbury, The Benin kingdom (1957) ,p .30.
3 Lloyd, p  ^" ^Sacred kingship and government among 
the Yoruba*1 (i9 6 0) 30 Afr.221, at p.234; Lloyd, Yoruba 
land law (1962), pp.211 ff, 239 ff* and 279*
4 Schwab , W.B.,**The terminology of kinship and marriage 
among the Yoruba** (1958) 28 Afr.352 at p.372.
5 Lloyd, "The Yoruba lineage** (1955) 25 Afr*235 at p.246; 
Schwab , ibid.
6 Sehv/ab • ibid.
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Burial and funeral expenses 'borne by a son-in-law may 
form part of refundable bride -price In parts of the Eastern 
Region of Nigeria,
In some parts of the Eastern Region of Nigeria, 
a son-in-law has greater reasons for, and derives more 
immediate and personal advantages from, helping to defray
the burial and funeral expenses of his parent-in-law*
1 2 This is because among the Ibibio , the Okrika I3aw and
the Ibo of Ahoada Division , such expenses form part of
the bride price, refundable on the dissolution of marriage.
The custom is, however, becoming unpopular among the Ibo
of Ahoada Division where bye-laws have been passed against
x
it by the local government authorities .
LEGAL RELEVANCE OF THE PERFORMANCE ON THE BURIAL AND 
EUNERAL RITES
The performance of the burial and funeral ceremony 
of the deceased is intimately linked with the inheritance 
of his property. This means that, barring the position 
of a son-in-law who, as has been pointed out, assists 
on a contractual basis, those persons who have carried out
1 The Eastern Nigeria Government Printer, Report on the 
Committee on bride price (1955) para.277 •
2 Ibid.f para.253*
3 Ibid., para*197.
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these rites - the members of the family - stand to inherit
1the estate left by the dead man . The Ishan maxim expressing
the connection between the performance of the burial and
funeral rites and the inheritance of the estate runs:
"Ono to Olinmin ole yan UiM" (He who performs the Burial 
Ceremonies owns the house and all therein 2) .
The importance of this connection is such that
a stranger or friend may be admitted to participation in
the scheme of inheritance, if he takes part in the burial
and funeral ceremony of the deceased. Thus, Meek states:
,fA friend who has lived with a family and has helped the 
head of the family to establish and maintain the family 
property, and on the death of the headman has borne a major 
share of the burial expenses, may well be regarded as 
having established a claim, or even the first claim, to a 
share of the dead headman’s estate%3
Kingsley sums it up, when she says:
"By taking charge of and interring a body, you become the 
executor of the deceased man* s estate ... a good deal can 
be made by an executor"* k
1 For the position in the Mid-Western Region, see generally:
Roth, Great Benin (l903)p.97? Talbot, The peoples of 
southern. ,N1geEla (1926), vol. Ill,pp. 683 ff.; Thomas,'(1910) 
pt.l. pp.66 ff.; Thomas, CiSliLU»iibI2,PP.128 ff.; Thomas, 
TT9To)ll j. Comp .Leg.(N.S.) 9k; Thomas,(1910) 10 J.A.S.I.; 
Ward Price, H,L»«Land tenure in the Yoruba Provinces,
(1933) para .374 (on the' Bini); Omoneukanrin, op . cit7*
p.73? Egharevba, op .cit.. pp.38 and 76; Rowling, op .cit. 
paras. 2l+,I+9,65 and 99? Okojie, op .cit.,pp6U, 90-2 and 127.
2 Okojie, op .cit., pp.61+ and 127? cf. Thomas (1910) .pt.l. 
pp.70 and 80. The position is the same among the Bini, 
Ivbiosakon, Ibo and, indeed,throughout the Region. See: 
Thomas, (1910) .pt^l, pp.69,70,7U-5*89-10; Thomas,(191U) * 
pt .IV,p .128; Talbot, op .cit.. p.681+; Egharevba, op .cit.
p .'33? and information collected from Chiefs Salubi, Ekpek- 
pei and Aboroson.
3 Meek, Land tenure and land administration in Nigeria (1937),
l6l|.
Relatives older than the deceased may not take -part ( o p  
active -part) in the burial and funeral ceremony
The connection between the celebration of the burial 
and funeral rites of a dead man and the subsequent succession 
to his property is also brought out by the rule which ex­
cludes relatives older than the deceased from participation 
or active participation in the performance of his burial 
and funeral ceremony, on the ground that they are usually 
not entitled to take property from a younger member of the 
family* A learned author makes this point when he observes 
that "no person plays an active part in the funeral rites 
for someone junior to himself^"*
This rule is most rigidly adhered to among the 
Yoruba, where it is stated to have been based on the fact 
that an older (and often wiser) relative might try to kill, 
by subtle means, a younger but prosperous member of the 
family, had the position been otherwise . Among the Urhobo, 
the information is that: an older relative views the death 
of a younger one as an unnatural and extremely sad event,
....p.180* But such a friend must be considered as 
having been fully incorporated into the family.
ij. Kingsley, M.H., West African studies (1899)» p*43U.
5 Bradbury, The Benin kingdom“T1^5T7 ♦ p. 50; also at p .97 *
6 Lloyd, (1955) 25 Afr. 235 at p.21+1; Lloyd, ll959j J.A.L.7 
at p. 19; Lloyd, Yoruba land law (1962)p*293; Morton- 
Williams, P. "Yoruba responses to the fear of death",
(I960) 30 Afr. p.3k*
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enough to create in him distaste for the inheritance
iof the latterTs property *
As will be more fully explained in the chapters on
the distribution of estates, the rule excluding older
relatives from the inheritance is not observed where the
deceased is not survived by close relatives. Thus, as
regards the Ishan custom, whereby the widow of the deceased
is taken as wife by his relative, Okojie writes:
o
"...it was not customary for a man to ’inherit1 the wives^ 
of his junior brother, unless there were no other brothers^".
It is, however, not clear whether such an older relative
thus benefiting from the death of the younger one is still
prohibited from undertaking the latter*s funeral; or whether
he is obliged to carry out the funeral. Having regard
to the link between the performance of this ceremony and the
succession to the rights of the deceased, already considered,
it is difficult to resist the view that such an older
relative is bound to give the dead man burial and funeral.
Concerning the particular Ishan custom referred to, it must
be observed that the Ishan dread of offending the dead -
1 Chief T.E.A. Salubi.
2 Quotation marks supplied by the present writer to 
indicate that that word(inherit) is, as will be shown 
in chapter seven, inappropriate.
3 Okojie, Ishan native laws and customs (i9 6 0),p .121.
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■believed to have joined the .powerful band of the departed 
but watchful ancestors - must impel the older relative to 
honour his deceased kinsman* Furthermore, it has been 
pointed out that the Ishan regard as still being ritually 
alive, a deceased person whose -burial and funeral rites 
have not been performed. In these circumstances, therefore, 
marriage with his widow prior to the celebration of rites, 
designed to dismiss him from this world, may not only be 
adulterous, but, indeed, dangerous*
FAILURF TO PARTICIPATE IN THE PERFORMANCE OF TOE BURIAL 
AND FUNERAL
With the exception of the position of the son-in- 
law already noted, it may be stated that just as partici­
pation in the carrying out of the burial and funeral rites 
of the dead man generally confers upon those so partici­
pating the right to inherit from the estate, so does non­
participation in such rites negatively affect the right to 
inherit. The position in each of the Regions in our area 
of general reference will be considered separately. With 
the exception of the Mid-Western Region where, as has been 
seen, there are various ethnic groups, the Regions are 
referred to by the names of the groups or main groups
1 Okojie, op.cit* * pp.91-2 and 121.
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inhabiting them; Lagos is included in the Western Region, 
or regarded as Yoruba for our purpose.
Yoruba customary law
It is a strict rule of the Yoruba customary law 
that anyone who has not contributed towards the funeral 
of the deceased is not entitled to benefit from the property
A
left by the latter •
2The case of Salami v. Salami and anor. seems, on 
first reading, to be in conflict with the rule of the 
Yoruba customary law stated above. The headnote of the 
report of the case reads:
” ...Right of child to inherit father1s estate notwithstanding 
her absence or minority at father’s death0. 2
Briefly, the facts of the case were as follows: the
parties were the surviving children of one Salami Goodluck,
a Yoruba from Abeokuta, who died intestate leaving a house,
some farmlands and movables at Abeokuta. Soon after the
death of her father in 1927, the plaintiff, then about seven
years of age, was taken to the then French Cameroons by
her mother. She (the plaintiff) did not return to Nigeria
until 1953* However, while she was in the Cameroons, her
1 A3isafe, A.K* Laws and customs of the Yoruba people 
(192U) p*83; Lloyd, [1959] J.A.L.7 at p"Tl6 ; Lloyd, ”
Yoruba land lav/ (1 9 6 2), pp.287 and 2 9 6.
2 [1957] W.N.L.R.10.
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deceased father’s estate was distributed; and, apart from 
some clothes and two chairs reserved for her, she received 
no benefit from the estate* She sued her two brothers 
for an account and prayed for partition of the estate *
Irwin, J., accepted the evidence of the plaintiff’s 
witness to the effect that a son and a daughter were equally 
entitled to share in their deceased father’s estate, pro­
vided they both joined in performing his burial and funeral 
ceremony* Nevertheless, he said, inter alia*
’’but I cannot think that the right of a child to inherit 
can be affected by his or her absence or minority at the 
time of death*” 1
This is tantamount to saying that funeral expenses can
be charged against the estate; and it would seem that
actual contribution towai*ds the funeral expenses will only
be expected from the living relatives of the deceased where
the estate left by him is insufficient to defray the cost
of his burial and funeral. This is an eminently sensible
2 ^practice; it obtains among the Itsekiri and Ishan*' of 
the Mid-Western Region, and there is no reason to suppose 
that it is not widespread generally.^*
1 [1957] W.N.L.R.10 at 11.
2 Omoneukanrin, Itsekiri law and custom* p .6 7 •
3 Okojie, Ishan native laws and customs, pp.69 and 12k* 
k Talbot, The peoples of southern Nigeria. 1926, voUII,
p.A7U. Meek, Law and authority in a Nigerian tribe.
19379 p. 320.; Lloyd, HSome notes on The Yoruba rules of 
succession...” Cl959] J.A.L.7 atp.l6. ; Lloyd, Yoruba 
land law. 1 9 6 2, p.287.
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A
The conflict between the decision in the Salami
case and the traditional Yoruba rule, which excludes a
non-contributor to the deceased’s funeral expenses from
inheriting, is more apparent than real. Ajisafe himself,
a most widely cited authority on Yoruba law, lists several
exceptions to the rule. These include absence, sickness
and any other causes unavoidably preventing a person from
participating at the funeral. Now, the plaintiff in the 
*1
Salami case was a young girl of about seven years of age 
at the time of her father’s death; she, clearly, could 
not be expected to possess the means of making a funeral 
contribution. Besides, she had left Abeokuta and, indeed, 
Nigeria soon after her father’s death; and the funeral 
probably took place in her absence. It is admitted that 
the exceptions listed by Ajisafe deal with the position of 
a son-in-law of the deceased. It is, however, submitted 
that, bearing in mind the fairly strict obligation resting 
on a son-in-law in this matter, there is no i*eason why the 
exceptions referred to cannot avail a child of the deceased
A
circumstanced as the plaintiff in the Salami case .
The position in the Mid-Western Region
In the Mid-Western Region, failure to contribute
i [1957) W.N.L.R.10.
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towards the "burial and funeral expenses of a deceased
pei*son does not completely wipe out the defaulter’s rights
of inheritance in respect of the deceased’s estate* It
merely restricts either the duration of the inheritor’s
ienjoyment of the inherited property ; or the quantum of
2share he gets on distribution * Ward Price, however, 
states that the defaulter, among the Bini, may not inherit 
at all * With the greatest respect, this statement does 
not represent the Benin customary law, which has been 
stated by Egharevba as follows:
"If the eldest son does not perform the funeral ceremonies 
at once, and dies before he has completed them, the right 
of inheritance goes to the second son and his children, 
provided he carries out the funeral rites. If, however, 
the eldest son has spent a good deal of money on the house 
[i.e. part of the inherited, property] before he died ... 
the second son who inherits the property must compensate 
the children of the first son, to the amount he spent on 
the improvement of the house " 4
Similarly, the position among the Ishan has been
stated by Bradbury in this way:
"The eldest surviving son..., must validate his claim by 
properly carrying out his father’s funeral ceremonies.
If he fails to do this he still retains the property until 
his death, but his brother might step in and perform the 
rites and take over the property’1 • 5
1 Egharevba, Benin law and custom, p.39; Bradbury, The 
Benin kingdom. 1997, PP *47 and' 77; Okojie, op ,cit.. 
ppT53,68 an<3- 126.
2 Egha^evba, op .cit.» p.38.
3 Ward Price, Land tenure in the Yoruba Provinces (1933) 
para.374*
4 Eghaffevba, op .cit. ,p .39. Cf. the Benin case of I.vamuse 
Bhigje v..araroxy.JBhlale [1961] All H.L.E.S1+2 at p.T3+5; 
[1961J W.Ii.L.K. 307 at p.309; where the president of
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The restriction to life interests of the inheri­
tance rights of an eldest son, who has not performed his 
deceased father’s funeral, can have an important effect 
on the rights of his (eldest son’s) children in the cases 
of estates of substantial value, and also of titles, such 
as chieftaincies• The Ishan make no distinction between 
different kinds of property} whether the property to be 
inherited is movable or immovable, or it is incorporeal" 
property, such as a title, the rule is the same^. Both 
the Bini and Urhobo, however, distinguish between succession 
to a title (a chieftaincy, for example) and the inheritance 
of other kinds of property# In the latter case, the bene­
ficiary still takes whether he has carried out the funeral 
rites of the deceased or not# In the former case, the 
person normally entitled to succeed to the chieftaincy is 
debarred from succeeding if he fails to perform the funeral 
of the former holder of the title# Thus, among the Bini,
....of the grade "A” customary court, Benin, said? If 
the eldest surviving male child dies without performing 
the customary funeral ceremonies for his deceased 
father’s burial, the right of inheritance passes on to 
the next junior brother who performs the ceremonies".
3 Bradbury, op.cit., p.77; also Okojie, op.ci t., pp.6 3,
68 and 127.
6 Olcojie, Ishan native laws and customs, pp.6 3 ,68 and 126; 
Talbot, vol.Ill, op.cit.. p.590.
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the eldest son of a deceased Oba succeeds his father, 
hut though he is entitled to succeed, ,fhe was only king
a
elect until every rite was performed” . Similarly, among 
the Urhoho, the eldest son of a deceased ovie ("king”), 
who normally succeeds his father, must carry out the deceased 
ovie*s funeral before succeeding for, "until he j^i*e. the 
deceased oviel is buried the head son is not deemed to have 
succeeded
The position among the Ibo of the Eastern Region
The rule gearing the right to inherit from the 
deceased to the antecedent performance of his funeral is 
sometimes circumvented by the Ibo^. As will be shown 
later, it is a general rule that the estate left by the 
deceased may not be distributed until the conclusion of 
his funeral rites. Where, however, the deceasedfs property 
is urgently required, and yet the possibility of carrying 
out the funeral is remote, those responsible for carrying 
out the rites simulate performance; they fire guns, after 
which the estate is, apparently, safely distributed.
1 Both, Great Benin, p.101, quoting Punch.
2 ThomasT'^Wotes^on Edo burial customs", (1920) 50 <T*B.
A,I* 361 at p .1+05; cf, Talbot, The peoples of southern 
Nigeria, vol.lll, p.U87#
3 Meek, Law and authority in a Nigerian tribe. (1937)*P*318
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Failure on the part of a son-in-law to assist at the 
funeral of his deceased parent-in-law
In the Mid-Western Region, a son-in-law may, "by 
his failure to help in carrying out the funeral of his 
parent-in-law, run the risk of losing the deceased*s daughter 
as a wife or, in all certainty of throwing a heavy strain on the 
success of the marriage between him and the deceased’s 
daughter. Thus, among the Bini, such a son-in-law falls 
out of favour with his wife’s family, who would be justified 
in putting an end to the continued existence of the
•i
marriage . Among the Isoko, the wife of such a son-in-law
2may refuse to obey his orders and requests . She may also 
refuse to return to the matrimonial home from her father’s 
family residence until the husband has, so to speak, purged 
his contempt for her family by paying his share of her 
deceased parent’s funeral expenses , Should the son-in- 
law refuse Or neglect to comply, the refusal of his wife 
to return to the matrimonial home may well constitute the 
first step towards the dissolution of the marriage.
It has already been pointed out that a son-in-law’s 
participation in the performance of his deceased parent- 
in-law’s funeral furnishes evidence of the marriage between
1 Egharevba, Benin law and custom, p.73* The rule is the 
same among the Yoruba. See: Ajisafe, Laws and customs 
of the Yoruba people, p.83.
2 VvelchV "Thesisoko tribe” (193U) 7 Afr .160 at &173.
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him and the daughter of the deceased^ and that men enjoying 
only loose and irregular unions short of marriage with the 
daughters of deceased persons are not permitted to take part 
in the letter’s funerals* It will he apparent when we 
shall consider the status of children that the institution 
of marriage generally determines the question of the af­
filiation of children. This being so, a son-in-law 
failing to discharge his obligation in connection with the 
performance of the funeral of his deceased parent-in-law 
may unwittingly jeopardise the continued exercise of his 
parental rights over the children of the marriage between 
him and the daughter of the deceased. This is because 
he has, by his failure to discharge his obligation, cast 
a doubt on the marriage - an institution that, in general, 
decides the question of legal paternity. It is submitted 
that, in siich a case, it would clearly be open to the 
members of the deceased’s family to take the view that 
what had hitherto passed for a marriage and respectability 
was, after all, nothing but an illicit and temporary as­
sociation, the children of which should belong not to
•i
the alleged son-in-law; but to them as the mother’s family.
1 In those societies where, by the system of marriage, 
the children are affiliated to the mother’s family, 
this step would undoubtedly, be unnecessary. Nor would 
it (step) be taken by the woman’s fan ily among those 
ethnic groups in which biological paternity determines 
the legal paternity of a child.
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It is further submitted that the possibility of risking 
the sudden loss of his children in this way, together with 
resultant drop in his social status, must be considered as
A
one of the sanctions for failure on the part of a son-in- 
law to assist at the funeral of his deceased parent-in-law* 
The failure of a son-in-law to participate in the 
carrying out of the funeral of his deceased parent-in-law 
may well prejudice the position of his children by the 
deceased1s daughter, in respect of the enjoyment of the 
property and rights belonging to their mother’s family.
This family would almost certainly entertain some grave 
reservations about the advisability of allowing the children 
to benefit from them by way of gift or inheritance when 
their father is unable or unwilling to discharge his ob­
ligation to them (their mother’s family).
1 Stemming from what has been stated in note 1 on p.l7U, 
this sanction would not operate in societies where, 
from the system of marriage, the children already belong 
to their mother’s family; or where biological patexviity 
not necessarily marriage, determines the legal paternity 
of a child.
CHAPTER SIX
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ADMINISTRATION OP ESTATES (CONTINUED)
THE ADMINISTRATOR - APPOINTMENT. RIGHTS. DUTIES. POYl/ERS 
AND LIABILITIES OP
Who is he?
The administrator is the person charged with the 
responsibility for the performance of the. burial and funeral 
rites of the deceased, and the management and preservation 
of the latter1s estate pending the distribution thereof 
among thos3 entitled.
APPOINTMENT Off ADMINISTRATOR
Under the traditional system, the appointment of an 
administrator in respect of the deceased’s estate was the 
exclusive responsibility of the family* Nowadays, and 
especially in cases of disputed succession,, hov/ever, the 
appointment may be made by the court. We shall consider 
first the appointment made by the family of the dead man.
Appointment by the family of the deceased
Soon after the death of the deceased, it is usual 
for, his family , at the family meeting, to assign to one ' 
of their members the responsibility for the overall super­
vision of the burial and funeral of the deceased as well
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as the control and management of the property comprised 
in the dead man’s estate. As a rule, the member assigned 
this task is invariably the person entitled to benefit 
either exclusively or substantially from the estate on its 
distribution; or, where such a person is too young to 
assume such responsibility, some adult relative acting on 
behalf of a beneficiary of tender age. Sometimes, however, 
the deceased himself may, as a dying wish, nominate one or 
more persons to carry out this task. But, as will be 
shown later, such nomination by the deceased may be ignored 
by the family. The person selected by the family or 
nominated by the deceased, as indicated above, we may term 
the "administrator”.
It may be argued that while the term "administrator” 
may be considered appropriate in designating the appointee 
by the family, it does not accurately describe the case 
of the nominee appointed (or recommended) by the deceased 
himself; and that in this latter case, the term "executor” 
would be more appropriate. Nevertheless, it is intended 
to employ the term "administrator” in this work in desig­
nating the person in charge of the burial and funeral rites 
and the property of the deceased, whether he is appointed 
by the family or nominated by the dead man himself. There 
are several reasons for adopting this course. First, as
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will become apparent later, the deceased’s nominee may 
act only if he is approved of by the family* Secondly, 
the deceased may limit the duties to be performed by his 
nominee to only those relating to his (the deceased) being
•i
accorded a worthy burial and funeral ; and thereby render
2meaningless the necessity for the office of an executor * 
Thirdly, unlike the position among the English, who at one 
time viewed dying intestate with peculiar horror-'; under 
customary law, intestate succession is the rule^.
Among the Yoruba, the appointment of an adminis­
trator is made by the elders of the family of the dead 
manr.. He is called babansinku (the father of the burial 
and f u n e r a l ) a n d  he is usually the dldest son of the
1 See for instance: Basden, Among the Ibos (1921) p.87; 
Basden, Niger Ibos (1938) pp.201 and 280; Meek, Law 
and authority in a Nigerian tribe (1937) p .303*
2 For the distinction between the executor and administrator 
under English law, see Williams on Executors and Admini­
strators* (I960), 14th edn., vol.l, chaps*2, 14 and 15*
3 Holds worth, W., History of English law, vol*II, p *93*
4 See for instance: Elias, Groundwork of Nigerian law (1953) 
P*337; Elias, Nigerian land Taw and, custom ri9&2T."~3rd 
edn, p*228; Lloyd, **Some notes on the' Yoruba rules of 
Succession” Ll959| J.A.L.7y at pp.17-18; Lloyd, Yoruba 
land law (1962), p.290.
5 Lloyd,[1959j J.A.L.7* at pp .15-16; Lloyd, Yoruba land 
law, p.287.
6 Adisafe, Laws and customs of the Yoruba people (1924)
p.81; Lloyd, jl959f J.A.L. ioc.cit; Lloyd (1962).loc.cit.
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deceased or, if he is too young to act, the deceased's*
younger brother may be appointed.
2Among the Ibo , the administrator is appointed on 
the same considerations as those indicated in connection 
with the practice found among the Yoruba. Some writers, 
however, refer to the Ibo administrator as guardian of 
the deceased's young children and manager of their property • 
functions which, as will be shown later, are not unconnected 
with some of the duties of the administrator.
Precisely the same kinship considerations that govern 
the appointment of the administrator among the Yoruba and 
Ibo are observed in the Mid-Western Region**. Her is ap- . 
pointed by or with the co-operation of the family; and is
1 Lloyd, Ll959j<I*A.L .7, at pp. 15-16, ; Lloyd, Yoruba land 
law, p.287*
2 Thomas, Anthropological report on Ibo-speaking peoples 
(1914), pt .rv, p T T l I ^ ^ ^ B a s ^ ^ r W R e V  Ibos~Tl938)p7F80;
Meeh, op .cit.. pp*230 and 324;
3 Meek, op.cit.» p .322; Green, Land tenure in an Ibo village 
(1941) p ."15; Talbot, The peoples of southern Nigeria, 
(I926), vol.Ill, p .687; Chubb, L.T., Ibo land tenure
(1 9 61) para.39; Obi, The Ibo law of property (1963T P .152.
4 Thomas, "Marriage and legal customs of the Edo-speaking 
peoples" (1910) 11 J* Comp .Leg. (N.S.) 94, at p.99;
Thomas, Anthropological report on the Edo-speaking 
peoples (191O), pt. 1, pp .68 ffj" Thomas," ‘(^ IgllJ) , 'p t .IV, 
iQc.cit; Omoneukanrin, Itsekiri law and customTl9527 
pp.&7 and 73; EgharevbSu. Benin law and custom (1949; 
pp. 77 3 and 77 4  > Okojie, Ishan native laws and customs 
(I960) p p .90-91*
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usually the kinsman entitled to inherit the deceased’s 
estate or a substantial share of it, If he is still young, 
an older male relative, such as an uncle, may administer the
-i
estate till he comes of age »
The administrator nominated by the deceased: the attitude
of the latter*s family to such nomination
As has been stated, the dead man himself may some­
times indicate whom his administrator may be. This is
2  ^ h 5the position among the Yoruba, Ibo , Bini and Ivbiosakon .
As a general rule, the person so nominated by the deceased
is a close relative - a son or brother - whom the family
would normally have considered as one of the candidates
fox^  such an appointment. Where this is the case, they
almost invariably accept the deceased’s nomination, which is
confirmed usually at the family meeting.
1 Thomas, (1910), x>t ,1, pp.68 ff, 78-9 and 84-6; Thomas 
L L S M u U .  pp.120, 133-5; Talbot, (.1926).,vol..Ill, 
p.686; Omoneukanrin, op .cit., p.74; Bradbury, op .cit., 
pp.47,77,107 and 137; Okojie, op.cit.. pp,90-2.
2 Lloyd, 11959S J-A.I..7f at p. 18; Lloyd, Yoruba land law
(1962) p.290.
3 Meek, Law and authority in a Nigerian tribe (1937)>P*303*
4 ThomasTl^lO.) r.lT p .89 .' "
5 Thomas, ibid. p.90.
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It is, however, stated that the deceased - among 
the Ibo - may apparently nominate anyone, including a 
friend or stranger, as his administrator • This raises 
the question as to whether the family of the dead man are 
concluded by his choice of administrator; or whether they 
are at liberty to reject his nominee, and select someone 
else. The answer to this question depends upon several 
factors, chief among which include the relationship 
existing between the family and the friend nominated by the 
deceased; the nature of the property to be administered; 
and the publicity or secrecy attending the deceased’s 
designation of his administrator. We shall take these 
points one by one.
The relationship between the family and the friend nominated 
by the deceased
If the deceased’s nominee is a close friend of the 
family or a person who, though having no blood relationship 
with the family, can be regarded as having been ,fincor­
porated" into the family, he is unlikely to encounter 
opposition from them. They will confirm his appointment; 
he may carry out his duties. This is because such a 
friend may be appointed by the family in his own right.
1 Meek, haw and authority in a Nigerian tribe (1937)* 
p.303.
182
On the other hand, the case of the complete stranger 
nominated by the deceased stands on a different footing.
The close connection between the performance of the burial 
and funeral ceremony of the deceased and the actual in­
heritance of his property has been emphasized in sundry 
places. In these circumstances, it is not difficult to 
appreciate that the family of the dead man are most unlikely 
to co-operate with him - a situation sufficient to frustrate 
any attempts on his part to carry out his duties. Further­
more, there can be no gainsaying as regards the hostility 
which the family will show towards this type of administrator; 
and there is judicial authority to the effect that it is
improper to appoint as administrator, someone not friendly
1with the family of the deceased •
The nature of property to be administered
If the property concerned belonged exclusively to 
the deceased and is not, as we shall see, specifically 
reserved by law for a particular beneficiary, the family 
may, subject to what has been stated above, permit the 
nominated administrator to discharge his duties. If,
f
however, it consists wholly or largely of family property 
over which the deceased formerly exercised mere power 
of control, the family will have far greater reasons for
1 Aileru and ors. v. Anibi (1952) 20 N.L.R.U6.
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opposing the nominated administrator. This is because, 
as will he apparent later, until there is partition of 
such property, no member of the family has any identifiable 
or separate interest in it, which he may deal with as his 
own; and in respect of which he is competent to appoint 
an administrator.
The publicity or secrecy that has attended the nomination
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of the administrator
Concerning the amount of publicity accompanying the 
nomination, it may be stated that although, as will be 
shown, this is not a legal requirement, it is of some 
practical importance that the deceased should have expressjr 
notified the members of his family of his instructions. 
Otherwise, they may treat them as mere expression of desire 
rather than the solemn obligatory wishes of a deceased 
person. For, as a learned author puts it, "secrecy is 
often allied to forgery" .
Appointment by court
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Lagos
Introduction
There are no customary courts in the Federal Territory
1 Lloyd.|l95$tSd*A.L.7> at p.18; Lloyd, Yoruba land law
(1962) p.291.
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of Lagos , and no specially enacted Act containing provisions
for the administration of estates governed by customary 
lav/ in the Federal Territory. This does not, however, 
mean that estates devolving in accordance with customary 
law situated in Lagos cannot he administered therein. The 
absence of customary courts in the Federal Territory is 
due, perhaps, to the heterogeneous nature of the local 
community inhabiting the Territory. The legislature 
has tackled the problem of the absence of customary courts 
in Lagos by enacting Acts which, while containing the 
general law provisions, nevertheless provide for the ob­
servance and enforcement of appropriate customary law or 
laws subject to their satisfying the repugnancy principle.
Thus, while the Administration (Heal Estate) Act 
sets out the general law relating to the administration 
of real property left by an intestate, it nevertheless 
provides for the operation of customary law rules of
1 Allott, A.N. Judicial and legal systems in Africa
(1962) p .47; Park A.E.W. The sources of Nigerian law
(1963)> PP-68 and 118; Nwabueze, B.O. The machinery 
of justice in Nigeria (1963) P*32*pun™ . i i  im a m  imi tm 1 lili 1 B ^ i. r ifT W im m m 'iw w iw w W n '  * ■***
2 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria and Lagos (1958), 
cap.2; formerly designated as The Administration (Real 
Estate) Ordinance. As Ordinances have now been renamed
11 Acts" (Designation of Ordinances Act, No .57 of 1 9 6 1) 
all Ordinances are referred to as Acts in this work.
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devolution in section 2 which reads:
"Provided always the real property the succession to 
which cannot by native law and custom be affected by 
testamentary disposition shall descend in accordance with 
the provisions of such native law or custom anything 
herein contained to the contrary notwithstanding*..."
»J
Similarly, the Administrator-General1s Act provides for the
administration of all estates defined as "unrepresented"
2whether governed by the general law or by customary law •
By far the most general provisions designed to
ensure the observance and enforcement of applicable
customary law are those contained in the High Court of
Lagos Act3, section 27(l) of which reads as follows:
"The High Court shall observe and enforce the observance 
of every native law and custom which is applicable and 
is not repugnant to natural justice, equity and good 
conscience nor incompatible either directly or by im­
plication with any law for the time being in force*•*."
Under the second subsection it is provided that customary
law shall be deemed to be applicable
"in causes and matters where - the parties thereto are natives and 
also in causes and matters between natives and non-natives 
where it may appear to the court that substantial injustice 
would be done to either party by a strict adherence to any 
rules of law which would otherwise be applicable*"
The Court having jurisdiction to appoint the administrator
The High Court of Lagos is the only competent Court
1 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria and Lagos (1958), cap.4*
2 Ibid* s*3l(2).
3 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria and Lagos (1958), 
cap.80* Cf* the Magistrates* Court (Lagos) Act, s.22(l).
that is vested with jurisdiction to appoint an admini­
strator in respect of an estate. This is expressly provided
A
in section 11 of the High Court of Lagos Act , which
vests in the High Court jurisdiction
n ... for the administration or control of property 
and persons..."
in the Federal Territory of Lagos.
The jurisdiction of the magistrate*s court in this 
matter is not quite clear. Section llj-(2) of the Magis-
Q
trates1 Court (Lagos) Act excludes the original juris­
diction of the court in any cause or matter which
"raises any issue as to the validity of any devise, 
bequest or limitation under any will or settlement".
It is arguable that it (the subsection) contains nothing
excluding the original jurisdiction of the court in
matters relating to the administration of estates either
under the general law or under customary law. In contrast
the provisions of the Magistrates* Courts Laws of the
southern Regions, which exclude the original jurisdiction
of the magistrates* courts in these causes and mattersf
are distinguished by their clarity. Thus, the relevant
provisions of the Magistrates* Courts Law, Western
Region, exclude the original jurisdiction of magistrates*
1 Cap•80, op .cit•
2 'Ibid. cap*113*
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courts in causes or matters "relating to inheritance 
upon intestacy under customary law and the administration 
of intestate estates under customary law"*(l)
The Magistrates1 Courts Law of the Eastern Region ex­
cludes the original jurisdiction in suits in which
"the validity of any devise, bequest or limitation under 
a will or settlement is or may be disputed or in any 
matter which is subject to the jurisdiction of a native 
court relating to marriage, family status, guardianship 
of children, inheritance or disposition of property on 
death" (2)
However, we shall have the occasion, at a later section, 
of this chapter, to point out that the words employed in 
these provisions of the Magistrates* Courts Law are not 
extensive enough to exclude the original jurisdiction 
of the court in all suits relating to matters governed 
by customary law enumerated above.
It is, of course, arguable that it does not matter 
much in which of the Courts in Lagos - the magistrates* 
court or the High Court - an application is. made fox* the 
grant of administration^ and that the whole question 
is, therefore, largely one of academic interest only. 
However, one has only to examine the Rules of the High 
Court.regulating, the incidence of costs in order to 
appreciate the practical nature of the question - a
cw I I I wh.iiwi mill ■■ 1 .HEM mil ■ m   whim ■wifu ' nan. . i n     i.im jml. iiwmi'mmirii     mm mi     n m—
1 Laws of the Western Region, 1959* cap.74*ss.19(4) and 
20(d).
2 No. 10 of 1955* s. 17.
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successful party may have the costs,to which he would 
have been entitled, considerably reduced, if he commenced 
in the High Court proceedings which he ought to have
i
instituted in the court below •
Who is a "native”-?
It will be recalled that we have reproduced in full, 
in chapter three, the statutory provisions which defined 
the term "native"; and we mentioned the fact that these 
provisions had been repealed* It has also been noticed 
that, notwithstanding the repeal of these provisions, 
that term is still contained in the provisions of both 
the Magistrates1 Coui’t Act and the High Court Act at 
present in force in Lagos.
As regards the persons covered by the definition of 
the word "native1’, it may be repeated that they must be 
the descendants of a parent or parents who are or were 
members of a tribe indigenous to Nigeria; or to some part 
of Africa. And, as will be remanbersds we advanced two
1 See Order Xiy, Rule 12 of the Supreme Court (Civil 
Procedure) Rules, cap.211, Laws of Nigeria, 19^ +8 edn. 
These Rules still regulate the practice and procedure 
followed by the High Court of Lagos by virtue of the 
High Court of Lagos Act, cap.80, s.89(3)* Lav/s of the 
Federation of Nigeria and Lagos, 1958.
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submissions: one was that the definition was broad,
enough to accommodate American negroes and West Indians 
of African origin (since they are descendants of persons 
who were members of tribes indigenous to Africa), but not 
Europeans or Asians, notwithstanding their acquisition 
of Nigerian nationality or domicile in Lagos; the other 
was that the repeal of the statutory provisions defining 
the term v/ould not prevent the courts in Lagos from 
referring to, and acting on, the definition contained 
therein.
Proceedings relating to the grant of administration
The prospective administrator applies to the High 
Court for the grant of letters of administration in the 
normal way in which applications are made to the Court. 
However, since the grounds upon which his application 
is based are those under the customary law, the Court 
is obliged, as has been stated, to consider the applicable 
cutomary law; and ensure that effect is given to it, if 
it satisfies the repugnancy principle•
Proof of the applicable customary law
It is not enough for the applicant to rely on a 
male of customary law in support of his application for
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the grant of letters of administration. In order to 
succeed, he must establish the particular rule of the
•i
customary law by evidence • This is because the Court
treats customary law as a question of fact, unless
judicial notice can be taken of it by reason of its
notoriety and the fact that it has been acted upon by 
2
the courts ♦
1 The Evidence Act, cap .62, silA, Laws of the Federation 
of Nigeria and Lagos (1958)*, also Fahm v. Ogbojulogun 
and anor. (1935) 12 N.L.R.A7; Jones, v. Martins 'T1955)
9 W.A.C.A. 100; George v. Administrator-General and. 
anor. (1955) 21 N.L.R* 83* In addition to oral 
evidence (of everts and traditional chiefs), customary 
law may be proved by means of any book or manuscript 
recognised as legal authority by those subject to the 
particular customary law: ss*56 and 58 of the Evidence. 
Act, cap.62, op .cit. For some of the cases where text­
books have been accepted by the courts in proof of 
customary law, see: Amodu Tijani v. Secretary. Southern 
Provinces of Nigeria (1921) 3 N.L.R.56: ) 19211 2~X.C.
399; Balogun v. Oshodi (1929) 10 N.L .R.36; Adeseye and 
ors ♦ v ♦ Taiwo and ors. (1956) I F.S.C.8A; Suberu and 
ors« v ♦ Sunmonu and ors ♦ (1957) II F.S .0.33; Oyekan v.
Adele 1957 I W.L*R. "STS; also Adedibu v. AdewoyinTl951)
13 W.A.C.A.191; where, however, Ward Price"rs book,
Land tenure in the Yoruba Provinces (1933)> was rejected.
2 8.1 A of the WITience^ A^tT 'cap'.‘62T""qp .cit.; Angu v. Attah 
infra, footnote j. For some of the authorities in 
which judicial notice has been taken of the rules of 
the customary law, see: Adagun v. Fagbola and anor. 
(1932) N.L.R.110. Buraimo and ors. v . Ghamgboye and ors« 
(l9Ao) 15 N.L.R.139; affirmed on appeal in 7 W.A.C.A.
69; Onisiwo and ors. v. Fagbenro and ors. (195A) 21
N.L .R.3; Coj^^v STnyeTe and ors . (1960) V F.S.C.8A;
Ajobi and anor. v. Oloko and ors.\l959}L .L.R.152.
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The principle governing the proof of customary law,
which was established in Angu v. Attah1 in 1916 by the
Privy Council, has recently been reiterated by the Nigerian
Supreme Court in the Lagos case of Giwa and ors. v.
2Brinmolokun , where the appellants failed to discharge
the burden of proof with respect to the rule of customary
law upon which their action for a declaration of title
to some land in Lagos had been based. Taylor, F.J., who
delivered the judgement of the Supreme Court, said:
"It is a well established principle of law that native 
law and custom is a matter of evidence to be decided 
on the facts presented before the Court in each particular 
case, unless it is of such notoriety and has been frequenter 
followed by the Courts that judicial notice would be 
taken of it without evidence required in proof" (3)
Western and Mid-Western Regions
As outlined in chapter one, there are customary 
courts in the Mid-Western Region which deal with the 
administration of estates governed by customary law.
This is also the position in the Western Region.
Brief introduction to the organisation and jurisdiction
M W — IfcWHHW » V « M WH.MHUli>|. II I)|IWI^b»*»rT »  II M  I I — IH 1      11 I Mil I
of the customary courts
There are four grades of customary courts, namely:
"A", "B", "G" and "D"; though there are plans to abolish
1 (1916) P.C. (Gold Coast) 187A-1928,A3.
2 119651 All N.L.R.294.
3 Ibid, at p.296.
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the last grade of these courts .
The jurisdiction of each grade of court in causes
and matters relevant to our dicussion is set out in
1 2 the second schedule to the Customary Courts Law as
follows t
PART I - GRADE "A"
Unlimited jurisdiction in all civil causes and 
matters ..... Provided that the court shall not have 
jurisdiction to administer the estate of an intestate 
where the gross capital value thereof exceeds £500.
PART II - GRAPE
Unlimited jurisdiction in causes and matters relating 
to inheritance upon intestacy and the administration 
of intestate estates under customary law. Provided that 
the court shall not have jurisdiction to administer the 
estate of an intestate where the gross capital value 
thereof exceeds £500.
part in - amm ”clf
Jurisdiction in causes and matters relating to 
inheritance upon intestacy and the administration of 
intestate estates under customary law where the value 
of the property does not exceed fifty pounds •
PART IV - GRADE "D”
Jurisdiction in causes and matters relating to 
inheritance upon intestacy and the administoation of 
intestate estates under customary law where the value 
of the property does not exceed toenty-five pounds.
1 The Customary Courts (Amendment) Law, Western Region,
No.3U of 1959; brought into force, with effect from 
3rd September, 1959 by W.R.L.N. No k39 of 1959* It 
should be noted that W.R. Mo 3^4- of 1959 amended the 
second schedule to the Customary Courts Law, cap.31> 
Laws of the Western Region of Nigeria (1959);wherein 
the jurisdiction of grades lfA,f and !!B” courts is stated 
to be unlimited.
2 Cap.31 $ Laws of the Western Region of Nigeria,1959.
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Briefly summarised, the second schedule to the 
Customary Courts Law confers jurisdiction in these 
matters (administration and succession under customary 
law) on grades "A" and "B" customary courts where the 
gross value of the estate does not exceed £500; while 
in the case of grades nC!tand i?D”, the value of the 
estate does not exceed £50 and £25 respectively.
Procedure adopted by the customary court in these suits
Nowhere in the provisions of the Customary Courts
1 2 Law or, indeed, in the Customary Courts Rules is any
guidance given as regards the practice and procedure to
be followed by the customary courts in suits relating
to the administration of estates under customary law.
It must not, however, be assumed that these are formless
suits from the procedural point of view. The position
is that the courts have substantially assimilated the
procedure in these suits to that observed in respect of
other civil causes and matters - a fact clearly borne
out by the certified true copies of proceedings relating
to administration obtained by the present writer and
appended to this v/ork; together with the information
1 Cap.31* Laws of the Western Region of Nigeria, 1959
2 The Customary Courts (Amendment, No.2) Rules, W.R.L. 
N.260 of 1959; amending the Customary Courts Rules 
(1958) contained in cap.31, op .cit.. with effect 
from 1st August, 1959.
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supplied by the clerks of court who certified such 
a
proceedings . The procedure will now be briefly des­
cribed*
The proceedings are usually initiated by the sole
or principal beneficiary who files an ex parte applica­
nt
tion ; and where such a beneficiary is still young,
some adult person acting for him, may make the application.
2
In the Itsekiri case of In re Fregene, decided by the Warri 
Divisional grade tTB!f customary court, three beneficiaries 
applied for a certificate of administration and inheri­
tance. The first applicant was the sister of the 
deceased; the second was the deceased’s second son, who 
appeared because the first son was of unsound mind; and 
the third was the dead man’s nephew who, according to 
the record, of the proceedings, had. been included !,to 
represent the interest of ... the half-brothers of the 
deceased tf. Sometimes, however, as where the question 
of the administration of the estate has been settled by 
the family, the application made is in respect of the 
actual inheritance of the estate. Thus, in the Urhobo case
1 These proceedings relate to the following unreported. 
cases: the Itsekiri case of He Fregene, infra, and the
Urhobo case of He Qmoko Ziregbe". infra.
2 Suit No GrBG/5S/6ti, unreported, decided on Uth June, I960*
3 Ibid, at p .1 of the copy of proceedings appended to this
work.
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involving the sum of £210, which the deceased had in his f 
savings bank account, the suit was headed, “Court Inquiry:
Re Certificate of inheritance to Estate of late Qmoko
*1 f |
Ziregbe • The evidence given by the deceased's eldest 
son left no doubt as to the fact that the process of 
administration had been completed; and that he was 
claiming the father's account at the bank by way of inheri­
tance. He testified as follows:
"I am .... the eldest son of .....my late father has a 
saving Bank Account in the B.W.A. Ltd., ¥/arri. X am 
here applying to the Court for a certificate of inheri­
tance; as to enable me to recover the saving from the 
Bank, which I have already owned through the right of 
inheritance according to native law and custom, by the 
members of our family”. (2)
Evidence required of the prospective customary administrator: 
proof of customary lav/ in the customary court?
It will be recalled that the prospective customary 
administrator applying for the grant of administration 
in the High Court of Lagos must prove the particular 
customary law upon which he relies, unless the Court can 
take judicial notice of it. The question now to be con­
sidered is: does the principle requiring proof of customary 
law apply also in respect of proceedings before the 
customary court; or is such proof dispensed with before
1 Suit No.2/61, unreported, decided by the Central 
Urhobo grade “B1f customary court, Ughelli, on 28th 
August,1961.
2 Ibid. at p.l of the copy of proceedings appended to 
this work.
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this type of tribunal? The answer to this question is 
that the judicial authorities on the point are divided: 
there are the cases in which it has been held that, 
unless it can be judicially noticed, customary law must 
be formally proved in the customary court) and there 
are others in which it has been decided that evidence 
of customary law is not required, where the members of 
the customary court hearing the case are familiar with 
the particular custom. We will now examine these 
decided cases.
(a) Customary law must be proved
The decision in ffijabi v. Qdumola , decided by 
the High Court of the former Western Kegion, is to the 
effect that a party relying upon customary law in 
proceedings before the customary court must adduce evi­
dence in support of it, unless the courts are bound to 
tahe judicial notice of it. In this case, the appellant 
obtained judgement against the respondent in the then 
Ojofba II native court, Ibadan, in respect of a debt 
owed by the latter. The respondent appealed to the 
native court of appeal, which allowed the appeal on a 
proposition of customary law not given in evidence 
before either of the customary tribunals; but which
1 fl9'55- W.N .L .R.133*
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was stated in the judgement of the native court of
appeal. On appeal to the High Court on the ground
that there had "been no proof of the customary law,
Taylor, J., as he then was, allowed the appeal, saying:
"It is true that in a case emanating from the Hative 
Courts there are no pleadings ordered, hut the absence 
of this does not in any way relieve a party from 
leading evidence as to such law and custom" (1)
2Similarly, in Edokpolor v . Idehen , also a decision 
of the High Court of the former Western Region, Thomas, 
J., as he then was, allowed an appeal from the decision 
of the Benin grade "A" customary court on the ground 
that the lower court had given judgement against the 
appellant in respect of trespass to the respondents 
land, without receiving (and,in fact, rejecting) evidence 
of the Benin customary land law.
2
The case - Edokpolor v* Idehen - is rather interes­
ting as regards the view e;xpressed by the president of 
the customary court on the question of proof of customary 
law in proceedings before the customary court. In 
answer to the request by counsel for the respondent that 
evidence of the customary law be led, the president 
remarked that his court was the repository of the
niwwmfiiiinrtii^ ^MwipMiii.iiMiiw.iiiimw.iiwMi iih tihui^ t—m hhh i ii fciinimii i ■■hum i^ —.n w mi ....  _li___________
1 [1955-6] W.N.L.R.133*
2 [196iJ W.N.L.R.ll*
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customary law and, as such, he required no proof of 
that system of law; which was to be proved only before 
the High Court. He even went further to draw the 
analogy with English law which, he pointed out, was not 
required to be proved in an English court. Perhaps, his 
view on this point will be more vividly brought out by 
quoting his actual words which run:
"This is a Customary Court and the court is the repository 
of Customary Law. If on appeal issues of customary law 
are raised and the High Court is in difficulty it can 
require the aid of assessors. Just as evidence of 
English law is not required in English Court so there is 
no need for evidence .... as to the existence or non­
existence of Customary Law in Customary Courts of the 
Western Region" (1)
As stated above, the president of the customary court
was reversed on appeal on precisely this point.
The consideration which weighed most with the
learned Judge, as he then was, who decided the case of
2 was that the president of the grade 
"A" court was not a member of a customary institution, 
administering purely customary law. In the learned 
Judge1s words:
”1 have noted that the learned President holds the view 
that as President of the Benin Customary Court Grade 
”Atf, he is the repository of customary law. That might 
be so had he been the President of a court accepted as
1 Edokpolor v. Idehen \l96li W.N.L.R.ll, at p.13.
2 L196lj W.N.L
V
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wholly native in its constitution and concept, and 
administering the law and custom of such native insti­
tution* He is a President administering the law as 
envisaged "by the Customary Courts Law, 1957, and on a 
proper construction of the statute, evidence of the 
customai'y law appropriate to the area should have been
A similar observation was made by the learned Judge, 
who decided the case of
(b) Evidence of customary law need not be given if 
members of the customary court are familiar with the
PWMIII I Ml I— IBM— Ill   Will........  I HI Bipi.j l.|WII W  I II IM I ■ I ■■ !■! ■! I ■ HlflU TinTTH MlUfcl llll jffTI II ll II ' > !!!■■ m p H * ^  !■ llllllMUlll j ■«!   M l *
On the other hand, there are cases in which it has 
been held that evidence of customary law need not be 
led, if the members constituting the customary court 
deciding the case know the customary law in issue.
We may start with the Ghana (Gold Coast) case of
•z
Ababio II v* Nsemfoo , where the appellant, in execution 
of a judgement for a declaration of title to some land 
he had obtained, ejected the respondent and other persons 
from the land in breach of the customary law; which only 
permitted him to compel them to enter into tenancy agree­
ments with him* The respondent, brought an action against 
the appellant in the Asantehene's f,A,f court (the para-
led C D
2Ehigie, which will shortly be examined
•particular customary law
1 Ibid, at p.lU
2
3
All N.L.H,814-2; | 
12 W*A.C *A*127*
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mount ruler*s customary court), claiming recovery of 
possession or, in the alternative, damages for wrongful 
dispossession* Notwithstanding that there was no evidence 
of the relevant customary law before the -^santehene*s ”An 
court, the tribunal stated that law in its judgement; 
and ordered that the appellant should restore possession 
to the respondent, and enter into a tenancy agreement 
with his adversary*
The appellant appealed to the Chief Commissioner’s 
Court, which dismissed the appeal, holding that the 
court below was expert on customary law* He then ap­
pealed to the West African Coui»t of Appeal which af­
firmed the decisions of both lower courts* The Court 
took the view that, notwithstanding the absence of evidence 
before the Asantehene* s 11A" court with respect to the 
existence of the rule of the customary law on which the 
customary tribunal had based its decision, the decision 
of the court must still be affirmed on the ground that 
the members of the court were familiar with the parti­
cular rule of the customary law, which they stated 
(without evidence being led as to its existence) in the 
judgement. As regards the principle laid down in Angu v. 
^ttah, which requires evidence of customary law to be
1 (1916) P.O. (Gold Coast) 187U-1928, U3.
201
adduced where the courts are unable to take judicial 
notice of it, the Court held that it must be confined to 
proceedings before non-customary tribunals; and that there 
was no ground for extending it to customary courts, at any 
rate, where ,fthe members are versed in their own native
4
customary law.,..’1 In the words of M* Car thy, J., who
delivered the judgement of the Court:
This^i.e. the principle in Angu v . Attah] , of course, 
was intended to apply to what may "be described as British 
Courts before which it is sought to prove a particular 
custom* There is no ground for extending its application 
to Native Courts of which the members are versed in their
own native customary la?/......If the members of a Native
Court are familiar with a custom it is certainly not 
obligatory upon it to require the custom to be proved 
through witnesses*' (l)
It should be observed that the portion of the
2
judgement in Ababio II v* Nsemfoo to the effect that 
proof of Customary law is to be dispensed with in proceedings 
before customary courts of which the members are versed in
2that system of law, is preceded by the phrase per incuriam; 
and that it has been held in the reeent Benin case of 
Iyamuse Ehigie v* Gregory Ehigie * where the view has also 
been expressed that the decision in AbabioTs case was given 
per incuriam and was not intended to be of general applica­
tion^ *, that customary law must be established by evidence -
1 Ibid, at p.128*
2 TJ947) 12 W.A.C.A.127. «
3 Ll96lj All N*L.R*8U2; L1961J W.N.L.R.307.
4 Ibid, at p.8h8; and at p.311 respectively*
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unless it can be judicially taken notice of - in all 
cases where the membership of a customary tribunal has not 
been constituted on considerations of expertise in, or 
familiarity with, customary law. In Ehigie!s case , the 
dispute was concerned with a house left by a deceased Bini, 
who died intestate. The eldest son of the deceased, the 
respondent, claimed the property as the deceased fathei*!s 
heir under the Benin customary law of succession; while the 
appellant - the eldest daughter of the deceased - contended 
that the house had been specially built for, and given to^ 
her by the deceased. The proceedings were commenced in 
the grade ,rA" customary court, Benin, where the respondent 
sought to obtain a declaration of title to the property 
which was occupied by the appellant.
It will be recalled that the view of the president
of the Benin grade "A!T customary court, as stressed in
2the earlier case of Edokpolor v. Idehen. was that it was 
not necessary to lead evidence of customary law in pro­
ceedings before a customary court, since that court was the 
repository of this system of law. Accordingly, in Ehigie1s 
case| the, learned president dispensed with evidence of the 
Benin customary law of succession, which he , however,
1 [19 6$. All N.L.R.8U2; [l96ll W.N.L.R.307.
2 £l96g W.N.L.R.ll.
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embodied in the judgement he gave in favour of the res­
pondent. The deceased’s eldest daughter appealed to the 
High Court, which allowed the appeal. The ground on which 
the decision of the customary court was reversed was that 
the president thereof, being a person appointed solely on 
consi&erations of his legal qualifications, erred in law 
in stating the Benin customary law in his judgement in 
the absence of any evidence adduced before the court • As 
regards the qualifications required of such a president 
under the provisions of the Customary Courts Law, Fatayi- 
Williams, J., observed:
‘'Although he is required to apply the customary law of 
the area of jurisdiction of the court the. president is not 
inquired by statute either to be a native of the area of 
jurisdiction of the customary court or to have any special 
qualification in the customary law of the area. The only 
statutory qualification is that he should be a legal 
practitioner’1.(!)
For this reason, the decision in Ababio!s case - to 
the effect that customary law need not be proved where the 
members of the customary tribunal are familiar with it - 
was held to be inapplicable, since the members of the 
Asantehene’s "A” court were ’’for obvious reasons,... 
familiar with their own native customary law” ; while 
the same thing could not be said of the Benin grade ”A”
1 Ibid, at p.8U8; and at p.311 respectively. This d'te’kutory 
requirement. ±s contained in section 6(l) of the 
Customary Courts Law, cap.31? Laws of the Western Region 
of Nigeria (1959) .
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customary court, the president of which is appointed 
strictly on the basis of his legal qualifications.
Some comments on the judicial authorities on proof of
customary law in proceedings before customary courts
In his booh entitled, the Sources of Nigerian law,
Parle advances the view that customary law need not be
established by evidence in proceedings before the customary
courts, partly because the provisions of the Evidence
Act do not in general apply to these courts; and partly
because the members of these courts, whether possessing
legal qualifications or not, are usually acquainted with
this system of law, by reason of their belonging to the
*1
areas of jurisdiction of the courts • While the present 
writer’s experience of the position in the Mid-Western 
Region lends support to the learned author’s assertion 
regarding the membership of the local communities of the 
judges of these courts (Obaseki, the president of the
Benin grade "A" customary court, who decided Edokpolor v.
2 3 iiIdehen and lyamuse Ehigie v. Ehigie^being a Bini) , it
is nevertheless to be noted that the learned author’s view
5is in direct conflict with the tw>decisions of the High
1. At p.90.
2 Edokpolor v. Idehen [1961J W.N.L.R.ll.
3 L3.9MLJ All N.L.R.&1+2; 0.961] W.N.L.R.307.
h He is, however, now a Judge of the High Court of the 
Mid-Western Region. See: M. N* Notice No.80 of 196h, 
2nd April, 19&+.
5 I.e., Edokpolor v . Idehen: and Ehigte’s case; op .cit.
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Court of the former Western Region already discussed*
1As already noted, the decision in the earlier of 
these two cases was to the effect that customary lav/, 
unless this can he judicially noticed, must he proved in 
proceedings before the customary court, on the ground that 
the customary court is not a court accepted as wholly 
native in its constitution, and administration of the cus­
tomary law; hut rather as a court established by the 
Customary Courts Law, the provisions of which empower 
the court to administer not only the customary law, but 
also the general law*
As regards the decision in the later case - Ivamuse
2Bhigie v, Gregory Ehigie - the 'View expressed by the learned 
judge seems, however, to be that the considerations governing 
the appointment of the members of a particular courtage-U  l-la 4+
to be taken into account in deciding whether to insist 
upon or dispense with proof of customary law in proceedings 
before this type of court*
It will be recalled that Park’s submission is to 
the effect that the requirement of formal proof should 
always be dispensed with in this connection* In point 
of fact, he has criticised the decision of Taylor, J*, as
1 Edokpolor v * Idehen jl96l| W *N *L *R • 11 •
2 7196iI' All N.L.R. 81+2; (196i| W.N.L.K.307.zaSt f t- *
1he then was, in Fijabi y» Odumola on two grounds: that
the attention of the learned judge had not been drawn to
2the Ghana case of Ababio IX v. Nsemfoo ; and that, m  
any case, proof of customary law in proceedings before 
customary courts was impracticable and unnecessary . Not­
withstanding the learned author’s submission and criticism, 
or the cleavage of judicial opinion on the point, it is 
respectfully submitted that some evidence of the customary 
law should always be required of a party relying on a rule 
of this system of law in proceedings before the customary 
court. Firstly^ this will put the appeal court in a better 
position to appreciate and evaluate the customary law rule 
in issue. Secondly, it will help to check possible 
abuse on the part of customary court judges, whose state­
ment of the law (without evidence) may represent a subjec­
tive - often sympathetic - view, based upon their own 
personal knowledge of the facts of the matter before them.
It is, perhaps, worth noting that the ease of 
2Ababio II v. Nsemfoo , where it was held that customary 
law was not to be proved if the members of the court 
deciding a .case were familiar with the custom, contains 
some cryptic reference to the advisability of leading
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evidence of customary law in proceedings before a customary 
tribunal* For, M rCarthy, J., delivering the judgement of 
the Court, observed:
nThere is no ground for extending its application to Native 
Courts of which the members are versed in their own native 
customary law, although there is nothing to prevent a party 
from calling witnesses to prove an alleged‘custom  ^ (1)mw. up II ■■—u—wimnm ji.pmw.iwji i w^iim >wv'|'»m»mi—wrw ifpmin n pfi  ...... imh ip \ i»hm—w mui n*. hhmpTpIb m»i i»<iT<nnwwi)iv»m^wiw » •
Nature of evidence* in fact* required of the prospective 
customary administrator in respect of his application beforeMPHPw ia I till IT'I nil       P up i ■ i li 1 ~ t ■ li i i i n n lM w f  IPIUP ~|IPI in ■ I IW H^iiim Piibi himim ni IIHIP Ii i r — V l i * w i i nmi iibiii—PiiP^ iwhiwiwii     |> I|ii^pwp »PP.WWW ppp»p|
the customary court•
The proceedings leading to the appointment of the 
administrator by the customary court take the form of an 
inquiry, at which he and his witnesses, if any, give 
evidence; and are subjected to cross-examination by the court* 
The evidence required of him covers certain facts, 
chief among which include: the time and place of death
of the deceased; his last place of abode; his occupation 
or occupations; the number of persons, such as children 
and other relatives, beneficially interested in the de­
ceased ’s estate; and the degree of relationship the appli­
cant has with the deceased. In the Itsekiri case of In re 
2
Fregene , two of the three applicants gave evidence es­
tablishing the facts indicated above. Only one of the 
applicants was, however, cross-examined by the court. The
1 Ibid. at p.128, underlined for emphasis.
2 Suit No. GBC/5E/60, unreported,of 4th June, I960; grade
*rB,r court, Warri.
208
applicants called no witnesses to testify in support of 
their claim; nor, indeed, in proof of the Itsekiri cus­
tomary law upon which they relied. One of the applicants 
merely said in evidence:
"The deceased had no brother living and I am the only 
surviving elder sister. I want this Court to grant the 
second son, his nephew .... and me a certificate of in­
heritance to enable us not only to inherit but also to 
administer the estate of my deceased brother according 
to Itsekiri customary law", (l)
The other applicant testified in support of the evidence
given by the first as to their inheritance rights under
the Itsekiri customary lav/ in this way:
1f....I would like the Court to consider the point in 
relation to the interest of the beneficiaries of the 
estate and give its decision according to the best 
principles of customary law". (2)
Could this evidence adduced by the applicants be regarded
as proving the Itsekiri customary law of succession? The
answer must clearly be in the negative. Nevertheless, the
customary court considered that the applicants had made
out a case entitling them to the grant of a certificate
with respect to the administration and inheritance of
the estate. The ruling of the court was as follows:
"Having heard the evidence of the first and second appli­
cants, I am satisfied that the three applicants before me 
are, having regard to the interest of the beneficiaries of
the estate of the deceased,  and of the Pregene family
under Itsekiri customary lav/ entitled to inherit and ad­
minister the estate of the deceased. I, therefore, order 
that the Certificate of Inheritance do issue to them 
a c co rdin gly" (2)
1 Suit No.gSc75E/6o, unreported, of 4th June, I960; grade 
"B" court, Warri.
2 Ibid. at p.2 of the copy of proceedings.
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a
In the Urhobo ease of In  the Estate of Qmoko Ziregbe ,
the eldest son of the deceased applied fop a certificate
of inheritance in respect of his father's money left in a
savings bank account. He gave evidence and also called the
deceased's brother in support of his case. Both were cross-
examined by the court. As in the Itsekiri case of In re 
2Hregene , however, there was no evidence directed at es­
tablishing the Urhobo customary law of succession. This 
did not, however, affect his chances of success: the court
granted his application.
courts.
2
Both the Itsekiri and the Urhobo cases - In re Fregene
*1
and In the Estate of Qmoko Ziregbe respectively - discussed 
above, plainly show that suits relating to the appointment 
of the customary administrator, including the grant of the 
certificate of inheritance, are characterised with little 
or no formality at all. This is not surprising. As has 
been seen, the process of administration and the actual 
distribution of the estate under customary lav/ are matters 
for the members of the family of the deceased.
A
In the Urhobo case of In the Estate of Qmoko Ziregbe
1 Op.cit .
2 Op.cit.
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the applicants witness (a full brother of the deceased)
made it clear to the court that the family of the deceased
had completed both the administration and distribution of
the dead man’s estate; but that they had come before the
court to obtain a certificate or authority to enable the
applicant (the deceased1s eldest son) to claim the deceased’s
savings bank account. He testified:
nI am the direct brother of the late Chief Omoko Ziregbe ... 
we the members of our family have administered the saving 
account of the late father now in the B.W.A. Ltd* [li.e. 
the Bank of West Africa LtdiHj, Warri, and wish that a 
certificate of inheritance be given to bim^i.e. the appli­
cant, referred to as ’complainant1 by the court,however! 
to enable him to recover the said money” (l)
As stated, the applicant^ was successful, the court making
an order which read: ’’Application is hereby granted.”
Procedure where the appointment of the administrator is 
opposed
Anyone opposed to the grant to the administrator of 
the certificate or authority entitling him to administer 
the estate may file an application specifying the grounds 
for opposing such grant. He is entitled to be heard, by 
the customary court, which will, however, require him to 
put on notice the party he seeks to oppose. The require­
ment enables the party sought to be opposed to file a
1 Ibid, at p.l of the copy of proceedings appended.
2 Ibid, at p .2.
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counter~app 11 cation to his opponent’s application; and 
generally affords him (the party sought to be opposed) 
the opportunity to resist more effectively his adversary’s 
case.
1In the Itsekiri case of In re Fregene , an application 
was filed, some four months after the appointment of the 
administrators and administratrix, in which it was sought 
to remove the persons appointed by the court. The court 
rejected this application on the ground that it ncan see 
nothing in the affidavit of the applicants to justify the
p
removal sought" *
Similarly, in the Yoruba case of Idowu and anor. v. 
Adisa and anor. the native court rejected the application 
opposing the appointment of the respondents as the persons 
entitled to administer the estate•
Order made by the customary court on termination of pro­
ceedings wherein the customary administrator is appointed 
As has been seen from the cases decided by the 
customary courts, the order by which the customary admini­
strator is appointed is designated as a ’certificate*. It
k 'is also termed a ’judgement* sometimes. In the Superior 
Courts, however, this certificate or judgement of the
1 Op.cit.
2 Op.cit♦, at p.2 of the copy of the proceedings appended
3 "pTgBTTw .N .L .R. 167.
4 See over.
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1customary court is variously referred to as ’authority* ,
o
’appointment* , *power* or * grant* (hut in this last instance,
■2
without the additional words ,fof letters of administration’*)^ * 
In the only known case - Idowu and anor, v . Adisa and anor.- 
in which the term*letters of administration* was employed 
by the High Court of the Western Region, Ademola, C.J., 
as he then was, cautiously put the words (letters of ad­
ministration) in quotation marks.
As will be shown later, one effect of the rather 
cautious terms employed by the Superior Courts in desig­
nating the order of the customary court has been to differen­
tiate the limited powers of the customary administrator 
appointed thereby from those possessed by his counterpart 
under the general law; who, as has been seen, is granted 
letters of administration.
Appointment by court (continued)
The position In the Eastern Region 
The customary courts
There are only two grades of customary courts in
k See: Suit NO.108U/59 (unreported), decided by the Obia 
grade tfA tf customary court, in Ahoada Division, Port Har- 
court, Pastern Region, on the 10th September, 1959*
Also: Lawal and ors. v. Younan and ors • [l96ll All N.L.R. 
2h5 at p .252; \_1965>P^1 .R .197 at p.202.
1 Lawal and ors. v. Younan and ors. fl959l W.N.L .R .155 at
p .158* ' „
2 Aragba and ors . v . Akanji and ors.fl960j W.N .L .R .92
3 LawarrsT case \l96l'j I I O . L  .R.&a5 at pp .252-3; 1961 W.N.L.R. 
137 PP *202-3*
k 1,1957] W.N.L.R. 167.
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the eastern Region namely: the grade"An district 
customary courts; and the grade ”Bff district customary 
courts•
The jurisdiction of these courts in causes and 
matters relating to succession is set out as follows: 
District Grade “A”
Causes and matters relating to the succession to 
property and administration of estates under customary 
law where the value of the property does not exceed one 
hundred pound.s. (l)
District Grade T,B’r
Causes and matters relating to succession to 
property and administration of estates under customary 
law where the value of the property does not exceed 
twenty-five pounds. (2)
In short, grades tfA” and ”B’r customary courts in 
the Eastern Region exercise jurisdiction in the causes and 
matters referred to above, where the value of the property 
does not exceed £100 and £25 respectively*
Procedure
Much of what has been described in connection with 
proceedings before the customary courts of the other two 
Regions applies to the Eastern Region; except that the 
prospective administrator appears as plaintiff, while 
one or more members of the deceased’s family defend in
1 The Customary Courts (Amendment) Law, E.R. No.12 of 1957.
2 Pirst schedule to the Customary 'Courts Law, No.21 of 1956*
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the proceedings. Thus, in the case of* Ephraim Ochonma v.
*1Vincent Ochonma , heard before the Obia grade ”A” customary 
court in Port Harcourt Province, the prospective admini­
strator sued his elder half-brother and head of the family. 
The relief sought was a declaration that the plaintiff 
was the next-of-kin of the deceased, entitled to the
o
"salary, gratuity, pension, if any” , from the government 
department (P.W.D. or Ministry of Works) which employed 
the deceased.
As in the customary courts of the Mid-Western Region, 
the proceedings before the customary court in the Eastern 
Region are treated as matters occasioning■little formality.
In the Ochonma^ case, for instance, the defendant, far from 
resisting the claim, admitted the whole case presented by 
the plaintiff; though, surprisingly enough, the customary 
court still subjected him to the ordeal of cross-examination. 
But this attempt on the part of the court to give the 
semblance of a contested case to the proceedings apparently 
does not have the effect of rendering the procedure ir­
regular. For, it has been held in the Yoruba case of 
Oladano v. Akinsowon that we should view the proceedings 
before a customary court as men of commonsense, and not
1 Suit No.1084/59# op.cit.
2 Ibid, at p.l of the copy of proceedings appended.
3 11957] W.N.L.R. 215.
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yas English lawyers applying the English rules of evidence, 
procedure and substantive law....11 (l)
AUTHORITY GRANTED TO TEE CUSTOMARY ADM INIS TRATQR BY THE 
CUSTOMARY COURT: LEGAL POSITION OF
There is no doubt that the order of the customary 
court appointing the customary administrator empowers him 
to administer the estate to which it (order) relates.
This means, of course, that such an order is effective only 
in respect of an estate governed by customary law. It 
cannot, for instance, be invoked in respect of claims arising 
under the general law or, at any rate, where the claim is 
one regulated by an English statute applying to Nigeria 
as a statute of general application.
2In Lawal and ors. v. Younan and ors* , the High Court 
of Western Nigeria held that customary administrators 
appointed by a customary court were entitled to sue for 
damages on behalf of the wives and children of two deceased
persons, under the provisions of the English Fatal Accidents
3 4Acts . On appeal to the Supreme Court , however, this
1 Ibid., at p.216. In the lower court (the old native 
court), a member said: "This Court is a Native Court 
and not a Law Court"; ibid.» at p.215*
2 [19591 W.N.L.R. 155.
3 (1846), 9 & 10 Viet, c.93; and (1864), 27 & 28 Viet.
c.95.
b Reported in[l96l] All H.L.R.245; 0-961] W.K.L.R.19’7.
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decision was reversed on the ground that the customary
administrators had no capacity to sue under the provisions
of the English law governing the rights of the defendants
of both deceased persons* The position would have been
different had customary law governed the claim or had the
defendants themselves brought the action. Ademola, C.<J.F.
delivering the main judgement of the Court, observed:
H0n the view I have taken of this matter, it is clear that 
a person to whom power is given under Customary Law to 
administer the Estate of a deceased person is a person 
empowered where the Customary Law can be invoked, and such 
a power cannot be extended to matters which are statutory 
rights under English law and to which statutory remedies 
apply **•* 1 have therefore come to the conclusion that the 
two actions in the High Court could not be prosecuted by 
the plaintiffs [li.e. the customary administrators"} as they 
have no capacity to sue • The dependants of the deceased 
persons themselves could have sued on their own behalf.'1 (l)
Lawal and ors. v. Younan and ors. also supportable on 
additional ground: original jurisdiction of the High Court
excluded in any matter 11 subject to th© Jurisdiction of a 
customary court relating to... inheritance or disposition 
of property on death*
We may repeat what has been stated in chapter one 
to the effect that the original jurisdiction of the High 
Courts of both the Western and the Mid-Western Regions is 
excluded in matters, which are subject to the jurisdiction
1 Ibid. at p.253; and at p.203 respectively.
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of a customary court, relating to inheritance or dispost-
tion of property on death ; and add that this is also
2the position in the Eastern Region • In addition, there are
' Z
the Yoruba cases of Igbodu and ors, :.VV Amoo. J as well as— I w b a n i l i — a H N — . i t um >n i*>^imfiirn*iin
Aragba and ors. v. Akanji and ora.^ in which the High Court 
of the Western Region declined to exercise original juris­
diction on the ground that the suits, being concerned with 
inheritance under customary law, were subject to the juris­
diction of the then native courts; which had appointed as 
customary administrators, the plaintiffs and the defendants 
in the first and second cases respectively*
It follows from the statutory provisions and the
decided cases referred to above, that the decision in 
5Lawalfs case * in which the Supreme Court held that the 
customary administrators lacked the capacity to sue.in the 
High Court of Western Nigeria, is clearly supportable on 
an additional ground* It is, therefore, rather surprising 
that this point - that the matter being one subject to
1 The High Court Law, cap *UU, s.9(l)> Laws of the Western 
Region of Nigeria, 1959*
2 The High Court Law, Eastern Region, No.27 of 19559 s*13*
3 ll957l W.N.L.R.22.
k tl96°j W *N *L *R .92.
5 Op .cit*
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the jurisdiction of a customary court which had appointed 
the administrators of both estates, the original jurisdic­
tion of the High Court was thereby excluded - was not taken 
in the Court below. This is all the more surprising when 
"it is realised that there was evidence with regard to the 
,appointment of the customary administrators by the customary 
court, from which the learned trial Judge was, no doubt, 
able to say:
lf... the test is whether an authority given to the plaintiffs 
[i.e. the customary administrators”] by the Customary Courts 
to administer the estate of the deceased persons entitles 
them to sue in the High Court as such administrators. I 
can see no objection in law to prevent them from doing so, 
for, although the .basis of the claim is under English law, 
it is by virtue of their right as customary administrators 
of the deceased’s estate and on behalf of the customary 
dependants that they have instituted these proceedings’’ (l)
As indicated above, the decision of the learned trial Judge
was reversed on appeal•
Notwithstanding the existence of the provisions
of the High Court Laws and of the judicial authorities
regarding the exclusion of the original jurisdiction of
the High Courts in matters pertaining to inheritance, ?/hich
are subject to the jurisdiction of a customary court, it
is still arguable, as has been observed in chapter one,
that instances may exist in which the High Court may be
justified in exercising original jurisdiction in respect of
1 Lawal’s case fl959l W.N.L.R.155 at pp.158-9 - High
Court of the 'Western Region.
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matters relating to succession governed by customary law. 
These instances will include cases in which the value of 
the estate governed by customaj: law exceeds the jurisdic­
tion of the appropriate customary court or courts; and 
where the estate devolving in accordance with customary law 
is situated in an area having no customary court. In 
respect of the situations instanced above, it is submitted 
that the original jurisdiction of the High Court cannot 
be excluded; in the first case, it is clearly not open 
to argument to say that the matter is one usubject to 
the jurisdiction of a customary court”, when that court is 
incompetent in law to assume jurisdiction; in the second, 
there simply is no .customary court to whose jurisdiction 
the matter is or may be subject.
THE PRIG-INAL JURISDICTION OF MAGISTRATES' COURTS IN THESE 
MATTERS
As regards the original jurisdiction of the Magis­
trates1 Courts in these matters, it is interesting to 
observe that the operative phrase - "subject to the juris­
diction of a customary ” - which was contained in the 
provisions of the old Magistrates1 Courts (Western Region)
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a
Law (but which, as has been seen, is still retained in 
the High Court Laws at present in force in the Western, 
Mid-Western and Eastern Regions, as well as in the existing
p
Magistrates1 Courts Law of the last Region ) is now omitted 
from the provisions of the Magistrates* Courts Law appli­
cable in the Western and Mid-Western Regions#
The existing provisions of the Magistrates’ Courts 
Law excluding the original jurisdiction of these courts 
in respect of matters relating to succession under 
customary law now read :
’* • * .causes or matters relating to inheritance upon intestacy 
under customary law and the administration of intestate 
estate under customary law" (3).
But though the exclusion of the original jurisdiction of 
magistrates’ courts does not depend upon the natter being 
subject to the jurisdiction of a customary court, as in 
the case of the relevant provisions of the High Court Laws,
1 No*5 of 1955, s.18;^see also the case of Idowu and anor* 
v# Adisa and anor, [19573 W.N.L.R.167 at p#l&8, in 
which Ademola, C.J., held that the provisions excluded 
the original jurisdiction of the magistrate: & court
in these matters. Cf. the case of Briggs v# Briggs 
£l957j II L E; *N.L *R*6, where the High Court of the Eastern 
Region held that these provisions excluded the original 
jurisdiction of the magistrate's court in a suit concerning 
the determination of family status (legitimacy) under 
customary law.
2 The Magistrates ’CourtsLaw, Eastern Region, No*10 of 1955 
s .17.
3 Cap*7h, ss #19(h) and 20 (d), Laws of the Western Region 
of Nigeria, 1959*
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it is possible to take the view that these provisions 
cover only eases relating to intestate succession governed 
by customary law; and that a magistrate’s court is not 
thereby precluded from exercising original jurisdiction in 
matters governed by the customary lav/ relating to wills 
(oral or nuncupative wills) and gifts inter, vivos. By 
way of contrast, we may note the position under the general 
lav/, in respect of which the court is prohibited from
exercising any jurisdiction whatsoever, whether the matter
1 2 involves testate or intestate succession. However,
barring undefended suits, case's involving disputed succes­
sion to land or any interest therein under customary or 
any other law fall outside those matters, in respect of 
which the magistrate ,!s court may exercise original juris- 
diction.
VESTING- OF THE ESTATE
It will have been observed in chapter two, dealing 
with the administration of estates under the general law, 
that, that law being based on the relevant English law, 
the intestate’s estate vests in the ’President’^ "of the
1 Ibid, s s .19(4) &nd 20(b).
2 See: Administration of Estates Law, cap.l, s.2(1), 
ibid; the Administrator-General’s Law, cap.2, s .2.ibid.
3 Cap.74, s s .19(4) and 20(a), ibid.
4 See: the High Court Law, Eastern Region, No.27 of 1955, 
s.8(1) where this term is used in referring to the Chief 
Justice.
222
High Court during the interval between the death and the 
grant of administration. In England, where the High Court 
of Justice is formally arranged In Divisions, the inter­
mediate vesting of the intestate’s estate is in the
-j
President of the Probate, Divorce and Admiralty Division ; 
while in Nigeria, where such formal organisation of the 
Court does not exist, the intestate’s estate vests in 
the Chief Justice of the jurisdiction concerned, who is 
the principal Judge or ’President’ of the Court. In 
both the Western and Mid-Western Regions, there are pro­
visions ..of the general law expressly vesting the in­
testate’s estate in the Chief Justice "from the date of... 
death until administration is granted-^". As regards the 
position in Lagos and the Eastern Region, however, such 
vesting of the intestate’s estate in the Chief Justice 
of the legal unit arises by the implication contained in 
the relevant provisions of the High Court of Lagos Act and the 
High Court Law of the Eastern Region,- reproduced in an 
earlier part of this work; by virtue of which the probate
1 See: .the Administration of Estates Act (1925)* (15 
Geo.5, c.23),Ss.55(l)(XV) an.& %
2 See: the High Court Law, Eastern Region, {To.27 of 1955, 
s.8(1) where this term is used in referring to the Chief 
Justice•
3 The Administration of Estates Law, Western Region, 
cap .1,s.10, ibid.
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jurisdiction of these Courts is to be exercised in con­
formity with the current English law and practice*.
What then is the legal position regarding the inter­
mediate vesting of the intestateTs estate under customary 
law? In the words of a learned writer:
"The theoretical question is thus posed - do the rights 
of the deceased pass automatically to his heirs at his 
death, or are they temporarily vested in those who ad­
minister the estate?" (2)*
In the opinion of the learned writer, the estate vests
in the administrators on the ground that they have the
powers of sale in respect of the dead man’s property, inclu
2
ding the rights to settle his debts and funeral expenses .
As regards the opinion expressed by the writer 
regarding the intermediate vesting of the estate in the 
customary administrator, hov/ever, it should be borne in 
mind that he is by discipline bound to see the question 
from a different angle; writing, as he says, "as an 
anthropologist and not as a lawyer ,f. Now, the rule that
1 See: the High Court of Lagos Act, cap.80,s*l6, Laws 
of the Federation of Nigeria and Lagos, (1958); the 
High Court Law,Eastern Region, No. 27 of 1955,s. 16.
2 Lloyd, Yoruba land law (1962) p.287*
3 Lloyd, op »cit. p.8; cf, Lloyd, "Some notes on the 
Yoruba rules of succession.[l959"3 J.A.L.7 at p.8; 
Lloyd, "Family property among the Yoruba", tl959] J*A. 
L *105 •
224
has emerged from the decided cases on the point is that
there is no such thing as the intermediate vesting of an
intestate estate governed “by the customary law and that
the property of a deceased intestate vests automatically
1m  his heirs as family property . It seems, however, 
significant that the same writer has stated elsewhere, 
the rule established by the judicial authorites, for 
he says:
"A prevalent view is that, when a man dies, his self- « 
acquired property immediately becomes family property’ *
In this regard, we may note the correct, clear and 
precise statement of the relevant rule of the customary 
law contained in the works of two learned legal text­
book writers* Coker, writing on the institution of 
family property among his people, the Yoruba, sums up 
the rule of the Yoruba customary law in this way:
".•• whenever any Yorubaman dies intestate, his ... property
1 For some of these cases, see: Qgunmefun v. Ogunmefun and 
ors* (1931) 10 N*L.R*82, and the author!lies considered 
therein; Jenmi v. Balogun (1936? 13 N.L.R.53; Fl.vran: and 
ors. v* Gardiner (1 9 5 3) 14 W*A*C*A.260; Edun v* Koledoye 
and ors * (1954T 14 W*A*C *A*642; cf • Taylor v. Williams 
and anor* (1935) 12 N.L.R.67*
2 Lloyd, LI9593 J *A.L*7 at p*29.
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becomes... family property.•.. The interests of the... 
members of the family, who become the owners, vests in 
possession forthwith*(l)"
Concerning the relevant rule of the Akan customary law, 
Professor Allott writes:
"By Alcan law, when a man(or woman) dies intestate, all 
his property... vests automatically in his matrilineal 
family (2)"
THE BIGHTS. DUTIES. POWERS AND LIABILITIES OF THE CUSTOMARY 
ADMINISTRATOR
DUTIES AND POWERS OP THE ADMINISTRATOR
The duties and powers of the customary administrator 
are discussed before consideration of his rights and lia­
bilities, since, as we shall see, the latter topics depend 
upon the manner in which he has performed his duties, and 
exercised his powers in the discharge of his obligations.
The main duties of the administrator include the 
following, that is to say:
(1) arrangement of the burial and funeral of the 
deceased;
(2) getting in the estate of the deceased;
(3) management of the estate;
1 Coker, Family property among the Yorubas (1958), 
PP*43-4 and 52.
2 Allott, "Marriage and internal conflict of laws in 
Ghana" [1958] J .A.L .164, at p. 179; Allott, Essays 
in African law (i960) p.239*
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(4) maintenance of the wives, children and other
dependents of the dead man;
(5) giving account of his administration*
(1) Arrangement of the burial and funeral of the
deceased■
The reader is referred to the account given in 
chapter five in connection with the performance of the 
burial and funeral rites of the deceased; including the 
link between participation in the performance of these 
’rites and the inheritance of the property left by the 
dead man.
It is sufficient here to state briefly that it is 
the duty of the administrator to arrange and supervise 
the burial and funeral of the deceased; and to exercise 
his powers of exacting from the latter1s relatives their 
contributions towards the expenses involved in carrying 
out the mortuary rites *
(2) Getting in the estate of the deceased
The administrator assumes control of the property 
of the deceased, satisfying claims made by the creditors 
of the estate and collecting debts owing to the deceased 
where these are due for repayment.
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(a) Payment of debts owed by the deceased
Under the traditional system, the administrator 
had to invite the deceased^ creditors to state their 
claims punctually, usually before the debtor was actually 
interred; or, where this was not possible - as where 
the creditor was unaware of his debtor^s death - as soon
A
as possible after the performance of the final rites.
This is not to say that a claim not advanced in time was, 
in general, not honoured, since lapse of time does not
a
p
extinguish a debt under customary law . It did, however,
mean that stale claims were often suspect, and might
entail some hard oath-taking on the part of creditors
2
before they were satisfied .
It is necessary to point out that it is now a 
criminal offence to employ the traditional method of 
proving a debt by means of oath or swearing*^. A creditor
See: Thomas, Anthropological report on Ibo-speaking 
peoples, (I9l!+)Y pt.IV, pp.l6i+-5; Obi, The Ibo law of 
property (1963) P*151; Ajisafe, The laws and customs of 
the Yoruba people (1924) p.82; Egharevba, Benin law and 
custom (1949)* p.74*
Thomas, (1914\ pt.IY, p .164; Thomas, Anthropological report 
on the Edo-speaking peoples (1910), pt.l, p.98; Basden, 
S o n g  the Ibos Tl921) P .85: Basden. ,Niger Ibos (1938), 
pT268; A3 i s a'fe. op. c i t. p. 87; Oraoneukanrin, Itsekiri law 
and custom (1942) p. 114; cf. the Limitation Law, Western 
Region, cap.64, s.1(2) - Laws of the Western Region of - 
Nigeria, 1959 - where statutory recognition is accorded 
to this rule of c u s 1d  mary law in matters relating to in­
heritance, among several other things.
See: The Criminal Code, cap.28, ss.145-8, Laws of the 
Western Region of Nigeria (1959); The Criminal Code(Lagos), 
cap.42, ss.207-210, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 
and Lagos, (1958)*
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of the deceased is clearly entitled to decline having 
to take oath before being paid; and may instead institute 
proceedings in a court of law with a view to enforcing 
repayment•
The debts owed by the deceased are paid from his 
estate; unless, as we shall see later, the administrator 
is also the only beneficiary or principal beneficiary of 
the estate, when his liability in this regard is not 
limited to the value of the property he has inherited.
It must, however, be repeated that only those debts due 
during the period of administration are paid by the ad­
ministrator. The repayment of debts falling due for pay­
ment after this period are, as will be shown, the respon­
sibility of the beneficiary or chief beneficiary of the 
estate•
(b) Collection of debts due to the deceased
As pai»t of his duty of getting in the estate, the 
administrator is responsible for the collection of all 
debts owing to the deceased and due for repayment, except 
those which had been assigned or waived by the latter during
•i
his lifetime .
Collection of the debts due to the deceased starts 
soon after his death. This is because, as will have
3* Obi, op .cit. , p.151.
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"been apparent, the proceeds of such debts may be required 
in connection with the performance of his burial and 
funeral rites; and, as will be clearer later, for the 
maintenance of his dependants during the period of ad- 
ministration*
(3) Management of the estate of the deceased
In the course of his duty of managing the estate,
the administrator is concerned with exercising control
over the property of the deceased; including the reaping
and subsequent storing of any crops planted by the latter,
which are ripe* In short, his duty in this connection
is to take charge of the deceased*s property as manager,
caretaker or custodian pending the distribution thei*eof •
However, he has po?\rer to sell, pledge or pawn or
otherwise deal with the property comprised in the estate,
2where necessary * As has been pointed out, the debts
1 Thomas, (1910) pt.l, p.70; Ajisafe, op *cit* p. 81;
Obi, op.cit*, pp7T5l~B*
2 Thomas, (1910) pt.l. p*86; Thomas, tfMarriage and legal 
customs of the Hdo-speaking peoples” (1910)i 11 J.Comp. 
Leg. (N.S.) 9k9 at p.99; Thomas, (191U) pt*IV. pp.133-8 
Bradbury, The Benin kingdom (1957) pp .47 and'77; Okojie 
Ishan native laws and customs (I960) p.90; Obi, The Ibo 
law of property (1963) .151-2; Lloyd, £1959] J.A.L.7
at p.16; Lloyd, Yoruba land law (1 9 6 2) p.287#
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owed by the deceased are payable.from his estate during 
the process of administration; and the expenses of his 
burial and funeral may be charged against the estate* 
Similarly, the demand suddenly made by a father-in-law 
with respect to the marriage between a son of the deceased
A
and the former's daughter may be met in this way*
He must not, however, engage in unnecessary sale
or alienation of the deceased's property, since, as has
been noted, he is only a caretaker, and has a duty to
preserve as much as possible of the estate. In point of
fact, he is obliged to seek and obtain the approval of
members, especially of the elders^ of the family before
exercising his powers of sale, pledge or pawn, etc.,
Indicated above. Thus, Lloyd has reported a case among
the Egba (Yoruba) where the customary court upset the
agreement entered into by the administrator with respect
to the pawn of the property of the deceased, on the
ground that the approval of the'family had not been secured
2regarding the transaction . However, the approval of 
the members of the family is more readily given in respect 
of the administrator's dealings with the perishable
1 See, for instance, Okojie, op *cit *. pp.91-2.
2 Lloyd, Yoruba land law. p*287*
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A
portion of the estate, harvested crops, for instance ;
which,for obvious reasons, may be wasted if such approval
is withheld.
He is entitled to supervise the business of the
deceased, if any,;or to carry it on personally, if this
latter course is necessary for the proper management of 
2the estate *
(U) Maintenance of the dependants of the deceased
The administrator steps into the shoes of the 
deceased as regards the maintenance, during the period 
of administration, of the latterfs dependants; who may 
be widows, children and others to whom he stood in loco 
•parentis .
(a) Widows
As regards the maintenance of the deceased*s widows, 
the main duty of the administrator may be described as 
the negative one of ensuring that the existing facilities 
provided for them by their late husband are maintained. 
Thus, he merely permits them to continue to occupy the 
living accommodation arranged for them by the deceased;
1 Thomas, (1910)» pt.l, p.68; Thomas (191U), pt.IV. 
P P .133-6.
2 See: Thomas, (lj910)f -pt.l. p.86.
3 See: Thomas, ('l,9lU/.» ,ptlxv. pp .127,133-6; Basden, 
Niger Ibos (1956) P *£22; Obi, on.cit..n .151.
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and to continue their farming activities on plots of 
land that may have been allotted to them for this purpose 
by their husband . He will not normally be responsible 
for clothing them during the period of administration 
which, as we shall see, may not exceed a few weeks. But 
he has the responsibility to feed those of them who are 
unable to provide for themselves in this regard, since 
this was one of the obligations of the deceased.
The cost of maintaining the widows constitutes a 
charge on the estate of their deceased husband, on the 
ground that the administrator is merely discharging the 
duty assumed by the deceased by virtue of the contract 
of marriage♦
On the obligation of a husband to maintain and support 
his wife or wives, see: Thomas, (1910). nt.1. pp .4-7 ff; 
Thomas, (191U), Pt.XV. p.IbO; Ajisafe, oo.cit, pp.6l-2; 
Ward, The Yoruba husband-wife code (1938) pp.56-7;
Talbot, The peoples of southern Nigeria (1926), vol.Ill, 
p.678; Talbot, Tribes of the M g e r  Delta (1932) ,p ,205; 
Meek, Law and authority in a Nigerian tribe (1937)> 
p p .100-102 and 202; Meek. Land tenure and land admini­
stration in Nigeria (1957; p.186; Green.Land tenure in 
an Ibo village (194.1) pp. 13-14; Green, Ibo village 
affairs (194.7) p.3U; Sp8rndli, “Marriage among the Ibos“, 
(194-2-5)* 37 Anthropos 113 at p.118; Harris, “Some 
aspects of the economics of sixteen Ibo individuals" 
(19i4h) 14- Afr. 302 at p.328; Jones "Ibo land tenure", 
(194-9) 19 Afr. 309 at p.313; Ardener, "The kinship 
terminology of a group of southern Ibo," (1954- 24- Afr.
85 at p.88; Forde, Yak6 studies (1964-) pp.18 ff and 4-0.
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He is not, however, justified in providing main­
tenance for any of the widows marrying outside their 
late husbandTs family while the process of administration 
is in progress; or any known to have been engaged in 
associations tending to lower the name and social position 
of their deceased husband’s family. Such widows must be
made to vacate both the residential accommodation and
-1
farm land provided for them by the deceased *
In practice, however, very little may be spent in
respect of the maintenance of the deceased’s widows.
Firstly, women are generally able to fend for themselves,
2with little help from their husbands . As has been 
seen, they grow their own crops on the land allotted to 
them by their husbands; in addition to their farming 
activities, they practically monopolise petty trading^,
1 See: the Yoruba case of Omoniregun v. Sadatu (1888) 
R.C.J.15; noted by Stopford, J.G.B•5"Glimpses of native 
law in West Africa1,f (1910) 1 J.A.S.80, at pp.85-6.
2 Ajisafe. ■ The laws and customs of the Yoruba people (1924) 
p.62; Ward, Marriage among- the Yoruba (1937) pp.3^-5; 
Ward, The Yoruba husband-wife code (1938), pp .58-67;
Meek, Lav/ and authority in a Nigerian tribe (1937)p.l00; 
Lei tlx Ross, African women (19380# pp.91-2. 225 and 228; 
Green, Land tenure in an Ibo village (191+1) pp.33 ff; 
Green, Ibo village^ffairs 0-91+7) .pp .36,170-172: Ford 
and Scott, The native economies of Nigeria (1946),pp 67-8 
and 73; ArionJ "Calabar” Cl95S) 52 Nigeria 70 at p.85*
3 Thomas, (1910), pt„.,l, p. 19; Basden, Among the Ibos.
(1921) p ff "Basden, Niger Ibos (1938) ,pp .208 and 33k; 
Talbot, (1926),, volAlll,pp .1+28 and 678; Meek, (1937), 
pp.19 and 98; Ward, (1937). pp.3k-5; Ward (1958) ,pp.130 
and 137; Leith Ross, on .cit.. pp.86-7; Ajisafe, op.cit. 
pp.62-3; Green (191+7). pp*37 ff and 171; Forde and 
Scott, op .cit. ,pp .i+9 ff: Omoneukanrin,- Itsekiri law and 
custom Tltfej p .81+; Okojie, op.cit.. p .251-------  “
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and cases of wives richer than their husbands (and 
who rely on their pros£>erous wives for support) are not
'i
altogether unknown* Concerning the ability of the
Itsekiri woman to support herself, Lloyd writes:
H •*• she is usually able to live independently, since 
many Itsekiri women become wealthy as traders and 
most can be self-supporting from fishing or craft in­
dustries* " (2)
Secondly, the would-be husband of a widow very often 
undertakes the obligation to provide for her soon after 
the death of her former husband . Such maintenance prior 
to the formal settlement of the question of the widowfe 
remarriage within her deceased husband’s family is 
designed to serve two purposes: it helps to secure and 
sustain her consent to the new proposal, especially 
where, as we shall see, seveiaL relatives of the late 
husband have the right to take her as wife, and there is 
a contest; it is calculated to impress and assure her 
as iso the ability of the new suitor to discharge his 
future matrimonial obligations towards her* Thirdly,
1 Meek, Law and authority in a Nigerian tribe (1937) p.203*
2 Llo.vd* "The Itsekiri0 in the' Beninkingdom (1957)* 
ed* . Bradbury, p*198.
3 As among the Itsekiri* See, Qmoneukanrin* op*cit*p*74»
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a woman’s children, especially where they are grown up 
and she is old, usually take it upon theseIves to provide
A
for her • The basis of such maintenance, however, is
filial regard rather than legal obligation. If, however,
she is old and has no children^ she may be attached to
any male member of the family as her nominal suitor -
nominal because she is then regarded more as a mother 
2than a wife *
Children and other dependants of the deceased 
It is the duty of the administrator to make adequate 
provision out of the estate for the maintenance of the 
deceased’s children and other dependants of the dead 
man, such as the orphaned children of a deceased relative * 
They must be reasonably housed and adequately fed and 
clothed.
He must pay for the cost of providing books and 
tuition for those of the defendants at institutions of 
learning# It is also his duty to settle the bride price 
of the first marriage contracted by a son of the deceased
1 See: Thomas, ’’Some Ibo burial customs’1, (1917)
I|7 J#R*A#I.l63, at p.198; Leith Ross, op .cit..
p.92; Lloyd, Ll959j <T#A.L.7* at p#13l Lloyd, Yoruba 
land law (1962) p#28^*
2 See: Ajisafe, The laws and customs of the Yoruba 
people (1924) pp TSU-S•
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•i
during his tenure of office ; and he must ensure that
part of any bride price received by him in respect of
the marriage of a daughter of the deceased is given to
the mother of the girl in connection with the provision
2of the bride's marriage outfit * He is,however, entitled 
to use part of such bride price in settling the amount 
demanded by the father-in-law of .a son of the deceased; 
for, as a learned author puts it, "what is received on 
the swings is spent on the roundabouts^"*
As in the case of the maintenance of the widows, 
the administrator is, in practice, not required to spend 
a great deal in providing for the children and other 
dependants of the deceased. This is because, most women 
are, as has been pointed out, well off; and can, there­
fore, be counted upon in this regard. Besides, the
1 Okojie, op .cit *♦ pp.91-2. The administrator is 
merely discharging the obligation of the deceased 
to provide the bride price required in connection 
with the first marriage contracted by his son. On 
the obligation of a father in this regard, see: Meek 
(1957) > p.267; Harris*(1944) 14 Afr. 302 at p.304; 
Bradbury, op.cit. pp.30 and 48; Forde, Yakd studies 
(19614.) p. 123; also Porde, Marriage and the family 
among the Yakd (1941) P *50.
2 The mother of the bride is also under a duty in this 
connection. On this, see: Welch, "The Isoko tribe" 
(1934) 7 Afr. 160, at p.171; Meek, (1937)» loc.cit: 
Omoneukanrin, op.cit. p.42; Leith Ross, op .cit..
p.102; Green, Ibo village affairs (1947) PP*97 and 
161; Bradbury, op.cit..p.158.
3 Meek, (1937) loo.cit.
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children of a widow, though not parties to the 
agreement, are invariably covered by the arrangement 
described above under which a prospective husband main­
tains a wife of the deceased. In any case, the children 
of one mother - mature or young, rich or poor - quite 
naturally bind themselves together in providing for 
one another* since it has been aptly stated that the 
household is "an economic grouping which supplies most 
of its own needs, men, women and children all contribu­
ting"^#
The widower
With respect to the widower, it will suffice to
say that the administrator of a married deceased woman
is under no legal obligation to maintain her husband out
of the estate. This is because a wife is not legally
responsible under customary law for the maintenance of
her husband. It must, however, be noted that, in
practice, a wife invariably contributes to the cost of
feeding the household. But such contribution is nearly
always drawn from the resources provided by the husband;
for example, the land on which she grows her crops, or
in some cases, the capital which she employs in her 
2petty trading .
1 Meek, (1937), p.100.
2 See: Ajisafe, op .cit, pp.62-3; Ward, Marriage among 
the Yoruba (1937) PP*3U~5; Ward, The Yoruba husband- 
wife code (1938) p*58.
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The seat of the administration of, and the concexux shown 
by a woman*s family over, her estate are such that the 
plea of her husband to be maintained out of the estate 
is unlikely to receive sympathetic consideration. For, 
on the death of a married woman, her coi*pse is usually
•i
conveyed to her family residence for burial ; and, as 
we shall see latex**, all her property - except in those 
societies where a husband may be entitled to part of it - 
is similarly removed fox* distribution among those entitled.
From the social (prestige) point of view, no 
husband worth the term will require to be maintained by 
his deceased?wife*s administrator.* For,while he will 
naturally welcome any contribution his wife may make 
towards the domestic budget during her lifetime or her 
helping to support him during this period; he will resent 
the idea of his being maintained out of her estate, now 
in charge of her administrator, as particularly revolting 
to his cutomary notion of the superiority of a man 
vis-a-vis his wife. The whole question may be dismissed 
as unheard of as the idea that " a: man marrying a woman
1 Thomas, (1910), 11 J. Comp. Leg. (N.S.) 94, at p.96; 
Leith Foss, op .cit.. p. 210; Green (19473 » PP-97 and 
163; Esenwa, "Marriage customs in Asaba Division”, 
(1948) 13 Nigerian Field 71, at p.74; Okojie, op .cit. 
pp. 121-2; Jones, The trading states of the Oil Fivers 
(1983) P.52.
239
•i
should live with her in her house" •
(5) giving account of his administration
At the expiration of the period of administration, 
the administrator gives an account of the manner in 
which he has dealt with the estate to the members of 
the deceased’s family, usually at a meeting of the 
family specially summoned for the purpose.
He must keep the family informed as to how the 
burial and funeral contributions have been spent; and as 
to the amount he has realised from the deceased’s estate 
as a result of the sale, pledge or pawn of property 
comprised therein. Similarly, he must indicate the 
extent of donations, if any, he has received from.sym­
pathisers • Other matters in respect of which he is 
obliged to report to the family include the amount used 
in paying off the debts of the deceased, including the 
extent of the debts due to, and due from,him, still 
remaining unpaid; the cost of maintaining the dependants 
indicated above; and, above all, the various items of 
the property comprised in the net estate available for 
distribution.
1 Nwugege v. Adigwe and anor. (1934) 11 N.L.R.13U, 
at p. 135; pe_r Graham Paul,’J.
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Duration of the period of administration
There is no uniform practice as regards the length 
of the period that the administration takes or must take. 
It varies from society to society; and, sometimes, varia­
tions occur within the same society. Thus, while the
process of administration is usually completed within a
1 2 week of the death among the Bini , Ivhiosakon and
Isoko^; this runs to a period of some three months 
among the Ishan , Urhobo^ and Yoruba . The relevant 
period among the Itsekiri is about one year, the per­
formance of the last mortuary rites being timed to
coincide with the first anniversary of the deceased’s.
7death • The most noticeable instances of lack of uni­
formity in this regard, however, are found among the
1 Egharevba, Benin law and custom (1949) PP.73-4; 
Bradbury, op .cit*. p.50.
2 Thomas, Anthropological report on the Edo-speaking 
peoples C1910)V Pt.1. p .74 ; Talbot , The peoples of 
southern Nigeria, vol.Ill, p.486; Bradbury, The Benin 
H.ngdom (1957) P »9 8.
3 Welch, "The Isoko tribe” (1934) 7 Afr. 160, at p.173*
4 Okojie, op .cit.. p p *69*103 and 124*
5 Thomas, "Notes on Edo burial customs^(1920) 50 J.R. 
A.I. 377* at pp .404-5; Talbot, op .cit.. p .487; 
Bradbury, op .cit *. p.152.
6 Ajisafe, op .cit.. pp *814.-5*
7 Omoneukanrin, Itsekiri law and custom (1942) p.73*
1 2Etsako and Ibo ; where the relevant period is said 
to range from about one week to about one year, depending 
upon the localities concerned in these societies*
The diversity shown in the custom governing the 
duration of the period under consideration may be accounted 
for by the fact, which has already been mentioned, that 
the performance of the burial and funeral rites - a 
vital aspect of the administration - may be accelerated 
or delayed, depending on the resources of those respon­
sible for the carrying out of the se rites*
RIGHTS OF THE ADMINISTRATOR
Rights of management (sale* pledge or pawn) of the estate; 
of settling debts; and of maintenance of dependants
Most of the rights of the administrator have already 
been considered in the section of this chapter dealing 
with the scope of his duties and powers* It now remains 
to examine what right he has, to remuneration by virtue 
of his office*
Right to remuneration
The right of the administrator to remuneration 
arises only in the exceptional case where he is not a
1 Thomas, (1910), J)t*l, pp .45*71-4; Talbot, op_*cit*
p.486.
2 Meek, Law and authority in a Nigerian tribe (1937) 
pp. 311-2; Obi, The IbolavT^of' property (196 3) v * 15 2 ♦
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close relative of the deceased; when he is paid, often 
in kind and out of the estate, for his services* An 
administrator who is also a close relative of the dead 
man may be given nothing more than a token gift of some 
of the property he has administered on the ground that 
administration is, as we have pointed out, the concern of 
the deceased’s family, imposing as it does an obligation 
on all close relatives to render assistance*
The attitude of the customary courts in this matter 
may be gauged from the observation of a learned author 
who writes:
"The courts admonish him to take only a token for himself 
c[ua executor* The customary courts will sometimes allow 
the babansinku [i.e. administratorj who is not closely 
related to the deceased, to take a share of the property 
to which he would not ordinarily be entitled." (l)
As has been seen, and will be appreciated later, no in­
justice is normally caused by denying an administrator, 
who is also a close relative of the deceased, the right 
to remuneration: he may be the person entitled to the
whole or the major share of the estate, a situation that 
hardly calls for his being remunerated by anyone else.
HIS LIABILITIES
Liability for misappropriation
Concerning the liability of the administrator for
1 Lloyd, Ysmba. land law (1962) p.287; cf. Lloyd, [l959] 
J.A.L.7, at p.l6.
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his misappropriation of the property comprised in the 
estate, it is necessary to observe that we have excluded 
from the discussion the position of an administrator 
who is at the same time the sole beneficiary of the 
estate. This is because the question of misappropriation 
hardly arises in such a case. We are thus left with the 
instance of the administrator who is not solely entitled 
to, or wbo< L£$-no rights of inheritance in respect of, the 
estate.
Cases of misappropriation by an administrator are 
usually rare since, as has been pointed out, the tenure 
of this office may be a matter of a few weeks; and, in 
any case, the concern shown by the family in the admini­
stration constitutes an effective check in this regard* 
Should he, however, commit acts of misappropriation, not 
merely of waste , the members of the family may compel 
him to make good the loss occasioned; or an action may
lie against him in the court at the instance of the person
o
or persons entitled to inherit the estate.
1 The courts, including the Superior Courts ,take a 
rather lenient view 9t this. See In re Hotonu (1892) 
R.C.J.18; noted by Stopford, in (1901) 1 j.A.S .80,
at p.88.
2 In addition, such misappropriation may attract criminal 
liability. See the Criminal Code, cap.28, ss.324 and 
331* Laws of the Western Region of Nigeria (1959); cap. 
42, s s .383 and 389* Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 
and Lagos (1958); i.e. the offence of stealing.
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Liability to be censured or to be removed by the family
As has been noticed, the administrator is appointed 
by, or with the co-operation of the family of the deceased. 
And, apart from the supervision which they exercise over 
him, including their authorisation of almost all his 
dealings with the estate, he is liable to be censured by 
them for the shortcomings in his administration.
He is also liable to be removed by or at the instance 
of the family upon any ground or grounds disclosing his 
inability and/or gross incompetence with respect to the 
discharge of his duties. Specific instances of such 
inability or incompetence include his
(i) failing to arrange the burial and funeral ceremony 
of the deceased in a manner at once befitting the 
dead man’s station in life, and enhancing the 
prestige of the family;
(ii) failing to collect or collect promptly the debts 
owing to the deceased;
(iii) failing to manage the estate intsuch a way that the 
debts or a good proportion of them owed by the 
deceased are paid, and the family are saved any 
embarrassment by his creditors;
(iv) attempting to d^ose of the property comprised in 
the estate without obtaining the approval of the
family;
(v) failing op neglecting to maintain the dependants 
of the deceased;
(vi) misappropriation of the property entrusted to him; 
and
(,vii) resenting the supervision exercised over him by 
the family of the deceased•
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PART FOUR
CUSTOMARY LAW IN THE MID-WESTERN REGION 
CHAPTER SEVEN 
DISTRIBUTION OF ESTATES 
CLASSIFICATION OP THE VARIOUS SYSTEMS OF SUCCESSION POUND 
IN THE REGION* INCLUDING CONSIDERATION OF SOME GENERAL 
PRINCIPLES GOVERNING DISTRIBUTION
Scope of inquiry
As indicated above, this part of the thesis will 
be devoted almost exclusively to a discussion of the 
various systems of the customary law of succession found 
among the indigenous peoples of the Mid-Western Region. 
However, this restriction of our field does not imply 
that the relevant rules of the customary law obtaining in 
other parts of southern Nigeria may not be referred to 
where this is necessary for the purposes of stressing 
points of divergence; ox* where such reference helps to 
throw some light on obscure aspects of the law of our 
area of special reference.
It must, however, be stressed that this restriction 
of our field to the Mid-Western Region excludes, in effect, 
the Yoimba customary law of succession, except on the 
basis indicated. The customary law of the Ibo inhabiting 
the Eastern Region is as relevant to our discussion as
2kl
that followed by the Ibo of the Mid-Western Region, since
*1
the rules observed by both sub-groups are similar * On 
similar considerations, the customary law of succession 
found among the I3aw of the Eastern Region will be discussed 
in this part of the thesis.
Succession to titles and offices: chieftaincies, customary
•priesthoods, etc.
The rules governing succession to titles, such as 
chieftaincies, are essentially topics belonging to that 
branch of the law which may be termed customary constitutional 
law. Succession to offices, like customary priesthoods and 
headship of the family, is more germane to the fields of 
anthropology, sociology and religion than to a work on law.
For these reasons, succession to titles and offices is 
excluded from this work.
MAIN PATTERNS OF SUCCESSION IN THE REGION
The rules of inheritance found, among the ten main 
ethnic groups inhabiting the Mid-Western Region may be clas­
sified into three main patterns in the essentially patri­
lineal societies.; with a fourth pattern for the groups where 
both the patr.ii,lineal and matrilineal systems of succession
1 See: Thomas, Anthropological report on . „ Ibo-speaking 
peoples (1911+), pt.1V, p. 127.
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exist side by side# The basis of our classification, which 
will be shown more fully in the next four chapters of 
this part of the work, is whether only eldest sons, or all 
sons or all children, are entitled to inherit from one or 
both of their parents*
The four main patterns we may refer to as: 
type UA'', which is found among the Ishan and holders of
hereditary titles among the Bini, under which the 
eldest son takes exclusively; 
type ,(B", which covers the Ibo and Ivbiosakon, where only 
sons inherit;
type "Cu, which is followed by the Bini (other than the 
holders of hereditary titles), Isoko, Itsekiri 
and Urhobo and Akoko-Edo, under which all children 
participate in the benefits of the inheritance; and 
type "Du, which represents the system found among the Etsako 
and Ijaw, where the inheritance rights of children 
with respect to their father’s estate are deter­
mined largely by the type of marriage (customary) 
contracted by their parents.
Warning must, however, be given in connection with 
our classification. The first is that these patterns must 
not be considered In water-tight compartments. There are, 
as will appear later, variations within each pattern and,
2U9
indeed, within the individual societies included in each of 
the patterns. And, in contrast, quite striking similarities 
on specific and isolated points are sometimes detectable 
between groups having otherwise divergent systems of succes­
sion. The second warning is that, even in some of the pre­
dominantly patrilineal societies, the matrilineal principle 
of inheritance often asserts itself; and, as will become 
apparent later, the maternal relatives of a deceased person 
are often included in the list of the beneficiaries of his 
estate♦
SOME GENERAL PRINCIPLES
Definition - "Heir" or "successor"
Under the general law applicable in both the Federal
Territory of Lagos and the Eastern Kegion (i.e. the old
English rules of inheritance and distribution), the word
"heir" is used to indicate the person who succeeds to the
real property of an intestate ; in contradistinction to
2
the next-of-kin who take the personal property. As regards 
the Western and Mid-Western Regions, the word (heir) has 
lost much of its importance since 1959* when descent to 
the heir on intestacy was abolished. Section h8(l) of the
1 Sees the Inheritance Act (1833)(3 & k Will.h* c.106),s.3; 
and chap.h of this work.
2 See: the Statutes of Distribution - (1670) 22 & 23 Gar.2, 
c.10; and (1685) 1 Uac.2, c.17. Also chaps 3 and h.
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Administration of Estates Law , which abolished such 
descent in the latter Regions, provides:
H
With regard to the real estate and personal inheritance 
of every person dying after the commencement of this Law 
I'i.e. the 23rd April, 19593 there shall be abolished -
(a) All existing modes, rules and canons of descent, and 
devolution by special occupancy or otherwise, of real 
estate, or of a personal inheritance, whether operating 
by the general law or otherwise howsoever....,^
The word "successor" is usually employed in connection
with succession where titular rights pass to another holder
on the death of a corporation sole, such as the Crown; or
where property passes to the next incumbent on the death
2
of corporation sole, such as a bishop or parson •
To a considerable extent, the word "heir” is nowadays 
used to refer to the person entitled to succeed either to 
the real property or the personal property of an intestate^, 
and the word seems interchangeable with the term "successor"^.
1 Cap.l, Laws of the \¥estern Region, 1959; of* the Admini­
stration of Estates Act (1925) 15 Geo .5* c.23; s.1+5.
But, although descent was abolished, the word "heir" is 
still retained foxvsome purposes. For example, if property 
is limited after 1959 (in the Western and Mid-Western 
Regions) to TTheirstT or "heirs of the body” of a particular 
person, those so entitled to .take will be ascertained in 
accordance with the old rules of inheritance; unless
the context indicates a contrary intention: Property
and Conveyancing Law, cap .100, ibid. s.11+7; the Administr- 
tion of Estates Lav/, cap.l, ibid; cf. Law of Property Act, 
1925 9 (15 Oeo .5*c .20), s. 131* Also, the word "heir1 must 
still be used for the purpose of creating an entailed 
interest: cap.100, op^cit., s.11+8; cf. Law of Property 
Act, op .cit.. s.132; and the Administration of Estates Act 
U9257 U 5  Geo.5, e.23) s.51(l).
2 See: Byrne, W.J. A dictionary of English lav/ (1923) *
p*81+7; dowitt, E., The dictionary of English law (1959)
vol.II, pp.1694-5 •
3 Aitkinson, T.E. Handbook of the law of wills (1953)p «4*
1+ Aitkinson, loc.cit; Jowitt, op .cit. vol.I,p .900-
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Meanings attached to the words b.v writers on the peoples
of the Region
"Heir"
There is general agreement among writers on the peoples 
of the Mid-Western Region as to the meaning to he attached
4
to the word "heir" in their works *
Writing in 1910 on the inheritance rules of the 
Edo-speaking peoples, Thomas states:
2
"A man’s legal heirs a?e his own children .... where there 
are no children, the deceased’s firstborn brother (any 
wife) takes the property ....Failing brothers, the next 
heir is odioekelafe or head of the great family". (3)
Bradbury’s use of the word conveys precisely the same
1 See generally: Roth, H.L.*"Rotes on Benin customs”
(1898) 11 Internationales Archiv ftlr ethnographic, 235 
at p.239; Roth, Great Benin: its customs,, art and 
horrors (1903) P P *97 and 100; and the authorities"quoted 
therein; Granville, R.K. and Roth, F.R., "Rotes on the 
Jekris, Sobos and Ijos of the Warri District. .*'( 1898-9)
28 J.R.A.1.101], at p.118; Thomas, Anthropological report 
on the Edo-speaking peoples (1910), pt .1, pp V47T55,Sk ff; 
Thomas, "Marriage and legal customs of the Edo-speaking 
peoples"' (1910) 11 J. Comp.Leg. (R.,S.)> 9k at pp.95-7, 
99-100; Thomas "The Edo-speaking peoples" (1910) 10 
J.A.S.l at 5-6 and 8; Thomas, Anthropological report
on : . . Ibo-speaking peoples, pp.127 ff; Talbot, The 
peoples of southern Rigeria (1926), vol.Ill, p .681+7 
Rowling, Land tenure in Benin Province (19^8), paras* 
23*U9 and 65; Omoneukanrin, Itsekiri law and custom,p.7U; 
Bradbury, The Benin kingdom, PP>15*30«Ul»i46-7»72,77«97» 
106-8 and 120; Okojie, Ishan native laws and customs 
(I960) pp *63-4, 68-70, 91-2, 103 and 119; Obi, 8.E.C.
The Ibo law of property (19&3) pp*X5^fff*
2 Thomas, Anthropological report on the Edo-speaking 
peoples , pt.lt p .Ib U . : ~ ~
3 Op.cit ♦ ,p .71 •
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meaning when he says:
"Almost everywhere the senior surviving son of a dead man 
is regarded as the chief heir to his property..." (1)
As regards who are a woman’s heirs, Thomas writes:
"A woman’s property goes to her children..,.If there are 
no children the husband takes all that the woman made 
in his house; the remainder goes back to her family, the 
heirs being (1) brother (2) sister, or (3) father’s brother
Bradbury’s statement of the Benin customary law on the
point is as follows: "If she has no children, her brothers
and sisters are her heirs^".
"Successor"
Like the word "heir", the word "successor" has 
acquired a definite meaning among writers on the Mid- 
Western Region, who have used it in connection with the 
devolution of titles, offices and statuses possessed by a
1 Bradbpry, op .cit.. p .15#
2 Thomas, Anthropological report on the Edo-speaking 
peoples, pt. p.77*
3 Bradbury, op .cit., p .47•
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deceased person . Thus, Talbot, writing on the "kingship" 
title among the Etsako, says:
"The burial of a king is not carried out until his succes­
sor has been appointed"* (2)
On the devolution of the title .of odion among the Isoko, Welch 
states:
"2
"Whenever an odion dies, his quarter chooses the successor.
1 The literature on this point is prolific. Some of the 
writers have employed the words•"succeed to" or the 
word "heir" or "heir-apparent". See: Cardi, C.N. "A 
description of the natives of the Niger Coast Protec­
torate.." in West African studies (1899)ed.Kingsley,
Ivl *H., p .451; ~Roth, '"Notes on Benin cus toms" (1898)
11 Internationales Archiv fttr ethnographic, 235 at 
p.239; Roth, great Benin... (1903) PP*98-100, and the 
authorities quo ted therein; Anon, "Notes on the form 
of the Bini government", (1904) 4 Man,50 at pp*52 and
54; Rumann, W.B. "Funeral ceremonies for the late ex-
Oba of Benin (1914) 14 J.A.S.35, at p.3 6 ; Thomas,
"Notes on Edo burial customs" (1920) 50 J.R.A.I.377 at 
p .405; Talbot, The peoples of southern Nigeria (1926) 
vol.l, pp.153 ffl and 333; vol.III, pp .486,4967579
and 589 Df; Moore, W.A. History of Itsekiri (1930) pp.
23-4 and 90; Welch*"The Isoko tribe’' (1934)' 7 Afr.l60 
at 167; Dennett, R.E., At the back of the black man^ 
mind (1906) pp.176-7 and 180; Hubbard, The Sobo of 
the Niger Delta (19hJj) p.257; Egharevba, Benin law and 
custom (1949) pp.24 and 37; Eghai^evba, A short history 
of Benin (I960) 3x*d edn., pp .7 ff, 14-35, 21,26 and 
35TT; Bradbury, "Some aspects of the political organi­
sation of the Benin kingdom/;( 1952) 1 W.A.I.S.E.R.
Proe. conf. 50 at p .54-55; Bradbury, The Benin kingdom 
(1957), pp.15,30,41,72,98, 105 and 147; Lloyd, "The 
Itsekiri" in the Benin kingdom, ed. Bradbury, pp.191-2; 
Okojie, Ishan native laws and customs (I960),pp.63-70; 
241 ff.
2 Talbot, op .cit. ♦ vol .III, p.486.
3 Welch, loc.cit.
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And^ Bradbury sums it up for all the Edo-speaking peoples 
when he writes:
"Almost everywhere the senior surviving son of a dead man 
is regarded as... the successor to whatever offices, pri­
vileges and duties he may have had/ (1)
Judicial authorities on the meaning of the word "heir"
Like the text-book writers, the courts have used
the word “heir1* to describe the person who inherits the
property - movable or immovable - of a deceased person
under the customary law rules relating to intestacy.
2In the Urhobo case of In the Estate of Agboruna , 
Ames, Ag.S.F.J., observed, inter alia:
11 It is quite clear that the half-brother is the ... heir 
of the deceased according to the law and custom of his 
tribe (which probably is Urhobo as his country is near 
VVarri). This means that he inherited everything left by
the deceased The custom by which a man's heir is
the next male relative, whether brother, son, uncle or 
even cousin, is widespread throughout Nigeria1/ (2)
In lyamuse Ehigie v. Gregory Ehigie , where then— T ~ f i l m f c f w  m«-iT ■ m u  i t m  ■ ■ Wrr - in  ' in Ih i . i ii |m iw i i b ^ i  hw ii ■■ 1 fc lrn m .B . i unTi^  | r i . mn*  i mmmm *
Benin customary law of succession was recently stated in 
proceedings before the Benin grade "A" customary court, 
the president had occasion to employ the word “heir” in 
his judgement. He said:
"It is one of the fundamental principles of Benin customary 
law of succession that the eldest male child who performs
1 Bradbury, The Benin kingdom (1957)* P*15*
2 (19U9) 19 N.L.R.38.
3 [1961] All N.L.R.8!+2j [196^ W.N.L.R.307.
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all the customary funeral ceremonies at the burial of his 
deceased father succeeds his father as heir and inherits 
his properties except that which he gave away before his 
death.. (i)
Meaning ascribed to “heir" and “successor" in this work
It will have been apparent from the literature
referred to and the judicial authorities cited, what meaning
both the learned writers and the courts have attached to
the word "heir". The word means any person beneficially
entitled to or interested in the property of another dying
intestate. It has been stated that the word "successor"
2is often used interchangeably with the term heir • Ac­
cordingly, both words will be used in this work in designa-^ 
ting any person who inherits the property of a deceased 
person dying intestate•
Glasses of "heirs"
We shall see later that in the majority of cases, 
the estate of a person dying intestate passes not just to 
one individual - be he a son, brother or other relative - 
but it descends to a group of persons who may have different 
rights to different categories of property comprised in the 
estate. For example, an eldest son or all.the sons may 
have exclusive inheritance rights over their deceased 
father’s house, lands and permanent crops; while the dead
1 [196:0 All N.L.R. at p.81+5; [l96l| W.N.L.R. at p.309.
2 See: Aitkinson,T.E., Handbook of the law of wills (1953) 
p.ij-; Jowitt, loc.cit.
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man’s "brothers and even sisters may be entitled to some 
of his movable property, such as, articles of clothing, 
household furniture and implements of trade or occupation. 
In other words, in the majority of the systems of inheri­
tance found among the indigenous peoples of our area of 
special reference, the benefits of inheritance are not 
concentrated in one heir; but are dispersed among a group 
of heirs. It is, therefore, desirable to distinguish 
between these classes of heirs»
In the majority of cases where the mode of distri­
bution is divisory, that is to say, where two or more 
heirs are jointly entitled to the estate, we intend to
A
employ the term joint heirs in referring to such heirs.
For the less common type of heir, who is solely entitled
2to the inheritance, the term used is sole heir . Again,
A
as will appear later, one of the joint heirs is usually 
entitled to a more substantial share of the estate than
See: Thomas, Anthropological report on the Edo-speaking
peoples (19I0TV ptVl, pp .64 and 73 * Thomas, Anthropological
report on 1d/ Ibo-speaking peoples (1914), pt .IV,p.60 
See: Roth, Great Benin (1903), P.97, quoting Nyendael; 
Thomas, (1910).pt.1. op .cit.. pp.64 and 74; Thomas.(1910). 
pt 1. op .cit.. pp .64 and 74; Thomas, (1914) .pt .IV. op . 
cit♦ p.128; Thomas, "Marriage and legal customs of the 
Edo-speaking peoples0 (1910) 11 J.Comp. Leg.(N.S.) 94 at 
p.95; Bradbury, The Benin kingdom (1957) p.106.
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A
any of the other .joint heirs. Where this is the case, we
2shall designate such an heir as mncipal heir ; while 
the other joint heirs having lesser rights in the estate 
we shall describe as the subsidiary heirs .
Ascertainment of the heir/s
■ Throughout the Mid-Western Region, a deceased 
intestate*s heir or heirs are generally well known and can 
be ascertained at any given moment, including the lifetime 
of the deceased• Neither choice nor appointment by any 
person is required to establish them as heirs. They are 
heirs by birth, not by being so appointed or chosen4*.
1 See: Thomas, Anthropological report on the Edo-speaking 
peoples (19107," pt .1, pp .64 and 74; ^homaslAnthropoloSical 
report on Ibo-speaking peoples (1914), ptTTv, p .60.
2 See: Bradbury, op.cit.. p .77 * He also uses the expression 
"chief heir”, Bradbury, op .cit.. pp.15,107. Thomas employs 
the term chief heirs Thomas, Anthropological report on
the Bdo-speaking peoples (1910), pt.l, pp. 65 and 80. Of.
Schap era who usea the term principal heir in referring 
to the eldest son among the Tswana - SchapetJ&?I., A hand­
book of Tswana law and custom (1955), pp.230 !ff. But, he 
also employs the word general heir: Sehapera, ibid.at 
P *233•
3 The term minor heirs is sometimes used; for example, see 
Sehapera, ibid. at p.237* We shall, however, avoid the 
use of the term throughout this work in order to avoid 
confusion where a minor is entitled to the estate as a 
sole heir or principal heir.
ft Contra: the position among the Akan peoples of Ghana,
where the heir or,better* still, successor is elected on 
personal merit and qualities. The selection is done by 
the members of the family of the deceased from a pool of 
candidates, who stand in varying degrees of blood relattion- 
ship with him. See: Rattray, R.S..Ashanti law and con­
stitution (1956 impression) pp.3-4| Danquah, J.B., Akan 
laws and customs (1928) p.184; Allott, Essays in African 
law (I960), pp.1 3 6, 234 and 239; Ollennu, N.A., The lav/ 
of succession in G-hana (i9 6 0) pp.7-1 2 .
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The criterion governing heirship is generally blood
relationship with the deceased; and the closer a man’s
degree of such relationship is with the deceased, the
greater are his chances of his being the deceased’s heir,
-1
sole or principal. This is why a man’s eldest son is
usually his sole or principal heir.
Indeed, this position of the eldest son is so well
known to all that, in some cases, his father treated
him in a special way during his {father’s) lifetime.
Thus, among the Ishan, Ha man made a public statement of
his first son by giving him the hearts of all animals 
slaughtered in his compound, so that by the time he died 
Egbele (2) were aware of who was his heir. (3)"
It should perhaps be observed that, unlike the position
among some peoples of southern Africa*4*, the eldest son
in the Mid-Western Region is the firstborn son by any
wife, not necessarily the first wife .
1 See the authorities on the peoples of the Mid-Western Region 
referred to in footnotes 2 on p.256 and 2 on p.257.
2 I.e. family (Ishan).
3 Okojie, op .cit., p.119; also pp.68 and 70. Qkojie 
communicated this information to Bradbury when the latter 
conducted his ehtnographic survey: Bradbury, The
Benin kingdom (1957), p*77n.
4 The Tswana, for instance: Sehapera, op.cit.. pp.130 and 
232.
5 Gkojie, op .cit. 119; also Thomas, Anthropological 
report on the Edo-speaking peoples {1910), ptTT, p .70; 
Thomas, Anthropological report o n ”, _ Ibo-speaking 
peoples (1914), pt.IV, p.217.
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THE ESTATE
Assets and liabilities
The rights and interests of the deceased which 
the law recognises as being transmissible to his heirs 
on his death intestate constitute the assets comprised 
in his estate.
But the deceased is unlikely to have led a life 
in which he acquired rights and interests without in­
curring any obligations, such as those arising from 
contract or civil wrong. Such obligations of the de­
ceased remaining unsatisfied at the time of his death 
constitute the liabilities of his estate.
1• Assets
The rights and interests comprised in the deceased’s 
estate may include not only interests in corporeal 
property; but also rights over persons, v/hich may be 
collectively termed his "authority*' over such persons.
(i) Movable property
In this category are included his rights and 
interests in respect of those objects of personal use, 
such as household articles and furniture, livestock, 
occupational or agricultural implements, articles of 
dress and personal adornment, money, etc., acquired by
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an individual for his personal use. Such personal 
chattels are held by their proprietor as his absolute 
property.
(ii)' Immovable property: land and trees 
Land
The system of land tenure in the Mid-Western Region
is such that group or communal rights and interests in
land are commoner than those held by individuals. This
situation has deceived quite a number of casual observers
into believing that the individuals interests in land
are not recognised as absolute anywhere in the Region.
The truth, however, is that the admittedly predominant
interests of the group or community exist side by side
2with those held by individual "absolute owners" , under 
a somewhat eomplext system of land tenure. And, it is
1 See, for instance: Thomas, Anthropological report
on the Edo-speaking peoples.... pt.l, pp.91-4> Thomas, 
"Marria ge and legal customs of the Edo-speaking peoples" 
(1910) 11 J. Comp. Leg. (N.S.), 9U at 100-101;
Thomas, Anthropological report on / lbo-speaking 
peoples . .pt .IV. pp.143; Omoneukaiirin, op .cit, 
pp.87-8; Hubbard, The Sobo of the Niger Delta (1948) 
pp*38-1+0; Rowling, Land tenure in Benin Province 
(1948), paras. 12-13, 41, 44-59 58, 61, 64,
86-8, 107-8, 112 and 123.
2 He is by this term distinguished from the "limited 
owner" who may have only a life interest. See’i Allott, 
A.H., "Towards a definition of 1 absolute ownershipfn 
[19611 J.A.L.99.
[<»* w
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to the eternal credit of Bradbury, who has accurately
and authoritatively described the position in this way:
n ..* rights over tracts of land are said to be vested in 
the chiefdom or village group, village, ward, extended 
family or lineage, and the i n d i v i d u a l 1)
Trees
Under a system of land tenure which is predominantly
communal, it may sound strange to those learned in
English law to say that the absolute rights of an individual
over trees and crops are more extensive than those he"has
in respect of land. The point, however, is that under
customary law, the ownership of land does not necessarily
2coincide with the rights over the trees growing thereon .
Any trees or crops planted by the deceased belonged
to him as his private or individual property; and it
2makes no difference on whose land they were planted . Self- 
sown trees and crops growing wild on his individually owned 
land form part of his property . Pie may also have established
1 Bradbury, The Benin kingdom, p.150#
2 Thomas, Anthropological report on the Edo-sneaking
peoples... pt.1. pp.95-6; Thomas, Anthropological 
report on <; .. Ibo-speaking peoples... pt.IV, pp .145-7 
150-5; Hubbard, The Sobo of the Uigeria Delta (1948) 
pp.59-40; Rowling, op.cit.. paras. 15,45,47-8, 51,
61, 63, 77, 86, 94 and 123* Bradbury, op .cit.. pp.24, 
45, 76-7 and 96; Okojie, op .cit.. p.91.
3 Thomas,Anthropological report on ... Ibo-speaking 
peon1es ... p t . Iv. pp. 149-15 2.
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ownership over sokb trees growing wild on land owned by
the group or community by clearing the spaces round such
wild trees ; or depositing some objects, such as stones
2or medicines, on or around them ; or he may have claimed 
ownership of a particular tree by virtue of the fact 
that, when he was born, his umbilical cord had been
*5
buried at the foot of the tree .
(b) Authority over persons 
(i) Wives
The mystical bond of marriage uniting a husband and 
wife through the payment of the bride price made by the 
former survives his death; but not that of the wife* In 
other words, while the death of a deceased female terminates 
a marriage, the death of a male deceased, on the other 
hand, dees not bring a marriage to an end. The result is, 
as will appear later, that the male deceased1s rights or, 
better still, authority over his wives, may be taken over 
by his heirs* Two reasons have been given for the exis­
tence of this rule whereby the rights of a deceased hus-
1 Thomas,Anthropological report on the Edo-speaking 
peoples, .1/ pTsFT Thomas, (19107 11 j 7 Comp. Leg. 
(N.S.), op .cit.. 94 at 101; Thomas, Anthropological 
report, on, Ibo-speaking peoples, pt.IV, p.154*
2 Thomas, Anthropological report on the Edo-speaking 
peoples." pt .1. p *96: Thomas* (1910) 11 J.Comp.Leg.(N.S.) 
loc.cit. .
3 Dennett, "Notes from southern Nigeria (1905) 16 Folk­
lore 434 at p.439; Welch, "The Isoko tribe" (1934) 
Afi*.l60 at p .169; Green.Land tenure in an Ibo village 
(1941) P*20; Chubb, L.T. Ibo land tenureT"[T^Sll.para. 101«
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band over his wives savour of "a species of inheritance'* . 
The first, which is now discredited, is that the deceased’s 
widows form part of his property to be distributed or 
inherited . The second and acceptable reason is that
1 Diamond, A.S., Primitive law (1935) p.244.
2 Hartland, E.S. Primitive law {192k) p.114; Yfesterrnann, 
D., The African today (1934) p.125; Green, M.M., Ibo 
village affairs (1947) PP»97* 161-5; Jeffreys, M.D.W., 
"Lobola is child-price" (1951) 10 Afr. Stud. (Johannes­
burg) 145 at p.146; and see: Kingisley, M.H., West 
African studies (1899) 438; who states that women must 
be considered as property in a different class.
3 Thomas, Anthropological report on the Edo-speaking 
peoples. pt.l, pp*47 ff,t 68 and 71 ff; Thomas, "Edo- 
speaking peoples"(1910) !10 J.A.S.l at pp.5-6; Thomas, 
"Marriage and legal customs of the Ddo-speaking peoples" 
(1910) 11 J.Comp .Leg. (N.S.) 94 at p.95; Thomas, "Notes 
on some Ibo burial customs", (1917) 47 J.R.A.I. 163 at 
pp.187 and 191; Hoth, H.L. Great Benin, p .97; Dennett,
At the back of the black man’s mind (1§06) p.199; 
Granville and Roth, F.N.,^Notes'"on the Jekris, Sobos 
and Ijos of the Warri District" (1898-9) 29 J.R.A.I.
104 at 118; Talbot, Obe.^peoples of southern Nigeria, 
vol.Ill, pp.430-1, 680"and 685; Omoneukanrin, dp.cit., 
pp*73“4; Esenwa, F.B.,"Marriage customs in Asaba 
Division" (1948) 13 Nigerian Field 71 at p.74; Fowling, 
op.c_it., para.49; In the Estate of Agboruja (1949)
1 9 I.L . 38 at p.39; Bradbury, op .cit.. pp.47* 80, 96
108 and 152; Egha^evba, Benin lav/ and custom, pp.38 
and 7 6 ; Okojie, op.cit♦. p.91• Some legally trained 
persons have even recently lent support to his un­
tenable view. See, for instance: Molajo, E.A.,"The
Nigerian married women and the law" (1957) 1 Nigerian 
Bar Journal p.23; Coker, G.B.A., Family property among 
the Yorubas (1958)? pp.35, 38-9 an(3- 287* It is perhaps 
significant that Coker classifies a customary wife 
into the category of immovable property.
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the institution of marriage is regarded by the customary
law not only as a union between one man and one woman,
but as a wider contract between the families of the 
1spouses .
The absurdity of the first view (that the widow is
the deeeasedTs property to be inherited) is readily seen
from a brief examination of the true posi tion of the
widow under customary law.
Firstly, a widow by her marriage did not become the
2
property of her deceased husband, like his slave ♦ No 
heir has ever been known to have sold a widow, whereas 
an inherited slave could, and might often, be sold by 
his inheritor. This comparison between the slave and the 
widow is of special significance: for marriage with a
female slave, far from worsening her already lowly status, 
was one of the recognised ways whereby she became a 
freed woman .
Secondly, unlike inherited property, which on dis­
tribution has no option but to descend to the heirs, a 
widow has the right to reject the new suitor chosen by
1 Lowie, H., Primitive society (1921) p.234; Allott, 
Essays in African law (I960) p.213*
2 Hartland, loc.cit.: Kingsley, op.cit*. p.439, where she 
says: "The immediate rule of a husband over his wife 
may be likened to that of a constitutional monarch; 
that of a man or woman over a slave to that of an 
absolute monarch”.
3 See: Thomas, Anthropological report on Ibo-speaking 
peoples (1914)* pt.l, pp. Ill and 119* Talbot, op .cit. 
vol.Ill, p.694*
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the deceased’s family to take her as wife# Where she 
exercises this right, the only remedy open to the re­
jected suitor is to ask for a refund of part of the bride 
price paid by the deceased in respect of the mai*riage
'i
with the widow . This point arose m  a neat fom in
2the case of horomeke v. Uekegho and anor# , where the 
parties were Urhobo residing in Accra in Ghana# The 
plaintiff was the dead man’s brother, allegedly chosen 
by the deceased’s family to take as wife, the surviving 
customary widow, the second defendant in the suit# The 
deceased man, had died intestate, leaving the customary
widow, the second defendant, and two young children born 
to him by her# The first defendant was the second de­
fed a n t ’s father, to whom the bride price of the marriage 
between the deceased and the second defendant was paid#
The case arose because of the second defendant’s refusal 
to marry.the plaintiff, who claimed to have been selected
1 Thomas, Anthropological report on the kdo-speaking 
peoples (1910) , pt.1,' p .Iff 1 Thomas^ (l910) TTj.Comp• 
Leg. (N.S#), op.cit.# 94 at p.96; Thomas, (1910) 10 
J.A.S# op .cit.# 1 at p.5; Okojie, Ishan native laws 
and customs (i960) p.91; In the Estate of Agboru.ja 
(19*4-9) 19 N.L.R. 38 at p .39; horomeke v. Nekegho and 
anor. (1957) 3 W.A.L.k.306 at pp.307-8; Okaludo v .
Omama [196<Jj W.N.L.R. 149 > a Kwale (Mid-Western Ibo) 
ease, where it was specifically held that the amount 
of bride price diminishes according to the duration 
of the marriage; and, accordingly, Morgan, J., as he 
then wasj affirmed a decision of a customary court 
reducing the bride price of £22 to £10, in respect of
a customary marriage which had subsisted for five years.
2 (1 9 5 7) 3 w.a.l.r.3 0 6.
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by the deceased’s family to take the second defendant 
as wife * He sued at the Accra grade "BtT municipal court 
claiming the repayment of the sum of £12 representing 
part of the bride price paid by his deceased brother, as 
well as the custody of the deceased’s two children by 
the second defendant.
The municipal court decided in favour of the 
plaintiff and, on appeal, this decision was affirmed by 
the magistrate’s court. The defendants then appealed 
to the High Court which allowed the appeal on two grounds. 
The first was that there was no evidence that the plaintiff 
was in fact selected by the deceased’s family as the 
second defendant’s new husband. The second ground was 
that, granting he was so selected, the repugnancy prin­
ciple governing the enforcement of customary law was 
infringed; since the custody of the children was, by 
the custom relied on by the plaintiff, to be given to a 
man whom the customary widow had refused to marry. In 
the words of the learned Judge:
”•..• the application of the custom is undoubtedly ,
repugnant to natural justice, equity and good conscience •
As regards the right of the customary widow to reject
the deceased’s heir as husband, the Judge remarked:
1 At p.308.
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"Evidence was in fact given that the widow was entitled 
to refuse but in that event was bound to refund to the 
family of the deceased £12 from the money paid to her on 
her marriage as dowry (1).... The evidence however was 
not seriously disputed by the defendants and in fact in 
cross-examination the first defendant confirmed the 
customf (2)
Thirdly^ even where the widow decides to marry 
again within her deceased husband’s family, she has con­
siderable freedom in the choice of her next husband*^; and 
may, for instance, decide quite naturally to marry her 
late husband’s relative who took the greatest care of. her 
during the period of administration^.
Fourthly, were she inherited like property, her 
"inheritor" should have been able to pass her on to his 
heir, which is not the case. As a general rule, she is
1 Ibid., at p .307 • See also In the Estate of Agboru,ia. 
op .cit.. where the deceased’s customary widow refused 
to marry his half-brother; and had to refund to him 
precisely the sum of £12. It is, however, not 
strictly correct, as Loromeke’s case (op .cit.) tends to 
suggest, that the bride price is paid to the wife 
herself. The usual practice is to pay it to the wife’s 
father or family. On this see: Thomas, (1910) 11
J . Comp.Leg. (H.S.), op .cit. 9U at p.97; Omoneukanrin, 
op .cit., p .41; Hubbard, The Sobo of the Niger Delta 
(19U8) p.191; Bradbury, op .cit.. pp *h9,80,108, 121,
156 and 190; Okojie, op.cit .pp.91.105 and 118.
2 (1957) 3v-W.A.L .R.306 atpBUBT"
3 Thomas, Anthropological report on the Edo-speaking 
peoples (1 9 1 0) , pt.l, p .75; OmoneukanrinV Itsekiri 
law and custom (19^2) p.7U; Bradbury, The Benin 
kingdom (1957) p.9 6 .
k As among the Itsekiri. See: Omoneukanrin, loc.cit.
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taken as wife once only; and must not marry again within 
the family on the death of the husband’s relative who
•i
took her as wife .
Fifthly, the process by which a widow becomes the
wife of the new suitor does not support the view that
she is inherited like property. For, as a general rule,
a special ceremony must be performed by the man before
he is recognised as the lawful husband of the woman con- 
2
cerned . Besides, there is the fact that she is usually 
married to her new husband before the actual distribution
■z
of her deceased husband’s estate is carried out - a fact 
which strongly lends support to our contention that she 
does not pass with the property comprised in the estate} 
and she is, therefore, not inheritable property.
1 Thomas, (1.910), pt.l, p .85. Omoneukanrin, loc .cit. Cf# 
the Marriage, Divorce and Custody of dhildren Adoptive 
Bye-laws Order, Western Region of Nigeria, W.R.L.N.
456 of 1958* s.10, which provides:"No dowry £i.e. 
bride price] shall be refundable .,. where an inherited 
widow is divorced" It is, however, our view that the 
widow is not ’inherited’. Only the Ika (Agbor) local 
council area is known to have adopted this Bye-laws 
Order in the Mid-Western Region. See: W.R.L.N.4* 12 
and 42-3 of 1959*
2 Thomas, ibid. p.50; Bradbury, op .cit.. p.152; Okojie, 
op .cit.» p. 91*
3 Thomas, ibid: pp*72, 80 and 88; Omoneukanrin, loc .cit.. 
Bradbury, op.cit.. p.97.
269
Sixthly, as will become apparent in the next two chapters, 
there are societies wheie a widow is free to return to her 
family, if she has surviving children for her deceased 
husband. It will also be shown in chapter eleven that 
in some societies the question of whether she is required 
to marry her deceased husband1s kinsman is determined by 
the type of marriage she contracted with the deceased.
From the foregoing argument, it is quite clear that 
the widow cannot be ranked with her husband’s property 
for the purposes of inheritance; nor can her husband’s 
heir be said to have a proprietary right over her. His 
right in this connection cannot be putany higher than that 
he is entitled to take her as wife, provided that she gives 
her consent and blessing to his proposal. In other words, 
as a learned writer has described the position, the right 
of the heir is no more than tfa right of ’first refusal*
A
should the widow decide to remarry" . The bride price paid 
in respect of her marriage does not, as a learned author 
has observed, "render her as a slave; rather it operates 
as a guarantee of her good treatment" * However, it will 
be shown in the chapters on the distribution of estates, 
where the legal rights over children are also discussed,
1 Obi, The Ibo law of property (1963) p. 187*
2 Hai^tland, Primitive law (1924) p.114*
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that one of the functions of the bride price is to 
determine the question of the affiliation of children.
Rights of the widow in respect of the estate of her 
deceased husband
It is a rule of the customary law most strictly 
observed that a widow cannot inherit any property from
-i
the intestate estate of her deceased husband . Though
some informants have sought to justify the position, as
we shall see, on the ground that the rule operates to
remove any temptation on the part of the widow to bring
about the death of her husband, the true rationale of the
rule would seem to lie in the practice of exogamy; as
well as in the principle of succession based on blood
relationship with the propositus ♦ Now, a wife and her
husband must belong to different families* Thus, in the
2Yoruba case of Sognunro Davies v* Sogunro and ors> , m  
which a widow,married under the Marriage Act, unsuccessfully
1 See: Roth, &t?eat Benin (1903) P*97; Thomas, "Marriage 
and legal customs of the Edo-spealcing peoples" (1910)
11 J. Comp .Leg* (N.S*) 94* at p. 100; Omoneukanrdn, 
Itsekiri law and custom (1942) p.74; Egharevba, Benin 
law and custom (T9^9Tpp.58 and 76; Esenwa, "Marriage 
customs in Asaba Division" (1948) 13 Nigerian Field 
71, at p.80; Okojie, Ishan native laws and customs 
(i9 6 0) pp.92-3; Obi, The Ibo law"ofProperty (19&3) 
chap.8, esp. pp.159 and 173• Cf. In the Estate of 
Agboruia - Urhobo case - (1949) 19 N.L.R.38.
2 Tl§29T9.N*L.R .79 i
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claimed her deceased husband's share in his family
•i
property , Berkeley, J., adverted to the position of a 
customary widow and observed:
"In an intestacy under native law and custom the devolu­
tion of property follows the blood. Therefore, a wife 
or widow, not being of the blood, has no claim to any 
share" (2)
Care must be taken, however, to distinguish between 
the widow's legal title to property left by her deceased 
husband and her rights of possession and enjoyment of 
provisions that may have been made for her by her husband 
during his lifetime; her living accommodation and farm 
land, for example. This point has already been mentioned 
in chapter six, where we examined the duties of the ad­
ministrator. It will, however, be treated again, at 
greater length, in chapter twelve, where the rights and 
duties of the heir will be considered. For the present, 
it is enough to say that, though excluded from the scheme 
of inheritance, she is not without some other rights. 
Witness her right to continued use’ of her residential 
accommodation provided by her husband^ regarding which a 
learned author writes:
"... the widow has an unassailable right to reside in 
the house  She retains this right till death, re­
marriage or return to her people." (3)
1 On the ground, as will be illustrated later, that no 
member of the family had a separate interest therein.
2 Ibid. at p.80.
3 Obi, op.cit., p.173.
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The other aspect of the status of the widow
The error into which some of the writers have fallen 
in ranking a widow as her husband’s inheritable property 
stems from their failure to see that aspect of her 
status, which she enjoys in her own family* They seem 
to have completely lost sight of the fact that she is also 
the child of some parents, who take an interest in her 
welfare; to whom she may look for protection in the 
event of her being ill-treated by the members of her 
deceased husband’s family; and from whom she may inherit 
property *
This aspect of the status of the wife under cus­
tomary law has been clearly brought out by Green, who 
has also contrasted it with her position in her husband’s 
family, in this way:
”A woman in her birthplace has a feeling of superiority 
that she lacks in her husband’s village* There she 
has been acquired by payment: in her own place she is
a native of the s o i l l ) ,
And even Coker who, it will be recalled, regards a wife
as part of her husband’s immovable property, has noticed
this other aspect of her status* He writes:
”It should also be borne in mind, however, that in her 
own family, the wife is still the daughter or the sister* 
This fact should not be overlooked, for as a child of 
her parents, she continues to enjoy all the privileges
1 Green, Ibo village affairs (l9h7) p.164*
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A
which by native law and custom attach to children
Purpose served h.v the custom whereby the widow is taken over
Whatever may be said against the custom whereby
the deceased*s heir or successor talces the widow as wife,
there is little doubt that it was probably the most
effective method in the traditional society of providing
2
for her and her children, if any* # It certainly enables
1 Coker, op,citM  P*39.
2 See Kayamba, H.M.T., 1fThe modern life of the East African 
native” (1932) 5 Afr. 50 at p.53» where he says: "This 
system has its beneficial use in Africa* It Is part
of the communal system which has not made room for poor 
people who depend on the community to support them” .
Also: Thomas,(1910). pt*l* p*64; Thomas, (1910) 11 J.
Comp, Leg. (N.S.) 94 at pp*99-100; Adam, L*, "Inheri­
tance in primitive cultures” (193U-5) 10 IOWA L.R. 762 
at p*777; Childs, 8 *H.$"Christian marriage in Nigeria” 
(1946) 16 Afr. 238 at p. 2*44; Meek, Land tenure and land 
administration in Nigeria (1957', p.187; Okojie, op♦ 
cit*, p.118. There is biblical support for the custom: 
Trr..the wife of the dead shall not marry without unto a 
stranger: her husband’s brother shall go in unto her,
and take her to him to wife...” Deut. XXV': 5* And,
judicial authority is not lacking: In the Estate of
Agboru.ia (19A9) 19 N.L.R. 38 at p#39, where Ames, J., 
said: The custom is based on what might be called the
economics of one kind of African social system, in which 
the family is regarded as a composite unit. There can 
vbe nothing intrinsically unfair or inequitable...”
2 7 k
a widow to live a normal married, life in close association 
with her children whom she would naturally be reluctant 
to leave behind even where she may be free - without 
the necessity of refunding part of the bride price - to
i
return to her own family.
The custom is, however, becoming less popular,
especially among the educated elements who are not
usually favourably disposed to marrying a 1 secondhand
o
wife1; but rather one of their own choice , To the 
uneducated and poor people, however, such a distinction - 
between a woman formally married and a widow taken as 
wife - does not seem to matter, since the observance of 
the custom may well be the only avenue open to them for 
ever affording to get married,
( id) . .Children* and other dependants
During his lifetime, the deceased exercised certain 
rights or authority over his children and others, to whom 
he stood in loco parentis. For example, he had a right 
to the personal services of his children and other de­
pendants; and was, in addition, entitled to receive the
1 Childs, loc.cit,: Meek, haw and authority in a Nigerian
tribe (1937)> p.321; Okojie, Ishan native laws and
customs (i9 6 0), p.102.
2 Esenwa, loc .cit.
3 Okojie, loc.cit.
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whole or part of the bride price paid in respect of the
-i
marriage of any of his daughters .
2. Liabilities of the estate
The discussion of the liabilities of the estate left 
by the deceased must await a consideration of the rights 
and duties of his heirs, without which no worthwhile 
examination of these liabilities can be undertaken. For 
the present, however, it may be observed that customary 
inheritance is not limited to the taking of property left 
by a deceased person; but it is very much concerned also 
with the assumption of any duties and obligations he may 
have had. If, for instance, the estate is insolvent and 
huge debts stand to be paid, the deceased’s heirs will 
be more occupied with the discharge of obligations than 
with the acquisition of property.
The Ishan custom on this point has been admirably 
stated as follows:
o
,fAssets and liabilities were in Ishan custom inheritable. 
And Harris's account of the position among the Ibo is 
to the same effect when he says:
1 Thomas, (1910) 11 J.Comp. Leg. (N.S.) 9^ at p.97; 
Omoneukanrin, op.cit., p.Ul; Hubbard, The Sobo of the 
Niger Delta (19k&J, p.191; Bradbury, The Benin kingdom 
(1957), PP 80, 121 and 156; Lloyd,"" ,fThe~~TtsekiriH 
in The Benin kingdom, edr, Bradbury, p.190; Okoiie, 
op.cit.. pp.91,103 and 118.
2 Okojie, op.cit.. p.92.
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"Upon the death of a debtor, responsibility for repay­
ment passes to his inheritor, as right to collect a debt 
passes to the inheritor of the creditor"* (l)
The need for stressing this negative aspect of in­
heritance (i.e. the liabilities of the estate) is 
becoming greater today with the growing tendency observable 
whereby succession is treated solely as a source of ac­
quiring rights; and the corresponding duties and obliga­
tions it also imposes are readily ignored.
(l) Time for the distribution of the estate
There is no uniformity among the peoples of the 
Region as to the special length of time that must elapse 
before the estate is formally distributed. Much, however, 
depends on how soon the task of administration of the 
estate is completed; for it is the rule that no distri­
bution is normally undertaken until the performance of the 
deceased’s burial and funeral - a most important part of
p
the administration - is carried out.
1 Harris, J.S., "Some aspects of the economics of sixteen 
Ibo individuals" (1944) 14 Afr. 302 at p.320.
2 Thomas, Anthropological report on the Ed.o-speaking 
peoples (1910), pt.l, pT76; Thomas, Anthropological 
report on Ibo-speaking peoples (1914), pt.IV, pp.
128 ff; Thomas^ "Notes on Edo burial customs" (1920)
50 J~.R.A.I. 377 ff., esp. at pp.404-5; Talbot, vol.Ill, 
op.cit.. pp.486-7; Welch, "The Isoko tribe" (1934) 7 
Afr. 160 at p. 172; Omoneukanrin, op.cit. p.73; Bgharevba, 
Benin law and custom (1949), PP .73-4; Bradbury, The 
Benin kingdom (1957). pp*50,80,98 and 132; Okojie, 
op.cit., pp. 64 ff; 90-1,124 and 127.
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Even when all that pertains to the task of ad­
ministration has been scrupulously observed, circumstances 
may still make it ...advisable or imperative for the 
distribution to be put off till some future time, "if, 
for instance, all or a majority of the heirs are still too 
young to be entrusted with the management of the inherited 
property, the distribution is usually postponed until
•i
they come of age . Similarly, if the heirs get on well
together, they may agree to enjoy the inherited property
in common; leaving till some indefinite date the question
2
of its formal and rigid division .
1 Thomas, (1910). pt.l. op .cit., p p .68,72,78-9,84-6; 
Thomas »(1914) .pt.IV. op .cit.. pp.120, 133-5; Talbot, 
vol. II I, op .cit.. p.68'5^ Omoneukanrin, op .cit. .p .74: 
Bradbury, op .cit♦. pp .107 and 137.
2 Thomas, (1 9 1 0 ) pt.l. op .cit.. p.75; Bradbury, ibid*, 
p.96. Such an arrangement to enjoy the inherited 
property in common is usually made in respect of land. 
Such an arrangement may be termed "allocation" in 
contradistinction to "partition", where the property 
is rigidly and formally divided or carved out into 
shares. "Allocation", which is made according to 
need, still leaves the utlimate title to the property 
vesting in the group of heirs; while rigid division—  
"partition" - gives every joint-heir his separate 
title to his share. See: Coker, Family.property among 
the Yorubas (1958) chaps. 5 and 6, and the judicial 
authorities cited therein; Lloyd,_ "Some notes on the 
Yoruba rules of succession" £l959j J.A.L.7 at p.15; 
Lloyd, Yoruba land law (1962) pp.285-6.
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On the other hand., the division of the estate may 
occur far earlier than would have normally been the case 
where the circumstances of the heirs and/or the nature 
of some of the rights to be inherited or taken over 
dictate a more expeditious course of action. It hardly 
requires any argument to say that a group of needy heirs 
would find more difficulty in resisiting the temptation 
of the earliest possible distribution,with the attendant; 
benefits, than a group of heirs comparatively well off. 
The division of the estate is also hastened where it 
comprises a substantial amount of perishable goods, such 
as harvested crops and vegetable foods. But, perhaps, 
the best example of how the nature of the rights to be
■I
inherited or taken over may advance the time for the
distribution of the estate is furnished by the custom
2 3 Ufound among the Etsako, Urhobo , Itsekiri and, to some
6extent, Ishan , under which the wives of the deceased are
1 The inheritance of the deceased* s rights over* his wives 
is, as will be shown later, incorrectly referred to as 
"widow-inheritance".
2 Thomas, Anthropological report on the Edo-speaking 
peoples ‘(1910), pt.l, p.75*
3 Thomas, ibid. p.88,
h Omoneukanrin, Itsekiri law and custom (19U2) p.73*
The rationale of this custom has been given by the
author as "nature did not seem to favour undue delay11 •
5 Okojie, Ishan native laws and customs (i9 6 0) p.118.
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A
usually taken over by some of his male relatives prior 
to the actual time for the distribution of the estate*
(2) Machinery of distribution of the estate
Like the process of administration dj&russed in the
preceding chapter, the distribution of the estate is a
matter for the members of the family of the deceased; and,
unless there is a dispute in the succession, it does not
require the intervention of the court* The rule is that
at the end of the period of administration, there is
held a family meeting at which the elders of the family
2supervise the distribution *
In practice, however, only the estate of a man 
survived by children born of different mothers is usually 
subjected to formal and rigid division, and to supervision 
undertaken by the family. Such supervision is carried 
out in this ease ,fin order to prevent disputes between
•7.
half-brothers11 , since jealousy between half-brothers and
1 The inheritance of the deceased*s rights over his wives 
is, as will be shown later, incorrectly referred to as 
,fwidOY/~inheritance".
2 Thomas, (1910)% Pt *1* pp.67 and 86; Bradbury, op _*c_i_t. 
pp . 1+7,77,99, 104, 107 and 152; Omoneukanrin, op .cit. 
pp*72-3; kgharevba, op*cit. pp.38 and 74; Okojie,
op *ci t * pp*90-92; Meek, Law and authority in a Nigerian 
tribe, (1937) pp.124 and 324; GreerTJ Land tenure in an 
Ibo village (1941) p.14.
3 Meek, op .cit ., p.324.
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■i
half-sisters is a feature of a polygamous society . In 
the case of an estate of a rnan survived hy children horn 
of one woman and that of a deceased woman, it is usual 
for the children to appropriate the property among them­
selves, without the need for invoking the supervision of 
the family. This is because there is unlikely to be
insistence on rigid division - a fruitful source of
2quarrels and disputes m  matters of inheritance .
(3) The seniority of children
It may seem somewhat illogical for a discussion 
of the rule relating to the seniority of children to 
precede those governing legal paternity and their inheritance 
rights. It is, however, considered that since the various 
systems in the Region have uniform rules in respect of 
the seniority of children, the opportunity may well be 
taken at this stage, to outline these rules; in order 
to avoid a repetition in the subsequent examination of the 
various rules governing both the legal rights over children
1 Meek, op .cit. p.324. Gf. Leith-Eoss, African women 
(1938) p. 226; Green, op .cit. pp.13-14; Ardener, E *W • 
"The kinship terminology of a group of southern Ibo" 
(1954) 24 Afr. 85, at p.88.
2 Meek, op .cit .. p.324, Green, op .cit.♦ p. 14.
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and their inheritance rights in respect of their parents* 
estates.
Unlike the position obtaining among some of the
indigenous peoples of Africa south of the continent , the
seniority of children throughout our area of reference
(i.e. the whole of southern Nigeria) is not determined by
the status of their mothers as great or special wives.
The eldest child is the son or daughter actually born
first irrespective of the status of the mothei* as the first
or last wife according to the sequence of marriage, or as
2
the wife best favoured by the husband. As an author puts
it: the eldest son is not necessarily the son of the
head wife..." (3)
The Tswana, for example, see: Schapera, I., A handbook 
of Tswana law and customs (1955), pp.14-15 and 232.
And see generally: Whitfield, G.M.B., South African 
native law (1948) chap .6 , esp. pp. 306, 351 and~~3So~* ff; 
Kerr, A.J., The native law of succession in South Africa 
(1 9 6 1), chaps. 2 and 3 *
Thomas, Anthropological report on the Edo-speaking -peoples 
(1910), pt.l, p.70; Thomas, Anthropological report on 
Ibo-speaking1 peoples (1914) pt.IV, p.127; Okojie, Ishan 
native laws and customs, p. 119; Obi, The Ibo law of 
property (1 9 6 3) pp. 156 and 177; Green, hand tenure in 
an Ibo village (1941), p.12.
Thomas, Anthropological report on Ibo-speaking peoples
pt.IV, p.1 2 7.
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CHAPTER EIGHT
RULES OP DISTRIBUTION IN TYPE "A11 SOCIETIES - ISHAN AMD 
HOLDERS OP HEREDITARY TITLES AMOHG THE BINI
The rules of distribution will be discussed in 
x»elation to the estates of the following persons:
(1) a married man survived by male issue;
(2) a married man with no male issue;
(3) a married woman; and
(4) an unmarried person.
(1) The estate of a married man survived by male issue
The customary law of succession of the Ishan as well
as that which governs the devolution of the estates of
4
hereditary title-holders among the Bini is based upon one
1 The hereditary titles include those of (a) the Oba of 
Benin; (b) the Uzama Nihiron (the seven Councillors of 
State or kingmakers); (c) Two titles - Elema and Qgiave -
associated with (b) above; (d) about three of the 
roughly fifty Eghaevbo nobles ("Town11 and "Palace" 
chiefs^); (e) a few of the Egie-ebo or priestly chiefs; 
and (f) the enigie or district heads. On these, see:
Roth, Great Bendn Tl9Q5)* chap.9, and the authorities 
cited therein; Roth, "Notes on Benin customs" (1898)
11 Internationales Archiv filr Ethnographic, 235 at p.239; 
Anon, "Notes on the form of the Bini government" (1 9 0 4)
4 Man, 50 at p.52; Rumann, W.B., "Funeral ceremonies for 
the late ex-Oba of Benin" (1914) 14 J.A.S. 35 at pp.36-39; 
Talbot, The peoples of southern Nigeria (1926), vol.l, 
chap .4; vol.Ill, cha?pA 24; Egharevba, Benin law and custom 
(1949), chaqfs'. 7 , 8 and 11; Egharevba, A short history of
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fundamental principle, which may he formulated as 
follows: the eldest surviving son succeeds to all his
deceased father’s estate as sole heir*
Thus, the Ishan law has been stated in these words:
A
"The first son inherited the father’s property "
And the revel ant Bini law applying to the estate of a 
holder of a hereditary title has been summarised as 
follows:
"When any person of condition dies, the eldest son is 
sole heir" (2)
The all-embracing inheritance rights of the eldest
surviving son of a deceased hereditary title-holder
among the Bini has recently been judicially pronounced
upon in the case of Iyamuse Bhigie v* Gregory Ehigie .^
where, however, the court, over-stated the Bini principle
1 (p*282) Benin (i960), pp.1-66, 76-80; Bradbury,
"Some aspects of the political organisation of the 
Benin kingdom" (1952) 1 W.A.I.S.E.R. conference. 50 
at pp.53-60; Bradbury, The Benin kingdom (1957) 
pp.34-43 and 56.
1 Okojie, op.cit.. p.90.
2 Roth, Great Benin. (1903) p.97, quoting Nyendael; see 
also: Talbot, op .cit.. vol.III, pp.684-685, and the
authorities quoted therein; Egharevba, Benin law 
and custom (1949) PP *37.-8; Cardi, op .cit . p  .455.
3 Q96r] Ail N.L.R.842; [l96lj W.N.L .R .307 .
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of primogeniture or total succession; and sought to 
extend it to the succession of non-holders of hereditary 
titles* In that case, the pai°ties were the eldest son 
and the eldest daughter of a deceased male dying in­
testate, leaving inter alia* a house, the subject-matter 
of the dispute* The defendant (the eldest daughter) 
had challenged the right of the plaintiff (her eldest 
brother) to inherit the house in dispute on the ground 
that their deceased father had built it specially for 
her to inherit. She occupied the property and refused 
to give up possession to the plaintiff. Thereupon, the 
plaintiff sued at the grade "A" customary court, Benin, 
claiming a declaration of title; or alternatively, that 
he was entitled to the house as against the defendant 
under Benin customary law.
Without receiving any evidence of the Benin custo<
4
mary law of succession , the president of the customary
1 A point on which he was reversed on appeal (High Court) .
See {l96l} All N.L.R.8U2 at p.8U8; [l96lf W .N .L .R. 307 at p.312. 
For an earlier case in which he was reversed on an identical 
point by another High Court Judge, see Edokpolor v . Idehen 
y-96ljW.H.L*R*11 at p.li+. There, the president specifically 
refused to accept evidence of the relevant customary law 
on the ground that "this is a customary court and the court 
is a repository of Customary Law...* Just as evidence of 
English law is not required in English Court so there is no 
need for evidence ... as to the existence or non-existence 
of Customary Law in Gustomary Courts of the Western Region": 
ibid.* at p .1 3 *
285
•i
court - himself a Bini - proceeded to give judgement 
for the plaintiff# His statement of the Benin customary 
law of succession, which the present writer’s investi­
gation has proved to he unnecessarily too wide, was as 
follows:
”It is one of the fundamental principles of Benin 
customary law of succession that the eldest male child 
of a deceased person who performs all the customary 
funeral ceremonies at the burial of his deceased father 
succeeds his deceased father as heir and inherits his 
properties except that which he gave away before his 
death." (2)
The principle of primogeniture: reasons for its existence
among the Ishan and Bini hereditary noblemen
As will be seen later, the principle of primogeni­
ture characteristic of the Ishan customary law of suc­
cession and which also governs succession to the estates 
of holders of hereditary titles among the Bini is in 
marked contrast with the systems found among the other 
indigenous peoples of the Region.
As regards the position among the Bini, an explana­
tion for this divergence may be found in Benin history, 
and especially in the power formerly wielded by the
1 He is one of the present writer’s informants on the 
Benin law of succession.
2 [l96l] All N.L.R.81+2 at p.81)5; Fl96l] W.N.L.R. 307
at p.309.
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4
ruler, the Oba , together with the mode of succession
to the ruler’s title? under which the eldest surviving
son succeeds to his father’s title and property to
2the exclusion of all others • As a learned author has 
observed:
’’The fact that the crown descended to the eldest son may 
have influenced local ideas, hut primogeniture is not the 
basis of inheritance in West Africa” (3)
1 On the formerly absolute powers of the Oba, see 
generally: Roth*(1903) pp.101,103 and 111, and the 
authorities quoted therein; Thomas»(1910). nt.l.p.91; 
Talbot, on .cit.. vol.Ill, pp.584 and 700; Punch, C.,
’■land tenure and inheritance in Yoruba”, in Great Benin
(1903), ed* . Roth, p.XXII; Egharevba. '.A:.short.-hist6r.v-:.;of 
Benin (i960) w  .5.81-88: Bradbury. The Benin kingdom 
Ti957) pp.i+l-2 and 44.
2 On this see: Roth, (1898) 11 Internationales Archiv
fdr Ethnographic, p. 233; Cardi, ”A description of 
the natives of the Niger Coast Protectorate” in West 
African studies (1899) , ed*-« Kingsley, M.H., p.451;
Anon, lfNotes on the form of the Bini government”,
(1904) 4 Man. 50 at p.52: Dennett, R.E., At the back
of the black man’s mind (1 9 0 6), pp. 176-7 and 180;
Rumann, loc.cit Talbot, op .cit«. vol.l, chap.4;
vol.Ill, chap. 24; Egharevba, Benin law and custom
(1949), PP .24,27,36-37; Egharevba, A short history of 
Benin (i9 6 0), pp*7 ff; Roth, Great Benin (1903) 
pp.100-101, and the authorities quoted therein; Brad­
bury, (1952) 1 W.A.I.S. E.R. confr., 50 at p.60;
Bradbury, The Benin kingdom (1957) pp.35, 40-41.
3 Roth,(1 9 0 5) n.101. Cf. Punch, ibid. who says: ”It
may well be that the centralisation of all proprietor­
ship in the king may have altered the usual customs 
in West Africa”.
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The occurrence of this principle of succession 
among the Ishan cannot he explained solely on their Benin 
origin for, as has already been noticed, most of the 
peoples of the Region originally came from Benin. A 
more satisfactory reason may be found in the common 
general features existing between the Bini and Ishan in 
language, culture and traditions. Thus, Okojie, him­
self an Ishan, says:
”A11 Ishans came directly and indirectly from Benin as 
could be seen from the uniformity of features, language, 
customs, etc., akin to Benin” (l)
But the position among the Ishan in this regard is
rendered more difficult of explanation by the fact that
the scope of the principle of primogeniture is broader -
it covers the succession of all male persons - than it is
among the Bini from whom it must have been adopted. Here
is an excellent example of the truth in the observation
made by a learned author that ”legal historians have
not found any universally common origin to the law of 
succession; nor does that branch of the law seem to have 
developed in different systems along uniform lines” (2)
Another, and perhaps better, explanation for the Ishan
extension of the scope of this principle of succession
may have been the traditional case of trying to be
1 Okojie, Ishan native laws and customs (i9 6 0), p.30.
2 Parry, D.H".'. The law of succession.~Hth edn. (1 9 6 1), 
P'v 1.
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"more royal than the king himself". This tendency among 
the Ishan has been noticed by a learned author, himself 
an Ishan, who says:
"Ask most Ishan men in Lagos where they come from and 
they would automatically say ’Benin’". (1)
Failure on the part of the eldest surviving son and sole
heir to perform the burial and funeral ceremony of his
deceased father: legal consequences
The failure of the eldest surviving son and sole
heir to carry out the burial and funeral rites of his
deceased father does not debar him from inheriting the
latter’s estate. But, if he wishes to have more than a
mere life interest in the inherited property, he must
perform the rites some time before his death. Should
he die without having performed them, the inherited property
passes not to his eldest surviving son, but to his next
2younger brother • If, however, he had improved the 
property during his enjoyment of it, his eldest sur­
viving son will be entitled to some compensation from the 
younger brother inheriting it.
1 Okojie, op .cit♦. p .41•
2 Egharevba, Benin law and custom, p.39; Bradbury,
(1957), P«77; Okojie, op.cit♦. pp.6 3 ,6 8  and 126;
Talbot, op.cit.. vol.Ill, p.590; Iyamuse Ehigie v. 
Gregory Ehigie. ibid..
3 Egharevba, loc.cit.
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The position of the deceased1s younger sons
As sole heir, the eldest surviving son is legally 
entitled to keep all the property he has inherited. In 
practice, however, he usually gives some share of the 
estate to his younger brothers, and even sisters; since 
all the children participate in the performance of their 
deceased father’s burial and funeral. His, however,
il­
ls a moral rather than legal obligation' ; and he nor­
mally will not give any worthwhile share to any of the 
younger children who has not substantially contributed
towards the expenses of the burial and funeral of their
2deceased father , This Banin, practice has been speci­
fically referred to, with approval, in Ehigie’s case ,^ 
where the president of the Benin grade "A" customary 
court observed:
H .... it is the usual practice for the eldest male child,, 
to... give his brothers and sisters who have made satis­
factory substantial contribution to the burial some share 
of the property* He has a discretion in the matter”* (4)
Similarly, the sole heir among the Ishan usually
1 Roth»(1903)* quoting Nyendael who says:HHe bestows no 
more on his younger brothers than what out of his 
bounty he pleases Jf Also, Cardi, ox? .cit .p .452. where 
he states: f,He is expected to act liberally with his
younger brothers; but there is no law on this point 
See further: Thomas, (1910). pt.l* p.66; Egharevba,
(1949)» pp.37-8; Talbot, on.cit.. vol.Ill, p.686; 
Ehigie’s case, ibid.
2 Okojie,. op .cit •» p.90; Ehigie’s case, ibid>: Eghayevba,
4 L1961J All N.L.R.842 at p.8h5; \19blJ W.N.L.R.307 at p.309
3
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distributes some part of his inherited property among 
those of his brothers who have helped with the performance
■i
of the burial and funeral rites of their deceased father .
The reasons underlying this practice are the eldest 
son’s desire to maintain harmony and co-operation with­
in the family; and the advisability of rewarding those 
younger children of the deceased who have joined in 
making his burial and funeral a successful and grand 
affair. A learned author puts the point in this way:
”In practice though the first son would be within his 
rights to inherit everything without sharing with any of 
his brothers, for the sake of peace and harmony in the 
family, he and he alone gave something reasonable to 
some of his brothers. It also paid him to do so, for 
during the burial ceremonies of their father all those 
who had or expected something in the way of inheritance , 
were bound to assist him with money, goats or even cows..”
No principle of representation
We have consistently employed the additional ad­
jective ’’surviving” in referring to the eldest son 
because we wish to stress the fact that it is the eldest 
son actually alive at the time of his father’s death who 
inherits; and that where an eldest son predeceases his father, 
the former’s eldest son - the deceased’s grandson - is
p
not an heir in his father’s stead • In other words,
1 Okojie, loc.cit♦
2 Implicit in the following authorities: Noth.(1905). 
p.97; Talbot, op ♦cit♦, vol.Ill, p p .684-6; Thomas, 
(1910). pt.l. pp.66-7, 78-80; Egharevba, (1949) p.38; 
Bradbury. (19571. pp .46-7 and 77; Okojie, loc.cit.: 
Ehigie’s case, ibid.
291
the pattern of succession now under consideration knows 
nothing of the principle of representation found among 
the Yoruba, under which a grandchild “benefits from the 
inheritance of his grandfather where the father pre- 
deceases the old man.
The deceased*s widows
Except for the gift of any property which may
have been made by the deceased husband to her, a widow
has no inheritance rights in respect of her husband's 
2
estate . As if her lack of such inheritance rights is
not'enough disability, she is generally required to marry
her deceased husband's sole heir. But the rules relating
to the right of the sole heir to take over his deceased
father's authority over the widows differ among the Bini
and the Ishan; the rules observed by tlie former group
being more equitable.
Among the Bini, any widow having surviving children
for the deceased is at liberty to return to her own family,
3and to marry any man of her own choice . The rationale
1 On this, see generally: Coker, Family property among
the Yoruba (1 9 5 8 ) ,  PP*45-6 and 123, and the authorities 
cited; Lloyd, lfSome notes on the Yoruba rules of suc­
cession". 11959] J.A.L.7 at p *2 3 ; Lloyd, Yoruba land law
1962 , p.297.
2 Roth. Great Benin (1903) p.97;Thomas, (1910) 11 J. Comp. 
Leg. (N.S.) 9b at p. 100; Egharevba, Benin law and custom 
(19U9) PP-38 and 7 6 ; Okojie, Ishan native laws and cus­
toms (i960) pp.92-3 .
3 Roth, G-reat Benin (1903) PP.37 and 97* and the authorities
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of this rule is that such a woman is regarded as having 
fulfilled her part of the conti'act of marriage, which
■I
is that she should hear children to her husband . On 
the other hand, any widow not having children by the 
deceased, or whose children all predeceased him, is 
under an obligation to marry his sole heir or refund
2
part of the bride price paid in respect of her marriage .
If the age and number of the widows to be taken 
over permit, it is usual for the sole heir to marry only 
one or two and leave the rest to some of his deserving 
and eligible younger brothers * Where he is young or the 
widows are glaringly older than himself, the usual 
arrangement is for an older relative - the deceased1s
3  quoted: Bennett, At the back of the black manfs
mind (1906) p.199; Thomas, Anthropological report 
on the Edo-speaking peoples ptVlV p p *50 and
58; Talbot, The peoples of southern Nigeria (1926) 
vol.Ill, p.685; Egharevba, op .cit.. pp*38 and 76; 
Bradbury, The Benin kingdom (1957) p.47* Egharevba 
states that a widow refusing to marry must refund 
the whole of the bride price. It is submitted,how­
ever, that in view of the decision in the J^ale 
(ibo) case of Okaludo v. Qmama [196(3 W.N.L.K.149, 
the bride price refundable will diminish according 
to the duration of the marriage between the widow 
and the deceased.
1 The present writer obtained this from an informantj 
Obaseki, <T. - a Bini - formerly president of the 
grade !,Atf customary court, Benin.
2 See footnote 3 on p.291*
3 Eghavevba. op.cit.. pp.38 and 76*
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younger brother, for instance - to marry the women on 
the understanding that he thereby assumes the res­
ponsibility of providing the heir with at least one
1wife of suitable age when the minor comes of age •
The Ishan rule on this point makes no distinction 
between the obligation to marry attaching to the child­
less widow and that borne by the widow, who has surviving 
children by the deceased: both categories are taken over
by the sole heir on pain of their having to refund
2part of the bride price , If the widow is, however, the 
daughter of a local potentate, the onogie, she is free 
to decide whether or not to marry her deceased husband’s 
sole heir^* The reason for this exception is that herihiha? 
who marries without having to pay any bride price, does 
not, as a corollary, receive any payment from the hus­
band of his daughter^".
As among the Bini, the Ishan sole heir gives some 
of his younger brothers the choice of taking over some 
of the widows . Similarly, if there is disparity between
1 Thomas, (1910)* ut.l. p.68.
2 Thomas, (1910)* pt.l. pp*79-60; Bradbury, (1957) *P*80: 
Okojie, op.cit** pp*91 and 102.
3 Okojie, op .cit.* pp*91 and 102, 
k Okojie, op.cit.* p. 103*
5 Okojie* op.cit.. p.91*
2 9 k
the age of the sole heir and that of the widows, an
older relative may, on mutual agreement, marry the
women; save that among the Ishan, the heir’s own mother
*1
will he covered under the mutual arrangement.
Ceremony marking; the taking over of the widow
No further bride price is paid by the new husband
in respect of his marriage with the widow. He is,
however, required to make the customary gifts of money
and drinks to the parents or guardian of the woman*
2This requirement is, however, not a legal one ; but is 
directed at maintaining and fostering the good will 
implied in the contract of marriage, more of an alliance 
between the families, rather than a mere union between 
two individuals* By far the most important requirement 
of the new marria ge, however, is the ceremony at which 
the new suitor slaughters an animal, usually a goat, at 
the ancestral shrine of the deceased’s family^* Until 
this ceremony is performed, the new suitor and the 
widow are not recognised as husband and wife^.
Among the Ishan, if a widow is not taken as wife in 
this ceremonial way within three months of her husband’s
1 Thomas, (1910) * nt*l*. n*80: Okojie, op*cit** p*91.
2 Okojie, op*cit** p.103*
3 Thomas, il91Q)* pt*l* p*50; Okojie, ibid*
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death, she is automatically released from any obliga- 
tiont arising out of her marriage with her late husband •
(2) The estate of a married man without male issue
Daughters normally have no rights of inheritance in 
respect of their deceased father’s estate, since other­
wise they may take away property from their own family 
to the families of their husbands * Thus, a learned 
author has observed:
tfA woman is never allowed to come from her husband’s 
place to inherit her father’s property • ••• In the laws 2 
of inheritance, therefore, the woman had no place ”
Where the deceased is the holder of a hereditary title, 
there is further justification for the exclusion of 
daughters from the inheritance: women do .not, as a rule,
aspire to titles; and there is need for the male re­
lative succeeding to the deceased’s title to use the 
inherited property in maintaining his new position and 
status•
The property, including any titles and offices, 
of a married man. without male issue, therefore, descends 
exclusively to his full brother , who must not, however,
1 Okojie, ibid,
2 Okojie, on,cit,, p.93. Cf* Thomas, (1910). nt.l. 
pp.66^78-80; Rowling, hand tenure in Benin Province 
X19U8), para. 65; Bradbury. (1957), nn.h7 and 77.
3 Thomas, loc.cit.: Talbot, on,cit.. pp .68^-6; Rowling 
loc.cit.; Bgharevba, Benin law and custom (l9U9)p.38;
• Okojie, loc.cit.
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1
be older than the dead man ; unless he happens to be
2
the only surviving relative .
With respect to his actual enjoyment of the in­
herited property, however, he is expected to be more 
liberal towards the other members of the family than 
would be the case where an eldest surviving son succeeds. 
In particular, informants-'say, he must give special 
consideration to the daughters of the deceased, his 
other younger brothers and any grown-up sons of those 
elder brothers who have been debarred from benefiting 
from the inheritance by reason of age. It is usual 
for him to give the deceased’s daughters some of the 
beads or other articles of feminine use and fbncy left 
by the deceased brother; and to treat any of them 
remaining unmarried as his own children by providing 
for them. As regards the deceased’s other younger 
brothers and the sons of his eldei* brothers, his best 
course is to waive some of his rights to marry his 
deceased brother’s widows in favour of these relatives. 
In respect of any cash coming to such heir by way.
1 Okojie, op.cit.. pp.120-1; cf. Bradbury, op.cit. 
pp and 50. This point has also been confirmed 
by the Oba of Benin.
2 Okojie, op .cit.. p. 121; also confirmed by the Oba 
of Benin.
3 The Oba of Benin and Obaseki, J., formerly president 
of the grade ’’A” customary court, Benin.
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inheritance, however, the information is that he may
*1 2keep this ; one informant adding that money is a rare
commodity to be retained by him for meeting unforeseen
demands, the refund of the bride price following the
dissolution of the marriage of any of the deceased’s
daughters, for example.
Failing a full brother*, the succession passes
exclusively to the nearest paternal oldest male relative
(generally not older than the deceased) - a half-brother,
x
uncle, nephew, cousin, etc., in that order of preference .
When an eldest surviving daughter may be a successor - 
the Ishan arebhoa
Among the Ishan, the deceased may alter the course 
of this male-biased pattern of succession by making his 
eldest daughter an arebhoa (also referred to as arhewa) 
when she then ranks as a son and inherits to the ex­
clusion of anyone else^.
Briefly, under this custom, a man having only
1 The Oba of Benin and Obaseki, J,, formerly president 
of the grade ,fA,f customary court, Benin.
2 Obaseki, J.
3 Thomas, Anthropological report on the Edo-speaking 
peoples ri9l6T> Pt .1, p"•66; OkoTie. op.cit.7 p.9Q.
b Thomas, (1910)* Pt.l. p.79; Thomas, (1910) 10. J.A.
S.l, at pp.7-8; Thomas, (1910) 11 J. Comp .Leg.(N .S.)
9b at p. 99; Rowling, op .cit.. para.6 5 ; Bradbury,
The Benin kingdom (1957) p.80; Okojie. op .cit. .pp.88. 
93 and 118.
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daughters may declare the eldest one an arebhoa.
Such an eldest daughter is not given in marriage but 
remains in her father’s house, where she entertains 
her lover or lovers; and bears children, who belong to 
her father, the eldest surviving male among whom takes 
over the property inherited by the arebhoa (their 
mother) from their maternal grandfather. It will have 
been noticed that although a woman has been accorded 
inheritance rights in this case, "she and all the
4
property did not leave the'family ". The reasons for 
the existence of this custom - which is now dying out ^  
have been given as the Ishan anxiety to perpetuate the 
family; and the need to retain property within the 
family, and especially to prevent it from being "seized" 
by the' traditional rulers (enigie) on failure of male 
issue
Where there are no male sumving relatives: rights of
the ruler - Oba or onogie
The property of a man dying without leaving any
known male relatives belongs to the local ruler: the 
. 3Oba or onogie . It should, however, be pointed out
1 Okojie, op .cit.. p.93*
1A Rowling, loc.cit.; Okojie, op.cit.. pp.89-90.
2 Okojie, op .cit.» pp. 88, 93-U*
3 Roth, . (1903)P *97; Thomas, (.1910)# pt.l» pp .67 and 
82; Talbot, op.cit.. vol.Ill, pp.685-6; Eghapevba,
(19A9). p.33; Okojie, op.cit.. pp.9^ 4 and 122.
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that as the village is organised on a kinship "basis, 
it is extremely unlikely to find the case of a man 
who is not survived by male relatives - blood or
-j
’'incorporated'1 . In any case, and, as has been aptly
pointed out by a learned author, "the property of a
o
man who has no visible heirs is rarely large" .
Under the old Ishan customary law, however, the 
term "dying without leaving male surviving relatives" 
had a special and restricted meaning: a man died
without leaving a male surviving relative if he left 
no surviving son; whereupon the chief (onogie) took 
his property.
Who are a man's children?
A man’s children, the eldest surviving male among 
whom normally succeeds him, may be legitimate or legi­
timated: the former are those born to him by his law­
fully married or betrothed wives; the latter are those 
born to him by unmarried women and in respect of whom 
he has acknowledged legal paternity, and has paid the 
necessary compensation to the families of the women
1 Thomas, (l910)» pt.l» p.67; Oko^ie, op.cit.» pp.9U 
and 122.
2 Thomas, (1910) pt.l. p*68.
3 Okojie, op .cit.♦ p.9h.
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concerned . It must, however, he horne m  mind that a 
child is nevertheless the legitimate issue of a man 
to whom its mother was married or betrothed at the time 
of its conception or, at any rate, its birth notwith­
standing that some other man might have been responsible
2
for the biological paternity •
A child born of a woman neither married nor betrothed 
is an illegitimate issue of its natural father; but a 
legitimate child of the woman’s father or, at all events, 
of the woman herself ♦ The natural father has no 
parental rights over such a child; and, conversely, it 
normally has no inheritance rights in respect of his 
estate unless he has acknowledged it and settled with the 
mother’s family^** Where, however, it is the only child 
of his putative father, such a child is permitted to in-
15
herit from hinr on the ground that such an unfortunate
1 Thomas, (1910)* nt.l. pp .50,65 and 67; Thomas, (1910)
10 J .A.S.l, at p. 6; Thomas, (1910) 11 J. Comp.Leg.
(N.S.) 94 at p.95; Talbot, on .cit.. vol.Ill, p.427; 
Egharevba,(1949). p.19; Okojie, on.cit.. pp.117-9.
2 Thomas, (1910). nt.1. p.48; Thomas (1910) 11 J.Comp.
Leg. (N.S.) 94 at p .9 6 ; Okojie, on.cit.. p. 118; also 
generally, the authorities cited in footnote 1 above.
3 Thomas, (1910). nt.l. p.50; Thomas,(1910) 11 J. Comp. 
Leg. (N.S.) , 94 at p .96; Talbot, loc .cit.: Eghatfevba, 
(1949), loc.cit.: Okojie, on .cit.. p.118.
4 Thomas, (1910) 11 JjCbmp. Leg. (N.S.), 94 at p.96; 
Bgharevba, (1949) loc.cit.: Okojie, on .cit. p.118
5 Thomas, (191C). nt.1. n .67: Thomas, (1910) 10 J.A.S.l
at p.6.
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position is tantamount to an act of God * Sometimes.,
as among the Ishan, a man may acquire legal paternity
in respect of a child born by an unmarried woman to another
man, who would not marry her, if the former marries her
and pays a rather stiff bride price to cover both the
2
marriage and thelegal paternity of the child *
The arebhoa (arhewa)custom found among the Ishan 
has been considered* It may, however, be recalled that 
under this custom, the children of the eldest daughter, 
who was made an arebhoa (arhewa), are affiliated to her 
father 5 and not to her lover who has been appropriately 
described as “merely a biological fD0N0R MT#^
Adopted children
A man not having children of his own may adopt a 
child, usually a member of his family, to be his heir^.
The elders of the family give consent to the adoption, 
which is marked by a ceremony in which an animal - usually 
a goat - is killed at the family ancestral shrine^*.
1 Oba of Benin*
2 Okojie, op.cit*. p.118*
3 Oko^ie, op *cit* * p .8 8.
k Okogie, op.cit** p.90; also1 generally, Thomas, (1910)
pt 1 , pp.89 .ff; and pp. 65 and 90 where he employs
the term “penal adoption" in referring to the traditional 
method of redress, whereby the murderer or a member of 
his family was transferred to the family of the murdered 
man.
302
The posthumous child; rights of inheritance
Whether a posthumous son may he his deceased father1© 
heir or not depends upon the date of his hirth and the 
time of the distribution of the estate. If he is born 
before the actual distribution takes place, he is heir 
provided that he is the eldest surviving son of the de­
ceased. On the other hand, if the distribution occurs 
before his birth, he is not heir; though the information 
is that in such a case, the practice is to postpone the
*1
distribution till he is born, and born alive I This is 
done so as to avoid both injustice to such a son and the 
liability to be divested of the inheritance that may be 
incurred by an heir who may have succeeded in the mean 
time.
The picture which has emerged from the foregoing 
account may now be briefly presented. Barring the case 
of the adopted child, we may say that the legitimate 
child acquires his status by the fact that his father has 
paid either the bride price of the marriage or the fee 
for the betrothal; while the legitimated child rises to 
his position by virtue of the natural father’s acknow­
ledgement of him as his child, and, above all, by his 
payment of the necessary compensation to the family of the
1 Oba of Benin *
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mother. The illegitimate child, on the other hand, is 
one in respect of whom no form of payment has been made 
and who normally enjoys no rights of succession to his 
putative father’s estate. Indeed, one cannot but agree 
with the observation of a learned writer, who has stated 
that bride price “purchases the right to children" *
The attitude of the court to the customary law governing 
legal paternity
The rules of the customary law relating to legal 
paternity, including the inheritance rights of the 
children flowing therefrom, outlined above must be viewed 
in the light of the statutory provisions governing the 
judicial enforcement of applicable customary law in 
general.
The statutory provisions controlling the enforce­
ment of the applicable rules of the customary law are
2contained not only in the High Court Law and the Magis­
trates’ Courts Law^, but also in the Customary Courts 
Law establishing the customary courts^1* under which 
customary law is denied enforcement where it is repugnant 
to natural justice, equity and good conscience, or is 
incompatible with any written law for the time being
1 Jeffreys, M.D.W.,uLobola is child-price“(l95l)
10 Afr. Stud.(Johannesburg) li+5 at p.ll|£.
2 Laws of the Western Region of Nigeria, 1959, cap .UU, s.*12.
3 Ibid. cap.7^> s.32.
^ Ibid. cap .31, s.19-
3 0 k
in force.' There is also the special provision contained
4
in the Evidence Act , which regulates the procedure in the
2
English type courts but not that m  the customary courts ,
by virtue of which a court may reject a rule of the
customary law when its enforcement will be contrary to
public policy. This provision reads:
... in the case of any custom relied upon in any judicial 
proceeding, it shall not be enforced as law if it is 
contrary to public policy.../1 (3)
In the case of Edet v» Essien^. decided at the 
Divisional Court at Calabar in the Eastern Region, Carey, 
J., expressed the view that the custom gearing legal 
paternity to the payment of bride price, irrespective of 
the man actually responsible for the biological paternity 
of a child, would not be enforced by the court (even if 
established) on the ground that such a custom would of­
fend the repugnancy principle. There, a woman was be­
trothed to the defendant when she was still a child. Sub-
1 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria and Lagos, 1958, 
cap.62.
2 Ibid. cap.62, s.l(^).
3 S.1^(3). See: Cole v. Akinyele and ors.(l960) V E. 
S.C.8U* where the claim of an acknowledged child under 
Yoruba customary law was expressly rejected by the 
Supreme Court of Nigeria on the ground of its being 
contrary to public policy. He was born to his putative 
father by a woman other than the wife the putative 
father had married under the Marriage Act; and during 
the subsistence of this Christian marriage. The Court 
did not, however, specifically refer to this section
of the Evidence Act.
4 (1932) 11 N.L.R.47.
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sequently and. with her consent and. that of her parents 
she married the plaintiff; with whom she lived there­
after, and for whom she had two children* The defendant 
claimed the children on the ground that they belonged to 
him by customary law, the betrothal fee he paid not 
having been refunded. The plaintiff sued for the return 
of the children. Both the Provincial Court and the Divisio­
nal . Court upheld the plaintiff’s claim, and rejected 
the defence as being repugnant to natural justice, 
equity and good conscience.
(3) Estate of a married woman
There is no rule that a woman must succeed a woman.
A deceased married woman’s children inherit her property
4
as joint heirs, the oldest son taking the largest share • 
Usually, the sons, especially the eldest?take the more 
valuable part of the estate - money, landed property, 
etc. - while the daughters share the personal effects, 
sucli as clothes, articles of adornment and household 
utensils.^
Where there are no surviving children: rights of her
family v. those of her husband
In default of children, a distinction is made
1 Thomas, (1910). pt.l. pp.68-9; Okojie, op .cit.. p.93; 
Eghapevba, (1949)T~P.39.
2 Thomas, ibid. p. 82; Bradbury, The Benin kingdom( 1957)
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in respect of the devolution of a married woman's estate, 
"between her ante-nuptial property, which goes back to 
her family; and her post—nuptial acquisitions which are
•j
inherited by her husband or his heir; • Egharevbd, that
2
generally accepted authority on Benin traditions , has, 
however, failed to bring out this distinction; and 
states that the husband always inherits where his wife is 
not survived by children . His statement of the Benin 
law is not supported by the Oba of Benin who, however, 
adds that any property given by the husband to such a 
wife reverts to him or his heir.
Property inherited by a husband from his wife in 
the circumstances indicated becomes his in the same 
manner as if he had personally acquired it; and on his 
death, is distributed along with his other forms of 
property in’ accordance with the rules discussed above.
In the case of a married woman's property reverting 
to her own kinsmen, the distribution is again carried 
out on lines■similar to those already considered; except 
that brothers and other male relatives inherit in place 
of sons, while sisters and other female relatives take 
in place of daughters«
1 Thomas, ibid. p.6 9 .
2 See for instance, Begum, C., "Great Benin" (i9 6 0) 66 
Nigeria 103 at p.105.
3‘. Eghavevba, op .cit.. p.38.
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(4) The estate of an unmarried person
The rules governing the distribution of the estate 
of an unmarried person are not dissimilar from those 
applying to the succession to married persons discussed 
above. It must be observed that the fact that a person 
remains unmarried does not necessarily imply that he 
must die without being survived by children, and legi­
timate ones too. Enough, it is hoped, has been said in 
the section on legal paternity to malce it clear that 
celibacy does not constitute an absolute bar to the 
having of legitimate children. Consequently, an unmar­
ried man may be survived by children whose paternity he 
may have acknowledged, and in respect of whom he may have 
made the necessary payments. In the case of an unmar­
ried woman, any children she may have had are her legiti­
mate issue and, probably also, the legitimate issue of 
her father. The inheritance rights of such children 
£i.e. those born out of customary wedlockj are, as has 
been pointed out, clearly recognised.
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RULES OP DISTRIBUTION IN TYPE "B" SOCIETIES -
IBP AND IVBIOSAKON
The rules of distribution that will be examined are those 
in respect of the estates of the following persons, 
namely:
(1) a married man survived by children born by one wife;
(2) a married man survived by children born by different
wives;
(3) a married man leaving no male issue;
(4) a married woman; and
(5) an unmarried person.
(1) The ‘estate of a married man survived by children born 
by one wife
When a married man dies, leaving children of both 
sexes born to him by one and the same wife, the eldest 
son inherits to the exclusion of all others; but with 
the obligation to provide for his younger brothers and
-I
unmarried sisters.
1 Thomas.Anthropological report on Ibo-speaking peoples 
(1914). pt .IV. pp .127-9 and 143: Talbot. The peoples
of southern Nigeria (19 2 6). vol.Ill, p p .086-7 ; Basden, 
G.T., Among the Ibos (1921), pp.32 and 85; Basden, 
Niger Ibos (1938). p p .267-8 and 277; Meek, Law and 
authority in a Nigerian tribe (1937), p*320; Jones,
G.I., lfIbo land "tenure" (1949) 9 19 Afr. 309 at p.315; 
Esenwa, F.E., "Marriage customs in Asaba Division" 
(1948), 13 Nigerian Field 71 at p.80; Forde, D., 
and Jones, G.J., The Ibo and Ibibio-speaking peoples
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This means that he steps into his deceased father's 
shoes, taking his house, land and other property and, 
of course, his obligations too. But, as will be shown 
more fully when we deal with the duties of the heir or 
successor, he is not obliged to give his brothers and 
unmarried sisters any specified proportion of the estate. 
Generally speaking, he keeps the substantial part of the 
property to himself and, depending on how onerous his 
legal duty of maintaining the younger ones (as the new 
head of the family) is, he may distribute the rest of the 
property among his younger brothers and unmarried sisters 
in decreasing shares according to their relative ages 
and the part they played in their father's mortuary rites. 
One of the reasons for the wide discretion enjoyed by 
the eldest son in deciding whether to keep all the 
inheritance, or to give part of it to his younger brothers 
and unmarried sisters lies in the cohesion-possessed by 
children born of one mother. As a learned author has 
observed: "...full brothers seldom quarrel with one
another on matters of inheritance".
1 .......(1950), pp.20-21; Chubb, L.T., Ibo land tenure
(1 9 6 1) para. 101; Obi, The Ibo law of property (19&5) 
pp *154-5; Thomas, Anthropological report on the Edo- 
spealcing peoples (1910)> pt .1, p .74; Bradbury , The 
Benin kingdom, p.9 6 .
2 Meek, op .cit., p.324; see also. Green, M.M., Land 
tenure in an Ibo village (1941) 9 P •14*
310
The deceased's widow
The deceased's widow, his children's mother, does 
not inherit from him. Her exclusion from the inheri­
tance is based on the fact that, the pattern of marriage 
being exogamous, she has not that blood relationship 
with her deceased husband which, in general, determines 
who are to be the heirs of a deceased person.
The death of her husband does not automatically 
dissolve the bonds of the marriage. She is still regarded 
as the wife of the deceased; and his rights over her 
are taken over, in this case, by her deceased husband's 
brother, since no son, of course, marries his own 
mother.
(2) The estate of a married man survived b.v children 
born by different wives 
The estate of an Ibo man leaving children born of
1 Thomas, Anthropological report on the Edo-speaking 
peoples (1910), pt.l, pp.69-70; Thomas, "Notes on 
some Ibo burial customs", (1917) 47 J.R.A.I., 163 
at p.198; Basden, Among the Ibos (1921) pp .32 and 85;
Basden, Niger Ibos (1938) pp.215 and 422; leek, op.
cit., pp.99* 142,r144 and 321; Leith-Ross, African 
women (1938), pp.93-4 and 102; Esenwa, "Marriage 
customs in Asaba Division" (1948) 13 Nigerian Field 
71 at p.74; Bradbury, op.cit.. p.96; Obi, The Ibo 
lav/ of property (1 9 6 3), pp.155 and 186.
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two or more wives is distributed, according to "houses”,
the sons of each wife constituting a "house" and unit
2of distribution . The subsequent division of the shares 
received by individual, groups of sons becomes an indoor 
Hiatter among the sons of each house or wife on considera­
tions of age and need. This point has been vividly 
made by a learned writer in respect of the division of 
land among the Ibo, who states:
"In the case of a man who has a number of wives with 
surviving children his lands are divided into as many 
shares as there are wives with surviving sons• The 
share of each of these sub-families is then divided 
again if need be between the individual sons who compose 
it.” (3)
The position among the Ivbiosakon is similar to 
that of the Ibo except that a wife having only daughters 
constitutes a "house" for the purpose of distribution; 
though the daughters are allowed a share of movable 
property only.^-
It will have been observed that, although the wives 
themselves receive no direct benefits from the intestate
2 Thomas, Anthropological report on Ibo-sneaking peoples 
(1914)f pt.IV, p.127; Jones, "Ibo land tenure(19U9) 
19 Afr. 309 at p.315; Ardener, IS.W., "The kinship 
terminology of a group of southern Ibo", (195U) 2^ 
Afr. 85 at p.88-89; Ardener. "Lineage and locality 
among the Mba-Ise Ibo" (1959) 29 Afr. 113 at p.115; 
Obi, op .cit..t»p.156.158 and 176.
3 Jones, loc.cit.; see also, Ardener, (1959) 29 Afr.
113 at p 7llB.
k Thomas, (1910)» pt.l, pp.73-5; Bradbury, op.cit.,p .97.
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succession of the husband, the number of primary shares 
into which the estate is carved is determined by the number 
of those of them having surviving children, in the case 
of the Ivbiosakon; and those with surviving sons among 
the Ibo* In the latter society, the unenviable lot 
of a wife having only daughters has been pathetically 
expressed by a writer thus: "•.. her door is closed ...
A
her path is lost.”
The rights of the eldest son
In recognition of his new responsibilities, which
will be examined later, the eldest son takes his father’s
2dwelling house , the largest portion of any land that 
may have been left by his deceased father-' and, in addi­
tion, has a claim to certain specific items of his 
father's propert^. These special items of property 
include such things as the deceased's gun, spear, hat,
1 Ardener, (1954) 24 Afr. 85 at p.89*
2 Thomas, (1914). pt.IV, pp.127 ff; Rowling, hand tenure
in Benin Province "(1948) para. 99; Bradbury, The Benin 
kingdom (1957) P .97: Obi. op.cit., pp.172 ff; Chief
H.H.A. Esegie (ivbiosakon).
3 Thomas, (1910)♦ pt .1, pp.71-4; Meek, op.cit.. p.322; 
Harris, 11944; lh Afr * 302 at p.326; Jones, HIbo land
tenure11 (1949) 19 Afr. 309 at p.315; Ardener, (1954)
24 Afr. 85 at p.88; Green, Land tenure in an Ibo 
village (1941), pp .12-14; Obi ♦ op.c'it ♦.' p p  .176  ff ♦
4 Meek, op.cit., p.322; Obi, op .cit., p.176.
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walking-stick, etc.; and their being reserved for him 
is designed to help establish his authority as the new 
head of the family. It must, however, be stressed that 
only one article out-of a specific item is reserved for 
the eldest son. It follows that where the deceased 
father has left two or more of a specific item - say, 
several guns - the eldest son may claim one only, leaving 
the others to be distributed along with the other assets
•i
of the estate.
When a daughter may inherit as a son - the Ibo custom of 
idegbe (ideb.w;e>)
It is a general rule among the Ibo that a daughter 
does not inherit from her father. Among the Ibo of the 
Asaba district, however, a man having only daughters
o
may declare the eldest among them an idegbe (ideb .w e: \ . 
when she then ranks as a son and inherits according to the 
rules discussed above. It will have been noticed that 
this custom is the Ibo equivalent of the Ishan arebhoa 
(arhewa) already considered. Like the Ishan practice, 
the idegbe (ideb we-1) is not given in marriage; but lives 
in her father's house where she entertains her suitor,
1 Among the Ivbiosakon, however, he is entitled to all 
articles of dress or personal adornment which the 
deceased was in the habit of using as everyday wear: 
Chief H.H.A. Esegie.
2 Thomas, (1914). pt.IV. pp.5* 60-61, 79t 128 and 130-1; 
Rowling, loc .cit.
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and raises children who are affiliated to her father - 
the idea being for her to pass the inheritance to the 
eldest son she may eventually have.
The existence of this custom among the Asaba Ibo 
has been credited to their proximity with the Yoruba of 
the Western Region, where women enjoy practically the 
same inheritance rights as men . With respect, it must 
be pointed out that there is no evidence of a Yoruba 
custom corresponding to the Ibo idegbe (idebwe), nor 
does the geographical position occupied by the Ibo justi­
fy the contention that they are in close proximity with 
2the Yoruba* . In point of fact, and barring the enclave
within the Ibo area inhabited by the people of Yoruba
stock, whose customs have long been assimilated to those
of the Ibo; the area occupied by the Asaba Ibo is
farther from Yorubaland than the comparative positions
2of the other ethnic groups in the Mid-Western Region . 
Furthermore, this view about the origin of idegbe seems 
to have lost sight of the fact that an identical custom 
was detected among a group of Ibo far away in the Eastern 
Region, by the .great missionary pioneer, Basden;^ and
1 Obi, op .cit.. p.185.
2 See map attached to this work and referred to as 
appendix 1.
3 Basden, Among the Ibos. (1921) p.76; Basden, Niger Ibos 
(1938) p.226.
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this has been recently confirmed by the committee set 
up by the Eastern Regional Government to inquire into 
the custom of bride price • Another author, who investi­
gated the Ibo system, has suggested that the idegbe 
custom must have spread into the Asaba district from the
neighbouring Ishan area, where the similar practice of
2
arebhoa is found « While one may not readily disagree
with this eminently sensible suggestion, one must bear
in mind the observation of a learned author that "legal
historians have not found any universally common origin 
to the law of succession.*.." (3)
The deceased * s widows
It has already been noted that a widow does not 
inhei*it from her husband, and that she is required to 
marry one of his kinsmen* The rules regulating the 
taking over of the widows are flexible: much, however,
depends upon the number of wives; the ages of both the 
widows and the prospective suitors (i.e. the deceasedfs sons); 
and the marital status of the latter* As a general rule, 
however, the tendency is for the eldest son to take the 
youngest widow, leaving the older ones (including his
1 Eastern Nigeria Government Printer, Report' of the Committee
. ■ ** * \ /- A ■ '... I ■ * I  ^  1 Hi ..........  -II -Ilf I* II  I in* I .MW.U iffiUB
on bride price* (1955) para.62.
2 Thomas, Cl9lllT» Pt.IV. p.5**  naaim'nuii.hmU finrrw . nnMmi /  ~
3 Parry, The law of succession (1961), i+th edn., p.l.
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A
mother) for his more mature uncles. But, if the
disparity in age does not forbid such a course, the
eldest son may give his younger brothers the choice of
marrying some of the widows other than their own mothers.
Any widow refusing to marry her new suitor is liable
to refund part of the bride price paid in respect of
2her marriage with the deceased. It matters not whether 
she has surviving children for her deceased husband or 
not; and as long as she has not refunded the appropriate 
amount of bride price, she is still legally the wife 
of the deceased. The rule stated is subject to local 
variation among two Ivbiosakon communities, who follow 
the Bini rule whereby widows having surviving children 
for the deceased are permitted to return to their own 
families; without the necessity of having to refund any 
bride price.
Some of the widows, usually very old ones, may,
1 Thomas, (1917) 47 J.H.A.I., 163 at p.198; Basden 
(1921) p.85; Basden, (1938). pp.213 and 422; Meek,
Law and authority in a Nigerian tribe (1937), pp.99, 
11^ 2, iljir~and 321; heith-Ross. African women (1938) 
PP*93-4 and 102; Esenwa, (194$) 13 Nigerian Field,
71 at p.74; Obi, op.cit. p.186.
2 Meek states that some rejected suitors often^ refrain 
from' demanding the refund of bride price in the hope 
of laying claim to any children subsequently born to 
other men by the widows; and that this led to the 
passing of a bye-law in Nsukka Division to compel such 
rejected suitors to accept the refund of bride price: 
Meek, op .cit., p.284.
3 Thomas. (1910). p t .1. p.70; Confirmed by informants, 
Chief H.H.A. Esegie and Mr C.O. Obadan.
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with the approval of the deceased’s family, remain in
the late husband’s house without marrying any of his
relatives; and may, acting discreetly and with the
acquiescence of the family, have sexual relations with
one of the male relatives of the husband, and thus live
1a normal married lif e .
Ceremony marking widow-marriage
A special ceremony is performed before the new 
suitor and the widow become husband and wife. The 
Ivbiosakon follow the Ishan and Bin! practice under 
which the new suitor provides a goat v/hich is slaughtered
p
at the family ancestral shrine ; while among the Ibo,
it is sufficient if he procures a chicken and/or palm
■3
wine for the same purpose .
Who are a man’s children?
A man’s children may be legitimate, such as those 
born by his lawfully married or betrothed wife during 
the subsistence of the marriage or binding agreement to
1 Meek, op .cit.. pp.2Bk9 321-2; Obi, op .cit.. p.187*
2 G*0* Obadan.
3 Meek, op .cit., p.28U; Thomas (1917)> U7 J.R.A.I. 
163 at p .205; Obi, op .cit.« p p .186-7 •
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marry (betrothal) ; or they may be legitimated such as
those who, though not born legitimate, have nevertheless
2been acknowledged, by him ; or, finally, they may be 
illegitimate, such as the offspring of an irregular 
union, and in respect of whom he has done nothing towards 
his recognition of their legal paternity.
A manfs heirs are generally his legitimate and 
legitimated sons. But it must be emphasised that, 
as a general rule, an adulterine child does not belong 
to its natural father; he has no claim enforceable at 
law to take possession of the child, which is affiliated 
to the lawful husband of its mother . For, as Basden 
has expressed the point: "The child is born to hist**©*
the lawful husband* sj wife, and that is the argument 
that counts".^
1 Thomas, (1914). pt. IV. p. 131; Basden, (1921). p.76; 
Basden, (1938). p .226; Meek, op.cit.. pp .97*267 and 
283-4: Talbot, op.cit.. vol.Ill, p.427; Harris, 
(1944), 14 Afr. 302 at p.325; Forde and Jones, The 
Ibo and Ibibio-speaking peoples (1950), pp.17-18; 
Green.' Ibo village affairs (1947) pp. 70 and 156; 
Leith-Ross, op.cit.. p.103; Esenwa, op .cit.. 71 at 
P*73; Jeffreys, "Lobola is child-price , (1951)
10 Afr. Stud. (Johannesburg) 145 at pp.146 and 165;
Obi , The Ibo lav/ of property (1 9 63)* PP*75» 190 -1.
2 Esenwa, op .cit.. 71 at p,.73; the kwale-Ibo case of
Jirlgho v . Anamali Q.95 8j W .N .L .R. 195, esp . at p.l97«
3 Basden, Among the Ibo (1921), p.76; Basden, Niger Ibos 
(1938), p.226.
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From the foregoing discussion, it will have been 
observed that the legal significance of the payment of 
bride price in the matter of legitimacy and the affilia­
tion of children is that it establishes the right of the 
husband to children born by his wife during the subsistence
of the marraige; irrespective of the man actually res-
*1
ponsible for their biological paternity • This was the
reason for the existence of the practice among the Ibo,
2which is now dying out , whereby an impotent or sick man
might permit his wife to have extra-marital relations,
in the hope that any resulting children would belong
to him by virtue of the bride price he paid in respect
3of his marriage with the woman concerned.
As regards Ivbiosakon law on this point, however, 
informants say that the rule gearing legal paternity of 
a child to the payment of bride price* irrespective of 
the claims of the biological father, is not generally 
observed today; on the ground that events have shown 
that such a child usually leans more towards the family 
of its natural father than towards that of its legal 
father^.
1 Bride price has been appropriately described as "child- 
price": Jeffreys, (1951) 10 Afr. 8tud.(Johannesburg),
145 at p.146.
2 No doubt, because people are beginning to realise that 
children born in such circumstances are more favourably 
disposed to the family of their putative father.
3 OS Esenwa, loc.cit.
4 Chief H.H.A. Esegie and C.O. Obadan.
320
A woman’s children
A woman’s children are, of course, the legitimate 
issue of her father or guardian, or at any rate, of the
woman herself; and this is so whether she is married or
single. The legal status of the children of an eldest
daughter made an idegbe (i deb we) among the Ibo - they are
affiliated to her father - has already been considered.
WOMAN-TO-WOMAN MARRIAGE: AFFILIATION OF CHILDREN OP
SUCH MARRIAGE
Among the Ibo, a barren woman may, if she is rich
enough, "marry" a "wife" whom she gives to her husband;
and if this second wife bears children, they are regarded
as the legitimate children born by the barren wife to 
■1
her husband *
i
In the case of a barren unmarried woman, she may 
contract a "marriage" with a younger girl to whom she 
subsequently allows a male proxy to have access, the
p
resulting children belonging to the "female" husband .
The custom of woman-to-woman marriage was always 
officially frowned upon especially when it became known 
that it was being used as a method of investment by
1 Thomas, (l91k) * ~pt.IV. pp*60, 83* 130-1; Meek, 
op.cit.. p.275*
2 Meek, loc .cit,.
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"female"husbands, who hired out the young girls married 
in this way to numerous men on payment of entertainment
A
fees . There is no doubt that the courts will today 
declare such a custom as being repugnant to natural 
justice, equity and good conscience.
Judicial attitude to the customary law governing legal 
•paternity
What has been said in connection with the Ishan and
Benin rules determining legal paternity, as well as the
limitations imposed by the general law on these customary
rules, applies with equal force to the relevant Ibo and
2
Ivbiosakon rules • In particular, the custom of woman- 
to-woman marriage and that by which an impotent or 
sick husband is enabled to claim the ad/ulterine children 
of his wives will not find favour with the courts; which 
will take the view that such customs clearly offend the 
repugnancy principle , and are also contrary to public 
policy.^
1 Esenwa, op.cit.. 71 at p.7U* For the official atti­
tude, see: Lugard, F.D., The Dual Mandate (1929),
p.387; noted by Jeffreys, in 10 Afr. Stud.(1951)
(Johannesburg) lk5 at p.l6U.
2 See pp. 299-305 for a discussion of the Ishan and Benin ruk
3 See: the following statutory provisions: the High
Court Lav/, cap.ljA, s.12; Laws of the Western Region of 
Nigeria (1959); the Magistrates1 Courts Law, cap.7^*
s.32, ibid; the Customary Courts Lav/, cap. 31, s .19. ibid. 
See p.JOifJ also the Evidence Act, cap .62, s .l4( 3); cf.
Cole v. Akin.yele and ors. (i960) V F.S.C.84.
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As regards the right.of the family of the deceased to a 
child born by his widow to a stranger, however, the case
A
of Amachree v. Goodhead , decided by the Divisional Court 
at Degema in the Rivers Province of the Eastern Region, 
would seem to suggest that such a claim will be upheld 
by the courts* In that case, the question for decision 
was whether a child, born after the death of her mother's 
husband to a non-member of his (husband's) family, be­
longed to the family into which its mother had married; 
or whether it belonged to the family of its mother, the 
putative father advancing no claim whatsoever* The back­
ground facts were briefly as follows: in 1907, a native
court awarded the custody of the child to the chief and 
head of the deceased husband's family, the respondent 
in this suit. In 1916, the respondent allowed the child 
and its mother to visit the child's maternal grandmother 
and stay with her for a while; but before giving his 
permission, the respondent obtained a written declaration 
from the grandmother acknowledging the right of the res­
pondent's family in respect of the child. It stayed 
with the grandmother for six years at the end of which 
she refused to return it to the respondent. Thereupon, 
he sued again in the native court, claiming the recovery
1 (1923) k N.L.R.101.
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of the child; and the court restored custody to him.
An application for an order for a writ of habeas 
corpus in respect of the child,at the time in custody of 
the respondent, was then made by the sister of the 
mother to the Divisional Court. It was argued for the 
applicant that the judgement of the native court amounted 
to giving judicial recognition to a form of slave dealing 
transaction; that the document signed by the child’s 
grandmother was worthless as it attempted to place both 
the child and its mother in a state of servitude; that 
the mother ceased to belong to the respondent’s family 
and reverted to her own family after hex* husband’s death; 
and that, in any case, the respondent’s claim was repug­
nant to natural justice•
Berkeley, Ag.J., rejected the argument of counsel 
for the applicant and dismissed the application; ob­
serving that he could not uphold the contention that 
giving custody to the respondent was ’’repugnant either to
■I
natural law or humanity”.
2The case of itoahree v. G-oodhead must be regarded 
as having been decided on its special facts * In parti­
cular, the written declaration signed by the applicants
1 Ibid, at p.102.
2 Tl9.23) k N.L.R.101.
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mother*unequivocally recognising the respondent’s right 
over the child*was enough to conclude matters. That 
the existence of such a written declaration, coupled with 
subsistence of two decisions of the native court in 
favour of the respondent, greatly influenced the Judgement 
of the Divisional Court is evident in the remarks made 
by the learned judge, when he said:
tf0n the other hand, the native law and custom on the 
subject is clearly indicated by the two Native Court 
decisions and the written admission of the maternal 
gr andmo the r* * (1)
Furthermore, no pronouncement was made on the right of 
the natural father in respect of the child, if any; he 
having advanced no claim, as has already been pointed 
out •
The posthumous child: rights of inheritance
The rules governing the inheritance rights of the
posthumous son among the Ibo are similar to those already
2considered in connection with the Bini and Ishan . The 
only point of difference is that where the posthumous 
son is the only son of his mother, he constitutes a
"house" or unit of inheritance; and inherits as a joint
. ^ heir .
1 Ibid* at p.102#
2 Chapter eight.
3 G.C. Onochie, an Asaba Ibo, Customs Officer, Sapele, 
Mid-Western Region of Nigeria.
325
Principle of representation
The point falling for consideration here is the 
place," in the scheme of inheritance, of an eldest son 
of a son who predeceases the person to whom he would 
have succeeded* Does the eldest son of such an heir- 
apparent predeceasing his benefactor take in the former’s 
(his father’s) stead under the principle of representation? 
The Ivbiosakon and Ibo rules differ on this point, and 
will accordingly be treated separately.
Among the Ivbiosakon, there is no principle of 
representation; and the eldest son of an heir dying 
before the person from whom he would have benefited does 
not inherit in the father’s stead. Indeed, one infor­
mant has expressed the view that it would be unjust for 
the eldest son of such an heir-apparent predeceasing his 
benefactor to take, since that would mean that he inherited 
twice over: first, he took the whole or substantial
part of the estate of his own father, when the latter 
died; second, he now seeks to inherit the property of 
the person to whom his father would have been heir had 
he lived long enough.
As regards the Ibo rule, however, opinions are 
divided. According to Thomas, who investigated the Ibo
1 Chief H.H.A. Esechie
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customary law, where the eldest son predeceases his 
father, the inheritance passes to the next senior sur­
viving son; and not to the eldest son of the deceased 
son. On the other hand, a recent author has taken the 
opposite view, which he has stated as follows:
tf... where an heir-apparent predeceases the man he was 
to succeed, his own eldest son .... will succeed in 
his stead under the principle of representation...(2).. 
a man is not dead, for the purposes of intestate succes­
sion, if he has a son living." (3)
Thomas1s account is to he preferred to the view of 
the recent writer, not only because the former’s state­
ment is backed by the result of actual investigation of 
the customary law; but also because it is supported 
by the mode of devolution of the Ibo of9 (a sacred stick
symbolic of the authority of the head of the family) again,
as recorded by someone who had undertaken field investi­
gation of the Ibo customary law^. Besides, considering 
his age - he belongs to the second generation - it is 
difficult to see how he could discharge some of the 
onerous duties and obligations which, as we shall see, 
succession implies. That the heir in such a case is 
the next senior son alive receives further support from 
the fact that, besides succeeding to property, it is
1 Thomas, Anthropological report on Ibo-speaking 
peoples "fl 914)7 P t .IV, p.219.
2 Obi, The Ibo law of property (1963), p.154*
3 Obi, op.cit.. p.137.
4 Meek, Law and authority in a Nigerian tribe (1937),
pp .1 0 6 and 322 . "
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also customary that he should take over the deceased’s 
wives; and provide maintenance for them as well as for 
any other dependants of the deceased. The merit in 
this view is that the fund for maintenance then comes 
quite naturally from the property inherited by the heir.
(3) The estate of a married man leaving no male issue
In default of sons, the property of a married
man goes to the eldest surviving full brother ; except
that among the Ivbiosakon, such a full brother must not
2
be older than the deceased • The position of the de­
ceased’s daughters, especially the eldest one, requires 
some comment. Among the Ibo, it is a rigid rule, as 
we have seen, that a daughter has no inheritance rights 
in respect of the estate of her father, unless the latter 
makes her an idegbe (idebwe). This rule does not, of 
course, preclude the full brother who succeeds from 
giving the deceased’s daughters some of the property he 
has inherited. Among the Ivbiosakon, however, the
1 Thomas, (1914). pt.IV. p.129; Basden, Among the 
Ibos (1921), p.32; "Basden, Niger Ibos (1936), 
pp.267-8; Thomas, (1910). pt.l. pp . £9 ff; cf. 
Bradbury, The Benin kingdom (1957)» p.97; Green, 
(1941)* p.13; Obi, o p . c i t pp.154-9•
2 Bradbury, loc.cit. This is confirmed by informants: 
Chief H.H.A.Esechie and C.O. Obadan, Esq.
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deceased’s eldest daughter is entitled to receive some
a
of the "beads, livestock and money left by her father *
Failing full brothers, the next heir among the Ibo
is apparently the father of the deceased, and not the 
2half-brother . The reason for this preference among the 
Ibo has been stated as being based on the ground that 
the old man is thereby afforded the wherewithal to marry 
another wife; and so found another branch of the family. 
This view is probably also supported by the Ibo rules 
of inheritance which, unlike those observed by the Ishan, 
Bini and Ivbiosakon already referred to, do not exclude 
from the succession relatives older than the deceased 
himself^*. It should, however, be pointed out that this 
order of preference favouring the deceased’s father at 
the expense of his half-brother may well be reversed 
if the latter undertakes the performance of the whole or 
the substantial part of his deceased’ brother’;s burial and
R
funeral •
If the deceased is not survived by a father or 
half-brothers, the succession passes to the nearest
1 Bradbury, loc.cit.. This is confirmed by informants: 
Ghief H.H.A. Esechie and C.O. Obadan, Esq.
2 Obi, op .cit.. pp.157 and 159•
3 Ibid. p.157.
4 Thomas, (1914). pt.IV. pp.129 and 130; Gf. Obi, op .cit. 
pp. 154-9.
5 Thomas, (1914). Pt IV. pp.128-9; cf. Obi, op .cit... 
pp. 154-9.
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paternal relative - uncle, nephew or cousin; or even the 
he'ad of the family - the Ibo rule making no distinction 
as to whether the inheritor is older or younger than 
the man he is to succeed*
In the absence of full-brothers, the order of pre­
ference among the Ivbiosakon is stated to be: half- 
brothers, uncles, nephews and oldest patrilineal relative 
of the deceased; who must not, however, be older than 
the deceased, and who must give a share of the movables
(beads, livestock, money, etc.) to the eldest daughter -
2of the deceased *
When a relative older than the deceased may be heir
In one instance, aielative may still be heir of 
the deceased notwithstanding that the latter was his 
younger kinsman. This occurs when the order of pre­
ference has been observed up to the line of male paternal
relatives stretching as far as third cousins; and no
2eligible heir is found . An older near patrilineal 
blood relation of the deceased - a father or an uncle,
for instance - then takes by virtue of the rule expressed 
in the maxim "ofede” or "ogbuli" : meaning that, there
1 Thomas, (191U)» pt.IV* pp.129 and 130; Obi, 
pp.i5ii.-5 and 159.
2 Chief H.H.A. Esechie and Mr C.O. Obadan.
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being no younger kinsman to inherit, the inheritance
-J
has rolled on to the olden relative*
Where remoter relatives (half-brothers, nephews» etc.) 
were horn of different mothers: principle of joint
inheritance.
Where the deceased*s remoter relatives, such as 
half-brothers, nephews and others, are children of the 
same mother, the eldest among the class of these rela­
tives inherits as sole heir on the lines indicated above. 
Where, however, they were born of different mothers (as 
is normally the case in a polygamous or composite family)?
they tahe as joint heirs under the principle of joint 
2succession which is observed in the distribution 
of the estate of a man survived by sons born to him by 
different women, discussed, earlier in this -chapter.
Where there are no visible blood relatives
We may repeat what has been said in the chapter on the 
Ishan and Bini with respect to the destination of the 
estate of an hairless man; and say that it is exceedingly 
rare to find the case of a man dying without leaving
1 Chief H.H.A.Esechie and Mr 0.0. Obadan.
2 Obi, The Ibo law of propecfc.v (19&3)» p. 157*
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known relatives and that, in any ease, the property of
A
such a man is unlikely to he substantial .
Where a man dies without being survived by any
blood relatives, his estate is inherited by the head of
his community, the village or town; who also sees to
it that the deceased is accorded a burial and funeral
2befitting his station in life ,
(4) The estate of a married woman
The estate of a deceased married woman is inherited 
by her children as joint heirs . But as the use to 
which property is put often determines its manner of 
devolution^, articles of clothing and personal adornment 
and household utensils gvC.. to the daughters ; while 
any immovable property and money she may have.left are
taken by the eldest son, who, however, must provide for
6his younger brothers and unmarried sisters *
1 Chapter eight* pp.298 and 299.
2 Thomas, Anthropological report on the Edo-speaking 
peoples, pt.l. p.70.
3 Thomas, (1910). pt.l. p.70; Thomas, (191U) pt.IV. 
pp. llil- 3; Bas den. (19 21). p.90; Basden, ( 19387T" 
p.208; Meek, op .cit.. pp.100, 203 and 323; Chubb,
Ibo land tenure (19fel). para. -1+1; Bradbury, The Benin 
kingdom (1957) p .97; Obi, op .cit.. pp. 190 ff.
!(. Cf. Lowie, H., Primitive society (1921), p.232.
5 Thomas, (1910). pt.l. loc.cit.; Thomas, (191U)* pt.IV. 
loc.cit; Meek, loc.cit; Obi, "loc .cit.
6 See generally, the authorities referred to in footnote 
5 above; and also the following: Esenwa, (19^ 4-8) 13
. Nigerian Field, 71 at p.80; Jones*(19U9) 19 Afr.309 
at pp.313-6; Forde and Jones, The Ibo and Ibibio-speaking 
peoples. (1950) pp.20-21.
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Failing children, any property owned by her before 
marriage - her ante-nuptial property - reverts to her own 
family; while any subsequent acquisitions - post-nup­
tial property - devolve upon her husband or, if he be
•i
dead, his heir • Meek, however, also states that the
husband always takes in default of children, on the
ground that it is only in this way that he is compensated
2m  respect of an unproductive bride price . With res­
pect, this view is not only unsupported by the views
A
of other writers on Ibo law referred to above ; but is
in direct conflict with the expert evidence given by
half-a-dozen chiefs on Onitsha (ibo) customary law in
the case of Nwugege v, Adigwe and anor. decided by the
Divisional Court* Besides, the author appears to have
contrdicted himself when he later on says:
"...purely feminine property would be handed to her Li.e. 
the childless married woman’s] sisters1' (2);
a practice which clearly recognises the claim of the
deceased woman’s relatives to her ante-nuptial property
usually represented by such "purely feminine property"*
It may, however, be observed that the valuables among
1 Thomas, (1914)» Pt.IV* pp .142-3; Meek, op .cit.*
pp.203* 323-4; Chubb, loc .cit: Obi, op .cit.. pp.71 ff,
192 Nwugege v. Adi awe and anor .(1934) 11 N.L.R..134*
2 Meek, op .cit.. p.323*
3 (1934) 11 N.L.3R. 134*
333
a married woman’s "purely feminine property" are in­
variably provided for her by her mother either before
•i
or at the time of the marriage *
The ante-nuptial property of a deceased woman
reverting to her own kinsmen is divided on lines similar
to those in respect of the distribution of the estate of
a married man leaving no children; except that her
articles of feminine use are inherited by her full sister,
half-sister or, failing these, her nearest male paternal
2relation in that order .
Her post-nuptial property devolving on her husband 
falls into the same category as his personally acquired 
property; and, on his death, is distributed in accordance 
with the rules already discussed*
(3) The estate of an unmarried person
(i) Unmarried man
The rules observed in the distribution of the estate 
of an unmarried man are the same as those applicable in 
respect of the division of the estate of a married man 
examined earlier; with the obvious qualification that 
•in the case of the unmarried man, there will, of course, 
be no widows to be taken over by the heir*
1 Meek, op *cit * * p*267; Leith-Ross, African women (1938) 
p.102; Green, Ibo village affairs IT947j]~PP #97" and l6l *
2 Cf* Obi, op *cit *, p.T^B; 0*0* Obadan (ivbiosakon)
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If, in accordance with the rules relating to the 
legal paternity of children already discussed, an un­
married man is survived by legitimated children, the 
eldest son or sons among them (depending upon whether 
the sons were horn of one mother or different mothers) 
will be his heirs#
(ii) Unmarried woman
When an unmarried wojman dies, her children, if any, 
inherit her estate as joint heirs in the same manner as 
the property of a married woman is divided among her 
children* If there are no children, the whole of her 
estate - unlike that of a deceased childless wife, the 
post-nuptial part of which goes to her husband or his 
heir - is inherited by the members of her family in 
accordance with the rules governing the distribution 
of a childless wife*s ante-nuptial property reverting 
to her own kinsmen#
SYSTEM OF MATRILIUEAL SUCCESSION ABSENT AMONG THE IBQ OF
THE MID-WESTERN REGION 
The matrilineal system of inheritance found among 
a group of Ibo inhabiting the Afikpo, Bende and Obubra
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Divisions of the Eastern Region is not practised by 
the Iho of the Mid-Western Region* The topic is, however, 
referred to in order to stress the point that the simi- 
larity in the rules of inheritance "between the Ibo east 
of the Niger and those west of the river - the Mid- 
Western Ibo - does not extend to this system of succession.
1 Under the matrilineal principle of inheritance, a man's 
heirs are the- children of his sisters. For a full 
account of this system of succession, see: Basden,
Niger Ibos (1936) p.268; Jones, "Ibo land tenure" (194?), 
19 Afr. 309 at p*315n; Chubb, Ibo land tenure (1961) 
para* 1*0; Ottenberg, S., "Double descent in an Ibo 
village-group", Selected papers of the Fifth International 
Congress of Anthropological and Ethnological Sciences, 
September 1956 (Philadelphia), 1*73 at pp * 1*78-80;
Obi, The Ibo law of property (1963)> chap*9; The 
Eastern Nigeria Government Printer, Report of the Com­
mittee on bride price (1955) paras* 251-2. The com­
mittee found that the system of inheritance was not 
popular with the,people of one area in Obubra Division; 
and that the clan council had modified the system by 
means of a declaration entitling children to inherit 
from their fathers: ibid* para.252.
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CHAPTER TEN
RULES OP DISTRIBUTION IN TYPE "C" SOCIETIES - AKOKO-EDO.
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BI.NI. (i.e. the majority of the Benin •people. not being 
holders of hereditary titlesl. ISOKO. ITSEKIRI AND URHOBO 
General remarks
One of the interesting features detectable in the 
law of succession in the societies under consideration 
is the comparatively wide range of relatives having 
inheritance rights in respect of the various items of 
property comprised in a deceased person’s estate. This 
means that the benefits of inheritance are not here con­
centrated upon one class of the deceased’s blood relations 
be they his children or brothers - but are rather dis­
persed among his children, irrespective of sex, and his
.4
remoter kinsmen on (in some cases) both the paternal
1 Thomas, Anthropological report on the Edo-speaking 
peoples 11910)7 pt*l. pp.85"8; Omoneukanrin, Itsekiri 
lav/ and custom (19^ -2), p.74 > Bradbury, The Benin king­
dom (1957), P .  152♦ Welch states that the eldest son 
among the Isoko is sole heir: ”The Isoko tribe”, (1934)
7 Afr. 160 at p.172. This is not supported by Thomas 
and Bradbury, op.cit.. and is certainly rejected by 
an informant, Chief J.A. Akiri, Odion of Uzere. The 
rules of the Benin customary law are different on this 
point; and collateral relatives and their descendants 
do not inherit where there are surviving children. See: 
Thomas, (1910). pt X  pp .66-69; Egharevba, Benin law and 
custom (1949)$ PP*38, 77-78; Bradbury, loc.cit.
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and maternal aides . The hulk of the estate, however, 
is kept by the children; while, except where the property 
is substantial, token shares only are given to remoter 
relatives. The position among the TJrhobo has been 
accurately described by Thomas, who says:
"All sons and all daughters get some share of the property.. 
.•♦The brother gets a small share", (2)
As regards the rights of the kinsmen of the deceased to
take over his authority over his wives, he writes:
"If there are four wives, two would go to the head son,  ^
one to the father’s family, one to the mother’s family."*^
The contrast between the inheritance rules briefly 
indicated above and those obtaining in societies "A" - 
Ishan and holders of hereditary titles among the Bini - 
and "B" - Ibo and Ivbiosakon - is striking: for, whereas
remoter relatives here inherit some property, albeit prseious 
little, notwithstanding that there are closer kinsmen; 
in societies "A" and "B", they are, as we have seen, ex­
cluded from the inheritance in similar circumstances•
1 Thomas, (1910)* pt.l. pp.87-8. This is confirmed by 
the Ovie of Ughelli, Chief T.E.A. Salubi (Urhobo), and 
Chief J.A. Akiri (isoko); the first informant adding 
that every person is the child of two individuals, 
each of whom belongs to a family.
2 Thomas, (1910). nt.1. p.86.
3 Thomas, (1910)» pt.l. p.87*
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Various estates considered
The rules of distribution discussed are those which 
apply to the estates of the following persons, namely:
(1) a married man survived by children born of one 
mother;
(2) a married man survived by children born of different 
mothers;
(3) a married man leaving no children;
(k) a married woman; and
(5) an unmarried person.
(X) The estate of a married man survived by children 
born of one mother
With the exception of the Bini, among whom remoter
relatives are excluded from the inheritance, the estate
of a married man leaving children, who are bx^others and 
sisters of the full blood, descends to these children 
and his other relatives as joint heirs. But, while 
the children - especially the sons - take the substantial 
part of the property, such as houses, lands and economic 
trees; the other relatives share only in some part of 
the movable property, such as some articles of the 
deceased’s clothing and a little bit of his money* It 
is, therefore, proposed to examine separately the various 
rights of these joint heirs in respect of the estate.
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Rights of children
It has been pointed out by some informants that, 
apart from the distribution of their part of the movable 
property and the handing over of those special items 
of the immovable property specially reserved for the 
eldest son, it is not the practice for the children 
born of one mother to effect a formal and rigid division - 
as opposed to a temporary and ad hoc allocation, based
4
on needs of the immovable part of the estate • The 
reason given for this state of affairs is that the co­
operation and good will usually existing between such 
children make it undesirable for the inherited immovable 
property to be enjoyed by them otherwise than as family
A
property . One informant has, however, observed that 
this traditional method whereby full brothers and sisters 
enjoy their inherited immovable property in common is 
nowadays being threatened by two new developments, namely: 
the increased opportunities for travel open to people, 
which often find members of the family taking up resi­
dence in different parts of the country or in different
countries; and the evergrowing tendency towards the
pindividualization and capitalisation of land *
1 Chiefs Salubi and Akiri. Cf# Omoneukanrin, op «cit*«p«75»
2 Mr S .0. Akarue•
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(a) The eldest son
A
He takes his father’s dwelling house , hut is
obliged to permit his younger brothers to reside therein 
. 2with him . His unmarried sisters also have the right to 
live in it* Where the father left more than one house 
(say, two), he may take only the one in which the deceased 
lived and allow the immediate brother next to him in age 
to inherit the other . It is, however, stated that since 
the sons are full brothers, inheritance rights determined 
with respect to age may bow before considerations based 
on the genuine needs of younger sons ; and that an 
older son already owning a house of his own may waive 
his right of taking his father’s house in favour of a 
less enterprising younger brother^*.
As regards the father’s lands and economic trees, 
such as plantations of rubber and palm, the eldest son 
is entitled to at least one plot and one plantation; and 
to the largest share of these' items of the deceased’s 
•
In respect of the movable property, certain specific
1 Thomas, (1910)* pt .1. pp*85-6: Ward Price, hand tenure
in the Yoruba Provinces (1933;> para. 374* Omoneukanrin. 
loc.cit.; Howling, hand tenure in Benin Province (19US)j 
para. 23; Sgharevba, op .cit *. p*38.
2 Bradbury» op*cit*. p*^7; Rowling, ibid: Thomas, (1910). 
pt 1. p *6(ST
3 Gf: Egharevba, loc.cit*: Bradbury, loc.cit*
U Ovie of Ughelli and Chief Akiri*
5 See, for instance; Thomas, (1910). pt.l* pp.66,8U-8;
Egharevba, loc*cit.: Bradbury, op.cit*. pp.A7»120 and 152
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items are reserved for him; and they include at least 
one of the following, for example: his father's guns
and spears, coral beads and walking*stick•
In addition to his rights indicated above, the
eldest son receives the largest share in that part of
the deceased father's movables which goes to his 
2children .
(b) The eldest daughter among the Isoko and Urhobo: 
Ovworon• m m ■
Among the Isoko and Urhobo, an eldest daughter is 
entitled to one article of special value, usually coral 
beads, out of the movables before the division takes 
place^.
(c) The youngest child among the Isoko. Itsekiri and 
Urhobo
The position of the deceased's youngest child in 
respect of the division of his father's movable property 
is a privileged one among the Isoko, Itsekiri and Urhobo.
5 .....Omoneukanrin, loc .cit: Lloyd, "The Itsekiri"
in The Benin kingdom' (1957). eel:* Bradbury, p.184; 
Rowling, ibid.
1 Cf. Omoneukanrin, op.cit. p.74; Lloyd, op.cit..p.201.
2 Thomas, (1910), Pt.l, pp.84-91 Omoneukanrin, op .cit., 
PP.73-4; Bradbury, op.cit.. pp.120 and 152; Lloyd, 
op.cit.. p. 184; cf* Bghavevba, loc .cit.
3 Ovie of Ughelli and Chief Akiri"'X'lsoko)♦
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He is accorded rights of inheritance in his father’s 
movable property out of proportion to his age; which 
makes his place in the scheme governing the division 
of movable property second only to that of the eldest
■i
son * It is not, however, true, as stated by Thomas, 
that the "last child" (ublevie) gets a big share in 
the same way as the eldest . What enhances his share 
in the movable property is the special article, such 
as goldware, or special amount of money, which he receives 
in addition to the normal share to which he is entitled 
when the movable property is finally distributed^.
(d) The eldest grandchild among the Isoko and Urhobo:
O'vwromo-okp ako
Another child, who receives preferential treatment 
with regard to the division of the movable property 
inherited by a man’s children, is his eldest grandchild; 
irrespective of the seniority or sex of the latter’s 
parent; i.e. the'position of the eldest grandchild’s 
parent as the eldest son or youngest daughter of the 
deceased is immaterial, the eldest grandchild being the
1 Mr S.O. Akarue (Urhobo) and Chief J.A* Akiri (isoko).
2 The correct spelling of this word is "ubrevwie" (Urhobo) 
or "ubreye" (Isoko).
3 Thomas, (1910). pt.l. p.89*
3k3
one actually born first by any of the deceased’s children* 
But his share does not come to anything near that of 
the youngest child. He does not share the estate with 
his uncles and aunts (the deceased’s children); he is 
merely lifted from the second generation to which he 
belongs and given an article of sentimental value, such
A
as a wrapper (cloth) or an odd piece of bead .
(e) The position of the other children
(i) Sons
As already stated, they have a right to live with 
their eldest brother in their deceased father’s house, 
which devolves upon him. If the deceased left two 
houses, only the one in which he lived goes to the 
eldest son, and the other is inherited by the second son.
After the disproportionately large share of the 
eldest son has been carved out of the deceased’s im­
movable property, the rest is shared among the younger
p
sons m  diminishing portions according to their ages ; 
and, as has been observed, sometimes on considerations 
of the actual needs of individual sons. It must not
1 Ovie of Ughelli (Urhobo), Chief J.A. Akiri (isoko) and 
Mr S.O. Akarue (Urhobo).
2 Thomas, (1910). pt.l. pp.66, 8h-9; Omoneukanrin,
op .cit.. p.73; Egharevba, loc.cit: Bradbury, op.cit.
p.120.
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be assumed that it is a rule of the customary law that 
daughters are precluded from inheriting their father’s 
immovable property* On the contrary, and as will 
appear later, their inheritance rights in such immovable 
property, especially where there are no surviving sons, 
are very much recognised* But, owing to the usually 
co-operative spirit existing among full brothers and 
sisters already pointed out, and other considerations 
which will be referred to subsequently, daughters do 
not normally take a keen interest in the division of any 
lands and economic trees left by their father*
In regard to the division of that part of their 
father’s movable property, which falls to be divided 
among the children, the same considerations affect and 
influence the sharing as those already discussed in 
relation to the immovable property; except that both 
sons and daughters take alike *
(ii) Daughters - where there are surviving sons
A daughter is not permitted by law to inherit her 
deceased father’s house, since she is sooner than later 
obliged to leave the family on her marriage; when she
1 Thomas (1910)* nt *1* pp.BU ff; Omoneukanrin, op .cit* 
p.7U; Eghas*evba, loc ,cit: Bradbury, on * cit * * pp.1.20 
and 152*
*
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will be unable to take an active part in the corporate 
activities of her family. But, she has a right to live 
in her father’s house, which she may take up as her 
permanent residence on the dissolution of her marriage; 
or she may use it as a temporary shelter on any of her
A
usual occasional visits to her own family .
In respect of her father’s lands and plantations,
however, a daughter has clearly established rights of
inheritance, though,in practice, these are not generally
pressed on considerations of her marriage - when she
must go to her husband who will provide her with the
2land she requires - and those relating to the solidarity 
of the kin group constituted by brothers and sisters of 
the whole blood* Where, however, a daughter remains 
unmarried (a rare spectacle*^), she is entitled to take 
her share in her father’s lands and economic trees 
along with her brothers^*.
1 Thomas, (1910)* pt.l, p.88; Thomas, ’’The Edo-speaking 
peoples” (19IO), 10 J.A.S. 1 at p.5*
2 Bradbury, on .cit«* p.28.
3 Gf* Hubbard, J.W#, The Sobo of the Niger Delta (19A8) 
pp.122 and 152: ’’These women are all without exception
married and "... every Sobo £i*e* Urhobo and
Isoko] woman is married”.
4 Ovie of Ughelli and Chief Akiri.
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The inheritance rights of the deceased’s daughters 
in respect of his movable property have been briefly 
touched upon in the section dealing with the rights of 
s o n s w h e r e  it has been stated that daughters share 
with their brothers the portion of the movable estate 
reserved for the children. W© may add that daughters 
usually take a share of the cash, crops and articles, 
such as coral beads, which have feminine use and attraction; 
leaving things used by men for their brothers to take.
Where there are no surviving sons
In default of sons, a full brother takes the 
*
deceased’s'house . Failing a full brother, it is
inherited by a half-brother, uncle or nephew on the
paternal side; and failing these, the oldest paternal
2relative - m  that order • The general rule as regards 
the age of such a paternal male relative is that he must 
not be older than the deceased . It has, however, been 
stated by informants that this general rule is nowadays 
not always observed among the Urhobo and Isoko; and that
1 Of. Thomas, (1910). 'pt.l. pp.87-8. Thomas’s state­
ment at pp. 86 and 89rTbid, to the effect that the 
Urhobo (Ughelli) and Isoko {Iyede) customary law 
rules permit a daughter to take her deceased father’s 
house is not supported by the Ovie of Ughelli nor by 
Chief Akiri, who (the latter) also belongs to Iyede 
clan*
2 Oba of Benin, Chiefs Salubi and Akiri.
3 Bradbury, op.cit.. pp .44 and 50; cf. Omoneukanrin, 
op.cit.» p.7^; where,however, the Itsekiri rule is 
stated as being applicable only in respect of the taking 
over of the -deceased’s widows.
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an elder 'brother of the deceased may still be allowed
to enjoy inheritance rights where he has not got much
property of his own.
Daughters are here (i.e. where there are no sons)
more insistent on the exercise of their inheritance
rights with respect to' their deceased father’s lands and
economic trees. And it matters not whether they are
married and, so, at their husband’s homes or not: they
2
take the economic trees ; and cultivate the lands from
■5
their place of marriage . Sometimes, they may allow a 
trustworthy male member of their family, their father’s 
brother or nephew, to take charge of the property as 
a caretaker accountable, of course, to them. As already 
noted, these forms of inherited property are not normally 
rigidly divided among children of the same mother.
Should the need arise, however, for formal division of 
such property, the usual mode of distribution is followed, 
that is, the shares are fixed in relation to the ages 
of the daughters along the lines discussed above.
The division of the movable property is carried out 
in more or less the same manner as it is effected where
1 Chiefs Salubi and Akiri.
2 Thomas ? (1910), Pt.l, pp.85 and 88.
3 Thomas, op .cit.. p.87.
3U8
there are sons and daughters; with the qualification 
that among the Urhobo and Isoko, the absence of sons, may 
entitle the remoter relatives to a larger share of this 
part of the estate . The information, however, is that 
the consent of the daughters is essential in this case; 
and that they may dedide to share all their portion of 
the movable property, including articles used exclusively
by men, in the hope that their own sons will findifee for
/
•i
some of the items of property coaiprised therein •
The -posthumous child
A posthumous child is entitled to inherit from 
the deceased father’s estate along with the other children 
for, as an author has stated the rules of the Isoko and 
Urhobo law on the point: "Posthumous children are
p
usually treated like other children" ♦
The author does not, however, make it dear what 
the inheritance rights of such a child will be, if he 
is still unborn at the time of the distribution. In 
other words, are his rights absolute, or do they depend 
on his being born and born alive before the distribution 
occurs? As may be recalled, this question has already
1 Chiefs Salubi and Akiri.
2 Thomas, Anthropological report on the Edo-speaking 
peoples (1910), pt.1,’ p.88; also at pp.68 and 85, 
ibid; Bradbury, The Benin kingdom (1957)* p.121.
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been considered; in connection with the Benin rules; 
which accord rights to such a child, if, and only if,
-I
he is born alive before the time of distribution *
The general position with respect to the inheri­
tance rights of the posthumous child is covered by the
2rules of the Benin customary law on the point • It 
may, however, be added that where such a child is also, 
as may often be the case, the deceased’s youngest child, 
he may be entitled to a larger share than is justified 
by his age; in accordance with the rules of distribution 
followed by the Isoko, Itsekiri and Urhobo, which have 
been discussed above*
(f) Other relatives
It has already been briefly stated that, barring 
the position among the Bini where the deceased’s other 
relatives do not benefit if there are surviving children, 
some share of the movable property of the deceased is 
given to his relatives, such as brothers and sisters, 
nephews and nieces. The share which these relatives 
take, however, does not bear any fixed proportion to
i
that divxl ed among the children,; and its size is deter-
1 Oba of Benin*
2 See the authorities cited in footnote 2 on page 3U8. 
Confirmed by'informants: Ovie of Ughelli and Chief
Akiri•
mined largely by the family as a whole, and the 
generosity or otherwise of the deceased’s children, 
especially the sons.
A learned author has summarised the position among 
the Akoko-Edo as follows:
"... they £i.e. the deceased’s sensj may agree to give 
something to their father’s brothers”« (l)
Among the Itsekiri, part of the movable property
of the deceased is shared among a wider compass of his
O
kinsmen, referred to by one author as "close relations. 
Lloyd, however, holds a contrary view and states that 
a brother takes a share only in the absence of children-'*. 
In view of the similarities between the inheritance rules 
of the Itsekiri and those observed among the Isoko and 
Urhobo^, however, Omoneukanrin*s statement of the It­
sekiri rules is to be preferred to that of Lloyd. The 
term ’felose relations” is not defined by the author in
1 Bradbury, on .cit.. p.120.
2 Omoneukanrin, on .cit.. p.74*
3 Lloyd, "The Itsekiri” in the Benin kingdom ('1957), ed*. 
Bradbury, p . 184•
4 See: Glanville and Roth, "Notes on the Jekris, Sobos
and Ijos of the Warri District”, (1898-9) 28 J.R.A.
I. 104 at p.118; It is not, however,correct as these 
writers have stated, that the Ijaw also "inherit like 
the Jekris”. The Ijaw rules are dealt with in the 
next pattern of inheritance rules. See also: Thomas, 
(1910). nt.l. p.89 - the Etsako having rules similar 
to those found among the Ijaw.
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the section, but it may be inferred from his earlier 
description of the Itsekiri kinship system that it extends 
to uncles, aunts, grandchildren and first cousins .
The range of relatives admitted to participation 
with respect to the deceased’s movable property is some­
times e:xpanded among the Isoko and Urhobo, depending on 
the cohesion and co-operation existing between the members 
of the extended family. But closer relations - i.e. 
brothers, sisters, nephews, nieces and grandchildren - 
are singled out for individual shares; while other 
relatives are given a Joint share for division among 
themselves; the sises of the individual shares depending 
on the ages of these relatives on the lines indicated in
connection with the division among the deceased’s 
2children •
It will have been observed that unless the movable 
property comprised in the estate is substantial and the 
deceased’s children are generous, the share which a 
remoter relative receives on distribution may be precious 
little, especially where the family is large. Indeed, 
one informant on the Urhobo custom has stated that there 
have been instances where remote relatives have got nothing 
more than a few pennies or a ragged piece of the deceased’s
1 Omoneukanrin. op .cit.. chan.8. u p .52-8.
2 Ovie of Ughelli and Chiefs Akiri , and Salubi.
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cloth from the distribution • He, however, adds that 
the idea behind such dispersal of the inheritance is to
■i
foster the solidarity of the family *
By the same token, the fostering of the solidarity
of the kinship group, it is the usual custom among the
Isoko and Urhobo to assign some articles of nominal
value to the maternal relatives of the deceased as a
group; leaving it to them to effect division among them- 
2
selves . This appears to be an instance of double des­
cent recently noted by a writer on a group of Ibo in 
the Afikpo Division of the Eastern Region . There is 
nothing, however, in this custom as practised by these 
two ethnic groups in our area of special reference
1 Chief Qalubi*
2 Ovie of Ughelli and Chief Salubi. Cf. Thomas,(lglO), 
•pt. 1. p.87f where he accurately observes that a 
member of the deceased’s maternal family may be 
permitted to take over a widow at Evleni (Evwreni),
- Cthe present writer’s home town) in Urhobo Division.
3 Ottenberg, S., "Double descent in an Ibo village 
group", Selected papers of the .Fifth International ■ 
Congress of Anthropological and Ethnological Sciences, 
September 1956 (Philadelphia) U73-80.
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approaching the matrilineal principle in the double-des­
cent system of the Afikpo Ibo, where, as this writer 
has pointed out, ,fthe head of the dead man’s matrilineage
A
is in charge of the distribution of his goods” ; and 
where the deceased’s movable property goes to ”the 
matrilineage to be divided equally among its male members, 
except for a few shillings given to the sons to help to 
perform the burial” •
The deceased’s widow
As in the societies whose rules have been discussed,
the widow enjoys no rights of inheritance in respect
of her deceased husband’s estate. But as regards the
right of one of the kinsmen of the deceased to take over such
a widow (i.e. the one having surviving children for her
late husband), however, the rules of the customary law
observed by the Akoko-Edo (some of) and Bini differ from
those followed by the Isoko, Itsekiri and Urhobo.
For, whereas, among the Akoko-Edo (some of) and
2Bini, she is free to return to her family ; among the
1 Ottenberg, op .cit.; p*l|-78. For a description of this 
■ system among the Yako, see Forde, D., Yako studies
(1964)* chap. b *
2 Roth, Great Benin (1903)*  PP*37 and 97; Dennett, At 
the back of the black man’s mind (1906), p.199;
Thomas7 (1910). pt.l.pp .50 and 68; Talbot, The peoples 
of southern Nigeria (1926), vol.Ill, p.685; EghaTevba, 
op .cit.. pp.38 and 7 6 ; Bradbury, op .cit.. pp.i+7 and 
120-1.
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Isoko, Itsekiri and Urhobo, she is obliged to marry one
of her deceased husband!s kinsmen or, failing that, to
refund part of the bride price paid by the deceased in
respect of the marriage * Sometimes, however, she may
be allowed to leave the family and marry somewhere else,
if she has lost two (successive) husbands, who are both
members of the family - that is to say, if the deceased
himself took her as wife on the death of some other
2member of his family . But such special dispensation 
granted to this kind of widow must, despite an assertion 
to the contrary , be distinguished from the fairly strict 
law on the point; which is, that she is under a per­
petual obligation to remain married within the family, 
notwithstanding the number of husbands she has lost there­
in, as long as there is a pool of eligible members. 
However, as an informant has stated, a widow who has lost 
two husbands within the family - especially where they 
died at close intervals - is popularly regarded as a 
witch and danger; and as such must be rid of the family^".
1 Thomas, (1910), 10 J.A.S.l at p.6; Welch, "The Isoko 
tribe" (1934) 7 Afr. 160 at p.172; Omoneukanrin,
on .cit.. p.74; Loremeke v. Nekegho and anor. (1957)
3 W.A.L.H. 306 at p.308 esp.; In the Estate of 
Agboru.ja (1949) 19 N.L.R. 38* esp* at p*39; Bradbury, 
on .cit.* p. 152.
2 Omoneukanrin, loc *cit*
3 Thomas, (1910)* nt. 1* p.85.
4 S *0. Akarue.
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Since the deceased’s widow is the mother of the 
sons, the relative to take her as wife is her late hus-
■i
hand’s full brother • Failing such a brother, a half-
2
brother may do so . In default of such brothers, any 
other paternal relative, such as a nephew or cousin, 
may marry the woman. Any relative talcing her over may 
not, however, be older than the deceased husband-'; 
though as has been pointed out in connection with the 
position among the Isoko and Urhobo, this rule is not 
strictly observed today.
Ceremony marking the taking over of the widow
The type of ceremony to be performed by the new husband 
of the woman is similar to that described in connection 
with the relevant procedure followed by the Ishan and 
the nobility of Benin; except that the animal provided 
for the rite among the Isoko and Urhobo may be a goat 
(as among the Ishan and Bini) or a sheep
(2) The estate of a married man survived by children 
born of different mothers 
Where a married man is survived by children born to
1 Thomas, (1910). 10 J.A.S.l at p.6; Welch, "The
Isoko tribe" (1934) 7 Afr. 160 at p.172; Omoneukanrin, 
op .cit.. p.74; Loremeke v. Hekegho and anor. (1957)
3 W.A.L.H. 306 at p.308 esp.; In the estate of Agboru.ia 
(1949) 19 H.L.R. 38, esp. at p. 39; Bradbury,op .cit. ,p .152.
2 In the estate of Agboru.ia (1949) 19 N.L.R.3 8 ; cf. 
Omoneukanrin, loc.cit.
3 Omoneukanrin, loqcit.
4 Bradbury, op.cit., pp.152 and 158.
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him by more than one woman, the basic mode of distribution 
is that the children of each mother, irrespective of sex,
A
take as a unit ; and effect the internal division of the 
property among themselves, if need be, in accordance with 
the rules already considered.
Such mode of distribution takes place after the 
special shares of certain of the children have been carved 
out of that part of the estate to be distributed among 
the children* It will be recalled that these shares 
include those relating to the privileged rights specially 
reserved for the eldest son; the distinct shares of 
the movables which the eldest daughter and the eldest 
grandchild receive among the Isoko and Urhobo; and the 
e nhanced one of the youngest child among the Isoko, It­
sekiri and Urhobo.
In practice, except where she has no full brother, a 
daughter does not figure prominently at the family 
gathering, whereat the estate is distributed; and is 
content to allow her eldest full brother (who may be 
younger than herself) to receive the share falling to 
all her mother’s children • This practice has the effect 
of misleading the foreign observer into believing that
1 Bradbury, op .cit., p *31 *
2 Oba of Benin, Ovie of Ughelli and Chief Akiri#
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the estate of a man leaving children horn by different
4
mothers is shared among the eldest sons of each woman ; 
while the true position is that both sons and daughters 
are entitled to inherit as has been pointed out.
The deceased’s widows
It has already been observed that the Akoko-Edo 
(some of) and Bini rules do not require a widow to marry 
within the family of her husband, if she has a surviving 
child for him. Among these peoples, therefore, widows 
fortunate enough to be blessed with children (surviving 
ones) may return to their own families.
As already noted, under the relevant rules followed 
by the Isoko, Itsekiri and Urhobo, all widows are ob­
liged to marry within their deceased husband’s family; 
or refund part of the bride price. In theory, the deceased1
sons have the strongest claim to take over their father’s 
2widows , except, of course, that no son marries his own 
mother. In practice, however, most of the widows are 
generally too old for the deceased’s own children; which
1 See for instance, Thomas•( 1910). pt.l. pp.66 and 85’ ff: 
BradBury, o p .cit!. p.1+6. ---
2 See: Thomas, ( 1910)» Pt.l, pp.50 and 85-7; Bradbury, 
op.cit.. p.47; Roth, Great Benin, pp.37 and 97;
Talbot, (1 9 2 6). vol.III, p .685; Bennett, loc.cit.: 
Egharevba, op .cit.. pp.38 and 7 6 ; Omoneukanrin, loc. 
cit; Glanville and Roth, (1898-9; 28 J.R.A.I. 104
at p .118.
358
accounts for the custom among the Isoko and Urhobo, 
whereby the eldest son is accorded a special right of 
ceremonially assuming his fatherfs position with the 
latter’s youngest wife at his side ~ as his (the eldest
A
son’s) wife.
Where, as is to be expected, the widows are much
older than their late husband’s sons, his brothers and
other paternal relatives take them over. Sometimes,
as among the Isoko and Urhobo, a member of the maternal
family of the deceased may be given the right to marry
2one of the widows .
Principle of representation
There is no principle of representation; and the 
issue of a child predeceasing the person he would have 
succeeded does not inherit in the former’s stead^. But, 
as has been seen, such an issue is not entirely without 
some rights in the scheme of inheritance found among ,the 
Isoko, Itsekiri and Urhobo* If he is a grandchild of 
the deceased, he is entitled to some of his movable 
property along with that class of kinsmen referred to as 
"close relations". If he is also the first child of
1 Ovie of Ughelli, Chiefs Salubi and Akiri.
2 Thomas, p.87; confirmed by informants 
named in footnote 1 above.
3 Chiefs Salubi and Akiri; Oba of Benin.
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the deceased’s eldest son, he will receive a share 
larger than that given to any of the other grandchildren 
of his age-group in accordance with the practice,; ob- 
served by the Isolco and Urhobo .
Who are a man’s children?
The rules governing legal paternity in the case 
of holders of hereditary titles among the Bini have 
been examined. It need only be added that the same rules 
apply to all the people of Benin, In regard to the posi­
tion among some of the Aholco-Edo, it may be stated that 
the rules observed are not dissimilar from the Benin 
ones, since, as we have seen, there is complete identity 
between the rules followed by these peoples in respect 
of the rights of the deceased over his widows* Yte may 
briefly recall the statement of the rules relating to 
legal paternity among these groups by saying that the 
affiliation of children ( who may inherit from their 
father) is geared to the settlement of the bride price or 
some other payment in respect of the marriage or betrothal 
of the children’s mother; or, failing which, the pay­
ment of the necessary compensation to her family*
On the other hand, the relevant rules of the
1 Ovie of Ughelli, Chiefs Salubi and Ahiri*
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customary law of* the Isoko, Itsekiri and Urhobo are 
based on what may be termed the dictates of compassionate 
nature, by virtue of which biological paternity alone 
sanctifies the child and ascribes to him the status of
i
legitimacy; providing that the paternity is not in doubt *
Thus, Omoneukanrin states the Itsekiri law (and the
position among the Isoko and Urhobo is the same) as follows:
"Any child born in concubinage was not looked on as
* illegitimate’ in the strict English sense of the word, 
but, on the contrary, it was tenderly treated by the 
father..*. Illegitimacy was recognised only when a woman 
was unable to say who the father of her child was, but 
this was a very rare occurrence"# (2)
A more recent writer on the Itsekiri has expressed this 
point more vividly when he says:
"A man has rights over any child of which he can claim 
biological paternity ..... A child is rarely considered 
a bastard and given in custody to its mother and her 
parents: such only happens when paternity is genuinely
in doubt as with children of prostitutes"#(3)
But, although the status of legitimacy is deter­
mined, as stated, quite independently of the legal status 
of the child’s mother as a married woman, it is said that, 
as regards rights of inheritance among the Itsekiri, 
however, children born to the deceased by his wives tend.
1 Omoneukanrin, Itsekiri law and custom (19U2), pp.i+5-6; 
Lloyd, "The Itsekiri^ in the' Benin kingdom (1957) ed« . 
Bradbury, p. 191.
2 Omoneukanrin, loc.cit.
3 Lloyd, loc .cit.
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to claim better rights to his estate than those born
to him by his lovers.
Among the Isoko and Urhobo, the information is
that children born to a man by his lover are placed on
an equal footing with those born to him by his wives
with respect to inheritance matters, and, indeed, for 
2
all purposes • In point of fact, a child born to a 
man by his lover confers some amount of social prestige 
on him (the father); and entitles him to be outside the 
ambit of the operation of a rather annoying social con­
vention. This convention forbids anyone, not being a 
person who has performed some feat of bravery , to drink 
at any gathering, from a glass or other container while 
it is held with the consumer’s left hand* The origin 
of this convention goes back to the troubled days of 
old when duels and unprovoked assaults were the order 
of things; and when a man’s lover, considering that he 
had no exclusive rights over her, could be forcibly taken
away unless he could protect his legally unenforceable
2rights by the strength of his good right arm .
1 Omoneukanrin, on.cit.* pp.i+5 and 73; Lloyd, loc.cit.
2 Chiefs Salubi and Akiri•
3 Similarly, a man who has slain a leopard is immune 
from the observance of this social convention. In the 
olden days, the most obvious heroic act was the suc­
cessful hunting of the head of a human being during 
warfare - a state which then perpetually existed.
362
As v/ill have been noted from the discussion of 
the rules governing the affiliation of children among 
the Isoko, Itsekiri and Urhobo, an adulterer has the 
legal right over the child resulting from his association 
with the wife of another man. In other words, the 
rules now under consideration have no place for the legal 
maxim - ”bride price is child price” - which is found 
in the relevant rules observed by the Akoko-Edo, Ibo,
Bini, Ivbiosakon and Ishan; and which emphasise the 
importance of the contract of marriage in the matter of 
the affiliation of children.
The adulterer is, of course, liable to pay com- 
pensation to the woman’s husband • The question which 
then arises is whethei* such compensation is payable by 
the adulterer in respect of the legal paternity of the 
adulterine child; or it represents damages arising out 
of the civil wrong of adultery committed against the 
woman’s husband. A very learned author’s view is that 
such payment secures the adulterer’s right to the child’s 
legal paternity^ for he says:
”If a betrothed girl bears a daughter to a man other 
than her future husband, the genitor, provided he has 
paid compensation to the husband, may claim the marriage 
payment when the daughter is herself married”. (2)
1 Omoneukanrin, op .cit•, pp .45* 49-50•
2 Bradbury, The Benin kingdom (1957)* p.137*
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With the greatest respect, this view is not supported 
by either the present writer1s observation as a member 
of the two groups the author has in mind (isoko and, 
Urhobo); or, what is more,, the account of informants
-i
vex^sed m  the relevant rules found among these peoples • 
The correct view is that the liability of the adultei’er 
to pay damages in respect of his adultery has nothing 
whatsoever to do with his right over the child resulting 
from his tortious act: it belongs to him whether or
not he, in fact, pays such damages*
For still greater reasons, one may take leave to 
disagree with another view of the very learned author 
expressed, this time, with respect to the status of the 
child born of an unmarried mother. He seems to suggest 
that such a child is illegitimate unless the father
o
has paid compensation to the woman’s father.
(3) The estate of a mai^ried man leaving no children 
When a marx^ied man dies leaving no children, the 
whole of his estate, in the case of the Bini, is in­
herited exclusively by his full brothers^, excluding,
1 Ovie of Ughelli, Chiefs Salubi and Akiri, and S.O. 
Akarue, Esq.
2 Bradbury, The Benin kingdom (1957), p. 137*
3 Thomas, 11910)Y Pt.lT"p «o57 Egharevba, op .cit.* 
pp .38 and 77; Bradbury, op .cit. * p .47 •
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2however, any of them who are older than himself .
Among the other peoples included in this pattern of 
succession, the rules spreading the henefits of inheri­
tance to other relatives, already noted, are observed; 
and full brothers take the substantial part of the estate , 
while some part of the movable estate is divided among 
other relatives, such as half-brothers and others. Full 
sisters, however, enjoy rights more or less similar to 
those of married daughters v/ho, as has been seen, are 
content with receiving some articles of feminine use 
out of the movable property; while they leave the rest
of the property to their full brothers.^"
The division of the whole, or substantial part,
of the estate among these relatives is carried out in
accordance with rules similar to those observed in
f
the case of a man survived with children; with the 
eldest brother of the deceased talcing the place of the 
eldest son.
In default of full brothers, half brothers rank
5next ; but the information,even among the Bini where 
the nearest class of relatives excludes the others, is
2 See Bradbury, on .cit.. pp*44 and 50.
3 Thomas, (1910)» pt .1. pp.84 and 87; Bradbury, op .cit.
p.120.
4 Ovie of Ughelli, Chiefs Salubi and Akiri.
5 Thomas, (1910). pt.1. p.66; cf. Egharevba, op .cit.,p.38.
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that the deceased’s full sisters are then entitled to 
a substantial share in the division of the movable
■i
property, such as money * Half sisters have little rights 
in the scheme of distribution, except for articles of
-i
nominal value which they take*
Failing brothers (of the whole or half-blood),
the order of priority with regard to those who inherit
the whole or bulk of the property is uncles (who generally
speaking, may not be older than the deceased), nephews 
2and cousins ; failing whom, the head of the family
takes, it is said, reluctantly . Parents are excluded
on the ground that the death of a child in the lifetime
of a parent is looked upon as a calamity, terrible enough
to erase any idea of inheritance from the latterTs 
1memory •
It. should be observed that where the deceased’s 
remoter relatives are of the half-blood, the mode of 
distribution is the same as that described in connection 
with the division of the estate of a man survived by 
children born of different mothers* This means that
1 Oba of Benin, Ovie of Ughelli, Chiefs Salubi and Akiri*
2 See Egha^evba, op,cit*, pp.36 and 77> who, however, 
includes nieces; appoint on which he has not been 
supported by the Oba of Benin.
3 Ovie of Ughelli, Chiefs Salubi and Akiri*
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the distribution is according to "houses" or "doors", 
with the children of each mother taking as a unit of 
inheritance.
Where there are no surviving relatives: rights of the 
ruler
The property of a man leaving no real relatives - 
a very rare occurrence - goes to the head of the com­
munity, such as the Oba, Olu, Ovie, Qdioru Olokpe, etc.j 
who must, however, arrange the performance of the
-i
deceased's burial and funeral*
It is the practice among the Bini for the ruler
to waive his rights in favour of any illegitimate children
2
that the deceased may have left surviving him .
(k) The estate of a married woman
The property of a married woman, survived by chil­
dren, is inherited jointly by the latter in the same way 
as that of a married man leaving children born to him 
by one woman^; except that her daughters, for obvious 
reasons, succeed to more of her personal chattels and
1 Thomas, (1910)* Pt.l. p.67; Egha^evba, op .cit.. pp.38 
and 78.
2 Thomas, (1910)« p t .1. p.67; Thomas, (1910), 10 J.A. 
S*1 at p.o. This is confirmed by the Oba of Benin.
3 Thomas, Anthropological report on the Edo-speaking 
peoples. pp .65, 85 and 88; Egharevba, Benin law and 
custom, p.39; Bradbury, The Benin kingdom. p.W.
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household utensils than in the ease of theii* deceased 
father *s estate.
Where there are no surviving children
Barring the position among the Bini ,where a husband
inherits the post-nuptial acquisitions of a wife leaving
. . 1no surviving children , the general rule is that all
the property of a deceased childless wife is returned to
the members of her own family for distribution among 
2themselves •
The rules governing the distribution of the 
property of such a woman among the members of her own 
family are similar to those applicable in respect of the 
estate of a married man leaving no children. The only 
qualifications that may be made here are that sisters, for 
obvious reasons, take more of the deceased woman’s 
personal effects, such as articles of clothing and adorn­
ment, household and kitchen utensils; and that there would, 
of course, be no widows for anyone to marry.
(5) The estate of an unmarried person
(i) Unmarried man
If the unmarried deceased male left any legitimated
1 See chapter eighty PP.305 and 306.
2 Thomas, (1910)» pt.l. p.88.
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children, as among the Akoko-Edo and Bini; or any 
children in the case of the Isoko, Itsekiri and Urhobo, 
these, as has already been pointed out, stand to inherit 
his estate. Such children inherit as outlined above.
If he left no surviving children, then the scheme 
of inheritance is, again, as has been shown; except that 
no widows will be available to his heirs.
(ii) Unmarried v/oman
Any children born of an unmarried woman share her 
property as joint heirs and in accordance with the rules 
discussed in relation to the estate of a married woman 
survived by children.
If there are no children, the whole of her property 
falls to be inherited by the members of her family in 
the same way as the estate of a married deceased v/oman 
(or part thereof, as among the Bini) is distributed.
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CHAPTER ELEVEN
RULES OP DISTRIBUTION IN TYPE "D" SOCIETIES -
ETSAKO AND IJAW
Scope
In this we shall he concerned mainly with
the rather interesting topic of the inheritance rights 
of children with respect to their father*s property 
which, as will appear fully, depend lai^gely on whether 
they (children) are the issue of § marriage in which 
a substantial sum has been paid as bride price; or 
whether they are the offspring of a union in which the 
amount of bride price paid has been negligible* This 
restriction in respect of the rules of distribution has 
been imposed on the ground that the rules governing the 
rights of other relatives in the societies already 
treated covei* broadly the position among the Etsako and
t  • 1I jaw *
1 On this, see: Thomas, Anthropological report on
the Edo-speaking peoples Ti9l61 , Pt * 1, "ppTfl-^and 
80^31 Thomas, (1910;,"11 J. Comp. Leg. S.) 94 
at p.99-100; Rowling, Land tenure in Benin Province 
(1948), paras. 49-50; Bradbury, op .cit., ppTlo£-7^
Of. Talbot, Tribes of the Niger Delta (1930) pp.289- 
90. Confirmed by two informants on the customary law 
of the Ijaw of the Mid-Western Region: Chiefs B.S.
Ekpekpei and L.A* Aboroson.
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Since marriage, then, is an important element 
in determining the right of children to inherit from 
their father, this institution will he briefly examined; 
and the types of it practised by the two groups outlined. 
In our examination of this institution, the popular, 
if somewhat inaccurate, terms - "big dowry" and "small 
dowry" systems - will be adopted in designating the 
types • The verna culai^  terms will also appear (in 
brackets), the Etsako terms appearing before the equiva­
lent or similar ones employed by the IJaw east and west 
of the Niger.
(A) RIGHTS Off CHILDREN IN RESPECT OF THEIR DECEASED 
FATHERT S ESTATE
(1) Where he married under the "big dowry" system
1 2 3(amoya. braere or ya)
1 This Etsako term is also spelt amoiya or amoiia.
See: Thomas, (1910). pt.l. sections III and IV, 
esp. pp.47» 54 ff and 80 ff; Thomas, (1910), 11 <J.
Comp .Leg. (N.S.) 94 at pp. §6 and 99? Thomas, (1910), 
10 J.A.S.l at p p . 5 and 7*
2 Mid-Western IJaw term: Chiefs B.S. Ekpekpei and L.
A. Aboroson.
3 This Eastern IJaw term is sometimes also spelt iya 
See: Talbot, ffihe peoples of southern Nigeria (1926) 
vol.Ill, p.438; Talbot, Tribes of the Niger Delta 
(1930) pp. 189 ff; The Eastern Nigeria Government 
Printer, Report of the Committee on bride price 
(1955) 9 paras. 205-6, 212, 2*15-6 and 223; Williamson, 
K., "Changes in the marriage system of the Okrika
IJo" (1 9 2 6) 32 Afr. 53 at pp.55-6; Jones, G.I.,
The trading states of the Oil Rivers (l963)pp*51 ff?
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(a) The marriage
As the popular name implies, a "big dowry11 mar­
riage involves the payment of a considerable sum of 
money as bride price by the husband to the woman1s
A
parents* In 19h8, one author estimated the amount of 
bride price payable in respect of the Braere marriage, 
practised by the Mid-Western Ijaw, at around £60. 
Informants, however, say that it now stands at between 
£100 and £150 . Some forty years ago, a man had to 
find about £h5 in order to marry under the ^  system of 
the Eastern I^aw^. It should be observed, however, that, 
in view of the Limitation of Dowry Law of the Eastern 
Region, the amount of bride price payable shall not 
exceed £30^•
(b) Affiliation of children of the marriage
The children of the marriage are affiliated to
1 "The amount of the big dowry has always been high...." 
Report of the Committee on bride price* op *cit«* para, 
hi* See generally the authorities referred to in 
footnote 3 on p.370, and the following: Rowling, op * 
cit., para. U9; Hubbard, J.W., The Sobo of the Niger 
Delta (19h8) pp. 191-2; Bradbury* op.cit*, p.108.
2 Hubbard, loc.cit.
3 Chiefs B.S. Ekpekpei andL.A. Aboroson.
h Talbot, (1926). vol.Ill* p.h38; Talbot, (1930)* p.190.
5 The Limitation of Dowry Law, No.23 of 1955, s .3; for 
comments on the Law, see: Williamson, (1962) 32 
Afr. 53 at p.59*
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the woman* s husband ; and this is so notwithstanding
that any of them may have resulted from their mother*s
2adulterous union * It will, however, he recalled that
there is judicial authority to the effect that the claim
of the legal husband to the paternity of a child born
in such circumstances will be rejected by the court, on
the ground that it offends the repugnancy doctrine ♦
There is a local custom among the Okrika Ijaw of
the Eastern Region, under which every third child of the
marriage is affiliated to its mother’s family^* It is
also stated that the family of the wife prefer a girl
to a boy, as the third child that is to be affiliated
to them; and that, if such a child turns out to be a
boy, **they will try to fdo a deal* by persuading the 
other family [i.e. that of the husband] to give them 
instead a girl in marriage under this system,!*(5)
1 Thomas* (1910), pt.l. section III* esp. pp.U7. 5U 
and 56; Thomas, '("1910), 11 J. Comp.Leg ?N.S.J 94 
at pp.95-7; Talbot, (1926). vol.Ill, p.437; Talbot, 
(1930), pp.189-90; Rowling, op*cit** para* 49;
Hubbard, op .cit * * p. 191; Report of the Committee on 
bride price* op .cit., paras, hi - 2 0 2 lS" a nd 2 34;
Williamson, op.cit.* p .55; Jones, -loc *cit: Bradbury, 
op .cit.* p.108.
2 Talbot, (1930)» pp.189-90; Report of the Committee
on bride, price* op .cit. * paras 206> and 216; Williamson,
(19£2) 32 Afr. 53 at p.55.
3 See Edet v. Essien (1932) 11 N.L.R.1j7, discussed in 
chapter eight at p.304*
k Report of the Committee on bride price* op .cit.♦ para.
*210; Williamson, op.cit.* at P .55.
5 Report of the Committee on bride price, op .cit.para.2l6.
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(0) Succession to the deceased’s estate
Except in the case of those of the children 
affiliated to their mother’s family, as indicated above, 
the children of the mairciage succeed to their deceased
A
father’s estate as joint heirs • The ultimate division
of the inherited property among themselves is carried
out in accordance with rules similar to those already
described in connection with such distribution among
2the Isoko, Itsekiri and Urhobo .
Similarly, the rules governing the taking over 
of the widows of the deceased do not differ from those 
found among the Isoko, Itsekiri and Urhobo .
1 See: Thomas, (1910)* pt.1. pp .75 ff; Thomas, (1910)
11 J. Comp .LegV(¥7s7}94“ PP* 96 and 99; Rowling 
op.cit♦» para. 49; Bradbury, op.cit.. pp.106-7.
Confirmed by Mid-Western Ijaw informants, Chiefs 
Ekpekpei and Aboroson.
2 See generally the authorities referred to in the 
preceding footnote; also Dlanville and Roth, "Notes 
on the Jekris, Sobos and Ijos of the Warri District", 
(1898-9) 28 J.R.A.I 104 at p. 118. Note, however, 
that the statement by the writers (Glanville and Roth) 
to the effect that the Ijaw customary rules of succes­
sion are similar to those of the Itsekiri and Urhobo 
is accurate only in respect of the rights of the 
children of a "big dowry"(braere) marriage; and not, 
as will be seen, in respect of the children of a 
"small dowry" (ekiere) marriage•
3 Eor the relevant Etsako rules, see: Thomas?(1910)» pt.l. . 
pp .71-3; Thomas, (1910) 11 J. Comp.Leg. (N .s".) 94 at
PP .96-7; Thomas, (1910), 10 J.A.S.l at p.6; Rowling 
op.cit♦» para. 49S Bradbury, op .cit.. p.108. The rele­
vant rules of the Mid-Western Ijaw are to the same 
effect: Chiefs Ekpekpei and Aboroson.
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(2) Where he married under the "small dowry1 system
1 2  3(isomi , ekiere or egwaJ)
(a) The marriage
Under the ffsmall dowry” type of* marriage, the 
husband pays a relatively small sum of* money as bride 
price to his wife’s parents^. Some twenty years ago, 
the amount of bride price in respect of this type of 
marriage among the Ijaw of the Mid-Western Region was 
stated by an author in this way:
”. • • this is much cheaper, the payment being only £8 or 
£10 ” (5)
Informants, however, say that the current price is
6between £20 and £U0 .
(b) Affiliation-of children of the marriage
The children of a ”small dowry” marriage are
1 This Etsako term is also spelt isumi - Rowling,Loc. 
cit .
2 Term employed by the Ijaw of the Mid-Western Region - 
Chiefs Ekpekpei and Aboroson.
3 This Eastern Ijaw term is also spelt igwa or jjgwa- 
sime: Talbot»(1926). vol.III. pJ-i-38; Talbot» "D-930) 
pp. 189 ff; Report of the Committee on bride price 
op.cit., paras. 205 and 212. Among the Okrika Ijaw 
(Eastern Region), the term used is yekuma - Williamson, 
op.cit., p.55.
k See footnote 1 on p.372.
5 Hubbard, op .cit., p. 191.
6 Chiefs Ekpekpei and Ahroson.
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affiliated to their mother's family or, mox*e precisely, 
2
to her father ; and they answer to the name of the 
maternal family *
Rights of the father over the children of the
max»riage
The fact that the children of the marriage "belong 
to their mother's family has led some writers into 
"believing that all that the husband acquires under this 
system is conjugal rights over the woman. Thus, Huhbard, 
writing on the Mid-Western Ijaw !fsmall dowry" or ekiere 
marri age, s ays:
"... the husband has the use of his wife's labour in 
farm and market, and her body for sexual gratification; 
that is all" (4)
The truth, however, is that he has limited rights over 
his children: he is entitled to their personal services,
especially where they choose to live with him and he 
maintains thenr ; he has a right to part, albeit a small 
part, of the bride price receivable in respect of the
1 See footnote 1 on p.372.
2 Thomas, (1910), pt.l, p.5b; Thomas, (1910), 11 J.
Comp. Leg. (N.8.; 9U at p.97; Bradbury, op.cit.. p.108.
The husband's rights over the children appear to be 
supplanting those of the mother's family* On this, see:. 
Thomas?(1910). pt.l* p.555 Thomas, (1910). 11 J.Comp. 
Leg. (N.S.)9h at p.9&; Yfilliamson, (1962), 32 Afr.
53 at pp.58-9.
3 Report of the Committee on bride price, op.cit..para.223.
U Hubbard, loc.cit.; cf. Jones, op.cit..p .51.
5 Chiefs Ekpelqpei and Aboroson.
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marriage of any of his daughters •
(c) Inheritance rights of children of the marriage 
Generally speaking, the children of a "small 
dowry” marriage have no rights of inheritance in respect 
of their father’s estate ; but must, as will be apparent 
later, look to tlieir mother’s family for such rights.
This lack of rights on the part of the children arises 
from the incidents of the type of marriage contracted 
by their parents as well as the rules relating to affilia­
tion, under which they belong to their mother’s family.
The result is that the property of a man survived 
only by children of this type of marriage is distributed 
as if he had died without issue. His brothers and other 
relatives then take more or less in the same manner as 
that already considered in connection with the relevant 
rules observed by the Isoko, Itsekiri and Urhobo.
When the children may inherit from their father
The rule that the children of a "small dowry” 
marriage do not inherit from their father is subject 
to one or two exceptions, which, however, apply differently 
among the Etsako and Ijaw.
1 Thomas, (1910)* pt.l, pp.56 and 81; Chiefs Ekpekpei and 
Aboroson.
2 Thomas, (1910). pt.l. pp .5^ 4 and 80 ff; Thomas, (1910),
11 J. Comp .Le g . (N .S .) 9k at p.97; Rowling.loc.cit.; 
Bradbury, op .cit., pp.106-7; Report of the Committee 
on bride price, "op.cit., para.23U; Wi 11 iamson7~7 1962)
32 Afr. 33 at pp ,55-57 Chiefs Ekpekpei and Aboroson.
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Among the Etsalco, a man’s children of an isomi or 
"small dowry" marriage may he his heirs, if they elect 
to take up residence in their father’s area rather than
A
remain in their mother’s family . Similarly, they 
inherit property from him, if he improves their social 
position by procuring a title (chieftaincy, otu, etc.)
-i
for them •
As regards the position among the Ijaw of the
Mid-Western Region, however, the information is that it
is usual to accord some rights to such children in
respect of their father’s movable property, such as
2
articles of clothing and household furniture • But 
the rights of such children are based on a rule of prac­
tice rather than that of the customary law; and infor­
mants were at pains to point out that much depended on 
the attitude of the other relatives of the deceased, of
his children of a "big dowry" marriage as well as the
2extent of the property available for distribution*
1 Thomas, (1910)t Pt*1* pp.54 and 80-1; Thomas, (1910)
11 J *Comp .Leg. (nV sT) loc .cit; Bradbury, op .cit* p. 108, 
But see: Rowling, ibid, who only indirectly referred 
to these exceptions by saying: "There are certain 
devices whereby a husband can obviate the results of 
this position [i.e. affiliation and, of course,
the inheritance rights of the children^". His fur­
ther .statement thereat, that the children would take 
their father’s property and cai^ ry it to their mother’s 
family if he failed to avail himself of the legal 
devices is, with respect, not correct.
2 Chiefs Ekpekpei and Aboroson.
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(d) The position of the widow of a "small dowr.v11
marri age
As regards the rights of the heir of the deceased 
to take over the latter!s widow of such a marriage, the 
Etsako rules on the point differ from those of the Ijaw. 
For, whereas among the former group, she is free to 
return to her own family if she had a surviving child
•j
for her late husband ; among the latter group, she is 
obliged to marry her late husband’s heir or refund part
of the bride price, irrespective of whether she had a
. . . 2 surviving child for her deceased husband or not .
fc) RIGHTS OP CHILDREN IN RESPECT OP THEIR DECEASED 
MOTHER'S ESTATE
Quite unlike the succession to a man, a woman’s 
property is generally inherited by her children as joint 
heirs; irrespective of the type of marriage contracted 
by her . And barring the local variation under which 
a brother may be preferred to children^, Bradbury ac­
curately states the rule governing children’s rights in 
respect of their mother’s property, when he writes:
"In either case [i.e. whether she was married under the
1 Thomas, (1910). pt.l. pp.U7 and 72; Thomas>(1910)
11 J .GompTLeg.(N.S.T 9h at p.96; Thomas, (1910),
10 J.A.S.l at p.5; Bradbury, op.cit.. p. 108.
2 Chiefs Ekpekpei and Aboroson.
3 Thomas, (1910). Pt.1. pp.83-5; Bradbury, op .cit..p.107 
cf. Rowling, loc.cit. Chiefs Ekpekpei and Aboroson.
h See: Thomas, T19107T Pt.1»p .85;Bradbury.op .cit..p . 107.
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"big!:, dowry" or "small dowry" system of marriage] her 
children are her heirs...." (l)
(1) Where she is not survived by children
The type of marriage contracted by a woman makes 
a .lot of difference where she dies without issue. We 
shall take the case of a woman married under the "big 
dowry" system first.
(a) The estate of a woman married under the "big dowry1'
In default of children*the whole of the property
of a woman married under the "big dowry" type of marriage
2goes to her husband or his heir • It is, however, said 
that there is an instance of local variation among 
the Etsako permitting the inheritance to go to the 
husband’s other wives married under the amoya system, or
■Z
to his brother’s wives.
(b) The estate of a woman married, under the "smalldowry" 
BVstem(lgomi. ekiere or egwa^
The rule is that the property of a childless de­
ceased woman, married under the "small dowry" system
1 Bradbury, loc .cit.
2 Thomas, (191QT,~t .1, p. 83; Howling, loc .cit; 
Bi»adbury, loc .cit. This is also the position among 
the Mid-Western Ijaw - Chiefs Eikpekpei and Aboroson.
3 Thomas, (1910)» pt .1. loc.cit.; Bradbury, loc.cit.
380
passes to members of her own family.
THE IJAW OP KABOWEI (PATANI)2
The rules of the Ijaw customary law stated above 
do not cover those applicable among the Kabowei sub­
group of this people inhabiting the area known as Patani• 
The rules of succession found among this sub-group of 
the Ijaw people are, to all intents and purposes, the 
same as those applicable among the Isoko, Itsekiri and 
Urhobo. Above all, this sub-group do not practise the 
types of marriage found among the other sub-groups of 
the I jay/. The reason for this divergence from the rest 
of the Ijaw group is generally believed to have been the 
geographical position of the Patani Ijaw; who are so 
near the Isoko and the Urhobo with whom they (Patani Ijaw) 
have always been in close and regular contact.
SOME MODERN DEVELOPMENTS
The law, as stated in this section, with respect to 
the types of marriage and the rights of children to 
inherit from their father, contains much that may be
1 Thomas, (1910)» Pt.!» pp.83-U; Rowling, loc.cit; 
Bradbury, loc.cit; Chiefs Ekpekpei and Aboroson.
2 Information on this sub-group has been personally 
obtained by the present v/riter from Chiefs J.A.P.Oki, 
a native and now the Agent-General of the Mid-\¥estern 
Region in the United Kingdom; and U.K. Porbeni, also 
a native, sometime Court Registrar (Magistrates* and 
High Courts) and president of grade tfCTr customary court, 
Burutu. This latter Chief is now a Member of the 
Mid-Western House of Chiefs.
381
regarded as traditional. It is, therefore, proposed to 
make some brief observations on the modern tendencies 
detectable in the actual practice of the people; which 
may suggest a discrepancy between the way people "think
A
of their institutions and the way they actually work" »
1 * Modification of the system of marriage: "small dowry" 
type now preferred, to the "big dowry" type.
That the "big dowry" type of marriage, with the 
absolute powers it confers upon the husband over his 
wife, has long ceased to be popular is implied in Thomasfs 
statement made in respect of the Etsako amoya marriage
over half a century ago, when he said:
"The amoiya wife is absolutely bound to the husband, and,p 
in fact, in some places only slaves became amoiya wives."
Similarly, and mox^ e recently, the committee set up by ,
the Eastern Nigerian Government to investigate bride
price in the Region observed inter alia:
"Fathers are today unwilling to give their daughters 
out on big dowry marriage...." (3 )
And more recently still, a writer on the marriage
system of the Okrikan Ijaw of the Eastern Region has noted
1 Williamson, (1 9 6 2) 32 Afr. 53 at p,60.
2 Thomas, (1910). pt.l. p.54*
3 Eastern Nigeria Government Printer, Report of the
Committee on bride price. 19559 para.238.
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this unpopularity of the "big dowry" type of marriage,
i
which he has ascribed to certain causes* These include 
the disintegration of the ’house system’ which the "big 
dowry" marriage was designed to safeguard; the spread
of education and the emancipation of women; the gradually 
shifting notion of the family from that based on the 
agnatic system of old to. the modern primary or biological 
one, consisting of a man, his wife (or wives), and 
children; and the realisation that children are now a 
responsibility, and must not only be maintained but also
-I
educated * There is. also the fact that the bride price
in respect of the "big dowry" marriage has always been
prohibitive until the recent legislation passed by the
2
Eastern Nigeria Government*
One result of these changes has been the ascendancy 
of the "small dowry" type of marriage over the "big 
dowry" type; and it is no exaggeration when the Committee 
on bride price observe that:
■z
"...small dowry marriage is the commonest form today."
2, The inheritance rights of children in respect of 
their father’s estate.
As a result of the changes in the marriage pattern
1 Williamson, op *cit. pp.58-9.
2 The Limitation of Lowry Law, No.23 of 1956.
3 The Report of the Committee on bride price, op .cit..
Bn^ i  *H ■■ ubi.mii I- ■— w.n > 11   mi ■iiibiii I .............................   <  van +
para.hi *
383
outlined above, the rules of inheritance with respect to
the rights of children to their father’s estate have
undergone some modification. -
It has already been observed that the Etsako rules
have legal devices, under which a man may make his
children his heirsnotwithstanding that they are the
issue of a "small dowry" or isomi marriage. Similarly,
we have' seen that it is the Ijaw practice (though not
the rule .of the customary law) to permit the children of
a "small dowry" or ekiere marriage to take some share in
their deceased father’s movable property.
' One of the recommendations of the Committee on
bride price was the abolition of the rule depriving
children of a "small dowry" or egwa ,marriage of the right
1to inherit from their father • The Committee was of the
A
view that "all should be equal before the law" • It is 
a matter for regret, however, that nothing has so far 
come out of this humane recommendation. But there is 
still some consolation: the courts will be prepared to
do what the legislature is unwilling to tackle; and 
Williamson records a case where a son of a "small dowry" 
marriage successfully sued his father’s family for a
1 Ibid, para.8.
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share of his inheritance . The greatest obstacle to
the desired change would seem, however, to be the atti
tude of the children of this marriage, who are said f,to
sway to where the power is, that is, incline to their 
mother*s or father*s family according to which is more 
powerful** (l)*
1 Williamson, op .cit«« p*39«
CHAPTER TWELVE
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RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF THE HEIR 
Scope of* inquiry
As in the preceding five chapters, this chapter is 
devoted almost exclusively to a consideration of the rules 
governing the rights and duties of the heir in societies 
inhabiting the Mid-Western Region; with the qualification 
that the relevant rules of the kindred groups found out­
side the Region, such as the Ibo and Ijaw of the Eastern 
Region, are also considered. The rules of the Yoruba 
customary law may, however, be referred to where this is 
necessary for the purposes of comparison or elucidation.
The topic will be only briefly treated, since much 
of it has been anticipated in an earlier chapter dealing 
with the rights, duties, powers and liabilities of the 
administrator; where it has been observed that the heir 
is nearly always also the administrator, i.e. administration 
follows the interest.
The class of heir, whose rights and duties will be 
discussed, is the sole or principal heir. This is 
because only this type of heir normally steps into the 
deceased’s shoes; while the subsidiary heir is merely 
required to use his share of the property in providing as 
much as possible for himself.
3 8 6
Duties
Consideration of the duties of the heir is placed 
before that regarding his rights in order to stress the 
fact that customary succession is not confined to the ac- ■ 
quisition of rights; but involves the assumption of 
corresponding duties on his part.
Almost all the duties of the heir have been sum­
marised by an author who, writing on the inheritance rules 
of the Edo-speaking peoples, states:
"The duties associated with inheritance are few. The
deceased is buried by his heirs, and conversely. The
man who buries a debtor or heirless man takes over debts 
or property, as the case may be. The duty of sacrificing 
to the dead man falls upon his children ..... In certain 
cases the first-born has duties towards his brothers ....
As a matter of course the sister remains with her brother 
till marriage...." (l)
Adding a little to the author’s statement of the law
quoted above, we may list the duties of the heir as in­
cluding the following, that is to say:
(1) burial and funeral of the deceased;
(2) setting up worship of the deceased as an ancestor;
(3) payment of the debts owed by the deceased; and
(10 maintenance of the dependants of the deceased, such
as wives, children and others to whom he stood in
loco parentis.
1 Thomas, Anthropological report on the Edo-speaking 
peoples (1910)7 Pt.l, p.78*
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(l) Burial and funeral of the deceased
The heir bears all or the major share of the ex-
A
penses of the deceased’s burial and funeral ; just as, 
as we have seen, he takes the whole or the substantial 
part of the deceased’s property.
As a rule, this responsibility for the deceased’s 
burial and funeral is nearly always unhesitatingly under­
taken by the heir; and this is not surprising. Firstly, 
as has been shown, he is either the sole or principal 
beneficiary of the deceased’s estate. Secondly, the law 
permits the expenses involved in the performance of a 
man’s burial and funeral to be charged against his estate . 
Thirdly, there is the popular belief that failure to
1 The authorities on this are prolific. The following 
may be referred to: Thomas, "Some Ibo burial customs",
(1917) hi J.R.A.I. 163 at pp.185 ff; Thomas, (1910). 
pt.l. p.78; Thomas, Anthropological report on Ibo- 
speaking peoples'L (1914), pt.IV, pp.128 and 165;
Thomas, ^Notes on Edo burial customs" (1920) 50 J.R.A.I. 
377 at pp.384 ff; Welch, "The Isoko tribe" (1934)
7 Afr. 1.60 at p. 172; Meek, Law and authority in a 
Nigerian tribe (1937), PP *3lU and 320; Egharevba,
Benin law and custom (1949), p.39; Bradbury, The Benin 
kingdom (1957) ♦ p p  *47 >50* 80, 9 8, 108, 124 and 159; 
Okojie, Ishan native laws and customs (i9 6 0), pp.64,
6 9, 89-91 and 127; and the recent Benin case of I.vamuse 
Ehigie v. Gregory Ehigie fl96l] All N.L.R.842 at p.845; 
[19613 W .N .L .R . 307 at p . 309.
2 Meek, op .cit., p.320; Omoneukanrin, Itsekiri law and 
custom (1942) p.67; Okojie, op.cit.. p p .69 and 124#
This is implied in the Yoruba case of Salami v. Salami 
and anor. [1957] W.N.L.R.10 at p. 11. For the position 
in southern Nigeria generally, see: Talbot, The peoples 
of southern Nigeria (1926), vol.Ill, p.474#
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accord the deceased burial and funeral is dangerous to 
his living relatives, especially to the heir who is
1primarily responsible for the performance of these rites •
Fourthly, there maybe a diminution in the social position
and prestige of the heir, and through him the deceased’s
2family, if these essential rites are not carried out • 
These considerations making for the inevitable performance 
of the deceased’s burial and funeral ceremony have been 
vividly stated by a learned author on Ibo law, who 
writes:
"If the eldest son is sufficiently grown-up to carry out 
the burial rites of his father, an expensive duty, he 
is entitled to recoup himself from his father’s estate. 
Indeed, one of the principal reasons for giving the 
eldest son a larger share of the inheritance than his 
brothers is to enable him to perform this primary duty*, 
a man’s foremost duty in life is to see that his father 
or brother is buried ... This is not merely a pious act.
It is done in order to avoid pursuit by,the dead man’s 
ghost. It also confers a social status on the person 
performing it - the more elaborate the burial rites the 
more important the performer becomes in the eyes of the 
people. Nor more abusive remark can be made to a man 
than ’You never even killed a rat for your father’s 
funeral1’" (3)i‘
1 Basden, Among the Ibos (1921), p.121; Basden, Niger 
Ibos (1938), pp.201, 269 and 280; Thomas, (1920)50 
J.K.A.I. 377 at p.381; cf. Okojie, on .cit.. p .62+*
Also Meek, op>cit.. pp.318 and 321, and especially
p.3195 where he says that relatives failing to perform 
these rites for the deceased are said to "have roasted" 
him.
2 Welch, "The Isoko tribe" (193U) 7 Aft?. 160 at p.172; 
Omoneukanrin, Itsekiri law and custom (19^2), p*69; 
Egharevba, op .cit.. p#73; Okojie, op.cit.. p.l2^,and 
also Meek, op .cit.. p.321.
3 Meek, op.cit.. pp.320-1.
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(2) Worship of the deceased as an ancestor
Under strict customary law, the heir is under a 
duty to erect a shrine or altar in honour of the deceased 
soon after the latter*s burial and funeral rites have
•i
been performed • Thereafter, he is bound to make offerings
consisting of animals, food, drinks, etc., to the dead
2man at the shrine or altar at least once a year . In 
the case of a son succeeding a father who was an important 
chief or other titled man, such annual worship is known 
as "making the father".'*
Among its adherents, ano.estor-worship is practised 
not merely as an act of showing filial piety; but is 
based on their conception of the deceased as a spirit, 
who is regarded as capable of exercising far greater 
influence over the living relatives than was possible when 
he was alive. Thus, Bradbury states:
"Offerings, including kola, palm-wine, chalk and pounded
1 Thomas, (1910). pt.l. p*37; Thomas, "The Edo-speaking 
peoples" (19 10J, 10 J.A.S.l at p*12; Thomas, (1914). 
pt.IV. p.27; Bradbury, op.cit.. pp.29-30 and 54*
2 .See generally the authorities cited in footnote 1 above. 
Also: Roth, H.L., G-reat Benin (1903) pp.101-2; Meek,
op .cit.. p p .104 ff and 119 ff; Thomas, (1 9 1 0 ). pt.l. 
p.78; Egharevba, op .cit, p. 8 6; Bradbury, op .cit.. 
P P *5 5 -6 ; Lloyd, '"The Itsekiri" in the Benin kingdom 
(1957) > e&t; * Bradbury, p p .184 and 201; Okojie, op .cit ♦♦ 
PP* 50 and 146 ff.
3 See: Glanville and Roth, F.N., "Notes on the Jekris,
Sobos and Ijos of the Warri District" (1898-9) 28 
J.R.A.I. 104 at p. 112; Roth, H.L., Great Benin (1903)
p . 102: Anon. "Notes on the form of the Bini government" 
(1 9 0 ^) 4 Man 50 at p .5 3 ;  Rumann, "Funeral ceremonies 
for the late ex-Oba of Benin" (1914) 14 J.A.S. p . 35*
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yam are made regularly and are accompanied by prayers 
for the welfare of the members of the family. In times 
of sickness and other catastrophes goats and fowls are 
sacrificed", (l)
No heir takes lightly the duty of worshipping the deceased. 
For, apart from the traditional fear of the supernatural 
powers ascribed to the dead man,this form of worship places 
him (the heir) in the position of an intermediary between 
the ancestors and the living members of the family; and 
helps to establish and maintain his authority as the new 
head of the family. It follows from this that any act 
of disrespect shown to the new head of the family by a 
member is viewed as having been directed at the deceased 
and, through him, the powerful band of ancestors. This 
point has been clearly brought out by a learned author 
who says:
"If he [i.e. the head of the family! is displeased with 
one or more of the family he may, when offering sacrifice, 
ask the blessing of the ancestors ’for those of the 
family who are right minded’, and this reservation would 
cause disquietude or even alarm among those with whom he 
had quarrelled". (2)
MODERN DEVELOPMENT: INFLUENCE OF THE CHRISTIAN AND OTHER
RELIGIONS ON THE CULT OF ANCESTORS
The account given above in connection with the duty
1 Bradbury, op.cit. p.55* Cf. Thomas, (1910). pt.l. p.78«
2 Meek, op.cit.. p.105. Cf. Okojie, op.cit.. p p .146 ff.
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of the heir to offer sacrifices to the deceased represents, 
in the main, the position under strict orthodox customary 
law. Today, the position has changed and is changing; 
the duty of the heir in this regard is often completely 
ignored or only vicariously performed.
The main cause of this change has been the spread 
of the Christian and other religions, such as Islam, whose 
tenets are fundamentally opposed to belief in the cult
A
of ancestors. While those propagating the teachings of 
these religions have every reason to welcome rather enthusias 
tically the decline in the once-powerful influence attri­
buted to the departed ancestors, the resulting position 
is not one of unmixed blessing. For one,thing, the 
solidarity of the family in its extended or agnatic conno­
tation is thereby threatened. For the other, the disap­
pearance of this once-restraining influence lies at the 
root of the modern tendency on the part of heirs to treat 
succession solely as a source of acquiring rights; while 
ignoring the duties attaching to it under traditional 
customary law. It is, therefore, little wonder that a 
recent author on the customary law of the Ishan people 
has decried the modern development in this way:
1 See, for example: Meek, op.cit.. pp.106 ff, 199, 259
and 333; Green, Ibo village affairs (1947) PP.52-3; 
Okojie. op.cit.. pp.99 and 148; Legum, C.,"Great Benin", 
(i9 6 0) 6b Nigeria 103 at p.109.
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"Today with the growth of Christianity and other religions . • 
ancestral worship and our way of social life is being 
forgotten and relegated to the background. The family unit 
with its spiritual binding is disintegrating, Ishans are . 
becoming more individualistic...," (1)
Where the heir is a follower of the Christian or other
religion opposed to ancestor-worship: manner in which the
2
duty to offer sacrifices to the deceased is performed
If the heir is an ardent follower of the Christian 
or other religion, such as Islam, which equates ancestor- 
worship with idolatry, the duty requiring him to set up 
an altar or shrine for the worship of the deceased is 
ignored. It is, however, usual for another member of the 
family, who is a pagan, to elect to perform this duty; 
and to be personally responsible for the cost of procuring 
the provisions to be used in such sacrifices* But such a 
member of the family does not thereby come under a legal 
obligation to continue the offering of sacrifice to the 
dead man: it is merely a moral or social duty, which is
undertaken in order to secure, as has been stated, the 
goodwill of the deceased towards his living relatives.
It will be appreciated that, as the recipient of the acts 
of filial piety involved in ancestor-worship, the deceased, 
during his lifetime must have discouraged his heir from 
embracing'any religion that forbids this quaint form of
1 Okojie, op.cit.* p.148..
2 Information supplied by nearly all the informants 
interviewed by the present writer, and mentioned in 
sundry places in this work.
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worship. And it has been stated that among the Bini, there 
is nearly always some difference and friction within the 
family on the conversion of a member into Christianity; 
since it is not at all easy for the convert to answer 
the obvious question: "Who will feed the spirit of,your
parents after they are dead..?" (l)
Perhaps the most interesting aspect of the.modern 
development as regards ancestor-worship has been the 
vicarious discharge of the duty of the heir to make of­
ferings to the deceased. It sometimes happens that an 
heir who has adopted Christianity or other religion having 
no truck with the cult of ancestors, nevertheless has,
o
what has been aptly termed "partial belief in juju" ; and
while he may not personally make the sacrifices to the
dead man, he is anxious to secure someone else who may
officiate for him in the performance of these rites. It
should be observed that in such a case, the officiant is
merely an agent of the heir: the latter, not the former,
must bear the expenses incurred with respect to the
materials - animals, food, drinks, etc. - required for 
x
the worship.
1 Legum, C., loc.cit.
2 Okojie, op.cit.. p.148.
3 All the informants. interviewed and mentioned in this 
work are agreed on this aspect of the modern develop­
ment •
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(3) Payment of the debts owed by the deceased
The heir is responsible for the payment of all or
the major share of the debts owed by the deceased, de-
\
pending upon whether the former is the sole heir or
only a principal heir •
It should be borne in mind that customary law knows
nothing of any rule of limitation under which a debt may
2
be extinguished by lapse of time • Consequently, the 
duty of the heir now under consideration is not limited 
to meeting the debts personally contracted by the deceased 
himself; but it extends to the settlement of any that 
may have been passed on to the latter by successive 
ancestors, who lived several generations ago. The plight 
of an heir having to pay ancient debtg- the mode of payment
1 Thomas, (.1910), pt.l, p.100; Thomas, (1914). pt.IV. 
pp . 165 ff"; Basden, Among the Ibos (1921), p .83;
Basden, Niger Ibos (1938). p*2<$8; Talbot, The peoples 
of southern Nigeria (1926), vol.Ill, p*633; Meek, haw 
and authority in a Nigerian tribe (1937)$ p.234; Harris, 
J.S. *'Some aspects of the economics of sixteen Ibo 
individuals’* (1944)* 14 Afr. 302 at p.320; Omoneukanrin, 
op .cit ♦ , p*?3; Egharevba, op.cit., p*74; Bradbury, op. 
cit, pp.120 and 152; Okojie, op.cit♦ . p.92.
2 Thomas, (1910), pt.l. p.98; Thomas, (1914). pt.IV,p.l64; 
Basden, (19 21 j, loc". cit.; Basden, (19^8), loc .cit: cf.
The Limitation Law, Western Region, cap.64, s • 1 (2)., Laws 
of the Western Region (1939) which states: "Nothing in 
this Law affects actions in respect of ... any matter 
which is subject to the Jurisdiction of a customary 
court relating to ... inheritance or disposition of 
property on death*lt
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of which may have changed beyond all recognition over
the years - has been succinctly described by an author
" on Ibo law. He states:
"The settling of ancient debts - perhaps three generations 
old - is a very intricate business, and a young man may 
find himself in an undesirable and even critical position, 
owing to his being suddenly confronted with a debt contrac­
ted years before by his grandfather, the repayment of 
which has not become easier by lapse of time - the money­
lender sees to that"* (l)
And, elsewhere, the same author says:
"In the olden days the debt was paid in kind;, nowadays, 
it is expected that the refund will be made in cash, a 
vastly different proposition"*(2)
Meek, however, seems to be of the view that lapse
of time may bar the repayment of a debt; for, he says:
"But if a creditor did not give notice of the debt before 
the conclusion of the final funeral rites he lost all 
claim to repayment"* (3)
It is submitted that this view does not accurately represent 
the customary law which is as stated above. The
learned authorfs assertion does not take into account 
the position of the deceased’s creditor who may not have
..z"'
got timely knowledge of his debtor’s death; -and who is 
bound to suffer injustice on this view of the law. Besides, 
the true position under customary law - i.e. the absence
1 Basden, Among the Ibos (1921), p.85; also Basden, 
Niger IbosTl938) p.268.
2 Basden, Niger Ibos (1938) loc .cit.
3 Meek, loc.cit.
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of any rule under which lapse of time may extinguish a 
debt - has received statutory recognition in the Limitation
■i
Law of the Western Region , which provides:
"Nothing in this Law affects •.. any matter which is sub­
ject to the jurisdiction of a customary court relating 
to ... inheritance or disposition of property on death".(2)
It cannot, of course, be argued that the payment of the
deceased’s debts is not a matter "relating to inheritance
or disposition of property on death"•
As a general rule, the heir must still pay the
debts of the deceased, notwithstanding that these exceed
the value of the estate, and render it a damnosa hereditas»
Among the Ishan, however, he may apparently divest himself
of the liability to pay' the deceased’s debts by refusing
to inherit the estate, usually an insolvent one^. When
this hapr.>ens, the local ruler (ono.iie or onogie) takes
over the property of the deceased; but without the
obligation to pay the latter*s debts, since no creditor
may seek to enforce the repayment of his debts in these
circumstances^.
The last point that may be considered in connection
1 Laws of the Western Region of Nigeria (1959) > cap *614-.
2 Op*cit ** s.1(2)*
3 Thomas, (191h)* pt .IV. p.l65; Omoneukanrin, op*cit** 
p.7U. Confirmed by all informants mentioned in 
sundry places in this work.
Okojie, op f cit.* p*92; but see pp ,9b ff and 109 ff, where 
t h e  author states that this and other autocratic 
powers and privileges of the local ruler are no longer 
exercised by him.
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with settlement of the debts of the deceased is the lot 
of a creditor whose claim the heir is unable to meet.
All informants interviewed by the present writer during 
his field investigation say that heirs nearly always pay 
up in order to save the name and status of the deceased 
and his family; and that, where circumstances render it 
difficult to pay the deceased’s debts all at once, payment 
by instalments is generally agreed upon. In practice, 
however, the ether members of the deceased’s family do not 
stand idly by and allow the heir to be harassed by the 
creditors of the deceased. But the primary liability 
to pay these debts rests with the heir; or, if he is only 
a principal heir, the liability becomes joint in respect 
of all those who have benefited from the estate left by 
the deceased* Tbe obligation iof therlhmily to help in the 
payment of the deits incurred by the deceased member rests 
on the principle of secondary liability, since the^ y.- were 
liable for his wrongs while he was alive. For, as Kingsley
1 See for instance: Thomas, (1910). pt.l. pp .99-100;
Thomas, (I91h)» pt.IV, p .161; Basden,(1938)» p.25^ 
and 261; TalbotTTl926). vol.Ill, pp. 632/ 635, 650-3, 
655-7 and 662; Meek, op.cit.. pp.207 and 230; Elias 
The nature of African customary law (1956), pp.87-92 
and 137* Kingsley, M.H., West African studies (1899) 
p *436.
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puts it:
"Every person is the member of a family, and. all the 
other members of the family are responsible for him 
and he to them"« (i)
(4) Maintenance of the dependants of the deceased
The heir has the obligation to maintain the de­
pendants of the deceased; be they the wives or children 
of the deceased, or others to whom he stood in loco 
parentis. We shall first take the duty of the heir to 
maintain the dead man’s widows•
(a) Widows
The heir’s duty in this connection is one that 
sounds more oherous in prospect than in actual performance. 
Several factors operate to lessen the burden associated 
with the heir’s duty to maintain the deceased’s widows. 
Firstly, as has been stated, some of the widows are taken 
as wives by the other kinsmen of their late husband*
Where this is the case, the obligation to maintain these
women is assumed by their new husband or husbands, and
A n
not by the heir * Secondly, even where the heir has
1 Kingsley, loc *clt.
la This is because it is the duty of a husband to provide 
for his wife or wives. On this see: Thomas, (1914). 
pt.IV, p.140; Thomas, (1910)« pt.l* pp.47 ff; Meek, 
op.cit.. pp. 100-2: and 202; Green, Land tenure in an Ibo 
village (1941) pp .13-14; Green, Ibo village affairs 
(1947.), p.34; SpBrhdlj, J.I., "Marriage among the Ibos" 
(1942-5), 37 Anthropos 113 at p.118; Harris, (1944) 14 
Afr.30'2 at p.328; Jones, G.I., "Ibo land tenure" (1949)
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taken some of the widows as wives, his duty to maintain 
them is no higher than the normal obligation on the part 
of a husband to co-operate, as we have seen, in providing 
for his wives. It should be appreciated that the women 
themselves are not idle; their activities in connection 
with farming and petty trading may, as has been pointed 
out in chapter six (on administration), supply much, if 
not all, of their needs as regards food and clothing. It 
will have been seen, however, that the best guarantee with 
respect to the maintenance of the widows is offered by 
the custom whereby they are taken as wives by the deceased’s 
heir or some other members of their late husband’s family - 
a point which has already been made, where,.however, it 
was observed that the custom has been steadily falling 
into disfavour. Thirdly and lastly, the obligation of 
the heir in this regard consists largely in the negative 
duty of allowing the widows to continue the enjoyment of 
whatever provisions the deceased may have made for them 
during his lifetime. For instance, they are entitled 
to remain in occupation of their living apartments in 
the deceased’s house; to retain possession of the plots
2
of land allotted to £hem by him for their farming purposes^
la ....19 Afr. 309 at p.313; Ardener, E.W., "The kinship 
terminology of a group of southern Ibo" (1954) 24 
Afr. 85 at p.88; Talbot, The peoples of southern 
Nigeria (1926), vol.Ill, p.678. —
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and, as among .the Ibo, to enjoy the produce of their
x
husband’s economic trees .
The duty of the heir to maintain the widows, like 
that of the administratoi* during the period of administra­
tion, is owed to only sxich widows who marry within the 
family; or who, while not so married (where they are old 
or no eligible husband has been found, for instance), 
elect to live the rest of their lives in association with 
the family. It is not owed, for example, to a widow 
refusing to max^ry a kinsman selected by the family to 
take her as v/ife* She is regarded as wanting to marry 
outside the family, and, therefore, not entitled to 
maintenance by them.
It should be noted that the allotment of residen­
tial accommodation by a husband to his wife and the sub­
sequent arrangement whereby she continues in possession
2 Green. (191+7)% loc.cit.: Obi, The Ibo law of property 
(1 9 6 3), PP*73 ff* 173-1+ and 183; Okojie, op.cit. .p.102# 
Also the Yoruba case of Omoniregun v . Sadatu (r&88) R. 
C.J.15; noted by Stopford. Tf.G.B., Glimpses' of native 
law in West Africa” (1901) 1 J.A.S.80 at pp.83-6. See 
also Lopez and ors. v. Lopez and ors. (1921+) 5 N.L.R.
1+7 at pp .'1+9-50, where the case was considered. In 
Lopez and ors. v. Lopez and ors. op.cit.. however, the 
issue was the partition of family land; and it was 
stated that the rights of female children were inferior 
to those of males. Note, however, that this decision 
is no longer good law, which is to be found in Lewis 
v. Bankole (1909) 1 N.L.R.82 at p.9 6 ; Sule and ors. v. 
A.1isegiri (1937) 13 N.L.R.11+6 at p.11+7; Salami v.
Salami and anor.f 19571 W.N.L.R.10; i.e. the rights of 
children are equal under Yoruba customary law, irres­
pective of sex.
3 Green, Land tenure in an Ibo village (19I+I) pp.20 ff; 
Obi, The Ibo law of property (1953) pp .98 and 159*
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thereof do not operate to vest such property in her; 
which she may pass on to the members of her family in the 
event of her dying without issue. This point was decided
A
in the -Yoruba case of Qloko v* Giwa , where the deceased’s 
son and principal heir successfully sued his younger 
brother for recovery of possession of a room, which was 
allotted by the deceased to the mother of both parties*
The defence, strangely enough, was that the allotted room 
vested in the mother of the.parties; and that the defen­
dant could not be ordered , to give up possession on the 
ground that it became the joint property of both parties 
on the death of their mother, to whom it belonged by the 
process of allotment* By far the strangest feature of 
the case, however, related to the availability and willing­
ness of a defence witness, who supported this strange 
contention; and who was disowned by counsel on his side, 
Graham.Paul, J., who decided the case, was so struck by 
this novel contention that he was forced to observe:
!II have heard a good deal of nonsense talked in the wit­
ness box about Yoruba custom but seldom anything more 
ridiculous than this* Even the defendant’s Counsel 
himself had to throw over his witness, and I really do 
not blame him for that”* (2)
1 (1939) 13 N.L.R.31; cf* Dosunmu v* Dosunmu (195U) lh
W*A*C*A. 527.
2 Ibid* at p *33*
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The widower
As regards the widower, it is enough to repeat what 
has been said in the chapter on the administration of 
estates and say that he is not entitled to be maintained 
by the heir* It is, of course, the case, as has been 
pointed out, that he enjoys rights in respect of his 
wife’s post-nuptial acquisitions under some systems, if 
the woman leaves no surviving children •
(b) Children and others to whom the deceased stood in
loco parentis
One consequence of the heir succeeding to the whole
or substantial part of the deceased’s estate is that he
is placed in the position of a father and guardian as
regards the minor children and others for. whom the dead
man was responsible. This imposes on the heir the duty
to maintain and support these dependants of the deceased.
The obligation of the heir in this connection has
been reiterated in both the Urhobo case of In the estate 
2
of Agboru.ja and the more recent Benin case of Iyamuse
•z o
Ehigie v* Gregory Eghigie « In the earlier case ,
Ames, Ag.S.P.J*, said, inter alia:
’’When there are minor children it means that the father’s 
heir becomes their new father”. (2)
1 See chapters eight, nine and eleven.
2 (19U9) 19 N.L.R.38. _ -
3 [1961] All N.L.R.842; [l96lj W.N.L.R.307.
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. . 1In the Benin ease of Iyamuse Ehigie v* Gregory Ehigie ,
Obaseki, president of the grade "A" customary court
o
(Benin City), as he then was , observed:
"The responsibilities for the care of the household and 
upbringing of the younger children of the deceased also 
pass to the eldest son [i.e. the heir] until they are of 
age. His position becomes that of the father of the 
family"* (3)
The heir must permit these dependants to reside 
with him in his inherited property, and provide for their 
feeding and general welfare*4"* Nowadays, he must bear 
the expenses of their formal education at school or 
other institution of learning. In addition, he must 
help to provide the bride price in respect of the first
1 tl96l] All N.L.R. 81).2; [l96lj W.N.L.R. 307.
2 The former president has since the 2nd April, 1964,
become a Judge of the High Court of the Mid-Western 
Region* See M# '*N. Notice No*80 of 1964.
3 11961] All N.L.R. 842, at p.845; [1961] W.N.L.R.307 at 
p.309.
4 On this see generally: Thomas?(1910). pt.l. pp. 68 ff 
and 86-6; Thomas, "Marriage and legal customs of
the Edo-speaking peoples" (1910) 11 J.Comp.Leg. (N.S.) 
94 at p.99; Thomas, (1914)* nt.IV. pp.127-8; Talbot, 
The peoples of southern Nigeria (1926). vol.Ill,
, p.677; Meek, Law and authority in a Nigerian tribe
(1937; p.320; Bradbury, The Benin kingdom (1957).
pp. 46-7; Okojie, Ishan native laws and customs 
(I960), p.91*
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marriage contracted by any of the deceased*s sons ; and 
see to it that such a married son is established in life. 
As regards the unmarried daughters of the deceased, he 
has the obligation to ensure, by making adequate allowance 
out of the bride price received by him, that the neces­
sary outfit consisting of household utensils, food, 
clothes, ornaments and cash - dowry in the English sense
of the word - is provided for any of them on the occasion
2
x of her marriage .
THE RIGHTS OF THE HEIR
As has been noted in the chapters on the distri­
bution of estates, the heir succeeds to the whole or the
1 Thomas, (1910). Pt ,1, pp.70 ff; Thomas, (1911+). pt.IV. 
p.127; Talbot, loc.cit; Meek, on .cit.. pp ,320-1; 
Bradbury, op ,citT, p?TS7 and 120; Qkojie, loc.cit.
It will be appreciated that the duty of the heir in 
this regard is one of the obligations he has inherited 
from the deceased who would have provided the bride 
price with regard to the first marriage of each of the 
sons. On this, see: Meek, op.cit.. p.267; Harris,
f,Some aspects of the economics of sixteen Ibo individuals” 
(191+1+) 11+ Afr. 302 at p.301+; Bradbury, op .cit.. pp*30 
and 1+8,
2 His duty here is to give part of the bride price to 
the bride’s mother, who then sees to the arrangement of 
providing the marriage outfit for her daughter. The 
bride’s mother also has a duty with respect to the 
provision of such outfit. On her duty, see: Welch,
”The Isoko tribe” (193^0 7 Afr* 160 at p.171; Meek,
op .cit.. p. 267; Omoneukanrin, op .cit.. p.1+2; Leith- 
Hoss, African women (1938) p.102; Green, Ibo village 
affairs (191+7) pp797 and l6l; Bradbury, op .cit, .p .158»
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major share of the property of the deceased, recognised 
by the law as being transmissible on intestacy; unless 
this is varied by the latter*s will* In other v/ords, 
the sole heir takes over the deceased’s rights and 
interests in toto; while the principal heir succeeds to 
the substantial part of these rights and interests. It 
will be appreciated, therefore, that the topic of the 
rights of the heir is really another way of looking at 
the nature of the rights and interests comprised in the 
deceased’s estate - a subject which has already been 
treated in an earlier chapter. For this reason, this 
section dealing with the rights of the heir will be 
brief.
Eights of heir over inherited property compared with his 
rights in respect of his self-acquired or individual 
property
A distinction is sometimes made between the 
property inherited by the heir and that which he has ac­
quired by what may be termed his "unaided” or "individual” 
efforts. The basis of this distinction seems to be that, 
while he may dispose of, or do what he likes with, his 
se3f-acquired property; he is fettered in the use and enjoy-
1 See chapter seven, at pp.259 ff*
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ment of inherited property, which must descend according
to predetermined rules* Thus, Talbot says:
"The property may be said to be left to him ti*e* the 
heir] in trust for the family, and is rarely regarded . 
as personal; everyone in the house has a claim on it"
Similarly, it will be recalled that the successor under
Alcan law, who is appointed by the deceased’s family to
take charge of the property comprised in the estate, does
not possess the rights of an absolute owner in respect
of the property of which he is appointed a manager or 
2custodian •
Concerning the position in our area of special 
reference, howeyer, it is.proposed to make some comments 
on this distinction and to state, with respect, why it 
must be regarded as untenable in all cases of inheritance 
in which the estate has been formally distributed*
Firstly, it is hoped that the advocates of this 
distinction do not have in mind the rights enjoyed by 
the deceased or his heir by virtue only of the membership
1 . Talbot, The peoples of southern Nigeria (1926)*
vol.III, p.677.
2 See chapter seven, at p.257* footnote 1+; also Allott, 
"Marriage and internal conflict of laws in Ghana"
[1958] J.A.L. 161+, at p.l79> Allott, Essays in 
African law (i9 6 0), p*239* Ollennu, N*A*, The law of 
succession in Ghana (I960), pp*7“12, and the authoritys 
cited therein*
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of a group, like the family or village, holding and 
controlling the totality of rights in the property of 
the group, such as land. For, if this is the case, the 
short answer is that there simply is no question of 
inheritance here. This is because melther the deceased 
. hor, indeed, any member has any rights or interests in 
the property which are separate and distinct from the 
general ones enjoyed by every member of the group; and 
which he may use as he likes or transmit to his heirs on 
his death intestate. Every member of the group, be it 
the family, the village or some wider community, accedes 
to his rights of user and enjoyment of such property on 
birth; and when he dies, these become available for 
x^eallocation among the living members of the group. The 
following observation made by a learned writer affords 
support to our view:
” ...• unless there is private property owned and possessed 
by individuals, the question of inheritance hardly arises. 
For whereas an individual dies and his property, if he 
has any, has to be disposed of •••*, a group,such as 
a clan or tribe or family, does not die. Members die 
and are replaced by new members in the common enjoyment
of the property of the group ....  Under such conditions
there is no inheritance .*.• The group holds in common ••• 
The individual does not hold but only shares in the use; 
and accordingly, Y/hen he dies, there is nothing for
14-08
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anyone to inherit*' .
It must, however, he pointed out that in practice, 
the group may, and often does, accord the heir of a 
deceased member the preferential right of continued user 
with respect to that part of the property that was under 
the dead man’s exploitation during his lifetime. But 
such an arrangement, based upon the needs of the group 
as a whole and the circumstances and extent of the pro­
perty concerned, must not be confused with the more impor­
tant question of the ultimate title to such property, 
which is vested in the group. Perhaps, one of the 
clearest statements of the customary law. on this point is
that made in the Yoruba case of Taylor v. Williams and 
2anor. by G-raham Paul, <T.,who observed:
"... the correct view is at any moment that the ownership
1 Cole, G-.D.H., "Inheritance", in the Encyclopaedia of 
the Social Sciences (19U8), vol.VIII, p.35* But see: 
Elias, Nigerian land lav/ and custom (1962). pp.152 and 
166; and Elias, Nature of African customary law (1956) 
where the author states that children have rights of 
inheritance in respect of their parents’ interests in 
family property. With the greatest respect, the 
learned author’s view is untenable. While on the topic 
of group interests, however, it must be observed that 
the rights of administering or controlling such property 
may form the subject of inheritance. On this, see:
Meek, hand tenure and land administration in Nigeria 
(1957) p.!78n; Lloyd,1 '"Some notes on the*Yoruba rules 
of succession ..." L1959] J.A.L. 7 at p.11; Lloyd,
Yoruba land law (1962), p.283.
2 ‘(19355 12 N.L.P.67.
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of the family property is vested in the whole family ... 
That individual right of user is ... purely and simply
a life interest  the family will generally permit
his or her children to have among them the same user as 
their parent had if the circumstances of the family and 
of the property permit." (l)
Secondly, the distinction between the property
inherited by the heir and that which he has personally
acquired does not hold in the case of a sole heir who,
as has been seen, succeeds to the whole of the property
of the deceased. It will be recalled that such an
heir stands in the position of an absolute owner to the
inherited property; subject only to his moral, not legal,
obligation to give some share of such property to.his
younger brothers and sisters, especially those of them
who have assisted him in the performance of the burial
and funeral rites of the deceased. At the risk of being
charged with the fault of repetition, we maa^  quote again
the relevant passage occun&ng in the Benin case of
* ' " 2 
Iyamuse Ehigie v. Gregory Ehigie , where the president of
the grade "A" customary court, Benin, said:
"However, whenever the deceased leaves a lot of property, 
it is the usual practice for the eldest male childti.e* 
the sole heir] who performs the funeral ceremonies to .. 
give his brothers and sisters who have made satisfactory 
substantial contribution to the burial some share of the
1 IbicU at p.70. - < ,
2 H 9S1] All N.L.E.8U2J [1961] W.N.L.EV> .,307.
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*1property. He has a discretion in the matter.”
Thirdly the distinction made in this connection 
breaks down in respect of inherited property of which 
there has been partition - a mode of division which vests 
in each of the joint heirs the absolute title to his 
share
The only instance in which this distinction may 
be validly drawn is where the joint heirs enjoy their 
rights in respect of the inherited property in common.
In this case, the rights possessed by individual joint 
heirs are decidedly inferior to those they exercise in 
relation to their own self-acquired property; or those 
they enjoy in respect of their specific shares of the 
estate on partition. This is because until there has 
been partition, the estate is family property, in res­
pect of which no one of the heirs has a separate and
2
alienable interest .
1 Ibid, at p.8A5; and p.309, respectively.
2 On the nature of the rights of members in respect of 
family property, and on these rights where partition of 
such property has been effected, see: Coker, Family 
property among the Yorubas (1958) chaps.3-9; Lloyd, 
1rSome notes on the Yoruba rules of succession... tf
[1959] <T.A.L.7 at pp. 11 ff; Lloyd, "Family property
. among the Yoruba” [1959] J.A.L.105 ; Lloyd, Yoruba
land law (1962), chaps 4 , 9 end 11; Elias, Groundwork 
of Nigerian law (1953), chaps.16-18; Elias, Nigerian 
land law and custom.' 3rd edn. 1962, chaps. 7 and 10; 
also the decided authorities discussed in these works.
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What then are the rights of the heir in respect of 
the property he has inherited? Are his rights like those 
of an absolute ownex* or are they no higher than those of 
a mere controller or caretaker of property owned by the 
group, the family, for example? The answer is that the 
heir inherits the whole or substantial part of the estate * 
according as he is a sole or principal heir - in his own 
right and as an absolute owner; unless, in the case of 
a principal heir, the inherited property is treated as 
family property and is enjoyed as such. The fact that 
he has obligations, already considered, towards the 
dependants of the deceased does not reduce the rights of 
the heir over the inherited property to those of a mere 
controller or caretaker* For, while he was alive, the 
deceased owed similar obligations to his dependants; but, 
he nevertheless occupied the position of absolute owner 
in relation to those rights and interests which are by 
lav/ transmissible to his heirs on his intestacy. Further­
more, to argue that tie duty of the heir to maintain the 
deceased1s dependants limits his rights over the inheri­
tance in such a manner that he is no more than a care­
taker of the inherited property is to say that he has 
no obligations in this regard, if the dead man*s estate 
weie 'insolvent; which is', of course, not the case. As
k ! 2
the new head of the family, he is still the guardian 
and ’father* of the young children of the deceased; and 
must do his best to maintain and support all members 
who are in need.
Summarising the position, we may state that where 
there has been formal distribution, the rights of the 
heir over his inherited property are like those possessed 
by the absolute owner. They are co-e xtensive with 
those which the deceased exercised over the property 
comprised in his estate. It will be recalled that the 
rights of the deceased, collectively termed the assets 
of his estate, have been examined in chapter seven to 
which the reader is referred for a detailed discussion.
WHERE THE HEIR IS A MINORS GUARDIANSHIP OVER HIM
If the heir is himself a minor and so cannot be
entrusted with the discharge of his duties considered
above, he is placed under the guardianship of some adult
person until he comes of age. Such a guardian is usually
1the brother of the deceased or the head of the family .
1 Thomas, (1910)♦ pt.l. pp.68 ff and 86-9; Thomas,
(19X0), 11 J. Comp.Leg. (N.8.)» loc.eit.; Thomas, (191U) 
pt .IV. pp.133 ff; Meek, op .cit.. pp.117, 122+, 230 and 
322; Omoneukanrin, op .cit.. p.7i; Egharevba, op.cit.. 
p.39; Bradbury, op.cit.. pp. 77 and 107; Okojie, op. 
cit♦. pp.65, 90-2; Rowling, Land tenure in Benin 
Province (19*4*8) para. 1+9; Chubb, Ibo land tenure (1961) 
para. 39 *
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But, if there is no close male relative of the dead man; 
or if the relationship between such relative and the heir
•i
is not cordial, a mother may act as guardian to her child •
RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF GUARDIAN
It is proposed to take the duties of the guardian 
first, 3ust as consideration of the duties of the heir 
was placed before the discussion of the latter's rights.
In the case of the guardian, however, his duties are 
examined before dealing with his rights in order to dis­
courage the tendency on the part of many a guardian, on 
which we shall make some observations later, to misap­
propriate the property of the ward.
Guai’dianship entails three main duties; Firstly, 
the guardian is to manage the property of the minor heir
and ensure that the latter is maintained out of the pro-
2
perty or the proceeds thereof . Secondly, it is the 
duty of the guardian to discharge the obligations in­
cumbent on the heir, which have been considered above. 
Thirdly and finally, the guardian must hand over any 
property of his ward in his charge to the heir when the
1 Thomas, (1910)♦ pt.l. pp*75> 78,8h-5 and 88; Thomas,
(191U). pt.IYVn.13S: Green, Land tenure in an Ibo
village (I9U1). p. 15; Bradbury, on.cit.. pp .77 and 
121.
2 See generally the authorities cited in footnote 1 above 
and footnote 1 on p.h!2.
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latter comes of age; or when he marries under age *
Guardian1s liability to account
In theory, the guardian is hound to use the pro­
perty entrusted to him for the maintenance of his ward; 
and, subject to his right to remuneration to be considered 
presently, to put the latter into full possession of 
whatever is left of the property when the guardianship 
determines in circumstances indicated above* The rule 
of the Benin customary law on this point has been stated 
by Egharevba who writes:
nhe I i.e . the guardian] must talce care of the property... 
and is entitled to his own chop-money for his pains, 
but he ought not to take anything more than that out of 
the child’s own possessions. He ought to hand it over 
in good order..*.” (2)
In practice, however, the rules governing the 
liability of guardians to account for their dealings with 
the property of their wards are often disregarded, with 
the result that many a minor heir has grown up to find 
that precious little property remains out of an other­
wise substantial estate that has been left to him.
In this regard, we may note the fitting remarks of
1 Thomas, (1910)♦ pt.l. pp.68, 79 and 86; Thomas,
(1914). pt.IV. pp.134-51 Meek, op .cit.. p. 322; 
Egharevba, op.cit.. p.40; Okojie, loc.cit: Chubb, 
loc.cit.; Howling, loc.cit.
2 Egharevba, Benin law and custom (1949)* pp.39-40.
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Thomas, author of several works on the customs of the 
vast majority of the peoples of the Mid-Western Region, 
when he writes:
In point of fact, it "by no means follows that the guardian 
carries out his duties, and cases have been quoted ... in 
which children who were small at the time of their father’s 
death have lost all their property”, (l)
It may be added that the passage quoted above instantly
recalls to the mind the familiar story of the wicked
uncle who has used a minor's inheritance ”for the benefit
of himself*..
Misappropriation by the guardian: how the minor heir may
seek redress
A minor heir whose property has been wasted or 
misappropriated by his guardian may seek redress in one 
or more of the following ways, that is to say:
(a) bringing the matter before the elders of the family 
and, ultimately, before the local ruler;
(b) relying on the supernatural intervention of the 
departed ancestors; and
(c) instituting an action in a court of law, „
1 Thomas, Anthropological report on the Edo-speaking 
peoples (1 9 1 0), pt.l, p .68 •
2 See: Lloyd, "Some notes on the Yoruba rules of suc­
cession” C19593 'J.A.L.7 at p.lh; Lloyd, Yoruba land 
law (1962) p f285.
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(a) Bringing the matter before the elders of the family
and, ultimately, before the local ruler.
The minor heir may report the waste or misappropriation
of his property by his guardian to the elders of the
family, who then enquire into the matter; and order the
latter to make good the loss, if any, caused to the heir
a '
by the wrongful act complained of . An appeal lies from
2the decision of the family elders to the local ruler *
(b) Relying on the supernatural intervention of the 
departed ancestors
Rather than leave the issue of his guardian's misap­
propriation to the decision of mortals - the elders of 
the family or the local ruler - who may be partial, and 
who are certainly fallible, the heir may choose to rely 
on the’supernatural intervention of the departed ancestors; 
who are believed to be impartial in the exercise of their 
powers of visiting, as we have seen, acts of injustice, 
cheating and fraudulent dealings with sickness, other 
catastrophes and, indeed, death* Under the traditional 
system, the defaulting guardian might be made to prove his 
innocence or fidelity before the ancestral shrine^. This
1 Thomas, Anthropological report on Iho-speaking peoples 
(1914-)* pt.IV* pp * 134-5^i Mee'k, Law and authority in a 
Nigerian tribe (1937)9 pp.117* 12A and 230; Egharevba, 
Benin law and custom (194*9) * p.4*0*
2 Egharevba, loc.cit: cf. Thomas, (1914*)* Pt.IV* p.135*
3 Thomas, (19T4T* pt.IV* p. 135; Meek, op .cit., p. 230.
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method is, however, no longer enforceable in view of the 
provisions of the Criminal Code which make it an offence 
to participate in or preside at the ceremony of oath
4
taking • Nevertheless, among the believers in the cult 
of ancestors, the fear of the watchful eyes of the dead 
constitutes a most powerful influence which restrains acts 
of misappropriation on the part of the guardians; and 
ensures that the property of a minor is preserved during 
his minority* Thus, an author on the customs of the Mid- 
Western Ibo observes:
"If the guardian embezzles, the family of the heir’s 
mother and his own umunna Ci.e. the paternal family of 
the heir, to which the guardian also belongs] will warn him.
It is believed that the Qsacred stick and
symbol of the cult of aneestorsj of the heir’s father will 
kill him, if he goes too far in"this direction*" (2)
Similarly, Olcojie states the position among the Ishan as
follows:
"The ever constant fear of the swiftness of action of the 
departed ancestors over injustice and cheating made the 
inheritor,Li *e. the guardian] particularly honest and so 
turned over the non-perishable property *.* when the heir 
grew up; in other words, he held the property in trust"(3)
As already stated, however, the spread of Christianity
and other religions, such as Islam, has considerably
1 Laws of the Western Region of Nigeria, 1959, cap.28, 
ss.1U5-8.
2 Thomas, (191h)* pt.IV* p. 135*
3 Oko;jie, Ishan native laws and customs (I960), p*91*
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weakened the belief in, and the influence of, the cult 
of ancestors. Today, therefore, a legal action is the 
most effective means of checking the excesses of a 
fraudulent guardian. This means of redress open to the 
aggrieved ward is discussed under the next heading, insti­
tuting an action in a court of law.
(c) Instituting an action in a court of law
There is no doubt that an action will lie against a 
fraudulent guardian at the instance of his aggrieved ward.
It will have been noticed in chapter one - dealing v/ith 
the legal system of the Mid-Western Region - that the 
appropriate forum for bringing such an action is the cus­
tomary court. It may, however, be noted that though they 
have exclusive original jurisdiction in causes and matters 
relating to intestate succession governed by customary law, 
customary courts are often reluctant to entertain these 
suits on the ground that they are essentially disputes to 
be settled amicably by members of the family. As a learned 
writer states it:
"... they advise the parties to go home and to r eturn only 
when they have reached a settlement which, since it will 
(in the circumstance's) almost certainly follow customary 
law, the courts will sanetion.as their own decisions"#(l)
The only reported case involving a minor and his
1 Lloyd. [l959] J*A.L.7 at p.ll+; Lloyd, Yoruba land law 
(1962), loc.cit,; ef. Lloyd, "Family property among 
the Yorubatr|l959] J*A,L. 105 at p.110,
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guardian seems to be the Yoruba one of Martins■v . Martins • 
There, the minor who inherited a sum of money from his 
father lived with his uncle and guardian, the defendant 
in this action. The sum inherited by the minor had been 
deposited in a bank* The defendant, however, obtained 
an order of court authorising him to withdraw this sum 
for the express purpose of investing it in land, on behalf 
of his ward. No land was ever bought; whereupon the 
minor, on coming of age, brought this action for the 
recovery of the sum. The defence was that it had been 
spent with the consent of the ward and for his benefit; 
the defendant tendering receipts to the court as to how 
the amount had been expended.
Counsel for the plaintiff, the ward, contended that 
the defendant was accountable for the whole sum totalling 
£196.8s.5d* Butler Lloyd, J., however, held that, despite 
the impropriety on the part of the defendant in withdrawing 
the money for one purpose and spending it for another - 
school fees and maintenance of the plaintiff - he should 
be given credit for the amount spent on the maintenance of 
the plaintiff; provided that the amount alleged spent 
was strictly scrutinised. In the result, he was held
1 (19U0) 15 N.L.R.126*
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liable to pay to the plaintiff a paltry balance of £58.4s.3d.
Rights of the guardian
In return for the discharge of his duties outlined 
above, the guardian is entitled to remuneration* Thus, 
Egharevba states the Benin customary law on the point in 
this way:
"He.is entitled to his own chop-money [ i.e. subsistence 
allowance] for his pains....." (l)
Yfriere the minor’s property consists of land, the guardian 
may be rewarded by being allowed the use of such land 
during his term of office; which terminates, as has been 
indicated,' when the ward comes of age or marries. Writing 
on the native laws and customs of Egbaland (part of Yoruba- 
land) Partridge makes the following points concerning the 
rights of the guardian:
"The guardian is allowed,in return for his care of, and 
providing for, the ward, the use of, and the fruits ac­
cruing from, his ward’s land during the term of his guardian­
ship." (2)
t
1 Egharevba, Benin law and custom (1949) P*39*
2 Partridge, C . , VkNat ive Taw™'and"e us tom in Egbaland"
(1911) 10 J.A.S.422, at p .424; cf. Ajisafe, The laws and 
customs of the Yoruba people (1924) p.4*
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PART FIVE 
TESTATE SUCCESSION 
CHAPTER THIRTEEN
TESTATE SUCCESSION UNDER CUSTOMARY LAW
Concerning the rules relating to testate succession 
under Yoruba customary law, Lloyd, wz^ites:
"The distinction between testacy and intestacjr by English 
law is almost meaningless in Yoruba customary law. The 
tacit will of the Yoruba man has always been that his 
property shall be shared .... according to rules known to., 
all men1', (l)
This statement is equally true of dthhr peoples of southern
2Nigeria generally ; and, indeed, a learned author has urged
that there is, accordingly, no need to consider testate
3succession under customary law .
It should, however, be pointed out that Lloyd’s state­
ment of the Yoruba customary law quoted above is not intended 
to convey the idea that wills are unknown under this system 
of customary law# For, he also states that he has encountered 
"few wills" in his investigation of the rules of the 
Yoruba customary law^# The author’s observation is merely
1 Lloyd, "Some notes on the Yoruba rules of succession"
1959 J.A.L.7* at no.17-18; Lloyd. Yoruba land law
(1962) p.290. ------- —
2 See for instance; Meek, Land tenure and land administration 
in Nigeria (1957) p.182; Elias, Groundwork of Nigerian
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designed to emphasise that while testate succession is 
the rule under English law; it is the reverse under Yoruba 
customary law. Similarly, another learned author makes 
the point when he says;
"We have tended perhaps in modern times to regard succession 
under a will as normal or natural and intestate succession 
as exceptional or accidental.... While on the other hand, 
distribution of property on an intestate’s death has been 
regarded in English law as complementary to testamentary 
dispositions, that is to say, as taking effect in the 
absence of and subject to any intentions manifested by a 
testator in his will. In early communities, however, a
will was something very different it was an abnormal
occurrence..... " 5
Notwithstanding the view expressed by a learned author 
to the effect that testate succession under customary law 
need not be considered , it is proposed to deal with the 
topic for the following reasons • As will be shov/n later^ 
testate succession under customary law is not confined to 
wills, i.e. dispositions that speak from death; but covers 
gifts inter vivos and donationes mortis causa or even the 
designation of the heir. As regards wills, it has never 
been doubted that those of them complying with the require­
ments of the customary law.are clearly recognised. The
2 •••* law (1953)* P*337;: Elias, Nigerian land law and
Custom. 3rd edn. (1952) p.228.
3 ' Elias. (1953). loc.cit.; Elias (1962) .loc.cit.
k Lloyd, [1959] J*A.L.7, at p.18; Lloyd, Yoruba land law, 
p.291*
5 Parry, The law of succession, i+th edn.? 1961, pp.2-3*
k 2 3
"few wills" encountered by Lloyd have already been men­
tioned. And, specifying some of the instances in which 
a man may make a customary will, the author says;
’The few wills I have encountered have been made either to 
clarify the wishes of the testator in distributing his 
property customarily, or to ensure that his children by 
concubines shall receive a fair share of the estate", (l)
Witness also the dictum of Crane Ag. J. in the recent
2Yoruba case of A.joke v. Olate.iu , where the learned Judge 
observed;
"Death-bed declarations are not unknown to native customary 
law, and the courts do in fact recognise them." (3)
Again, whatever might have been the position in the
traditional society, it is now widely accepted that the
general enlightenment of the people at the present day^ *,
coupled with the shift of emphasis from the agnatic or
extended family of old to the immediate family - the
spouses and their children - is conducive to the desire
to make wills, either under the customary law or general
law.
Furthermore, despite the earlier emergence of intestate 
succession, it is generally believed that the practice fol­
lowed by testators in their will-making has had some
1 Lloyd, [1959] J.A.L.7, at p. 18; Lloyd, Yoruba land law, 
p.291.
2 ri962j L.L.R.137*
3 Ibid. at p.139*
I4. Meek, op .cit.. p.l8L| Elias, Nigerian land law and 
custom, (1 9 6 2) ♦ p.2 6 6.
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influence on the customary law rules relating to intestacy*
As an eminent writer puts it:
"The fact that men usually ask that their property shall he 
distributed in a certain way helps to create a rule that 
it should descend in that way in the absence of provision 
to the contrary"* (l)
Powers of the propositus to affect succession to his estate 
The normal rules of intestate succession already dis­
cussed may be varied by the deceased himself in one or more 
of the following ways, viz: by -
(1) gifts inter vivos;
(2) nuncupative or oral wills; and
(3) donatio mortis causa*
It will be seen later that of the three ways enumerated,
only the nuncupative will, strictly speaking, refers solely
to the testamentary powers of the deceased. Gifts fall
within the powers of the deceased to influence the normal
course of succession to his estate by disposition inter vivos;
while the donatio mortis causa has been described as "a
singular form of gift*... of an amphibious nature... neither 
a complete disposition inter vivos nor a testamentary 
gift". (2) _ _ _ _ _
The deceased, thus, has - in addition to his testamentary 
powers which refer solely to dispositions which speak from 
death - powers of dispositions, such as those relating to
1 Diamond, A*S*, Primitive law (1935)* p.2i+8*
2 Re Beaumont jfl902j 1 Ch,889* at p.892, per Buckfery, J.
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gifts and the designation of his heirs, by means of which 
he may vary the normal course of succession to his property*
A
The term ’’dispositive succession’*, has been used in desig­
nating these latter powers of the deceased in contradis­
tinction to his powers with regard to testamentary succession*
Role of both types of succession (dispositive and testamentary)
When a man dies, his property is usually distributed
among his children and members of his extended family* But
he may not wish his normal heirs to inherit his property,
as when he was on bad terms with his family during his life- 
2time • Or he may be anxious to leave specific property to 
someone else - his child or wife,' or even a complete stranger. 
Several reasons may be vesponsible for the action of a man 
wishing to make a departure from the normal course of suc­
cession to his estate; but it is probably true that 
reasons of this kind gave rise to the practice of making 
gifts inter vivos* nuncupative wills and donationes mortis 
causa*
One or two of such reasons may be mentioned* A man may 
give property to a relative, wife or friend as a reward for 
the care and attention he received from such a person during 
his lifetime , especially during the fatal illness. He
1 The writer first heard this term used by Professor A.N. 
Allott in October, 1958, during the course of LL.M. 
seminars on African Law he (the writer) attended.
2 Chubb, Ibo land tenure (1961), para.39*
3 Green, Land tenure in an Ibo village (l9Ul)> p.27*
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may also leave proper^ to any of his children or wives for 
whom he had special l o v e ; m a y  make adequate provision 
for any or all of them in order to avoid the harsh conse­
quences of the rules governing distribution, under which 
these persons may be excluded from the inheritance . Finally, 
a man may distrust his heirs and may be anxious to prevent 
injustice and disputes in connection with the division of 
his estate? and so lay down, as his last will and testament,
p
the precise manner in which the distribution should be made .
Wavs in which the deceased may affect the normal course 
of succession to his estate.
(l) Gifts inter* vivos
A man may make a gift of some of his property to some­
one else, usually a relative or very intimate friend. Such 
a gift may be outright; or it may be conditional, depending 
on the manifest intention of the donor.
The distinction between the two kinds of gift is 
fairly obvious. In one, the donee is entitled to an
immediate interest in possession in respect of the subject- 
matter of the gift; in the other, the doneefs interest 
may be either subject to its being divested on the breach
1 Diamond, loc.cit; Chubb, Ibo land tenure. 2ne edn.(l96l),
para. 102; Forde, D*, Yak# studies (TSQIT p*108.
2 Diamond, loc.cit; Meek, Lair and authority in a- Nigerian
tribe (1937) * 5 ”^ 322; Meek.. Land tenure and land admini- 
stration in Nigeria*.. p.184; Lloyd, tl95§j?*A*L.7
at p.18; Lloyd, Yoruba land law. p*29l; Egharevba,
Benin law and custom (1949). P.39*
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of the condition (by the donee) upon which the gift was 
made; or the actual vesting’of the subject-matter of the 
gift may be made subject to the fulfilment of a condition 
precedent on the part of the donee. Thus, if a gift was 
made on the condition that the donee should observe special 
conduct of behaviour towards the donor, the interest of the 
former vests immediately in possession; but it is liable 
to be divested when he ceases to behave as stipulated, and 
the donor revokes the gift. As regards a conditional gift 
where the condition is the performance of a prior obliga­
tion,- an example may be given of a gift of a portion of land 
to a donee on the condition that he built upon it. If he 
complied with the condition by erecting a building on such 
portion of land, his interest vested and became absolute; 
if he failed to build as stipulated, the gift would not 
take effect."*
Proof of gifts inter vivos
Meek states that a gift inter vivos must be made ,fin 
front of disinterested witnesses” • This statement would 
seem to suggest that it is a customary law rule governing 
gifts that the transaction, must not only be witnessed; but 
also that the witnesses to the. transaction must be dis-
1 Alake v. Halid and anor. (1935) 12 N.L.R.22; where, 
however, such a gift was made by a will in English form.
2 Meek, Land tenure and land administration in Nigeria p.182#
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interested ones. With the greatest respect, this view
does not accord with the customary law rule on the point.
It is, of course, admitted that the absence of written
evidence of transactions under customary law is generally
iprovided for by the presence of witnesses • But this is
not to say that an otherwise valid gift is rendered void
and unenforceable by reason only that it was not made ”in
front of witnesses” - a matter which 3s relevant only to proof
and not to the constitution of the gift* The requirement
as to the ”disinterestedness” of the witnesses sounds, with
due respect, unconvincing. It is most unlikely for
a man to make a gift of his property without ensuring that
there are present some members, especially the elders, of 
2the family • Now, these persons are obviously interested 
in the making of the gift.. For, if no gifts were made by 
the donor, all his property would fall into the hands of 
members of his family at his death, and would be available 
for distribution among them* It is submitted that provided, 
as will appear later, that the donor had full control of 
his mental faculties and had his own private or individually*
1 Blias, Nigerian land law and custom pp. 184 and 186;
Coker, Family property among the Yorubas* p*69*
2 Thomas, Anthropological report on the Edo-speaking peoples
(1910), pt.l, p .67; Thomas. Anthropological report on
Ibo-speaking peoples (1914)» pt.IV, pp.131-2; Omoneukanrin, 
Itsekiri law and custom (1942), p*73| Okojie, Ishan 
native laws and customs (i96 0), p*90.
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owned' property, the issue as to whether or not he made a 
gift of some or all of his property is a question of fact. 
Thus, in Alake and anor. v. Awawu , where the point for de­
cision was whether the deceased mother of the parties had 
made a gift of one parcel of her land to the defendant, the 
Court treated the issue as one of fact; and found for the 
defendant. Ringdon, C.J., delivering the judgement of 
the court, observed:
” .. .As regards the ... property the appellants contended 
that the finding of the learned trial Judge that the parties1 
mother .... did in fact give the property during her life­
time to the defendant is wrong .... it is pure question of
fact”• (2)
Essential elements of a valid gift inter vivos
On the esential elements of a valid gift inter vivos.
Meek was on firmer ground when he says:
,fAs regards gifts inter vivos, it is hardly necessary to 
observe that gifts must be of property which can be legally 
given away..” (3 )
It follows that a man can only give away property it is 
his to give* He cannot, for instance, validly make a gift 
of someone^ property; or of his undivided and unidentifiable 
share in his family property, since, as we have seen, no 
one member has a separate and identifiable interest therein.
1 11 N.L.R.39* See also, Malomo and ors. v. Olusola and
anor. v. Osho and ors (1954) 21 N.L.B.1. and Bankole'""and
anor. v. Tapo ri96l! All H.L.H.140.
2 Ibid. at pp.39-40. Underlined for emphasis.
3 Meek. Land tenure and land administration in Higeria(1957) p.162:
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Perhaps, this is where it is advisable (it cannot he put 
higher* so as to erect a legal rule) that there must he wit­
nesses - especially family members and elders - to the 
transaction. As a writer puts it:
**rhe transaction should therefore be witnessed by the donor’s 
olori ebi [i.e. the head of the family] as a certification , 
that the donor does in fact possess the right to the gift..”
The donor must be able to make full use of his mental 
facilities at the time of the gift. So, a gift made during 
a period of madness, or under the influence of drink or 
drugs, or in extreme old age imposing senility, is null and 
void, since the donor would not be expected to exercise 
his powers of reasoning properly. The gift must also be 
voluntary in the sense that it is an act of free volition on 
the pai*t of the donor. These essential elements of a 
valid gift - mental state and free will of the donor - are the 
same as in the case of nuncupative wills, and will be dis­
cussed more fully in the section on wills*
The donee must signify his acceptance of the gift at 
the time it is made or so soon thereafter as he can; and 
must, in any case, do so in the presence of the donor. He 
may present a drink, some money or any article to the donor 
or his relatives. Such a present, however, - does not form
1 Lloyd. ”Some notes on the Yoruba rules of succession” 
[1959] J.A.L.7, at p.17; Lloyd, Yoruba land law (1 9 62) 
p.290* Of. Loveridge, A.J., ”Wills and the customary law 
in the Gold Coast” (1950) 2 J.A.A., No*4* 24 at p.27.
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an essential element of* a gift, unless it was a conditional 
gift made on such a condition. In this connection and 
hy way of contrast, we may note the position under Akan 
customary law, under which the donee must evidence his 
acceptance by the gift of aseda (drink or some token sum of 
money) which he presents to the donor; part of which is 
served or shared among the witnesses to the transaction * 
Lastly, it is also an essential element of a valid 
gift inter vivos that the donee is put in possession of 
the subject-matter of the gift. In the case of movable 
property, the donor must effect actual delivery of the gift. 
As regards immovable property, such as land, however, pos­
session is given by taking the donee to the land and round 
the boundaries; usually at a time when the owners of ad­
joining lands are present in response to prior notice given 
to them by the donpr*
We may then summarise the essential elements of a valid 
gift inter vivos as follows:
(a) the sanity of the donor;
(b) the free will of the donor;
(c) the disposability of the subject-matter;
1 On this, see: Rattray, JR.S., Ashanti law and constitution
(1956), pp. 154 24 an& 116; Danquah, J.B., Skan laws and 
customs (1928). pp*185 and 219; Matson, J.N.^^Iestate 
succession in Ashantitf (1953) 23 Afr. p.224*
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(d) the acceptance of the gift "by the donee in the lifetime 
of the donor; and
(e) the delivery of the subject-matter by the donor to the 
donee •
(2) Nuncupative or oral wills
A nuncupative will has been defined as Ha declaration
made voluntarily and orally by a person in sound mind, in 
expectation of death, in the presence of responsible and 
disinterested witnesses”* (l)
The definition rightly calls attention to some of the 
principal characteristics of a nuncupative will, namely:
(a) that the testator must possess sound mental capacity;
(b) that the dispositions must be voluntary and free from 
undue influence, fraud or coercion; and
(c) that it is oral.
However, this definition is inadequate in several 
respects, and calls for some comments. It is certainly not 
a rule of the customary 3aw that a nuncupative will can only 
be validly made in expectation of death. It is, of course, 
true that a man may be reluctant to indicate the destination 
of his property unless and until he feels that he is ap­
proaching the end of his days* But that is an entirely 
different matter from saying that a testator cannot make
1 Meek, Land tenure and land administration in Nigeria
p.182.
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a valid nuncupative will when he is in good, health. It 
is submitted that it is not essential that the testatoi* 
should be on the point of death, in grave sickness, or even 
in fear of death in the future; and that the requirement 
as to expectation of death is, as will be shown later, 
relevant only in the case of a donatio mortis causa.
Similarly, the definition is unduly restrictive in
its requirement that the declaration must be made in the
presence of disinterested witnesses. It will be recalled
that this requirement has been adequately criticised in
connection with gifts inter vivos, and the reader is referred
to the section on these. It is, however, necessary to
observe that it is almost certain that a man wishing to
dispose of his property by a nuncupative will would ensure
that the members of his family were close at hand. Meek
himself admits this elsewhere, for he states:
”When a person of social importance becomes a permanent 
invalid, or so ill that he is likely to die, he may call . 
the family-group together and designate his successor..... . 
A case came to my notice of a rich man overriding local 
custom by bequeathing the family ofo to his eldest son when 
normally it should have passed to his younger brother.
But the old man first secured the consent of all the members 
of the family including the brother...” (2)
From the practical point of view, however, it is ad­
visable for the beneficiary under a nuncupative will to
1 Me&, Law and authox^ity in a Nigerian tribe, p.303*
2 Meek, ibid. pp.322-3*
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ensure that there are both disinterested or independant 
witnesses and the family witnesses - who, obviously, a're 
interested in the testamentary gift - when the declaration 
is made. Both types of witnesses serve different func­
tions: the disinterested or independant ones help to prove
the gift, they being regarded as impartial by reason of 
their lack of interest in the ,matter; the family witnesses, 
though interested, serve to bind the family by their con­
senting presence or acquiescence.
Essential requirements of a valid nuncupative will
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The essential requirements as to the mental state of 
the testator and the voluntary nature of his dispositions 
have been noted. Other essential elements are that:
(a) the property given away must be identifiable;
(b) it must be disposable; and
(c) the beneficiary must be identificable*
Putting all the essential requirements together, the es­
sential elements of a nuncupative will may be stated as:
(i) testamentary intention of the testator;
(ii) identity of the subject-matter;
(iii)disposability of the subject-matter; and
(iv) identity of the beneficiary.
These essential elements will now be briefly considered*
(i) Testamentary intention
One aspect of this requisite is that a person suffering 
from mental disorder is, during the continuance of such 
disorder, incapable of making a valid testamentary disposi­
tion. Infirmity or weakness caused by old age or illness 
may produce such mental disorder as to affect a person^ 
testamentary capacity. Similarly, any temporary impair­
ment of the mind resulting from accident, which deprives 
a person of the full use of his mental faculties, may 
interfere with his capacity to make a valid nuncupative 
will. A drunkard, therefore, cannot make a valid nun­
cupative will while he is drunk; nor can a person who is. 
drugged, while still under the influence of drugs. But 
a will made by an insane person during a lucid interval is 
valid. The requirement as to this aspect of testamentary 
intention is similar to the position under the general law; 
and it is difficult to resist quoting the classic utterance
-i
made on the matter by Cockburn, C.J., in Banks v. Goodfellow
"It is essential ... that a testator shall understand the 
nature of the act and its effects; shall understand the ex­
tent of the propei'ty of which he is disposing; shall be 
able to comprehend and appreciate the claims to which he 
ought to give effect; and with a view to the latter object 
that no disorder of the mind shall poison his affections; 
pervert his sense of right or prevent the exercise of his 
natural faculties, that no insane delusion shall influence 
his will in disposing of his property, and bring about a
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disposal of it which, if the mind had been sound, would 
not have been made • " (i)
The other aspect of this essential element is that a
nuncupative will is invalid if it is made through undue
influence which destroys the free agency of the testator,
and substitutes therefor? the will of another. This will
be the case where a testator was forced by the threat of
death, bodily harm or the disgrace resulting from the
non-performance of his funeral i»ites to give his property away.
(ii) Identity of subject-matter
The property left by means of a nuncupative will must 
be specified either as an individual item or as one or 
more of a class of items, for example, a particular chair; 
or one or ..more of plots of land owned by the testator. This 
is because, as has been noticed, a man may not give away 
his entire estate; and certain specific items of his 
property may be reserved for his sole dr principal heir.
(ii) Disposability of subject-matter
This requirement is self-evident. Nemo dat quod non 
habet is the statement of the English legal principle for 
it. A man can only give away property which it is his
1 Ibid, at p.5 6 5 *
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to dispose of. His attempt, for instance, to devise his 
undivided and unidentifiable share in his family or com- 
mun;:al property will be ineffective, since, as we have 
pointed out earlier, his interest therein is inalienable 
until there has been partition of such property; and, in 
any case, his interest therein determines at his death.
This point will be illustrated more fully when we deal with 
testate succession under the general law in the next 
chapter.
(*v ) Identity of beneficiary
This requirement does not normally present any dif­
ficulty; for, unless unavoidably prevented, it is usual 
for the beneficiary under a nuncupative will to be present 
when the declaration is made; and to accept the devise or 
bequest made to him. But it is not essential that he 
should be personally present at the time when the will is 
made; and a testator may validly give property by his will 
to his absent child or one en ventre sa mere. In this 
regard, the contrast between the beneficial interests of 
posthumous children under a will and the absence, generally, 
of their rights under the rules relating to intestacy should 
be noted. For, while, as we have seen, a posthumous child
s.
is not generally accorded inheritance rights in the dis­
tribution of its father’s estate, it can be a beneficiary 
under his will.
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Anothei* factor which makes it easy to fulfil this 
requirement of the nuncupative will is the publicity that 
attends the declaration; coupled with the fact that the 
beneficiaries under a man’s will are usually well-known - 
his children and other members of the family, and, some­
times, his wives. It is only rarely that a man may leave 
any of his property to a personal who is a stranger to him 
by blood. As has been noted, this usually happens when 
the relationship between the testator and his family was 
strained at the time he made his will•
Effect of a nuncupative will 
(• a) When it takes effect
A nuncupative will takes effect on the death of the 
testator; and once it has been validly made, the bene­
ficiary acquires a vested interest in the property given, 
subject only to a condition precedent, namely; the death 
of the testator. in zhe mean time, the testator may use 
the property as he pleases• a nuncupative will is thus 
distinguishable from an outright gift inter vivos, where, 
as we have seen, the donee acquires an immediate interest 
in possession.
(b) The attitude of the testator’s family
It will have already been seen that neither the consent 
of the members of the family nor their presence at the time
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of making the declaration is an essential requirement with
1
respect to the constitution of an otherwise valid nuncupative 
will made by the testator. Nevertheless, their attitude 
to the dispositions contained in the will is important if 
only because it is their scrutiny which ensures that any 
invalid provisions -therein contained are not enforced; since 
disputed cases of succession very often end at the family 
level, and without the intervention of the court*
Members of the family, especially those who have not 
benefited or ben^ited adequately under the testator*s will, 
are naturally hostile to gifts made by their deceased ■ 
member by his will* The persons most jealous of such 
gifts will be potential heirs, the brothers and sisters of 
the deceased, and other members of the extended family, in 
that order. Their jealousy inez*eases as the degree of 
blood relationship between the testator and the beneficiary 
becomes less close. Hence, gifts to members of the family 
will occasion least scrutiny ox1 opposition; thereafter gifts 
to the deceased’s wives and intimate friends will not be 
too jealously scrutinised, unless where they are excessive 
or the recipients are in ill favour; while, lastly, be­
quests and, especially, devises to complete strangers will 
be most strenuously resisted. This is where the point made 
in connection with the advisability of the presence of some
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members of the family at the time of the gift is of 
immense importance. By ensuring that some of their members 
are so present, a beneficiary thereby forestalls both the 
hostility and objection of the family to the gift •
( 1/ When the family may upset a will
A nuncupative will complying with the essential require 
ments discussed above may nevertheless be successfully 
challenged by the testator’s family, on the ground that 
giving effect to it would be tantamount to disinheriting 
the person entitled under the rules relating to intestacy. 
This statement of the law is most vividly illustrated by 
the Itsekiri maxim:
" *E ne biri omokparan te tse te gba gba aro-okun* (Be 
what it may the heir-at-law fi.e. the eldest son} must 
receive the coral-bead necklace”* (l)
We have already seen that the house in which a father lived 
may not be left away from his eldest son; nor must he 
f[the eldest son] be deprived of specific articles, such as, 
the deceased father’s only gun, hat, bundle of beads, etc.
Failure of gifts
(a) Revocation
The testator may at any time before his death revoke 
a testamentary gift. He may do this, for instance, where
1 Omoneukanrin, op.cit., p.74*
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he is no longer on good terms with the beneficiary; as 
where the latter has been guilty of infamous conduct, or 
has been insolent to the testator or to a member of the 
latter’s family.
(b) Ademption
Sometimes a testator may during his lifetime dispose 
of the whole or best part of the property he had previously 
allotted to a beneficiary; or the property given is des­
troyed during the lifetime of the testator; or he may 
recover a debt or part of it after he had bequeathed it 
to a beneficiary* When this happens, such property or 
part thereof, as the case may be, is adeemed. But there 
is no presumption of ademption, as under the general law, 
whereby provisions made by a father during his lifetime to
his child may, in certain circumstances, operate to adeem
<1
a gift given to the child in his father’s will •
(c) Lapse •
If the benefificary dies during the liifebime of the 
testator, the gift to him lapses. The provisions of the 
general law,which save a gift from lapsing where the 
beneficiary predeceasing a testator leaves a surviving 
child,have no application under customary law.
1 On this presumption of ademption (general law £English 
LawJ ), see Parry, op .cit., pp .124-6.
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(d) Disclaimer
A beneficiary may refuse or renounce a gift made to
him by the testator. Such a disclaimer usually occurs
where onerous conditions are attached to the gift; or,
where, in consequence of the gift being made, the beneficiary
is required or merely expected to undertake some heavy
responsibilities. An instance of such responsibilities
is the case where a benefificary is required or expected to
bear the whole or major part of the testator’s burial and
funeral expenses. Meek puts the point in this way:
“...A gift of this kind may involve responsibilities - such 
as a duty to bear yart of the expenses of the deceased’s 
funeral. The heir named may also be held responsible for 
a portion of the deceased's uebts (proportionate to the 
amount of the bequest)**. (1)
The effect of reducing a nuncupative will into writing
With the spread of literacy, the terms of the traditional 
oral will are sometimes reduced into writing. The idea 
behind such a practice may be to clarify the wishes of the 
testator; and to ensure that little or no room is left for 
disputing the fact of his having made a customary will*
The effect, however, of such writing may astound the testator, 
since the view has been that the will is thereby taken 
from the realm of rhe customary law; and its validity in
1 Meek, Land tenure and land administration in Nigeria., 
p p .183; cf. Thomas, Anthropological report on the Edo- 
speaking peoples. (1910), pt.l, pp.70 ff; Talbot, The 
peoples of southern Nigeria (1926), vol.Ill, p.428; 
^gharevba, op.clt.. p.33; Okojie, op .cit., p. 92,
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the sense of qualifying for admission to probate is 
governed by the general law relating to wills* It should, 
however, be observed that once such a will is successfully 
propounded for probate purposes, its provisions will be 
.construed, and they take effect* in accordance with the 
applicable customary law* This point will be illustrated 
in chapter fourteen dealing with wills made in the general 
law (English law) form*
Admission of written customary wills to probate 
(a) The Federal Territory of Lagos
The High Court of Lagos will not grant probate or let­
ters of administration with the will attached in the case 
of a written customary will* It has already been observed 
that the jurisdiction of that Court in probate causes and 
matters is, gnerally spealcing, to be exercised in con­
formity with the law and practice for the time being in force in 
England, Now, the English High Court of Justice will not 
admit such a will to probate* There is also the fact that 
the English Wills Acts apply to Lagos as statutes of
2general application in force on the 1st January, 1900 ; and the 
Court itself had' decided that even a will made in
1 (1837), 7 Will and 1 Viet, c.26; and (1832), 13 Viet.
c*5*
2 In the will of Wright: Lumpkin & anor* v. Sousa (1929) 
9 N.L.R.81, at p.82,
English form will not he admitted to prohate if it fails 
to comply with the requirements of the general law. Thus, 
in Nelson and, anor. v. Akofiranmi , Bellamy, <J., refused to 
grant prohate in respect of a will made in English form on 
which the testator had made his mark after the attesting 
witnesses had signed their names* In the course of his 
judgement, he observed:
11 It is clear to my mind that before a document can he admitted 
to probate it has to he a testamentary document, complying 
with the requirements of the Wills Acts, 1837 and 1852"• (2)
Similarly, in the more recent case of the Federal Admini-
strator-General v. Johnson and anor , where the defendants
(two of the testator*s children) unsuccessfully opposed the
grant of probate to the plaintiff (the executor), Coker, J.,
as he then was, laid down the law as follows:
"By the law of wills it is required that every will probate 
of which is granted should he free and voluntary expression 
of a capable testator and that every such will should he 
properly attested in accordance with the provisions of 
section 9 of the Wills Act." (U)
C O  The Eastern Region
It has already been seen that the original jurisdiction
of the High Court of the Eastern Region is excluded "in any
matter which is subject to the jurisdiction of a Native Court 
relating to marriage, family status, guardianship of children 
and inheritance or disposition of property on death."
1 tl959]L.L.R.lU3.
2 Ibid, at p.11+5•
3 T5S50lL.ltR.290. 
k Ibid. at p.293.
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It has also been seen that the courts, which exercise 
original Jurisdiction in these matters, are the customary 
courts . The High Court will on this ground alone refuse 
to exercise original Jurisdiction in respect of the admis­
sion to probate of a customary will* In the case of Briggs 
•\
v. Briggs , which involved paternity and legitimacy under 
customary law, the High Court set aside the Judgement of 
the magistrate’s court which heard the case at first 
instance, on the ground that the lower court had no Juris­
diction.
Quite apart from the provisions of the High Court Law 
on this point, the Court is, as we have seen, to exercise 
Jurisdiction in these matters in conformity with the 
current English law and practice relating to the grant of 
prohate* This, of course, means that the English Wills 
Acts apply, quite apart from their application by virtue 
of their being held as statutes of general application 
applying to Nigeria. Thus, in Onwudinjoh v. Onwudinjoh and
o
ors*", Ainley, G.J., held that the will alleged made by the 
testator could not be admitted to probate on the ground, 
inter alia, That it aid not comply with the requirements 
of section 9 of the WilxS Act, j.837*
1 (1957) II E.N.L.K.6.
2 (1957) II E.N.L.k .1.
( c) The Western and the Mid-Western Regions
Unlike the High Court of Lagos .act and the High Court Law
of the Eastern Region, the High Court umi uf the western
liegion does not have any specific provisions permitting
the court to exercise its prohate jurisdiction in conformity
with English law*"' But there is a general provision which
would rule out the question of admitting customary wills to
probate. The relevant provision reads:
"To the extent that such jurisdiction may be conferred by 
the Regional Legislature, the jurisdiction by this Law vested 
in the High Court shall include all Her Majesty's civil 
jurisdiction  ....  for the judicial hearing and determina­
tion of matters in difference, or for the administration or 
control of property or persons (l)
It cannot be seriously argued that the jurisdiction of Her 
Majesty’s High Court also exists for the granting of probate 
in respect of customary wills*
There are, however, two other reasons why the High Courts 
of these two Regions will not admit written customary wills 
to probate* Firstly, it has been noted that these Courts 
have no original jurisdiction in causes and matters relating 
to customary succession, where these arc subject to the 
jurisdiction uf a customary court* Secondly, we have seen 
that the'.Administration of Estates Law, which applies in 
probate matters, contains an express provision excluding
1 The High Court Law of the western Region, Laws of the 
Western x<egion, 1959* cap .Ui+, s* 9(t).
The Court is, however, to follow English procedure and 
practice in probate matters. See: The High Court Law
(Western Region), cap *i+h# ss. 9 and 11.
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eases where the succession is governed by customary law.
The position of a written customary will in a customary court 
The question here raised is: suppose, instead of 
being propounded in the High Court, a written customary 
will is produced before a customary court, has the latter 
court power to deal with it in a manner approximating to 
the way in which the High Court grants probate in respect
of wills in English form? The answer to this question
depends entirely on the provisions of the law establishing 
these customary courts, and the jurisdiction conferred upon 
them by that law, As regards the Federal Territory of 
Lagos, this question does not arise, since it has been 
observed that there are no such courts in the Federal Ter­
ritory, For the position in the rest of southern Nigeria,
the relevant provisions of the Customary Courts Laws will 
fall to be examined,
(a) The Western and the Mid-Western Regions
The customary courts of both the Western and the 
Mid-Western Regions have no power to admit a written cus­
tomary will in proceedings before the%because their juris­
diction in succession matters is limited to tfeauses and
matters relating to inheritance upon intestacy and the . 
administration of intestate estates under customary law” #
1 The Customary Courts (Amendment) Law, W,R* No,3U of 
19599 amending the Second Schedule to the Customary 
Courts Lav/, cap*31» ibid*
Ij.^8
Matters relating to customary wills deal with, testacy, and 
therefore fall outside the jurisdiction of these courts•
(b) The Eastern Region
The position of the customary courts of the Eastern 
Region is different, and a written customary will complying 
with the essential requirements of the customary law already 
considered will be admitted in these courts as the last will 
and testament of the testator. This view, which is also
A
held by a writer on Ibo law , is supported by a provision
2
of the Customary Courts Law , which confers jurisdiction 
on the courts in respect of succession under customary law, 
whether testate or intestate. The relevant provision reads, 
in part:
!,Causes and matters relating to succession to property and 
administration of estates under customary law....1’ (3)
(3) Donatio mortis causa
We have already briefly touched upon the amphibious
nature of a donatio mortis causa. It falls half-way betv/een
a nuncupative will and a gift inter vivos: and possesses
some of the characteristics of these two ways by means of 
which the deceased may affect the course of succession to 
his estate.
A donatio mortis causa is like a nuncupative will
1 Obi, The Ibo law of property (19&3) P*211.
2 No.21 of 1956.
3 Ibid. First Schedule thereto, para. 2(iii)*
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in the sense that it takes effect, and is conditional, on 
the death of the donor. But, whereas it is not an essential 
requirement of a nuncupative will that the "beneficiary under 
it must be given possession of the devise or "bequest, it 
is essential in the ease of a donatio mortis causa that 
the donee should be put in possession of the subject-matter 
of the gift. In this requirement (that the donee should 
have possession of the property given), it resembles the 
gift inter vivos: but, unlike the latter, the interest of
the donee in the case of a donatio does not vest in pos­
session until the death of the donor.
A donatio mortis causa is more likely to "be made in 
time of illness, when the donor is on his death-bed, and 
when he hurriedly sends for the donee and members of the 
family. But it must be pointed out that it is not essential 
that the donor should be on the point of death, in grave 
sickness, or even in fear of death in the near future*
Other likely times for the making of donationes are during 
periods of stress, or when the donor is about to engage in 
a risky undertaking. As an example of the first, the writer 
would recall his experience during the Second World War 
when several young soldiers, hailing from his district, made 
gifts of their property, conditional on their death in war.
As regards the second, the writer has personally witnessed 
instances of persons making donationes just before going
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for major operations in the hospitals.
For the essential requirements of the donatio mortis 
causa, the reader is referred to what has been discussed in 
connection with the essential elements of both the nuncupative 
will and the gift inter vivos, But, perhaps, it is pertinent 
to quote one of the best statements of the law in this 
regard, namely, the classic utterance of Lord Kussell of 
Killowen in Gain v. Moon :
°For an effectual donatio mortis causa, three things must 
combine: first, the gift or donation must have been in 
• contemplation, though not necessarily in e:xpectation of 
death; secondly, there must have been delivery to the donee 
of the subject-matter of the gift; and thirdly, the gift must 
be made in such circumstances as to show that the thing is 
to revert to the donor in case he should recover0. (2)
Limitations on the powers of the deceased to effect disnosi- 
tions of his property
If the testamentary dispositions and gifts inter vivos 
made by the deceased are to take effect, they must not offend 
certain rules of the customary law. Otherwise, they are 
liable to be upset at the instance of the members of the 
family, especially those who would take in default of such 
dispositions and gifts • In point of fact, however, the 
family are reluctant to override the wishes of the deceased;
2 Ibid, at p.286.
3 Meek, Land tenure and land administration in Nigeria .. 
p.183; Okojie, op.cit.. p.93* Rowling, Land tenure in 
Benin Province, para. 23; Bradbury, The Benin kingdom.
1
p.47.
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and will nearly always endeavour to carry them out, out or 
fear of the spirit of the departed man or of respect for 
his memory *
The customary rules limiting the deceased*s powers of 
disposition may he stated as those relating to:
(1) nature of property involved; and
(2) disherison*
It will he noted later that both rules have much in common, 
in being designed so as to prevent a man from practising 
generosity at the expense of his heirs* But they (the 
rules) are also different: for whereas total disherison
deprives an heir of all rights in respect of the estate; 
the leaving away from him of property which is by law to 
descend to him, which may threaten his inheritance rights, 
need not necessarily amount to disherison, since he may 
be otherwise provided for by the deceased* We shall now 
examine these rules a little further*
(l) Hature of property involved
The discretionary powers of the deceased to make 
testamentary dispositions and gifts inter vivos of his 
property are generally restricted with respect to certain 
items of his property, which must descend to his sole or
1 Meek, loc .cit: Ward Price, Land tenure in the Yoruba
Provinces* para, i+6; Omoneukanrin, Itsekiri law and 
custom* p *73•
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principal heir# Such an heir, we may recall, is usually 
the eldest surviving son. The more usual forms of property 
to which the restriction applies are the deceased’s dwelling- 
house, and one (at least) of his plantations# Howling states 
the position among the Bini as follows:
”A man has complete discretion to divide plantations among 
his wives and children or to devise them by will; but must 
leave at least one to the heir. The same rule covers 
house-property .... the deceased’s only house in which he 
lived must go to the eldest son1', (l)
This restriction of the deceased’s powers is by no means
limited to cases where the property involved is immovable,
o
such as a house; or where the property ’'savours of realty” ,
such as a plantation; but extends to movables like beads .
\*
In fact, informants say that the restriction covers items
of movable property such as guns, hats, walking-sticks,etc#,
at least one of which must be reserved for the sole or
principal heir^'* Among the Ivbiosakon, however, the
eldest surviving son is entitled to all the articles of
dress or adornment which were personally in use as everyday
wear by the deceased at the time of death; notwithstanding
5
the latter’s attempt to give them away to someone else .
1 Meek, loc.cit: Ward Price, Land tenure in the Yoruba
Provinces. para. 46; Omoneukanrin, Itsekiri law and custom
p.73.
2 Etim and ors. v. Eke and ors. v# Ekpri and orst(l94l) 
iS'lT.h.R.43 at o.51:~oer MartindaleT J.V
3 Omoneukanrin, op.cit.. p.74*
4 The writer’s informants were: the Oba of Benin, the Ovie 
of Ughelli and. Chief T.E.A. Salubi (Urhobo); Chief Akiri 
(Isoko); Chiefs N.K. Probeni and L.A. Aboroson (ijaw); and 
Chief H.H.A. Ssechie (ivbiosakon).
3 Information personally obtained from Chief H.H.A.Eseehie
(Ivbiosakon)*
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The reason for the rule restricting the discretionary 
powers of the deceased with respect to the disposition of 
the items of property concerned is two-fold: to enable
the heir to step into the deceased’s shoes; and to make 
it easier for him to establish his authority over, and 
assume his obligations towards, those for whom the dead man 
was responsible"* .
(2) Disherison
It will have been noticed that, in general, it is
well-nigh impossible for the deceased totally to disinherit
his sole or principal heir, since the latter may always
count on taking those items of property which are reserved
for him by customary law as indicated above. As regards
the subsidiary heirs, however, the position is different;
and it is generally recognised that they may be completely 
2disinherited • But the Benin customary law rule^differs 
on this point in that a man may not totally disinherit any 
of his heirs without the prior consent of his family*^; or, 
ultimately, of the Oba^.
In practice, cases of disherison are rare. They are
1 Omoneukanrin, Itsekiri law and custom (1942) p .74; also 
the informants mentioned in footnotes 4 and 3 in the 
preceding page*
2 Okojie, Ishan native laws and customs (i960) p.92; also 
the informants referred to in footnotes 4 and 5 in the 
preceding page.
3 Bradbury, loc.cit.
4 Rowling, loc.cit. Confirmed by the Oba himself.
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usually the result of ill-feelings between the deceased 
and his heirs; and, no doubt, because of their rarity, 
declarations containing disherison are often made in solemn 
form. Thus, among the Ishan, a father disinheriting his 
child slaughters a goat at the ancestral shrine, where also 
he solemnly announces his intention to disown the child
-i
with effect from the date of such declaration .
However, the family of the deceased may scrutinise
the reason for the disinheritance of an heir; and, unless
it is justified by law on account of the heir!s fault,
the deceased’s wishes may be ignored in the distribution
of the estate. If,however, the family are satisfied that
the heir has been disinherited for good cause, they uphold
the wishes of the dead man. Thus, where a child has caused
his parent great distress and financial loss, the latter
2will be justified in disinheriting such a child .
It should be borne in mind that a disinherited child 
may be reinstated and given property by the parent, if the 
cause of the disherison has ceased; for example, where a 
reconciliation has been effected between parent and child^.
1 Okojie, loc.cit♦
2 Okojie, loacit.: Lloyd, HSome notes on the Yoruba rules 
of succession1*. [1959] J.A.L.7* at p.18; Lloyd, Yoruba 
land law (1 9 6 2), pp . 290 and 2 9 1.
3 Okojie, loc.cit.
CHAPTER FOURTEEN
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TESTATE SUCCESSION UNDER THE GENERAL 
OR WILLS IN ENGLISH FORM
Unlike the position in some African countries which
have had the British colonial connection , it has never
been doubted that the Africans of Nigeria have the po?/er
2to make wills in English form • Thus, the contention
of counsel in Apatira and anor. v, Akanke and ors* . to
the effect that the validity of a will made apparently in
English form by a Nigerian Moslem should be governed by
Moslem law, was flatly rejected by Ames J., who retorted:
,fThe fact that the deceased was a Nigerian and a Mohammedan 
cannot make any difference to the necessity of complying 
with the requirements of the Wills Acts.” (4)
1 Kenya and Uganda, for example, for which see respectively: 
The future of law in Africa, p.44 - Record of proceedings 
of the London conference, 28th December, 1959 to 8th 
January, 19&0, edited by Professor Allott; Morris, H.E., 
"The law of succession in Uganda", pp.3 and 9 - Paper 
prepared for, and presented at, the Ibadan conference on 
the integration of customary and modern legal systems; 
24th to 29th August, 19&4* present writer also
gathers from Professor Allott that Africans in Malawi 
(Nyasaland) and Zambia (Northern Rhodesia) have no power 
to make wills in English form.
2 See, for instance: In the VVill of Wright: Lumpkin and
anor. v. De Souza and ors. ,(1929) 9 N.L.R.81; Lawaland 
ors. v. Younan and ors. I 1961 All N.L.R.245; f 1961! W.N.L. 
R .197 i
3 (1944) 17 N.L.R.149.
4 Ibid. at p *151*
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The reception of the Wills Acts in southern Nigeria
The introduction of English law into Nigeria, as
a whole, has "been effected by a local statute - the former
2Supreme Court Ordinance • As regards the Federal Territory
of Lagos and the Eastern Region, the provisions receiving
English law are now contained, as has been seen, in the
Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act^ of Lagos; and the
High Court Law^ and the Magistrates* Courts Law^ of the 
. 6Eastern Region • Concerning the position in both the
Western and the Mid-Western Regions, however, it will be
7recalled that the Wills Law1, a local statute based sub­
stantially on the relevant English law, is in force. We 
may now briefly consider the law relating to wills as it 
stands in the Federal Territory and the Eastern Region, on 
the one hand; and in the Western and the Mid-Western Regions 
on the other.
1 As a whole, because prior to the enactment of legislation 
having effect throughout the country, there were in force 
separate Ordinances in different parts of Nigeria. See, 
for instance: No.3 of 1863 applicable to Lagos Colony 
only; No.4 of 1876 applicable to the Gold Coast Colony
of which Lagos formed part; No.4 of 1900 (Proclamation)
which applied to the Protectorate of Northern Nigeria; and 
No.17 of 1906 which was in force in Lagos Colony and the 
Protectorate of Southern Nigeria*
2 (1914), cap.3, s.14, Laws of Nigeria, 1923 edn.
3 The unrepealed part of cap.89, s.45, Laws of the Federa­
tion of Nigeria and Lagos (1956)#
4 No.27 of 1955, s.14.
5 No.10 of 1955, s.40.
6 For a discussion of the relevant provisions of the enact­
ments referred to in footnotes 3 to 5 above, see chapters 
3 and 4, at pp .70-72 and 108-9.
7 Cap.133, Laws of the Western Region of Nigeria, 1959.
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(l) The Federal Territory of Lagos and the Eastern Region 
On the basis of their applicability as statutes of 
general application, the English enactments relating to 
wills in force in Lagos and the Eastern Region are the 
Wills Act of 1837^ and the Wills Act Amendment Act of 18522. This 
is because,? as has been pointed out, the provisions receiving 
English law^into both jurisdictions have expressly specified 
the 1st January, 1900, as the date of reception. On this 
basis, therefore, the later English statutes on the subjectj
1 7 Will.4 & 1 Viet., c.26•
2 15 & 16 Viet., c.24.
3 For the controversy as to whether the reference date
(1900) applies also to English common law and doctrines
of equity; or wte ther it is limited to statutes only, 
see: Allott, Essays in African law, p.31* where the 
author is of the view that the reference date applies to 
all three sources of law; Park, The sources of Nigerian 
law. pp.20-24> where this author takes a contrary view; 
and states that it is the current common law and doctrines 
of equity of England, which are in force in Nigeria.
See also, Nwabueze, The machinery of .justice in Nigeria 
(1963) pp.21-22, where the author holds yet a different
view, namely, that the common law the Nigerian courts
are required to apply is not just English common law, but 
it includes the common law of other common law countries. 
As Professor Allott has rightly pointed out, if the 
current English law were already applicable by virtue of 
these provisions, there would have been no need for the 
special provisions of the High Court enactments empowering 
the Courts to apply current English law. Further sup­
port may be found for this view in the provisions of 
the Western Regional enactment, Law of England (Applica­
tion) Law, cap.60; section 3 of which specifically 
provides that the current common lav; of England and the 
doctrine of equity shall be in force in the Region, 
subject to the provisions of any local lav/ to the 
contrary.
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such as the Wills (Soldiers and Sailors) Act of 1918^
and the Navy and Marines (wills) Act of 1953^> are clearly
inapplicable.
However, attention must again be drawn to the provisions
k
of both the High Court of Lagos Act^ and the High Court Law^* 
of the Eastern Region, which empower the Courts to exercise 
probate jurisdiction in conformity with current English 
law and practice. This means that in deciding whethex* to 
admit a will to probate, these High Courts may apply the 
provisions of these later Xilnglish Acts governing privileged 
wills; on the ground that this is in conformity with 
current English law and practice,
(2) The Western and the Mid-Western Regions
The law of wills in force in both the Western and
the Mid-Western Regions is a local statute - the 'Wills Law^,
6And, like the Administration of Estates Law applicable 
in both Regions, the Wills Law^ is almost entirely a re­
production of the English enactments on the subject, namely:
The Wills Act*^ ; The Wills Act Amendment Act^; and the 
Wills (Soldiers and Sailors) Act • The Navy and Marines
P
(Wills) Act is not, however, incorporated in the Wills Law,
1 7 & 8 Geo .5, c*58*
2 1 & 2 Elis.2, c.24*
3 Cap,80, s*l6, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria and Lagos,
1958*
4 No.27 of 1955, s.16.
5 Cap .133* Laws of the Western Region of Nigeria, 1959#
6 Cap.l, ibid.
7 7 Will.4 & 1 Vict*,c,26.
8 15 & 16 Viet.,e.24.
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It must not, however, he assumed, as in the case of 
Lagos and the Eastern Region, that the Navy and Marines 
(Wills) Act may still apply in the Western and Mid-Western 
Regions, hy virtue of the provisions embodied in the High 
Court enactment regarding the exercise of the probate juris­
diction of the Court* Eor, as has been observed, the 
probate jurisdiction of the High Courts of the Western and 
the Mid-Western Regions is to conform to that of the
English High Court as regards practice and procedure only;
2and not as regards substantive law • One result of this 
is that there exist no provisions in both Regions empowering 
a seaman or marine to make a privileged will •
The provisions of the Wills Law recognising some rules 
of customary law
•5
The Wills Law^ contains two provisions designed to 
take account of the rules of the customary law* The rules 
so recognised are those relating to
(a) the indisposability of certain forms of property; and
(b) the effect of a marriage on a will*
(a) The indis’posability of certain forms of property
It has already been mentioned in the chapters on
1 1 & 2 Eliz.2, 0*24*
2 The High Court Law, Western Region, cap .i+UySS.*§ and '1,1, Ibid*
3 Cap *133* Laws of the Western Region of Nigeria, 1959 ®
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distribution and on customary wills that certain items of 
the property of the deceased must descend to the heir; 
notwithstanding any attempt on the part of the former to 
leave them to other persons by his will* Similarly, it 
has been noted thsfc the deceased has no power to make a will 
of his share in his family property, on the ground that 
he has no separate and identifiable interest in such pro­
perty* The provisions of the Wills Law have given recogni­
tion to these rules of the customary law. Thus, while 
section 3 (l) of the Law gives powers to every normal
person to tfdevise, bequeath or dispose of, by his will ••• 
all real and personal estate which he shall be entitled to.* 
*..;,f, it nevertheless adds a provision that the exercise
of such testamentary powers must be usubject to any
customary law relating thereto••* *,f *
(b) The effect of a customary marriage on a will
Although customary law seems to be silent on the 
effect of a marriage on a will made before the contracting 
of a marriage, yet the view may be expressed that a marriage 
does not and ought not to have the effect of revoking a 
will under customary law. Indeed, were the rule otherwise, 
its operation would lead to absurd results, having regard 
to the polygynous nature and, hence, the frequency of 
cus tomary unions•
i+6l
The non-existence of a rule of the customary law, 
which operates to revoke a testator’s will on his marriage 
subsequent to the making of the will, is recognised by a 
section of' the Wills Law. It provides:
"Every will made by a man or woman shall be revoked by his 
or her marriage (other than a marriage in accordance with 
customary law)".(l)
The -position of gifts to wife or husband of attesting witness
The Wills Law contains a provision which renders null
and void gifts made by a testator to the wife or husband
2of any person attesting the will • Neither in the Law
x
itself nor in the Interpretation Lav/ are there any defini­
tions of the words "husband” and "wife"; and it is not 
clear whether the legislature intended that these words
should include spouses of a customary marriage. In view,
2however, of the contrast between this section - which is 
silent on the position of customary spouses - and section 15 
which expressly excludes a customary marriage from the form 
of marriage that may revoke a will - it is submitted that 
a gift made to a customary spouse under a will whereof the 
other spouse was the attesting witness will be void. It 
is suggested that this section of the Law requires clarifi­
cation by the legislature.
1 Cap.133, s.15, ibid.
2 Op .cit.. s.12.
3 Cap.51, op .cit.
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The requirements of a valid will under the general law
Scope
It Is not proposed to go into any formal or detailed 
discussion of the English law of wills in force in 
southern Nigeria, either as statutes of general application 
or as embodied in a local enactment; nor of the requirements 
prescribed by English law regarding the making of wills, 
such as testamentary capacity, due execution and testa­
mentary character of the instrument. The principles and 
rules of English law governing these matters have been 
lucidly treated by the acknowledged masters in this field,
whose standard works on the subject are readily accessible 
1for reference •
The discussion which follows is, accordingly, 
concerned almost exclusively with two main topics and a 
subsidiary one, namely: the distinction between the validity 
of a will and that of the dispositions contained therein; 
the purposes for which the new-found machinery, offered by 
the English law of wills, has been employed by the 
Nigerian testator; and the problems of construction that 
have arisen where, as Butler Lloyd, J., so aptly puts it,
1 See Williams, W.J., Law of wills. 3^d edn. (1952), vol.I, 
chaps .1-20; Theobald on Wills, ,12th edn. (19^3), chaps. 
4-13; Jarman, T., A treatise on wills. 8th edn. (1951) 
vol.l, chaps. 2-15; Parry, op .cit., chaps. 2-7.
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"a legal document in English form is used, to create an 
interest unknown to English law [i.e., as we shall see, 
family propertyj "* (l)
These topics will now he discussed;
(a) Distinction between (i) the validity of a will and (ii) 
the validity of the dispositions contained therein
(i) Validity of a will
A will is valid if it can be successfully propounded
for the purpose of probate* Vs/hen a will is admitted to
probate, nothing more is determined than that the will is,
on the face of it, in good form; and that it is the last
will and testament executed by a competent testator in
the manner prescribed by law. In the recent Nigerian case
2of Federal Administrator-General v. Johnson and anor* , Coker, 
J., as he then was, succinctly described the validity of a 
will for probate in this way:
"By the law of wills it is required that every will probate 
of which is granted should be free and voluntary expression 
of a capable testator and that any such will should *be 
properly attested in accordance with the provisions of section 
9 of the Wills Act, 1837". (3)
Proof of a will, therefore, is only conclusive of
the testamentary nature of the instrument, and the validity
of the will as regards the capacity of the testator, form
and execution**. Probate is not conclusive, for example, of
1 Sogbesan and ors. v. Adebiyi and ors. (1941) 16 N.L.R.26
fit p*£7.
2 [i960,] L .L .R. 290 *
3 Ibid* at p.293.
4 Thornton v. Curling (1824) 3 Sim.310*
464
the right of the testator to dispose of the property con-
4
eerned ; or other collateral matters, such as the domicil
2 3of the deceased ; nor even of the death of the testator *
These are generally matters for the determination of a court
of construction, that is, they relate to the validity of
the.dispositions which are contained in the will.
(ii) Validity of the dispositions contained in a will
After what may he termed the external validity of 
a will has been established and the instrument has been 
admitted to probate, it is often necessary to determine 
what property the testator has disposed of or is capable 
of disposing of; who are the specific persons to be 
identified as beneficiaries, and subject to what conditions,
’ if any, they take; and in what proportion, if any, 
the beneficiaries are to share the property left to them.
As has been noticed, these are questions to be determined 
by a court of construction, normally in a separate suit 
brought for that purpose; or in the part of the process 
of administration wherein the property is distributed or 
the rights of the beneficiafies under the will are deter­
mined.
1 Smart v. Tranter (1890) 43 Ch.D.587.
2 Whicker v. Hume (1858) 7 H.L• Cas.124.
3 Moons v. De Bernalegf (1826) 1 Russ .301.
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The distinction between the validity of* a will and 
that of the disposition it contains may be briefly stated: 
while the former is concerned to see that the will qualifies 
as testamentary document of the testator, and is not void 
on account of incapacity, coercion or undue influence; the 
latter ensures that the property disposed of by the will 
goes to the proper persons in the manner specified therein. 
One result of this distinction is that a court of construc­
tion is not bound by an opinion expressed by a court in 
probate proceedings on the construction of a will •
Importance of this distinction in southern Nigeria
As will become apparent when we shall consider the 
decided cases, a testator may make a perfectly valid will 
in English form; but the court may, in ascertaining the 
intention of the testator as gathered from the will itself, 
hold that the validity of the dispositions contained therein 
must be determined in accordance with customary law, and 
not English law. The importance of the distinction in an 
area such as southern Nigeria cannot be over-emphasised: 
provided that a will in English form complies with the 
requirements of English law relating to wills, and is, of 
course, admitted to probate; the rights of the beneficiaries
1 Theobald on wills. 12th edn. (1 9 6 3), s.277, p.87.
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under the will need not he in jeopardy or doubt, simply 
because the validity of the dispositions which it contains
is governed by a system of law other than English law;
or the interests comprised in the gifts are known to that 
system of law, but not to English law. But for this dis­
tinction, the interests which beneficiaries take (under a 
will in English form) as family property under customary 
lav/ might have been declared null and void. This point 
v/ill be fully considered later.
Purposes for which property has been given b.y testators 
in southern Nigeria.
Problems of construction 
G-eneral remarks
Wills made undei5 the English Wills Acts have been used 
in southern Nigeria to create interests which may be grouped, 
for the purpose of our discussion, under the following 
headings
(1) those strictly known only to English law, such as
the trust;
(2) those strictly known only to the customary law, such
as the family property; and
(3) those known to both English and the customary law,
such as the gift or legacy.
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In their employment of the machinery provided, by 
the Wills Acts, the southern Nigerian testators have, even 
where literate, often experienced difficulties in expressing 
in writing, directions in their wills in a way capable of 
ready interpretation by the courts. These difficulties 
h.ave largely been due to the paucity of precedents relating 
to wills; the limited access to professional legal advice 
or the inability and/or unwillingness on the part of 
testators to pay for it when this is available; and, above 
all, the existence of an indigenous tenure under which the 
great bulk of property has been subject to family interests 
under customary law, which are no more capable of exact 
definition than those held by individuals. The following 
dictum of Butler-Lloyd, J., in Balogun and anor. v. Balogun
i
and ors. illustrates some of the difficulties mentioned above:
"It must not be forgotten that Wills are a new thing in 
this countx^y, and that testators cannot be expected to make 
their wishes as clear as in a country where Wills have been 
made for centuries, where unlimited precedents are available, 
and where tenure of land is not complicated by the persistence 
of native custom......" (2)
Problems of construction
It is not intended to consider in any detail the 
rules governing the construction of wills under the general
1 (1936) 2 W.A.C.A.290.
2 Ibid. at p.295«
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law, since the position is not dissimilar from that under 
English law, to which the reader is referred for a full 
discussion . Our discussion here will he limited to an 
examination of the approach adopted by the courts in 
specific cases, in grappling with the problems of construction 
and interpretation that confronted them in their attempts 
to give effect to the intentions of testators - a good 
proportion of whom made their wills in English form; hut 
who also, as will he seen later, intended nevertheless or 
must he taken to have intended that the validity of the 
dispositions contained in such wills should he determined 
in accordance with the rules of the customary law.
As has already been alluded to, the problems of 
construction and interpretation will he treated in the 
form of a running commentary on each of the decided 
authorities involving such problems. As a general remark, 
however, it may he stated that the courts have, on balance, 
been rather liberal in this connection, as may he inferred 
from the dictum in Baloscunfs case referred to above. In 
order' to appreciate the attitude of the courts in this 
matter, however, attention must he drawn to the existence 
of statutory provisions, which will he considered later, 
enjoining them not to deprive any person of the benefit
1 See: Williams, W.J., Law of wills. 3**d edn. (1952)
chaps 48-90, esp. chaps. 48 and 49; Jarman, T., A treatise 
on wills, 8th edn. (I95l)> vol.l, p p .379-91; vol.Ill, 
pp • 2065-72; Theobald on wills. 12th edn. (1 9 6 3), sections 
l639"46, 1741-99; Parry, The law of succession. 4th edn. 
(1961), chap.7*
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of any applicable rule of the customary law relating to 
testamentary succession, among several other topics, provided 
that the enforcement of such customary law rule does not 
offend the repugnancy principle.
INTERESTS CREATED BY WILLS: PROBLEMS OF CONSTRUCTION
1. Interests strictly known only to English law - TRUSTS
The notion of the English trust with its concept of 
a beneficial; ownership of property existing side by side 
with, and often divorced from, the legal title to that 
property, is foreign to customary ideas. Witness, for 
example, the following dictum of Ademola, C.J.F., in Avinke
A
and anor. v. Ibidunni , regarding counsel’s argument that 
the deceased could constitute a secret trust under customary 
law:
"Whilst I am not prepared to challenge the above statement 
of native law and custom made by Counsel, I would substitute 
the word’’declaration’ instead of ’secret trust’. As tte 
learned trial Judge pointed out in his judgement, secret
trusts are peculiarly an English concept  I think they
are foreign to and unknown in native law and custom" (2)
The nearest customary concept to the English trust is the 
institution of family property under which the head of the 
family has been likened to "a kind of trustee"*^, and the 
members as a whole to "the cestui que trust"^ or bene­
ficiaries •
1 (19597 IV E.S.C. 280.
2 Ibid. at pp.281-2.
3 E.vo .vArchibong and brs. v . Etubon Archibong (1947) 18 
N .L .R .117 at p.123; per Robinson J.
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But this analogy must not he pressed:.” for, it will 
he dangerous, for instance, to suppose that the head of 
the family holds the legal title to the family property 
as trustee in trust for the members * Indeed, as a writer 
has expressed it:
1tthe peoples of West Africa would he surprised if they were 
told that the heads of their families owned the legal estate to 
family land"*(l)
Prom the trust point of view, the best way of referring
to the institution of family property is, perhaps, to say
that both the legal title to, and the beneficial ownership
of, the property co-exist; and both are in the members of
the family as a whole* In this connection, we may note
the dictum of Graham Paul, J., in Taylor v* Williams and 
2anon* when he observed:
" * * * ♦ the correct view is at any moment that the ownership 
of the family property is vested in the whole family as 
trustees for the whole family11 ♦ (3)
Nevertheless, persons leading a customary mode of
life have created or attempted to create trusts by their
wills • The majority of such trusts have been private in
the sense that they were meant to benefit individuals,
usually members of the testator^ families* This is not
surprising since deceased persons rarely leave their
1 Daniels, W*G*E•, "Some principles of the law of trusts 
in West Africa", [1962! J*A*L*l6l4. at p*l69*
2, (1935) 12 N*L.R*6 7 *
3 Ibid* at p*70*
U71
property to someone who is completely a stranger by blood* 
However, there have also been several instances of chari­
table or public trusts* We may now examine the cases 
involving these trusts.
(a) Private trusts
A
In Abasi v* Kopon and ors, , the eldest son of the
testator ashed for an interpretation of a clause in his
father’s will. The relevant clause read:
"I hereby authorise my executors to give and bequeathe to 
my sons and daughters who love and served me wilfully 
(sic) and also follow my advice who act not as traitor to 
me during my lifetime from the eldest to the young babes 
on hand as each of them may deserve,"
The testator, however, directed his executors not to allow
his eldest son, the plaintiff, "to step his foot in any of
my compounds after my death neither to have a pin’s head in 
any of my estate" •
The point for decision was whether the testator’s directions
operated as a devise of his estate to the executors in
trust for his children other than the plaintiff; or
whether they were void and intestacy resulted, in which
case the plaintiff would apparently be one of the beneficiaries
to be ascertained.
It was contended on behalf of the plaintiff that
1 (1921) 5 N.L.R.61.
the trust for the testator’s children as a whole must 
be void on the grounds of uncertainty, both as to the 
individuals or class who v/ere to be the beneficiaries and 
also as to the propoi^tion of the trust property to which 
each individual was entitled# It was held that the words 
contained in the relevant clause in the will constituted 
a general devise and bequest of the testator’s real and 
personal estate to the executors in trust for the children 
of the deceased, other than the plaintiff, in such shares 
as the executors in their discretion should determine.
Though the testator did not specifically devise his pro- 
pex*ty to the executors by his will, the Court felt that 
the principle established in the decision of the Privy
i
Council in Shaw and anor. v. Taylor and anor. applied, 
namely: that where a will contains no express and formal
devise of the trust property to the trustees; but such a 
devise can be collected from the provisions of the will, 
the court can and will supply the words necessary to con­
stitute the formal devise, and so carry out the intention 
of the testator rather than that an intestacy should result. 
To Van der Meulen, J., the effect of the. relevant clause 
in the testator’s will was to create a discretionary trust, 
leaving the executors with the discretion to select the
1 (1918) 3 N.L.H. 80,Supreme Court, Lago's; Privy Council’s
decision at pp.82-4.
objects of the trust from a specified class of persons, 
that is, the testator’s children who loved and served him 
’wilfully1 (sic*); who obeyed his advice and who were not 
traitors to him* In the course of his judgement, he 
stated the point in this way:
11 In my opinion what the testator has done is to create a 
discretionary trust such as is well known to the law. The
class from which the objects of the trust are to be 
selected is very clearly defined, and the test which is to 
be applied in making the selection is also stated in 
unequivocal terms, and it is moreover one which the trustees 
should find no difficulty in applying. As regards the 
question of the subject matter of the trust, here again 
there is no ambiguity, for it is clear the testator in­
tended the whole of his estate to be included. " (i)
2In Branco & ors* v* Johnson , the trust constituted
by the testator’s will followed the English form under
which the income from property is left to the children for
life with remainder over to their children* There, the
testator devised certain real property to trustees in
trust tfto let the same and collect the rents thereof; and 
(after always deducting therefrom the expenses for the 
repairs and the maintenance and education of my children 
and grandchildren....), to distribute the balance equally 
among my children ...♦ and after their death, the said 
rents should be distributed among their child.ren per 
stripes. I desire and declare that my said houses shall 
never be sold.11
1 (1921) 5 N.L.R. at p.66.
2 (l9U3) 17 N.L.R. 70. See also, Alake v. Halid and anor.
(1935) 12 N.L.R.22, where the property was devised to 
trustees upon trust to apply the rents and profits there­
from as to pne-half for the repair and upkeep of the
property; and as to the other half for the maintenance
of the testator’s son and daughter in equal shares.
The plaintiffs were the majority of the beneficiaries 
under the trust, and they sought an order of the court 
for the sale of the trust property and for the distribution 
of the net proceeds among those entitled* In short, they 
sought to put an end to the trust, all the beneficiaries 
having attained majority at the date action brought. The 
defendant, the testator’s eldest daughter, opposed a sale 
of the property on the ground that it was the intention of 
the deceased to create family property under customary law, 
and not a trust under English law. Baker, Ag* C.J., 
rejecting the contention that the devise created family 
property under customary law, decided that a valid trust 
under English law was created by the terms of the will; 
but that the trust affected the rents issuing out of the 
property. There were two grounds for his decision.
First, he held that the property was always let to tenants 
during the lifetime of the testator. Second, that the 
bequest followed the English form in that the income from 
the property had been left to the testator's children for 
life, with remainder over to their children. He, however, 
ordered that the property should be sold and the proceeds 
distributed among the beneficiaries under the will.
(b) Charitable trusts
Wills have also been employed in southern Nigeria
k l 5
for the purpose of constituting public or charitable trusts. 
Of the three cases involving charitable trusts which have 
been reported, one was held to be validly created; one 
failed completely, and a third was partially upheld*
In In the Estate of Tome- Jones: Shaw and anor* v *
<1
Taylor and anor* , the testator, by his will appointed 
the appellants and another to be his executors and trustees, 
and directed them to build a hall for the absolute use 
of his countrymen of the Lagos community for public meetings 
and as a library. The building, when erected, was to 
bear his name and to be known as such for ever. His 
will did not, however, contain any clause expressly and 
formally devising to the trustees the property on which 
the hall was to be built*
The children of the testator claimed that as there 
was no formal devise of the property to the trustees, it 
never vested in any manner in them; and that there was 
an intestacy under which they (the testator’s children) 
were entitled.
Both the Divisional and the Supx*eme Court of Lagos 
held that the claim must succeed as in the absence of a 
specific devise of the property to the trustees, it could 
not be implied that the property in question was legally
1 (1918) 3 N.L.R. 80, Supreme Court, Lagos; (1920) 3 N.L.R.
82, Privy Council.
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affected "by the terms of the trusts. There was, therefore, 
an intestacy and the testator1s children were the persons 
entitled.
The trustees appealed to the Privy Gouncil which 
allowed the appeal. The grounds on which the appeal 
succeeded were (l) that the property was, by the terms of
the will, impressed with, a permanent trust, notwithstanding
the absence from the instrument of an express and formal
devise of it to the trustees; and (ii) that, having regard
to the expressions contained in the will, the doeiiment
should be construed as effecting a devise of the property
to the trustees for the purposes of the trusts declared
therein. Viscount Gave, who delivered the judgement of
the Board, said:
"The declaration that the building when erected .,,. shall 
’be and remain’ for the use of the Lagos community for ever, 
and that the library ’shall be available’ for the use of 
readers shows that the property is to be affected with a 
permanent trust, Further the appointment by the testator 
of certain persons as ’trustees of the said building* with 
powers of management indicates that the building when 
erected is to be transferred to those persons absolutely 
upon the trusts declared; and for this purpose the fee 
simple must be vested in the trustees of the will. It is 
true that the will contains no express and formal devise of 
the property to the trustees; but unless such a devise is 
to be collected from the terms of the will the whole of
the elaborate trusts declared by the testator are upon the 
face of them nugatory and of no effect* In their Lord­
ships1 opinion this cannot have been the testator1s in­
tention; and having regard to the expressions above quoted, 
the will can and should be construed as effecting a devise 
of the property to the trustees*" (l)
In In the Will of Wright: Lumpkin and anor* v* De 
2Souza and ors. , the testator, a Wesleyan minister, be­
queathed his leasehold property to trustees upon trust to 
his church for the purpose of erecting a parsonage; but 
with a gift over to his sister, if in the opinion of the 
trustees, the land was not large enough* He also devised 
his two farms to the trustees, directing that the proceeds 
should be used in supporting his Church; but that if that 
body found it impracticable to keep the farms, it should 
receive only one-half of the proceeds, while the other half 
should go to his sister, one of the respondents.
The trustees of the will petitioned for the deter­
mination of the rights of the testator’s sister under the 
will. Webber, J., decided that she had no beneficial 
interest in the leasehold property, since it passed as 
devised to the trustees upon the trust declared in the docu­
ment. As for the two farms, however, he held that there 
was uncertainty as to the title of the Church on the ground 
that the will did not specify the destination of the farms 
in the event of. that body finding it impracticable to
1 Ibid, at p.84.
2 TT929) 9 N.L.R.81.
maintain them* But, in order to give effect to the 
testator’s intention, which was that both the Church and 
his sister should benefit, he ordered that the farms should 
be sold and the proceeds divided equally between both 
classes of beneficiaries*
In I.yanda and ors * v, A.iike and ors- , the point for
decision was whether a clause in the testator’s will had
enough charitable purpose so as to constitute a charitable
trust for the advancement of religion* The relevant
clause in the will directed the trustees as follows:
"My property should not be sold under any circumstances
the same should, be let and the rents accruing therefrom 
should be deposited in the Bank .... for the upkeep of 
Hunmu Oshikiti’s Mosque"*
The will also contained other provisions regarding the 
following details, namely: that the mosque was to be a 
private room in the testator’s dwelling house; it was to 
bear his name, and used for prayers by the members of his 
family; and the selection and appointment of the leader 
in charge of the mosque was to be made by the members of 
his iHatehnal family.
On these facts, Baker, S.P.J., held that there was 
no charitable purpose in the el&use, since there was no 
indication that the public would be admitted to the mosque
1 (19U8) 19 N.L.R.11.
in the private room of the testator’s dwelling house.
The learned - Judge observed, inter alia:
"Religious purposes are charitable only when religious 
services tend directly or indirectly towards the instruction 
or edification of the public " (l)
THE ESTATE TAIL
2In Jenmi v* Balogun and ors* , the testator, by his 
will, specifically devised certain real property to his 
son "and his children"• Soon after he had acquired the 
property and during his lifetime, the testator put his son 
into possession* The son thereafter occupied the pro­
perty as his own home, being married there and having 
children born to him and living with him there• The 
defendants obtained judgement against the testator’s son 
in pursuance of which they attached the property in question* 
The plaintiff was one of the children of the son, and 
brought these proceedings to release the property from 
attachment on the ground that it was family property; in 
respect of which his father (then deceased) had no separate 
and identifiable interest which could be attached*
The question that fell to be determined was the 
construction to be put on the devise of the property to 
the son "and his children"* Graham Paul, J., following
1 Ibid* at p .12•
2 TT936) 13 N.L.R. 53.
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the English authority of Webb v. Byng , decided that the 
testator intended to create an estate tail for his son 
and the latter’s children. The learned Judge attached 
much importance to the contrast between this clause 
creating the entailed interest, and another clause in the 
will wherein the testator specifically devised his own 
dwelling house as family property; and the fact that the 
testator’s son had gone into possession of the entailed 
property during the lifetime of the testator, and had oc­
cupied and treated the house "in every respect as his 
home".^
As regards the further question as to whether the 
son’s interest in the estate tail was attachable, the learned 
Judge was of the view that it clearly was attachable by 
virtue of the Rules of the then Supreme Court Ordinance*^, 
under which immovable property or any interest therein was 
subject to attachment*
1 (1856) 69 E.R.951.
2 (1936) 13 N.L.R*53, at pp.5U-5.
3 Then, Order 1+5, Rule 10. These provisions are now 
contained in the Judgements (Enforcement) Rules, cap.189, 
Laws of the Federation of Nigeria and Lagos, 1958. 
Section 2 of the current Rules gives an interesting 
definition of "immovable property" which runs as follows: 
"immovable property" includes any right, title or 
interest in immovable property. Cf. the current 
Interpretation Act, No* 1 of 1961+, where "immovable 
property" is defined in s.l8(l) as land.
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(2) Interests strictly known only to customary law -
FAMILY PROPERTY
As a device for the holding of property, the in-
•1
stitution of family property is unknown to English law *
It is a concept generally found among all the peoples of
southern Nigeria. Its highest development, however, may
be said to have been attained among the Yoruba where it is
commonly employed in connection with the establishment of
o
the "family house" . As its name implies, the purpose 
of a family house, usually containing many rooms, is to 
provide residence for the members of the family.
In the majority of cases, family property comes into 
existence by the oiDeration of the rules of the customary law 
relating to intestacy. In other words, on the death of 
the original owner, his property devolves upon the members
1 see, for instance, Butler Lloyd, J.1s dictum in Sog- 
besan and ors* v., Adebiyi and ors.(l9Ul) 16 N.L.R726, 
at p .27. ■ “
2 For the family house among the Yoruba, see: Coker, 
on .cit.. pp.hO and 41? 149-51; Lloyd "Some notes on 
the Yoruba rules of succession..." \l959] J.A.L.7, at 
p p .12-14? 21 and 26-32; Lloyd, "Family property among 
the Yoruba" ibid: pp .105-115; Lloyd, Yoruba land law 
pp.78 ff and 298 ff* Other peoples of southern Nigeria 
usually hold their family interests in other forms of
'property, such as land, plantations, or bodies of water 
^streams, lakes, ponds, etc.). For the position 
among the Ibo, see Obi, The Ibo law of property (1 9 63)
pp .171-6.
of his family, at all events on his children, as family 
property* However, for reasons which will he stated
later, a testator may sometimes prefer to create family 
property by his will rather than leave the matter to the 
operation of law* The testamentary power of the deceased 
to create family property was confirmed by the West African 
Court of Appeal in the case of Young v* Young , where 
Foster-Sutton, P*, delivering the judgement of the Court, 
said, inter alia:
"Family property is a form of tenure indigenous to Nigeria, 
well known and understood, and I am of the opinion that the 
testatrix clearly intended to create family property by 
her devise and that it can be created by a testamentary 
instrument *" (2)
Definition 
Family property
Family property may be defined as property collec­
tively owned and usually enjoyed in common, by the members 
of the family;, but in respect of which no individual 
member has a separate and identifiable interest capable of 
being disposed of inter vivos* or transmitted at his 
death* The interest of each member of the family in the
family property has been appropriately described as "a
■2
right of user during his or her life"*
1 Cl953l W.A*C*A. Cyclostyled Deports 19*
2 Ibid, at v .21 *
3 Taylor v *• W'i 11 iams andjafi611 (1935)' 1 2 *R*67* at p .70; 
G-raham Paul, J .
per
k&5
As already stated, the institution of family property 
among the Yoruba usually takes the form of the family 
house designed as the residence set apart for the members 
of the family* A clear, if somewhat long, definition of 
the Yoruba family house occurs in the judgement of Carey,
J*, in the case of Coker v. Coker and ors« , where the 
learned Judge said:
"A family house ..... is a residence which the father of 
a family sets apart for his wives and children to occupy 
jointly after his decease. All his children are entitled 
to reside there with their mothers and his married sons 
with their wives and children. Also a daughter who has 
left the house on marriage has a right to return to it on 
deserting or being deserted by her husband. No one has 2 
any chargeable or alienable interest in the family house.."
The construction of the word 1 family" in wills creating 
family property
In construing the term "family" occurring in a will, 
the courts have, in keeping with their function of seeking 
to give effect to the intention of the testator, refrained 
from adopting a rigid attitude; and have instead left it 
to the testator himself to fix the range of the member­
ship of the family entitled to participation in the enjoy­
ment of the family property created under the will• If 
he, as will appear later, extends such membership of the 
family so that it covers his remoter kin who ordinarily 
would not have been included under the customary law rules;
1 (1938) 14 N.L.R.83.
2 Ibid. at p .86.
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or restricts the meaning of the term by excluding from 
participation in the enjoyment of the property created, an 
admittedly rightful member of the family; or, indeed, 
varies the normal customary rule regarding the appointment 
of the new head of the family, the court will give effect 
to his wishes in so far as these can be gathered from his 
testamentary document.
As indicated in the general remarks on the problems 
of construction, a discussion of the authorities estab­
lishing the propositions stated in the last paragraph is 
to await an examination of the actual cases involving the 
construction of wills in which there was a dispute as to 
the meaning to be attached to the word "family" appearing 
in such wills. It may, however, be stated here that the 
word as used by the testator in Sogbesan and ors. v.
Adebiyi and ors. , was held to have been intended by him 
to include not only his children, but his brothers and 
sisters as well as the descendants of these persons.
Expressions necessary for the creation of family property
The proper words to create family property are, of 
course, "family property" or expressions to the effect 
that the property should be held and enjoyed in common 
by members of the family. These are usually followed
1 (191+1) 16 N.L.R>26.
by provisions p rohibiting the alienation of the property 
so created* But, as the cases show, no particular ex­
pressions are necessary. It is sufficient if the court 
can, on a true construction of the will, find an intention 
on the part of the testator to create family property by 
his testamentary document.
Where the proper words have been employed
■i
In Jacobs v. Oladunni Brothers , a testator, by
his will, devised certain property to all his four children
to 11 remain and be retained as a ’family property’ in 
accordance with native law and custom";
with a direction that "the said property shall not on any
account whatever be alienated or sold " It transpired
that three of the testator’s children became judgement 
debtors and the property became attached by their creditors, 
the defendants in this suit. The plaintiff, who was the 
fourth child of the testator, sued claiming that the pro­
perty be released from attachment on the ground that it 
was family property, in respect of which the other three 
children had no separate and identifiable interest capable 
of being attached for their debts.
G-raham Paul, J w, following the earlier case of
2Ayeni v» Miller Brothers , held that the plaintiff’s claim
1 (1935) 12 N.L.R.1.
2 (1 9 2 4) 3 N.L.R.lf.2; where, however, the family property
was created by operation of law, i*e. intestacy.
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must succeed on the ground upon which it was based.
In the case of In the Estate of Kdward Forster:
■i
Coker v. Coker and ors* , the words employed by the testator 
were as follows;
”1 leave my present dwelling house to the whole of my 
family or blood relatives and their children’s children 
throughout and cannot be sold for any d-ebt or debts that 
may be contracted by any of them.....” (2)
It was decided that family property was properly created.
The words ”the said premises to be reckonned family
property to perpetuate my memory ••. under no circumstances 
should it be sold or alienated”
occurred in the will that came before the court in Shaw
and ors. v. Kehinde and ors. One of the points fdr
decision in that case was the effect of the words quoted,
upon an, earlier provision in the will which read:
”the house shall remain for his [i*e * the testator’s son’s] 
absolute use and benefit;” but which also directed that
the family property was to come into being after the death
of the testator’s son • Was this devise an absolute
gift of the house to the son; or was there a limitation of
his title to a life interest?
It was ccsitended on behalf of the testator’s son and
1 (1938) li+ N.L.R.83. r n
2 Cf* Young v. Young; 11953J W.A.C.A. Cyclostyled Reports
19, at 21; where the words used were: ’’all my relatives”.
It was, of course, held that family property was TsLidly 
created.
3 (I9if7) 18 N-L*K-129.
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other plaintiffs that the devise was an absolute gift 
to the son; and that the subsequent limitation was in­
consistent with the devise, and, hence,must fail. Brooke,
, J., decided that family property was created after the 
death of the son on the ground that the effect of the 
limitation was to cut down his title to a life interest.
A
In Sogbesan and ors. v. Adebiyi and ors. , it was, 
of course, not disputed by the parties that the direction 
of the testator that his landed property should be held 
"as family houses" properly created family property* The 
dispute that arose was in connection with the meaning to 
be attached to the word "family" which was also contained 
in the will. It will be recalled that the court held that 
the word was intended by the testator to cover not only 
his children, but his brothers and sisters as well as the 
descendants of these persons•
Where the intention to create family property may be 
collected from the will
It has been stated that no special words are neces­
sary for the creation of family property; and that it is
1 (19U1) 16 N.L.R.26* See also Balogun and anor. v.
Balogun and ors. (1935) 2 W.A.C.A.290$. where it was 
agreed by the parties, and unanimously decided by 
the Court, that family property was created; but 
where the dispute centred round certain out-of-pocket 
payments made by the trustees,to the new head of the 
family. In the determination of this point, howevex*, 
the decision was by a two to one majority.
k d b
essentially a question of construction, wherein the real
intention of the testator is ascertained so far as this
can he done from the terms of his will. Thus, the fact
that a testator has employed English terms in designating
the interests of the "beneficiaries under his will is not
conclusive against his intention to create family property
by his testamentary instrument. This point arose in a
neat form in the case of George and anor. V. ffariore •
There the testator, by his will, devised his property to
twelve named persons, "their heirs and assigns for ever as
tenants in common without any power or right to alienate 
or anticipate the same or part thereof".
After the testator1s death, his executors allotted 
a portion of the devised property to one of the beneficiaries. 
On the death of this beneficiary, his son took possession 
of the portion allotted to his father by the executors, 
the plaintiffs in this action. When this child died, 
however, the defendant (the widow of the testator;and 
grandmother of this child) went into possession of the 
allotted portion, claiming to bd entitled as next-of-kin 
of the deceased child. The plaintiffs (executors) sought 
to recover possession of this portion of the property as 
well as the sum of £30 for its use and occupation by the 
defendant•
1 (1939) 15 N.L.R.1.
k%G\
The plaintiff^ argument was that notwithstanding the use 
of the words "Itemnts in common" in the devise, the in­
tention of the testator, as gathered from the whole tenor 
of his will, was to create family property under customary 
law. For the defendant it was argued that the effect of 
the words occurring in the will was to create a tenancy 
in common according to English law; and that upon the death 
of her grandchild, his separate interest (the allotted 
portion of the property) descended to her as next-of-kin.
Butler Lloyd, J., held that it was the intention 
of the testator, as collected from his will, that the 
devised property should he held as family property. In 
arriving at this decision,' the learned Judge was influenced 
by three considerations. The will contained a provision 
prohibiting the alienation of the property. There was 
also a clause directing the executors to maintain the 
property out of rents accruing from part of the premises to 
be let by them. Finally, had English law applied as 
contended by the defendant, she still would not have suc­
ceeded in the absence of proof of the death of the deceased 
child’s mother, who would take as next-of-kin to the 
exclusion of the defendant, a grandmother.
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Subject-matter of family property
The interest out of which family property may be 
created by will may take any form. It may be unbuilt 
land; or, as is usual among the Yoruba, a dwelling house; 
or a fund. What is essential is that the interest must 
be the self-acquired or individual property of the testator. 
This is because a testator creating family property by will 
is really making a gift of such property to the members 
of the family; and it presupposes that the property so 
given is his to give.
But the fact that the testator acquired his indi­
vidual or private interest by means of a conveyance in 
English form is not a bar to his creating of family property
A
out of such interest* In Jacobs v. Oladunni Brothers , 
it was contended, in effect, that, having acquired the 
property under an English conveyance in fee simple, the 
testator could not leave it, by his will, as family property 
to his children. It was further argued that the interests 
of the testator*s children, to whom the property was devised 
as family property, were those of tenants in common under 
English law; and were attachable for their judgement debts.
1 (1935) 12 N.L.R.l Cf. Jenmi v. Balogun and ors. (1936)
13 N*L*R*53 at p.55* where the testator expressly 
declared in his will that his dwelling house should 
remain family property after his death; but where he 
devised it to certain named children and their heirs 
"as joint tenants". The court nevertheless held that 
the devise constituted family property.
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Graham Paul, J., wasted no time in rejecting this submis­
sion by the judgement creditors. He held that what was 
important was the intention of the testator which, in this 
case, was that the property should be held as family property.
WILLS CREATINE BOTH TRUSTS AND FAMILY PROPERTY
In some of the cases, both the trust and the family 
property are created by one and the same testamentary 
document. In these eases, the property is devised to 
trustees with directions that they should hold the same in 
trust, and as family property for the testator’s family.
This was the position in the cases of Balogun and anor.
■■   n ip  h i t — i n
A
v. Balogun and ors* and Sogbesan and ors* v* Adebi.vi and
■ WWWIWtta— HIM ■■■ W ■ ■H*W1M III^ WIIII |*M in Mill**............Ill 111 I HP
2ors .
In Balogun and anor. v. Balogun and ors. , the tes­
tator left both his real and personal estate to trustees, 
who were not members of his family, upon trust for his 
children. He provided, however, that the rights of the 
children under the trust should be in accox'dance with 
customary law, for one of the clauses in the will directed 
that all his property "should be taken to be one aggregate
and should remain.... the family house with the incidents 
of native law and custom thereto attaching".
1 (1935) 2 W.A.C.A.290*
2 (1941) 16 N.L.R.26.
He also provided that his eldest son should he the new 
head of the family, and should perform the duties inci­
dental to that office. He did not, however, authorise 
the trustees to pay the new head any allowance out of 
the trust fund for the discharge of his duties* The 
trustees, nevertheless, paid him a monthly allowance of 
£10 out of the trust fund to reimburse him in respect of 
the expenses incurred as head of the family* ^he West 
African Court of Appeal was unanimous in the view that 
both the trust and family property were validly created* 
Where the Court was divided was as to the propriety of the 
monthly allowance paid by the trustees to the new head of 
the family; appoint we shall have occasion to treat fully 
later on, in connection with the role of trustees ap­
pointed in these circumstances.
•i
Similarly, in Sogbesan and ors* v*Adet>iTvi and ors* 
the testator devised his real property to trustees upon 
trust to hold the same as ’’family houses”. Unlihe the
p
testator in Balogun1s case , however, he passed over his 
eldest son,and appointed his own (testator’s) brother to 
be head of the ”family”; and directed the new head to act 
in family matters under the control, direction and ad­
vice of his (testator’s) mother and aunt. Again, there
1 (1941) 16 H.L*H*26.
2 (1935) 2 W.A.C.A.290.
was no dispute in respect of the family property and 
trust created. But there was a difference regarding the 
word "family" used hy the testator in his will. As al­
ready noted, the court held that that word was intended 
hy the testator to include not only his children, hut 
his brothers and sisters as well as the descendants of 
all these relatives•
ROLE) OF THE TRUSTEE IN THE INSTITUTION OF FAMILY PROPERTY 
The two cases just discussed make it clear that 
it is perfectly feasible for a will to create both the 
trust and family property; or, better still, to superimpose 
the former concept on the latter institution. This at 
once raises the question of the role of the trustee in the 
institution of family property. The view has been ex­
pressed by an authority on family property among the 
Yoruba that trustees appointed in respect of family pro­
perty are entirely redundant, on the ground that that 
institution does not recognise trustees as such • While 
one may not deny the general position that customary law 
has no exact counterpart of the English trustee, one must 
take leave to disagree if the learned writer1s view is 
meant to suggest that such trustees, who are, ..after all, 
appointed under the general law, have no duties to per-
1 Coker, Family property among the Yorubaa p.75*
form in respect of the management and control of the 
property (family property) created under the will.
It is, of course, not open to argument that the 
legal title to the family property in this case is in 
the trustees; and that their co-operation may he essential 
where the members of the family wish to bring the institu­
tion to an end by the sale or partition of the property. 
Where the family property consists of funds, the trustees, 
who are usually not members of the family, take charge
*i
of these. Thus, in Balogqu^s case , this possession of 
the trust fund by trustees was emphasised by Graham Paul, 
J., when he said, inter alia:
"The persons in charge of that fund are not members of 
the family but trustees vei*y carefully chosen by the 
testator." (2)
It hardly needs emphasising that the trustees in such a 
case have an important role, namely: that of ensuring
that the trust fund is not misapplied or dissipated.
Again, Balogun and anor. v. Balogun and ors* , makes 
it quite clear that the trustees of family property are 
not entirely redundant. On the contrary, and in addition 
to their duties with respect to the preservation and
1 (1935) 2 W.A.C.A.290.
2 Ibid, at p.301.
3 Of* Park, The sources of Nigerian law. p.39» where
Balogun’s case, op.cit.♦ is discussed.
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management of the propei^ty, they are given powers by the
testator to enforce his directions disinheriting any
member of the family whose conduct may lead to a break-up
of the family property. In that case, the trustees were
specifically enjoined to exclude from the enjoyment of the
property created any child of the testator "who became
quarrelsoneor cause litigation or who insisted on parti­
tion of the family house,T. (l)
Position of head of the family where trustees are appointed
If a will creates family property without, at the
same time, constituting a trust of such property, the
duty of administering the property is primarily that of
2
the head of the family . He is not usually paid for his 
management and control of the family property, though he 
is entitled to be reimbursed for his out-of-pocket ex­
penses in respect of his duties as head of the family. 
Where trustees are appointed in respect of the
1 rbicU at p.300.
2 On this see: Elias, Groundwork of Nigerian law (1953)
pp.325-6; Elias, Higerian land law and custom (1962) 
pp.140-149* and the authorities cited therein; Meek, 
Land tenure and land administration in Nigeria.
pp . 1 3 1* 1 5 5 -6 and 178 Coker, Family property among 
the Yorubas (1 9 56), chaps. 6 and 7 > especially at 
pp.1 2 1, 135 and 153-4.
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family property, however, the head of the family is super­
seded by them in the administration of the property by 
reason of the trust superimposed on the family property.
But the fact that the trustees have the management and 
custody of the family property does not affect the right 
of the head of the family to be reimbursed out of the 
property for expenses incurred by him in respect of his 
other duties as such head. In this regard, it must 
be observed that the fact that the testator1s will is 
silent on the new head’s right to such reimbursement 
does not make any difference. He still gets his out-of- 
pocket expenses,, to which he is entitled under customary
law; and not under a will. This point is well illustrated
a
by the case of Balosrun and, anor. v. Balogun and ors. , which 
will be discussed in the next paragraph.
A
In Balogun and anor. v. Balogun and or s. , the tes­
tator, by his will left all his property to trustees who 
were to hold same as family propei»ty for his children.
But, although he appointed his eldest son to be head of 
the family and directed him to perform all the duties per­
taining to this office, he made no provision in his will 
for the payment of any allowance to the eldest son. The 
new head of the family discharged his duties and incurred
1 (1935) 2 W.A.C.A.290.
b 9 1
expenses. To reimburse him, the trustees paid him a 
monthly allowance of £10 out of the tost ;fxmcL After some
time, the payment of this allowance was opposed by two of
the testator’s daughters, the plaintiffs in this suit.
They sued the trustees seeking an order asking the latter 
to refund the sums already paid; and restraining the 
trustees from making any further such payments. They 
alleged that such payments constituted a breach of trust 
on the part of the trustees•
It will be appreciated that the point for decision 
depended upon whether the validity of the dispositions 
contained in the will was governed by English law or cus­
tomary law: for, under the former system there was a clear 
instance of a breach of trust; while under the latter system,
no breach of trust had been committed, since the head of 
the family was entitled to be reimbursed for his out-of-
pocket expenses incurred in family matters.
Butler Lloyd, J., held that the frequent use of 
the phrase ’’according to native lav/ and custom” by the
testator clearly showed that it was his intention that
customary law should govern the validity of the provisions 
in his will. Consequently, the monthly allowance of 
£10 paid by the trustees to the testator’s eldest son as 
head of the family was rightly made by them. The learned
U 9 Q
Judge was at pains to point out that his decision rested 
to a great extent on a provision contained in section 20
A
of the then Supreme Court Ordinance . That section
provided that no person shall be deprived of the benefit
2
of any applicable customary law, particularly in causes
and matters relating to inheritance and testamentary
dispositions, amongst other things, where such customary
law satisfied the repugnancy principle • The implication of
such a> provision was, according to the learned Judge, to
avoid a too rigid judicial attitude in the construction of
a will, where this would have the effect of depriving a
beneficiary of the rights of succession accruing to him
under customary law; unless where the enforcement of
such rights would be repugnant to natural justice, equity
and good conscto.ce. The reasoning of the learned Judge
is succinctly stated in a passage reproduced in the report
of the case when it was heard on appeal. It reads:
"It was no doubt for the purpose of giving effect to the 
real intention of a testator and of avoiding the necessity 
of too rigid adherence to the ipsissima verba of a Will 
that testamentary dispositions were included in section 
20. In my view no breach of trust has been committed here.
1 (191U), cap.3 (section 20), Laws of Nigeria, 1923 edn.
The present enactments are all contained in the various 
High Courts and Magistrates’ Courts statutes. For the 
provisions contained in the High Courts statutes, see: 
the High Court of Lagos Act, cap. 80, s.27, op.c i t.;
the High Court Law, Western Region, cap .l|4, s.12, op .cit; 
the High Court Law, Eastern Region; No.27 of 1955, s.22.
2 This part of the section of the former Supreme Court 
Ordinance, containing particular provisions with respect 
to matters relating to testamentary dispositions,etc •,
is not repeated in the various current enactments cited above.
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To hold otherwise would in the present case result in 
depriving the person designated as head of* the family of the 
benefit of his customary right to reimbursement for the 
expenses necessarily thrown upon him by his position.” (l)
The decision of the learned Judge was upheld by 
the West African Court of Appeal by a two to one majority;
Aitken, J., dissenting on the ground that there was no 
proof of the customary' law entitling the new head of the 
family to such payment, in the absence of a provision to 
that effect contained in the testator's will. G-raham Paul, 
J., on the other hand, was of the opinion that reference 
to section 20 of the then Supreme Court Ordinance, while 
not being irrelevant, represented a narrow view; and that 
the broad view of giving effect to the intention of the 
testator as expressed in his will was the better approach.
Reasons behind the creation of family property by wills
The effect of the operation of the rules of the 
customary law governing intestacy is that the self-acquired 
property of a deceased intestate is converted into family 
property owned and. usually also enjoyed in common by members 
of his family. This being so, it may, at first sight, be 
difficult to understand the need for the establishment of 
the institution of family property by will; when by the 
operation of law the result will be precisely the same
1 See footnote 2 on page U98 .
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where the deceased has left no will to that effect.
It must, however, be observed that family property
arising on intestacy may not possess the same enduring nature
as that specifically created, usually with restrictions
against alienation, by a testamentary document. The
customary rules relating to intestacy are largely concerned
with prescribing the manner in which the deceased's estate
is to be distributed; and the members of the family may agree
among themselves to effect the partition or sale of the
family property, and so put an end to that institution.
Where, however, the institution is brought into existence
by the will of a testator, imposing the usual restrictions
against sale or partition, the hands of the members of the
family are thereby tied; and, as long as the property still
serves its purpose as the family residence, the court will
not order a sale or partition thereof "merely because some
of the interested parties desire to turn the property into 
cash". (2)
The reasons, then, why a testator may wish to create 
family property by his will rather than leave the matter 
to the operation of law, may be briefly stated. Firstly,
1 "I hold that under the Will the property in question 
became a 'family property’ as effectively as if the 
children had succeeded to it under native law and custom"• 
Jacobs v. Oladunni Brothers (1935) 12 N.L.R.l at p.2,
per G-^xam Paul, J*
2 Bajulaiye and anor. v . Akapo (1938) Ik N.L.R.10, at p.ll; 
per Butler Lloyd, J. It is not, however, clear from the 
report of the case whether the family property in respect 
of which the plaintiffs sought an ordex1 for partition or 
sale, was created by will or by the operation of law.
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he may hold the view that what will become family property 
on his death intestate has been the result of his own 
exertions; and, hence, ought to be regarded more as a monu­
ment to perpetuate his memory, and less as an ordinary 
building to provide residential accommodation for the 
living meinbers of the family. Secondly, while not being 
unmindful of his duty to provide for the needs of his 
dependants, he may wish that family property should be kept 
in the family for as long as' possible in order to perpetuate 
and unite the family, both dead and living. Thirdly, he 
may define in his will the extent of the membership of 
the family it is his intention to benefit from the family 
property created thereby. Fourthly, he may specify in 
his will the sanctions to be applied to those members of 
the family whose conduct may render the continuance of 
the institution of family property im possible. Fifthly 
and finally, he may, if he was also head of the family, 
nominate a more eligible and competent member of the family 
as his successor to ensure the continuance and efficient 
management of the institution; rather than allow the normal 
successor, who may be less suitable, to be such head.
These' points will now be illustrated from the decided cases.
Perpetuation of testator*s memory
Perhaps the clearest example in this regard (i.e.
the intention of a testator to employ the institution 
of family property to perpetuate his memory) is that 
offered by the clause in the will that came before the
•i
court in Shaw and ors* v. Kehinde and ors . As already 
noticed, part of the claiise provided that the testator’s 
dwelling-house should be regarded as ”family property to 
perpetuate my memory” .
Retention of the property within the family
Where the family property takes the usual Yoruba form 
of a large family residence, the intention of the testator 
creating it by his will is, as a rule, that such resi­
dence should be retained by the family for as long as 
possible* In Balogun and anor* v. Balogun and ors* * for 
example, one of the clauses in the testator’s will directed 
that the family property created, therein should be re­
tained for at least ”the period of twenty-one years after
the testator’s death or such period as is allowed by 
native law and custom*” (2+)
This enduring aspect of the institution of the family 
property has been likened to the English strict settle­
ment, by an eminent writer, who says;
”The institution of the ’family house’ is thus the 
Nigerian counterpart of the English strict settlement, 
the aim of both being to keep the property in the family 
for as long as possible,” (5)
1 (19U7) 18 N.L.R.129.
2 Ibid* at p,130.
3 T1935) 2 W.A.C.A.290.
1+ O p.olt.. at p p .291,298,300,301,301+ and 306.
5 Elias, Higerian land law and custom (19§2), p.268.
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The institution also serves two other purposes.
The common residence or enjoyment of the family property 
by the members of the family helps to cement the common 
ties of blood; and shape the family as a close-knit 
social and economic unit* It enhances what a testator
A
has described as the ’’prestige, dignity and reputation” 
of the family* We have stated that where family property 
has been created by the operation of law, the members of 
the family may sooner or later put an end to that institution 
by effecting a partition or sale of it. Now, the distri­
bution (for sale or partition is nothing else) often leads 
to family disputes and quarrels, which in turn may under­
mine the unity of the group. One of the aims of a 
testator in creating family property by his will is to en­
sure that the family property is retained for generations; 
and the solidarity of the family is thereby maintained.
Graham Paul, J., made this point in the case of Balogun
"t aand anor* v* Balogun and ors, , cited above, when he said, 
inter alia;
”Such distribution often leads to family feuds, sometimes 
to a complete disruption and disappearance of the family as 
a real unity. The large numbers of partition or sale 
suits in the Divisional Court at Lagos in the last ten years 
are evidence of that. The late Alii Balogun from the 
terms of his Will was obviously very well aware of that...
He wanted to deal with all his properties ... so as to
1 The testator in Balogun1s case* see (1935) 2 W.A.C.A.
290, at p .296. 
la (1935) 2 W.A.C.A.290*
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avoid disputes* But above all he desired to perpetuate 
his family house and his family.” (l)
It will be recalled that whether a testamentary docu­
ment has created family property or not is essentially a 
question of interpretation to be determined by collecting 
the intention of the testator from his will; and not by 
paying undue regard to the form of words he has employed 
in describing the interest created thereby. In the 
majority of cases, however, the wills creating this kind 
of interest have, in additipn to the term ’’family”
or "family property” contained therein, expressly imposed 
prohibitions against the sale, partition or any other form 
of alienation of the family property created thereby.
The words commonly employed in imposing such prohibitions 
include the following;
(i) on any account whatever be alienated or sold..*.
2always remain and be retained as a "family property” ;
(ii) without any power or right to alienate or anticipate 
the same or any part thereofy
(iii) in no case and under no circumstances should it be
sold or alienated;^"
(iv) none of these properties be sold, mortgaged or in
5
any other way alienated;
1 Op.cit.» at p.300.
2 Jacobs v. Oladunni Brothers (1935) 12 N.L.R.l.
3 George and anor. v. Eaiore (1939) 15 N.L.R.l.
4 Shaw and ors, v. ICehinde and ora. (1947) 18 N.L.R.l29.
5 Ayoola and ors. v. Rolawlyo^^nd ors. (1942) 8 W .A .C .A .39*
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(v) should on no account be sold or partitioned; and
(vi) cannot be sold for any debt or debts that may be
2contracted by any of them •
lfFamil.v!r for the purpose of admission to participation in 
the enjoyment of family property
* • »xi — n w w t t j f  » in * ■ !■■■!! w a ri. mw t« w » ih ipu  mmi — 0m
It has already been seen that the testator is given 
a free hand in deciding the scope of the membership of the 
family he intends to benefit by the family property he 
has created by his will. In this way, he is enabled to 
vary the normal rules of inheritance, and may include a 
remote relative in the enjoyment of the family property, 
even where the latter would ordinarily not be entitled 
had the testator died intestate^; or exclude from parti­
cipation in the enjoyment of the family property created, 
his eldest son and principal heir^.
Making family members co-operate in their enjoyment of 
family property. Consequences to members attempting 
to nut an end to the institution
This point forms part of the larger one, which is, 
the intention of the testator that the property created
1 Young v. Young 0-955) W.A.C.A. Cyclostyled Reports 19.
2 In the Estate of Edward Forster; Coker V. Coker and ors.
(1938) l k  N.L.R.83. : ~
3 See: Sogbesan and ors. v. Adebiyi and ors. (1941) 16
n .l .r75o I :
4 See: Abasi v. Koran and ors. (1921) 5 N.1.R.61.
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should he retained by the family for as long as possible*
In order that his intention may be given effect, he may
stipulate the condition under which a member of the
family may continue to participate in the common use and
enjoyment of the family property. In the wills containing
conditions governing members1 rights, the requirement for
members* continued use of family property has been good
behaviour; and especially, non-insistence on the sale or
partition of the joint property. In Balogun and anor. v.
TBalogun and org, . the will contained clauses disin­
heriting any child of the testator who became quarrel­
some or caused litigation; or, who insisted on partition
of the family house• Similarly, in Ayoola and ors. v.
2
ffolawiyo and ors« , the relevant clause in the will pro­
vided that:
"should any of my children demand a partition or sale of 
any of the said properties, I desire that he or she be at 
once disinherited by my Trustees of his or her share in 
my properties." (3)
Testator*s nomination of1 his successor
As already noticed, a testator may, if he was also 
head of the family, nominate his successor in the will by 
means of which he has established family property. It 
will be recalled that the testator in Sogbesan and ors.
w p — ■>— n — ■ w n a ^ — — — a*— . m w p — l a m - n a — w * m i m m *w— ^
1 (1935) 2 W.A..C.A.290.
2 Avoola and ors. v. Folawi.vl and ors. (1942) 8 W.A.C.A.39.
3 (1942) 8 W.A.C.A.39, at p.i+O.
1
v* Adebi.vi and ors# appointed his brother as head of 
the family instead of his eldest surviving son, who normally 
would have succeeded him# It is thus clear that the 
creation of family property by will may afford the de­
ceased an opportunity of varying the normal rules of suc­
cession to the headship of the family*
(3) Interests known to both English law and customary law- 
gift or legacy
Hitherto, the discussion has been concerned with 
interests (created by wills in English form) hnown strictly 
only to either English law, such as the trust; or only 
to customary law, such as the family property* It must 
have been apparent from what has gone before, that in 
most cases in which a trust is constituted, and in all cases 
in which family property is created, there is not one bene­
ficial owner absolutely entitled; but the property is 
devised or beque&ted so as to be enjoyed by a number of 
persons either concurrently or in succession.
In a fewer number of instances, however, there have 
been testamentary gifts of property in respect of which the 
donees? interests have been absolute and individual in 
nature. But there has also been one instance where the 
testamentary gift has been subject to a condition precedent. 
It will have been observed that testamentary gifts of
1 (19U1) 16 N.L.R.26.
property owned personally by a testator can be made by 
him under customary law. In the field of testamentary 
gifts or legacies, therefore, wills in English form and 
those made in accordance with customary law have been 
used in creating interests mutually known to both systems 
of law.
Gases involving gifts made by wills in English form
In Adedoyin v. Simeon and ors* , the testator, by 
his will, made an absolute gift of the proceeds of his 
real property(which he directed his executors to sell) to 
his four daughters; three of whom were born to him by 
one woman and one by another woman. One-half of the 
proceeds was to be given to the one daughter having a 
different mother, vdaile the other half was to be divided 
equally among the other three daughters• The daughter 
entitled to one-half of the proceeds of the sale of the 
property died intestate and without issue before the sale 
of the property was effected. The plaintiff was her 
mother and she claimed her deceased daughter’s half-share 
in the property, on the ground that she was entitled under 
customary law. The defendants were the three half-sisters 
of the deceased daughter and they claimed to be entitled 
on two grounds. First, that as the property had not, in
1 (1928) 9 N.L.R.76.
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fact, been sold when the plaintiff’s daughter died 
intestate and without issue, her one-half share in the 
proceeds of the sale lapsed into the residue for their 
benefit* Second, and in the alternative, whether English 
law or customary law governed the succession, the property 
of the deceased daughter passed to her brothers and sisters
whether these be of full blood or half-blood.
Combe, J., received expert evidence of the relevant 
customary law (Yoruba customai’y lav/) which established that 
the property of a daughter dying intestate and without 
issue passed to her mother* to the exclusion of the 
deceased’s brothers and sisters of the half-blood. Accor­
dingly, he decided that the plaintiff was entitled to 
receive her deceased daughter’s one-half share of the
proceeds of the sale of the property as devised.
1
In Alake v . Halid and anor. , the testamentary gift 
was made subject to a condition precedent. There, the 
testator devised certain land to trustees upon trust to 
apply the rents and profits therefrom as to one-half to­
wards the repair of the propei»ty; and as to the other half 
towards the maintenance of his son and daughter in equal 
parts. He also provided that if his son or any of his 
son’s children-should, during their lifetime, erect at
1 (1935) 12 N.L.R.22.
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their own expense "a solid and hrick building and dwelling 
houseff on a portion of the devised land, then that portion 
should be conveyed absolutely to the son or any of the 
son’s children fulfilling that condition.
During the lifetime of the testator’s son and before 
he had time to erect on the land the type of building 
contemplated by the testator, the Lagos Executive Develop­
ment Board (a sort of town planning authority) acquired the 
land in question and paid the trustees compensation in 
respect of the acquisition. Later, the testator’s son 
died intestate and without issue; whereupon the trustees 
were sued for his share of the compensation by his mother, 
the plaintiff in the case.
Graham Paul, J., dismissed the plaintiff’s claim on 
two grounds .* Firstly, the vesting of the gift of portion 
of the land was conditional upon the erection thereon of 
a solid brick building by the plaintiff’s son. This he 
failed to do in consequence of which he had no vested 
interest in respect of the portion of the land devised.'
The fact that, the acquisition of the land during his life­
time subsequently made it impossible for him to fulfil the 
condition was immaterial. Secondly, even if the gift could 
be held to have vested in the plaintiff’s son, she had no 
right to sue without having obtained letters of admini­
stration; she being not a direct beneficiary under the
will, but someone claiming as the next-of-kin of her 
deceased son.
A testamentary gift may be made to take effect when
the donee attains a specified age* In such a case, the
rule is that the gift vests in the donee at the date of
the testator’s death, subject, however, to divestment if
he (donee) should fail to attain the specified age. The
notion is that the time element is introduced not for the
vesting of the gift, but for the purpose of its enjoyment*
This proposition of law is clearly brought out by the case
*1
Bickersteth and anor. v* Shanu , which went to the Privy 
Council. In that case, the testator, by his will, ap­
pointed the appellants to be his executors and trustees *
He bequeathed some twenty-one legacies, including one of 
£1,000 to his son and another of £k00 to his daughter; 
directing that the legacy to the son should be deposited for 
him in a bank until he attained the age of twenty-five 
years. He then devised certain properties to the son, the 
respondent, with a direction that ”these devises shall take
effect upon my said son attaining the age of twenty-five 
years”*
On attaining the age of twenty-five the son brought this 
action against the appellants, claiming an account, as 
from the date of the testator’s death, of the rents of
the properties devised to him by his father’s will*
The question to be decided depended upon the meaning 
to be put on the words "shall take effect upon my said 
son attaining the age of twenty-five years”* Did they 
vest the devise of the properties in the son at the death 
of the testator, subject to divestment should he fail to 
attain the age of twenty-five years? Or, did they make 
the vesting of the devise contigent on the son attaining 
that age? Both the Divisional Court and the Supreme Court 
of Lagos decided in favour of the first view, that is to 
say: the devise vested in the respondent at the death of
the testator, subject to being divested if he should fail 
to attain the age of twenty-five years• The executors 
and trustees appealed to the Privy Council*
The Board affirmed the decisions of both the Divi­
sional Court and the Supreme Court of Lagos on two main 
grounds. Firstly, it was the established rule for con­
struing devisees that they were to be held vested unless 
a condition precedent to the vesting was expressed with 
reasonable clearness; which was not the case in the 
instant devisees* Secondly, on a true construction of 
the will, as a whole as well as on a consideration of the 
circumstances in which it was made; and applying the rule
of construction referred to above, their Lordships were 
*
of the opinion that the words "shall take effect..."
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related to the devise taking effect in possession, and
were not intended to impose a condition precedent on the
vesting of the devise. Their Lordships were considerably
influenced by the comparison between the vesting of the
legacy of £1,000 also made to the son and that of the
devise, the subject-matter of the dispute in this case;
and the consequences of holding that the rents of the
property until the respondent attained the specified age
would pass as on intestacy, when neither the respondent
nor his sister would derive myr benefits from such rents•
As regards the legacy to the son, this was to be deposited
in a bank until he attained the same age; but his vested
interest therein was not contigent upon his attaining that
age* It was merely to prevent his enjoyment thereof until
he attained this responsible age* From this, the Board
inferred that the object of the testator with regard to
his son v/as "not to prevent him having any estate in the
real property unless and until he should attain the age 
of twenty-five years, but rather to postpone his enjoyment, 
and if possible to prevent him from misapplying the 
property before he was twenty-five#" (l)
FUTURE POLICY IN REGARD TO WILLS IN SOUTHERN NIGERIA
As will have been gathered from what has gone before,
the present law of wills in regard to the admission to
1 Ibid* at p *299.
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probate of written customary wills (even in customary 
courts) is a matter of some uncertainty. The powers of 
Nigerian testators to disinherit even their sole or princi­
pal heirs, when wills in English form are used, are in 
direct conflict with the provisions of the customary law.
The exercise of the deceasedfs testamentary powers in this
I
way is unjust and unfair particularly to the customary heirs, 
not to mention the position of the wives of the deceased; 
especially when it is realised that we are concerned with 
an area where no law relating to family provision exists.
The above are some of the matters which should be a 
field for early legislation. They may be set down for 
brief remarks as follows
(1) Customar.y wills
'  • ip — m n w  ■ ■ w tn — — m
A simple form of recording customary wills, and a 
simple method of proving such wills are required. It is, 
of course, true that traditional customary law knew of no 
writing. But, in these modern times, it may be provided 
that the traditional oral declaration should be recorded
it
at the time is is made; it should be signed or marked 
by the person making It, and attested to by at least two 
witnesses, one of whom must be a member of the makerfs 
family. It may even be necessary to legislate in connection 
with the admissibility of oral declarations of intentions 
concerning the testamentary dispositions of property; and
to provide that they should rank as a will in writing if 
made by a person on his death-bed, and when incapable of 
making a normal v/ritten will# As regards witnesses to 
such oral declarations, it should be provided that at least 
three witnesses to such oral declarations, including the 
testator1s sole or principal heir, must be present#
As regards proof of written customary wills, there 
is no reason why the Courts, both the English and 
Superior Courts and (especially) the customary courts, 
should not be empowered to grant probate of such wills 
complying with the provisions suggested above. In the case 
of customary wills in the form of oral declarations made 
in the circumstances indicated, "probate" should be 
granted in respect of them in all courts, subject to ade­
quate proof by persons witnessing them.
(2) Wills in English form
Provision should be made for the alteration of the 
general law relating to wills in order to make the require­
ments of a valid will in English form approximate, if not 
conform, to the suggested requirements of the customary law. 
In particular, the general law should be modified so as to 
admit as a will (and not merely as evidence to be lightly 
treated), a "death-bed" declaration on satisfactory proof
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of the circumstances necessitating the making of such a 
declaration.
(3) Family provision
It will have been observed that under the existing 
law governing wills a testator may leave away all his property 
from his family; except that under customary law, certain 
specific items of his property may, in general, be reserved 
for his sole or principal heir. This raises the question 
of imposing some restrictions on the testamentary powers 
of the deceased. Legislation may be initiated to ensure 
that a fixed portion of a man’s estate is left to the 
members of the family, especially those of the immediate 
family towards whom he had the duty of maintenance while 
he was alive*
RELEVANT LEGISLATION ENACTED IN MALAWI
Commendable steps have already been taken in Malawi 
in connection with most of the reforms suggested above.
Under its recent Wills and Inheritance Ordinance, 1964?
Malawi has provided an example of how the procedure for 
the making of wills may be simplified; and how the testa­
mentary powers of the deceased may be restricted in order 
to ensure that if he fails to make adequate provision 
for his family, the court will put matters right on 
application being made to that effect. These Malawi
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provisions are discussed in a recent issue of the Journal
-i
of African Law, to which the reader is referred . Only 
a summary of the various provisions is attempted here.
The requirements of a valid will
2
Every will must he in writing in duplicate , one
copy of which must he lodged in the local court exercising
jurisdiction over the area of the testator’s normal resi­
tsdence . It must he signed hy the maker and at least two
witnesses attesting in the presence of each other^*. One
of the winesses must he a close relative of the testator
and, in the case of a married man, the other must he a
. 5person who witnessed the testator’s marriage • A witness 
must not he a beneficiary under the will, or someone under 
the age of eighteen^.
Oral wills
There are also provisions authorising the making of 
oral declarations of intentions concerning the dispositions
1 Durand, P.P.* ,fNew provisions for the making of wills 
and inheritance hy intestate succession in Malawi” 0.964)
■J.A.L.109-113.
2 The Wills and Inheritance Ordinance, 1964* (Malawi), No.
36 of 1964* s.5(l). The enactment is also jgnown as j^amuzu’s 
(i.d. Dr Banda’s) Mbumba (i.e. sisters) Protection 
Ordinance•
3 Ihid. s.5(5) .
^ Ihid. s.5C 2) .
3 Ihid. 8.5(4).
6 Ihid. 8.5(3)•
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of property on death. To he valid, such declarations 
must he -made in the presence of at least three witnesses, 
hy a person "in imminent prospect of death and whgi incapable
' A
of signing a will". The local court is then empowered
to receive evidence in proof of such declarations from
the witnesses, and to give effect to the testator’s wishes
2as expressed in such a declaration •
Family provision
Section 10 of the Malawi Ordinance deals with the 
circumstances under which family provision- may he ordered 
hy the local court. The deceased must have failed to 
make adequate provision in his will fena surviving wife, 
minor children or children of any age who hy reason of 
some mental or physical disability are incapable of main­
taining themselves • These dependants may then apply to 
the local court, in which a copy of the testator’s will 
has been lodged, for an order that reasonable provision 
he made for their maintenance. Under the section, up 
to two-thirds of the deceased’s property passing under 
his will may he ordered hy the court to he distributed 
among the dependants in accordance with the provisions of 
the Ordinance governing intestacy.
1 Ibid. s.6(l}.
2 Ihid. s *6(2).
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It .is to be hoped that this progressive step of the 
Malawi government will be followed by the various govern­
ments within our area of general reference; and that 
legislation will be initiated, without undue delay, modi­
fying the law relating to wills on the topics raised. This 
is today, more than ever before, a field which must be 
looked into as a matter of urgency - and for good reasons. 
Firstly, the increased mobility of the population, some­
times resulting in the virtual break-up of the family as 
known to the African; the rising standard of education 
and general enlightenment of the people; together with the 
effects that these have on the process of the "individuali­
sation" of property, are factors likely to encourage rather 
than discourage the tendency on the pai*t of testators to 
dispose of their estates to the detriment of their families. 
Secondly, the injustice and hardship that may be caused 
to disabled and yet disinherited dependants may well be 
imagined, when it is realised that there is at present 
an almost complete lack of social and welfare services 
catering for such luckless and less privileged members of 
the society.
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Customary Courts: Western Re;;ion of Nigeria 
In the ^arri Divisional Cride *B% Customary Court 
Holden at Kkurede-^arri Saturday the
hth d? torethePresi-
.eyin
(5BC/5E/60: *n re Chief Hyenomuro Fregene: Deceased.
In the matter of application for Certificate of Inheritance 
filed by:
1. Madam Ekunkubo Progene-Sister of deceased
2. Anthony Ogbitse Pragene-2nd 9on of deceased.
3* Alexander Obogu Progene-Nephew of deceased.
1st and 2nd Applisecants only are present.
3rd Applicant is absent.
1st Applicant iworn on matchet states in Itsekiri: My name 
is Ekunkubo Pregene female Adult Itsekiri petty trader resi­
ding at 0gbe-3obo. I am the elder full sister of Eyenomuro 
Pregene male Adult Itsekiri launch transport owner who died 
at Warri on Saturdayr the 28th day of May, I960. At the time
of his death his fixed place of abode was at No. 16 Cinuwa I . x
Road,, v/arrl. The late Eyenomuro Pregene vm) is snrvived by
Enerxpmotsagha (f), Unuarere j(f) Arpielainojgho (f) deceased,
Orac^ (f) Christiana (f) and one other wife whose name I do 
j not nov/ remember. I now remember the name of another wife 
which is Esanjurai (f) who Is deceased. All the wives, except 
Christiana, were married according to native lav/ and custom.
My deceased brother is also survived by fourteen children « 
namely, Orode (f) aged about 32 ycafs, Ejuteme%den (m) 29 
years, CTgbitse (m) 23 yeufcs, Eyeyin (f*) 22 years, Otsemaye(f)
20 years, Mayuhu (f) 19 years, Matemi (f) 18 yeafs, A^hultu- 
tsere (m) 13 years, Oforitselaju (f) 12 yeato, Ayaghanroro 
(f) 6 years, Odemi (f) 7 years, Oritslumewo (m) 3 years, Ornntie 
(f) 3 years and the last born (Odub?) not yet named, only 
8 months old. Matemi lives with her mother, Enerunmotsar*ian,
| the father and mother of‘'deceased diod long before him. 2hkx 
The deceased has no brother living and I am the only the sur­
viving elder sister. I want this Court to grant the second 
son, his nephew Alexander Cbogun Pregewe and me a certificate 
of inheritance to enable us not only to inherit but also to 
administer the estate of my deceased brother according to 
Itsekiri customary law*
Examined by Court: Alexander Obo^un Fregene i3 a son of one 
of the many half - brothers of the deceased, fie first son 
happens at present to be of unsound mlnfi. I include the third 
applicant to represent the interest of the Pregene fsmily- 
that is the family comprising the half brothers and half-hr - 
•' tlfb£<***?£ th I  - .... *...^  1
wy name is Anthony 0gbit3e Pregene male adult Itsekiri Bank 
Clerk employed by B.^T.A.Ltd, warri • All I would like to add 
to the statement of the first applicant is that I agree with 
the reason given for including the third applicant I would like 
Court to consider that point in relation to the interest of the 
beneficiaries of 1he estate and give its decision accdrding to 
the best principles of customary law. The daughter, Aya^ianroro 
(f) lives with first applicant, Odemi, Oritselumewo (f) lives 
with her own mother. The last b o m  (Odubi) also lives with its 
mother.
Ruling: Having heard the evidence of the first and second appli­
cants, I am satisfied that the three applicants before me are, 
having regard to the Interest cf the beneficiaries of the estate 
of the deceased, namely, Syenom ro Fregene late of 16, Oinuwa 
Road, V’arri, and of tire Fregenei^ fi&mily under Itsekiri customary 
law entitled to jinherit and administer the estate of the deceased. 
I therefore order that Certificate of Inheritance do issue to 
them accordingly,
(Sgd) TJ.E.Onuwaje
President, 1/6/60.
At Skurede-'.Varri Wednesday the lhth day of S — 
Before the President Chief Utieyin 2, Onawaie.
1960
T3C/5S/60: In the matter of Eyenomuro Pregene: deceased
In re Certificate of Inheritance granted on 1/ 6 /6 0 to Ekiinkubo 
Pregene (f) and two others (m).
In the matter of notion of Jemigbeyi Pregene and 1| others for 
removal of the second person, son of the deceased, from among 
those to whom Certificate was granted and for appointment of 
another pei?3on in his place.
Applicants are all present.
Respondent, Arithony Ogbitse Prsgene, sought to be removed, is 
also present. Applicants file joint affidavit and respondent 
files Counter-affidavit opposing application.
Note:Both affidavit and counter-afflciwtit read over and inter­
preted to both parties in the Itsekiri language by me.
Order: I can see nothing in the affidavit of the applicants to 
justify removal sought. Application is therefore refused. I make 
no order as to costs.
^ (Sgd) TT.E.Onuwaje
p  f  <3 President, 11/9/60.
It \/L‘ Diivisional 5rtfcTe fB* CiiAtomary Court 
ff-rl* r i. 28/5/63.
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In the Cuutomary Courts of the Aestcrh Region of Nirtria.
In the Central Urhobo Orade ' B* Customary Court before
j£. A. O n o ....  .......................Pres 1 lent.
k.O. O d e c c a ...........................member.
Tuesday > the 29 th lay of Au.ruet, 1961.
inhiri-Uncc to estate of 
■Late Omoko ^re,:bc.
Complainant/Applicant sworn on th^ - holy eible states in
! *
j«V'lish language:*-
I am kacauly Omoko u 
» Lirpgbe; m,
>.A.A. Ltd.,
he eldest son of lateI
a raving Lank Account in
regbe, 1
|:noko iegb y :i late father has
the B.A.  ^arri. 1 air. here' applying to the Court 
fjbr a certificate of Inheritance; as to enable me recover 
the saving from the rank, which 1 have already owned 
through the ri ;ht of inheritance according to native law 
and custom, by the members of our family. The saving 
acco unt is about u21C,
-\2L_4 by court
Yes; I am here with my paternal uncle anu a paternal 
cousin in per ion of Chief Apute uiregbe and Junrttor*
Cvhitmu reBpectivel:, .
C&ijJL Anutu .uir-c-:bc aw-rn on mutchet states in t jhobo. .language?
I am the direct brother of late Chief Cmoko Lire'be of 
uru, and the complainant ij the el test son to him (my late
. h . J \ |
brother) 1^ 0 whom, we the members of our fan|ily havtj 
ajninictered the saving account of the late father now in \ 
the u.m.A. Ltd., Aarri, ana wish th .t a certificate of 
inheritance be given him (complainant) to enable him recover 
the said money.
........ / 2
- 2 -
AA- fcjl ,CQ.UT.1;-
Anre»toro who is also a member of our family new 
present in court was also present durin.* the adr inioti-ation 
of the said estate.
The deceased hod other children comprising of boys 
and rirls.
The conplainant is to u^c the money, if recovered, in 
bringing- ip the youn*: ones left behind by their l ather.
jvriTttoro Ovhiomu called by court to ipu-.at ions and 
he confirmed the statei ent of Chief «.pute <.iret;be.
i
C o u r t s- As per the eviuence adduced before this court 
it could be believed that the complainant (Vacauly 
Omcko «ire^be) is a fit person tp be entitled to 
the Certificate of inheritance which he now applies 
for.
C r d i r i- Application is hereby granted.
(ogd; . .
President. 29/d/el.
(dgdj t'» i d e e  a.
Atarib er • 29/ c/ 61.
1 I
-.0. 2/61. Pursuant to the enquiry held on the c9th
day 01' Au. u t, 1961, and in accordance
with the powers vested on this court
(Central lirhobo irade 'b' uu toi.ary Court*;,A
by C:wjj-K 17 iectior. 3, xart *. of the J»h.
Ca toraary Court's haw 1917, one hr. h.acaulay 
Oncko hire,-be (m) of ^wu Town is h. rety 
declared unaer Cu. tomary haw to inherit the 
I ersonality and reality of the lute ’ ui:,oko
hirejbe' of i*wu Town.
Dated at U.;helli this 29th aay of August,
1961.
(a^d; ot A. cne »
Presi cnt.
Central - rholo »d. Cu t. Court*
Uuhelli.16/-
iSixteen 3hllrs.)
Pees coi euted• o.3. 29/166382 of -9/8/61. 
ia,d; A .A. lisenn.
cL ?•/ :/t * •
c;
Civil, C*s.». NO. 10flU/59
Kphraim Oehonma of Aro mwomasi 
V*
V'orent Oehonma ( m) of -tr^ ntnnwil
£1 : 5/- Copy of 609 words at 2V6d 
per 100, plu3 Inspection fee 7/6d 
Vide OCR 5767 of 10/10/63.
C l 1 m: T o  r l K ' i u p p
in Court. that Plaint iff 
Ip the nevt—of—kin to *) the Uriah
 ^ Oeh '*naia ot' iro Umunma-
'l v >rv ii under ‘.ha .
\ Port. Hareourt before hr 
 ^ rl 1 ed SS a r*»Hlll * of Car 
' accident in the Cener 1
\ Hodpttnl fort Haroourt .
Cmise of 
nK'nt hs
■»ct j on ar i- «*
B0TM ?idTT.-.S Pk KH8Nt  
PI or. Claim admitted by the n*f>n1niit.
Pie nt.jfc Knhrpim Oehonma e / a : -
tly name is Bphra im Oehonma, s native of A m  Umuomasi
• orklru- in P . .7 .1). Port Ilarmurt . T he dorr- sed Uriah
Oehonma is my hroth-r of he same parent.. He h«® m o
nth* r suoeod r>.r son op daughter to inherit hts t.»
or jroperty than myself. He wan vorkln. under the p . .0. 
r or t Hareourt before he died two months nt*o. "’he 
Defendant 1s .Iso 'he h^,t ot’ uir family 1 t oov M,ts «®M->r, 
against hir *o d,e1r»re -n thi r Court that sin t nert-.f-Vln 
to the deoeHped Uriah Oehonrs and jr. ntivr p- n r *>1 . v ' '
brother Obasi Ochonmn » H  also . iv“ evi .nee to confirm my
at st omen• •;.
•vitnesa Obasi Och^naa for fla-ntifl’. a/st-
V v name is 0 b " « ‘ i. chonma, « native of Aro llmuomanl t
I am a contractor r>inc in the ihel 1 Resi irntlsl i r ^  
HmuVoroahe. I.nte lirinh Oehonma ir sue brother. It our 
Cs t IIv , the Plaintiff Is th® only r.sr who in ttie next.-of-f 1 n 
to the dec e a s e d , and he is only entitle- hv Cun' on to inherit 
toe d.-erased nr«>nert v or estate. The h le member >f oit~ 
fnmltv ■. re 1n" favour or Plaintiff's action --a regards to 
his claim t0 proye he Is the next-of-kin to the
Her. - *ed Uriah O c h o p m s .
He iVn l en t  V  incept O c h o n m n  s/at —
My, name is V ncept (ichorma, a nntlv * of «ro . innonai ,
I ond r fa rm er. 1 of the  head jof Ochonm--' a b-*u«e. 1 adv. |* 
the PI® nt ff's clpt , because he is the e r e  el brother f
♦ he s®me parents, nr' *hr p. rt-of-klt * O the deceased.
Plaintiff in the on'y man (r our faml’v .-ho is "ntl' '• to
nherit tne deceased' est.at e and property. He r. al®- entities 
t -> cl®lm anv nanalon, salary or rat llty v.h c» r.rv r- i»i" 
irces«<9d by t'.e p.,.,n. Port, iiarccort . T*!*t from
ftie Plaintiff no ®'h»r m® r or woman 1r our ' • r *y or . 
y.eo pry rttf-ht over the property or e t ■. • e o ’ • -ie dece • 1 
Uriah Oe h o n m a .
Finding by Court
The efendant admits Plaintiff' cj«im In fulU . P r •n 
t Pe evldenoe adlieed by parties before *hin Court, t he bench 
t„ satisfied th«t the Plaintiff is th® next-of-kin to the 
deceased Uriah Oehonma. Therefore Plaintiff 1® entitled t->
,,p h a s e d  e sta t e  and property. He 1f also to claim 
Cr fp the P. .D. Por» Hsrrourt any aalary, . ratu ty, pen j >i 
if any, »n 1 ” -• h.-r death b«neflta lue t ' t he l i r m M
JUDGMENT.
For Plaintiff for £2 Cost.
Plaintiff it* now tHe next-pf-V^ to the deceased 
Uriah Oehonma. tfe ia alfso legaflly «nd naturally 
entitled to the deceased r**operty or estate h1a 
salary fo * the month in which he died, his gratuity 
if any, aid any other benefits due to him before his 
dejath.
j
1. 8igned Chief P. Iroanya
2. Signed Chief W. I. Aka
J. R.T.I. Chief Amadi Okacha
10/9/59
W/M. Signed I. K. Ogundu C.C.
SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY
528
Ajisafe, A.K. 
Allott, A.N.
Basden, G.T.
it
Bradbury, R.E
Cheshire, G.C 
Chubb, L.T. 
Coker, G.B.A. 
Dennett, R.E,
tt
Dicey, A.V.
A. BOOKS
The laws and customs of the Yoruba people, 
Routledge, London, and C.M.S. Bookshop,
Lagos (1921+).
The future of law in Africa: Record of 
proceedings of the London conference, 
December 1959 to January i9 6 0. Butterworths, 
London,
Essays in African law, Butterworths London,
1960.
Judicial and legal systems in Africa. 
Butterworths London, 1962•
Among the Ibos of Nigeria. Sealey Service, 
London, 1921.
Niger Ibos, Sealey Service, London, 1938.
The Benin kingdom and the Edo-speaking 
peoples of south-western Nigeria. Inter­
national African Institute, London, 1957*
Private international law, 6th edn.,
Oxford University Press, 1961.
Ibo land tenure. Ibadan University Press,
1961.
Family property among the Yorubas. Sweet & 
Maxwell, London, 1958.
At the back of the black man’s mind. 
Macmillan, London, 1906.
Nigerian studies, the religious and poli­
tical system of the Yoruba. Macmillan, 
London, 1910.
Conflict of laws, 7th edn. Stevens, London, 
1956.
529
Eastern Nigeria 
Government Printer
Egharevba, J.U.
n
Elias, T.O.
tt
ft
tf
Forde, D.
i t
Forde D. and 
Jones G.I.
Forde D • and 
Scott, R.
Graveson, R.H. 
G-reen, M.M.
tt
Halsbury, Lord
tt
Report of the Committee on bride 
price. Government Printer, Enugu,1955.
Benin law and custom, 3rd. edn. Author, 
Benin, 1949•
A short history of Benin, 3rd edn. 
Ibadan University Press, i9 6 0.
Groundwork of Nigerian law. Routledge 
& Kegan Paul, London, 1953.
Nigerian land law and custom, 3rd edn. 
Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1962.
The nature of African customary law. 
Manchester University Press, 1956.
The Nigerian legal system. Routledge 
& Kegan Paul, London, 1962.
Marriage and the family among the Yak8 
in south-eastern Nigeria. Percy Lund, 
Humphries, London, 1941.
Yaktf studies. Oxford University Press, 
1964.
The Ibo and Ibibio-speaking peoples of 
south-eastern Nigeria. International 
African Institute, London, 1950.
The native ecohomies of Nigeria. Faber, 
London, 1946.
The conflict of laws, 4th edn. Sweet & 
Maxwell, London, i9 6 0.
Land tenure in an Ibo village. Percy 
Lund, Humphries, London, 1941.
Ibo village affairs, 1st edn., Sidgwick 
& Jackson, London, 1947.
Laws of England, 1st edn., vol. 11. 
Butterworths, London, 1910.
Lav/s of England, 3rd edn., vol.l6. 
Butterworths, London, 1956.
Jarman, T.
Jones, G.I.
Jones, G.I. and 
Forde, D.
Kingsley, M.H.
Leith-Ross, S.
Lloyd, P.C.
Lucas, J.O.
Lugard, Sir F.J.D.
Meek, C.K.
t*
Moore, W.A. 
Nwabueze, B.O.
Obi, S.N.C.
Okojie, C.G. 
Ollennu, N.A. 
Omoneukanrin, C.O.
530
A treatise on wills, 8th edn., Sweet 
& Maxwell, London, 1951.
The trading states of the Oil Rivers• 
Oxford University Press, 1963.
The Ibo and Ibibio-speaking peoples of 
south-eastern Nigeria. International 
African Institute, London, 1950.
West African studies. Macmillan,
New York, 1899.
African women: A study of the Ibo of
Nigeria. Faber, London, 1938.
Yoruba land law. Oxford University 
Press, 1962.
The religion of the Yorubas. C.M.S. 
Bookshop, Lagos, 1948.
The dual mandate in British Tropical 
Africa. William Blackwood, London,1926.
Law and authority in a Nigerian tribe. 
Oxford University Press, 1937.
Land tenure and land administration in 
Nigeria and the Cameroons. H.M.S.0.1957•
History of Itsekiri. Arthur H. Stockwell, 
London, 1930.
The machinery of justice in Nigeria. 
Butterworths, London, 1 9 6 3.
The Ibo law of property, Butterworths, 
London, 1963.
Ishan native laws and customs. Author, 
Ishan Division, i9 6 0.
The law of succession in Ghana. 
Presbyterian Book Depot, Accra, i9 6 0 •
Itsekiri law and custom. Author,
Warri, 1942.
531
Park, A.E
Parry, D.] 
Price, H.] 
Roth, H.L 
Rowling, i
Talbot, P
»t
Theobald, 
Thomas, N
Ward, Rev
,W. The sources of Nigerian law. African
Universities Press, Lagos, and Sweet & 
Maxwell, London, 1963•
[. The law of succession, 4 th edn. Sweet &
Maxwell, London, 1961.
i. Ward Land tenure in the Yoruba Provinces,
19339 Government Printer, Lagos, 1939.
► Great Benin: its customs, art and
horrors. P. King & Sons, Halifax, 1903.
3.W. Notes on land tenure in Benin, Kukuruku,
Ishan and Asaba Divisions of Benin 
Province. Government Printer, Lagos,1948.
,A. The peoples of southern Nigeria, vols I
and III. Oxford University Press, 1926.
Tribes of the Niger Delta. The Sheldon 
Press, London, 1932.
Sir H.S. Theobald on wills, 12th edn. Stevens,
London, 1 9 6 3 .
»W. Anthropological report on the Edo-
speaking peoples of Nigeria - pt. 1:
law and custom. Harrison & Sons, London,
1910.
Anthropological report on Ibo-speaking 
peoples of Nigeria - pt IV: law and 
custom of the Ibo of the Asaba district, 
southern Nigeria. Harrison & Sons, 
London, 1914•
. E. Marriage among the Yoruba. The Catholic
University of America Anthropological 
Series, No.4» Washington, D.C., 1937.
The Yoruba husband-wife code• The 
Catholic University of America Anthro­
pological Series, No.6; Washington D.C. 
1938.
532
Williams, 
Williams,
Sir E.V. Law of executors and administrators,
vol.l, lhth edn, Stevens, London, i960•
W •J • The law relating to wills, 3rd edn.,
Butterworths London, 1952.
Adam,. L.
Allen, H.A., 
Allott, A.N.
tf
Anon.
Ardener, E»W.
tt
Arikpo, 0. 
Atilade, P.A.
Beier, H.U.
tt
Bowen, R.L.
tt
Bradbury, R.E. 
Butcher, H.L.M 
Daniels, W.C.E
533
B. ARTICLES '
Inheritance in primitive cultures 
(1934-5) X I0WAL.R.762.
The Jekris [i.e. Itsekiri! (1949) West 
African Rev. 757.
Marriage and internal conflict of laws 
in Ghana [1958] J.A.L.164.
Towards a definition of ’absolute 
ownership ’ [l96l] J .A.L .99.
Notes on the form of the Bini government 
(1904) 4 Man 50.
The kinship terminology of a group of 
wouthern Ibo (1954) 24 Afr. 85.
Lineage and locality among the Mba-Ise 
Ibo (1959) 29 Afr. 113.
The future of bride price (1955) No.2108 
West Africa,;, October 29th, 19559 1017.
Is there one Nigerian domicile or dif­
ferent regional domiciles in regard to 
divorce? (1 9 6 4) V Nigerian Bar Journal 
56.
Yoruba enclave (1956) 58 Nigeria 238.
The dancers of Agbor (1959) 7 Odu 41.
The Olu of Itsekiris (1944) 22 Nigeria 62.
Obi Oputa of Aboh (1944) 22 Nigeria 6 4 .
Some aspects of the political organi­
sation of the Benin kingdom (1952)
W.A.I .S-.E.R. annual conf. proceedings 50.
Some aspects of the otu system of the 
Isa sub-tribes of the Edo people (1935)
8 Afr. 149.
Some principles of the law of trusts 
in West Africa Q.962J J.A.L. 164.
Durand, P.P.
Esenwa, F.E.
Glanville, R 
Roth, F.N.
Harris, J.S.
Hubbard, J.W 
Jeffreys, M.j
Jones, G.I. 
Kayamba, II.M
Lloyd, P.O.
!f
tt
If
tt
Loveridge, A 
Matson, J.N.
534
New provisions for the making of wills 
and inheritance^ by intestate succession 
in Malawi [1964] J.A.L. 109.
Marriage customs in Asaba Division 
(1948) 13 Nigerian Field 71.
K. and Notes on the Jekris CltsekiriJ , Sobos 
[Urhobo} and Ijos [jaavfjof the Warri 
district of.the Niger Coast Protecto­
rate (1898-9) 28 J.R.A.I 104.
Some aspects of the economics of sixteen 
Ibo individuals (1944) 14 Afr. 302.
The Isoko country (1931) 77 Geog.J.110.
).W* Lobola [bride plaice] is child-price
(1951) 10 Afr. Stud.(Johannesburg) 145*
Ibo land tenure (1949) 19 Afr. 309.
,T. The modern life of the East African
native (1932) 5 Afr. 50.
Some notes on the Yoruba rules of 
succession and on ’family property’ 
, [1959] J.A.L.7.
Family property among the Yoruba [19591 
 J.A.L.105.
The Yoruba lineage (1955) 25 Afr. 235.
Sacred kingship and government among 
the Yoruba (i9 6 0) 30 Afr. 221.
Tribalism in Warri (1956) W.A.I.S.E.R. 
annual conf. proceedings 99.
J-. Wills and the customary law in the Gold
Coast [1950] 2 J.A.A., No.4 (0ctober)24.
Testate succession in Ashanti (1953)
23 Afr. 224.
Molajo, E.A. 
Otteriberg, S .
Partridge, C. 
Roth, H.L. 
Rumann, W.B. 
Salubi, T.E.A.
Schwab, W.B. 
SpOrndli, J • 
Temietan, S.O.
Thomas, N .W.
Welch, J.W. 
Williamson, K*
535
The Nigerian married woman and the law 
(1957) I Nigerian Bar Journal 23.
Double descent in an Ibo village-group 
(1956), Fifth International Congress of 
Anthropological and Ethnological Sciences 
473; University of Pennsylva nia Press, 
Philadelphia.
Native law and custom in Egbaland (1911)
10 J.A.S.422.
Notes on Benin customs (1898) 11 Inter­
nationales Archiv Fttr Ethnographie 235#
Funeral ceremonies for the late ex-Oba 
of Benin (1914) 14 J.A.S.3 5 .
The establishment of British admini­
stration in the Urhobo country (1958)
1 Journal of the Hist. Soc. 9^ Nigeria
184.
The terminology of kinship and marriage 
among the Yoruba (1958) 28 Afr. 352.
Marriage customs among the Ibos (1942-5)
37 Anthropos 113.
Marriage among the Jekri [itsekiri! 
tribes as contrasted with that amongst’'the 
Hausa tribes (1938) 13 Nigeria 75.
Marriage and legal customs of the Edo- 
speaking peoples of Nigeria (1910) 11 
J. Comp. Leg. (N.S.) 94.
Edo-speaking.peoples of southern Nigeria 
(1910) 10 J.A.S.l.
Some Ibo burial customs (1917) 47 J.R.A.
I. 163.
Notes on Edo burial customs (1920) 50 
J.R.A.I. 377.
An African tribe in transition (l93l)
20 Inter. Rev. of Missions 556.
Changes in the marriage system of the 
Okrilca Ijo (1 9 62) 32 Afr. 53.
